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This thesis investigates the effect of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on 
employee job attitudes and behaviours by taking into account the critical role of participation 
in decision making. The data were obtained from a large British retail organization operating 
profit sharing (PS) and save-as-you-earn (SAYE) schemes. This is a quantitative study in 
which the data were gathered through a questionnaire. The unit of analysis is the individuals 
who responded to the survey, and the study is cross-sectional. To analyse the data a variety of 
statistical techniques, namely frequency, Pearson correlation, partial correlation, t-test, chi-. 
square (X2), reliability, multiple regression, hierarchical regression, and path analyses, were 
conducted using SPSS. The sample comprised 1,000 employees subdivided into groups of 
managerial and non-managerial employees, and participants in schemes and non-participants in 
schemes. The administration of the questionnaire resulted in 450 returns (430 usable), an 
overall response rate of 45%. 
This study addresses four main research questions: (1) What are the effects of profit sharing 
and employee share ownership schemes (financial participation) on the job attitudes of 
individual employees in a large organization? (2) What are the effects of participation in 
decision making on employee job attitudes in a large organization? (3) What are the relative 
effects of financial participation in comparison to the effects of individual participation in 
decisions? (4) Does the combination of financial participation and participation in decision 
making produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes than does participation in 
decision making on its own? The aim of this study was to construct a more advanced model of 
profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes by reviewing the theoretical and 
empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, those developed by Long (1978) 
and Florkowski (1989). 
After reviewing the employee participation literature and testing Long's and Florkowski's 
models, it was found that both financial participation and participation in decision making have 
separate effects on employee job attitudes and behaviours, even if financial participation has a 
small (not statistically significant) impact on some attitudes and behaviours. Since financial 
participation shows a negligible effect on some job attitudes, and participation in decision 
making has a stronger effect on job attitudes than has financial participation, the new model is 
constructed on the assumption that both (a) the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making and (b) participation in decision making produce favourable 
effects on employee job attitudes, such as integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, 
motivation, perceived pay equity, and perceived performance-reward contingencies. The test of 
the new model shows that both (a) the combination of fmancial participation and participation 
in decision making and (b) participation in decision making produce favourable effects on 
employee job attitudes and behaviours, but the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making does not produce more favourable effects on employee job 
attitudes than does participation in decision making on its own. 
It should be noted that it is not known in this research whether financial participation changed 
employees' actual influence in decision making, as the study did not collect any data on this 
question. Therefore, there is the possibility that if the same study were conducted in 
organizations with financial participation schemes which increase employees' influence in 
decision making, the effect of the combination of financial participation and participation in 
decision making might be found to be stronger than that reported in this dissertation. 
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1.1. The Nature and Importance of the Problem 
Although financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes) is 
not a new phenomenon or an innovation in the UK (Greenhill, 1990; Hanson, 1986; IDS 
Study 641, 1998; Wilson, 1992), in the US (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Coates, 1991; 
Engen, 1967) and in other countries (for example, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Israel, and Japan) (Estrin, 
Perotin, Robinson, and Wilson, 1997; Onaran, 1992), it has currently become more 
commonplace (Estrin et a!., 1997; Long, 1996). The number of organizations using financial 
participation schemes has been increasing continuously in such countries (Miliward, Stevens, 
Smart, and Hawes, 1992; Wilson, 1992; Baker et al., 1988; Blasi and Kruse, 1991; Coates, 
1991), and this is regarded as a potential explanation for the increasing interest in the 
relationship between financial participation and employee job attitudes in the recent 
management literature. According to an OECD (the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) study conducted in Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and the United States, between 6% and 27% of workers enjoy a slice of the 
profits (The Economist, 1996). 
According to Estrin et al. (1997) profit sharing schemes are widespread, and "in many 
countries, the number of schemes has recently grown fast, after stagnating for several 
decades" (p.28). Estrin and his colleagues categorise countries into three groups by incidence 
of profit sharing schemes. In the first category are countries where the incidence of profit 
sharing is very high (at least 15% of employees covered by a scheme). This group contains 
Japan, Mexico and France. In the second group are countries where the incidence of profit 
sharing is relatively high (at least 5% of employees covered). This group includes Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, New 
Zealand, and possibly Italy. In the third group the countries are known to have a number of 
profit sharing schemes, but less than 5% of employees are covered. This group contains 
1 
Australia, Ireland, and Belgium with the possible addition of Switzerland. In several countries 
(e.g., France, the UK, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the US, Canada, Belgium, and Italy) the 
number of profit sharing schemes and employees covered has grown, sometimes quite 
dramatically, in the last two decades. 
In July 1996, the Employee Benefit Plan Review published the report of the National Center 
for Employee Ownership (NCEO). According to figures from the NCEO, most enterprises 
with more than 200 employees have been sold primarily to their workforces, with an average 
of non-management employee ownership ranging from 55% to 65% of a company in Russia. 
However, the NCEO states that if legal changes are not made to limit the sale of individually 
held stock, many employee-owned enterprises are likely to be sold in whole or in part to 
investors or other companies in the future in this country (Employee Benefit Plan Review, 
1996). The NCEO also reports that in China many local governments have sold off most of 
their enterprises to employees, and the central government is willing to introduce employee 
ownership on a large scale. According to the NCEO, most Eastern European Countries and 
former Soviet Republics have in place provisions to stimulate at least minority employee 
ownership in privatized enterprises, and hundreds of enterprises have become majority 
employee-owned in countries including Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland. These developments 
made employee ownership a common topic of discussion in all circles, not only amongst 
academics (Los Angeles Times, 1 989a, b; Washington Post, 1990; Wall Street Journal, 1991 a, 
b). 
Financial participation schemes have been growing continuously over the last two decades in 
Britain (IDS Study 641, 1998; Smith, 1993; Richardson and Nejad, 1986) and according to 
Dunn, Richardson, and Dewe (1991) have been one of the more widely used institutional 
innovations in human resources. 
Employee share ownership has long been claimed to have a substantial effect on employee 
job attitudes and behaviours, and therefore on organizational performance (e.g. Lloyd, 1898; 
Williams, 1913; Holyoake, 1906; James et al. 1926). It is argued that when employees are 
owners, they can think and act like owners (Pfeffer, 1998). Moreover, conflict between labour 
and capital can be reduced by linking them through employee ownership. Most of those 
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advocating profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes do so on the basis of a 
three-part argument about the impacts of share schemes (Pendleton, Wilson, and Wright, 
1998). It is argued that, first, employee ownership will create more 'favourable' attitudes 
towards the company, including integration (Blasi, 1980; Hammer and Stern, 1980; Lawler, 
1977; Long, 1978; Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Webb, 
1912; Whyte, 1978), involvement (Aitken and Wood, 1989; Heller, 1984; Long, 1978; Poole 
and Jenkins, 1991), and commitment (Aitken and Wood, 1989; Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, 
Leopold, and Ramsay, 1987; Buchko, 1993; Florkowski, 1989; French, 1987; Hammer, 
Stern, and Gurdon, 1982; Klein, 1987; Long, 1978; Mitchell, Levin, and Lawler, 1990; 
Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Smith, Lazarus, and 
Kalkstein, 1990). This in turn will result in changes in behaviours that support the 
organization, such as performance-reward contingencies (Florkowski, 1989; Long, 1978; 
Rhodes and Steers, 1981), pay equity (Florkowski, 1989), and lower turnover, decreased 
absenteeism, and fewer grievances (Long, 1978, 1978a). These changes in individual 
behaviour will lead to improved organizational performance, as measured by productivity and 
profitability. So far researchers have rarely attempted to test this three-part argument in full, 
as there are some conceptual and methodological difficulties with doing so. Instead, they 
have concentrated on investigating relationships between two of the stages, on the assumption 
that the other stage works more or less as argued (Pendleton et al., 1998). While some 
researchers have investigated the relationship between share ownership and organizational 
performance (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Bloom, 1985; Brooks, Henry, and 
Livingston, 1982; Conte and Tannenbaum, 1977; Cottham, 1991; Estrin and Wilson, 1986; 
Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986; General Accounting Office, 1987; Hanson and Watson, 1990; Jones 
and Kato, 1993a, 1993b; Kruse, 1988; Park and Rosen, 1990), others have concentrated on 
the first of the three stages, concerning the links between share ownership and employee 
attitudes. This research will also focus on this first stage. 
Research on employee share ownership has generally supported the contention that it has a 
positive impact on employee attitudes and behaviours (e.g. Long 1978a, 1978b; Tucker, Nock 
and Toscano, 1989). The results of other studies, however, do not support this ownership-
attitude relationship (e.g. Hammer and Stem, 1980; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Hammer, 
Landau, and Stem, 1981; Long, 1981; Sockell, 1985). The UK literature on employee share 
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ownership has also provided mixed evidence of attitudinal change (Marchington, Wilkinson, 
Ackers, and Goodman, 1994). While some researchers (such as Bell and Hanson, 1987, and 
Poole and Jenkins, 1990) have reported extensive attitudinal change among employees in 
companies with employee share ownership schemes, others (e.g., Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, 
Leopold, and Ramsay, 1989; Dunn, Richardson, and Dewe, 1991) reported few, if any, 
pronounced differences in attitudes toward working for the company between employee 
shareholders and others. Other studies in the UK (e.g., Allen, Cunningham, and McArdle, 
1991; Pendleton, 1992b; Poole, 1988; Wilkinson, Ackers, and Goodman, 1994) reported that, 
although employees were broadly supportive of the principle of employee share ownership 
schemes, they were skeptical about such schemes' effect on their attitudes and working lives. 
Therefore, it can be said that the existing literature on profit sharing and employee share 
ownership provides mixed evidence of attitudinal change. For Buchko (1992a) perhaps more 
significant differences in research findings, from the perspective of developing and testing 
theories of employee share ownership, may be due to the lack of a unified theoretical 
framework to guide research. Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (1991) also stated that one 
reason for the mixed results has been the underdeveloped state of conceptual models to guide 
research and analysis. The majority of reported empirical studies rarely offer a well-
developed theoretical explication of the process through which employee ownership affects 
job attitudes and behaviours. The approach in this study was to construct a more advanced 
model of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes by empirically testing and 
extending Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) models. The new model was constructed 
on the assumption that both (a) the combination of financial participation and participation in 
decision making and (b) participation in decision making produce favourable effects on 
employee job attitudes, such as integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, 
motivation, perceived pay equity, and perceived performance-reward contingencies than does 
financial participation alone. 
A 1995 report by the OECD, reviewing the published studies from nine of the 25 OECD 
countries (namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UK 
and the USA) indicated that profit sharing arrangements are most common in large 
companies (cited in IRS Employment Review 596, 1995). In their study of British companies, 
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Poole and Jenkins (1998) found that most profit sharing schemes are more likely to be present 
in larger firms. Although financial participation schemes (e.g., profit sharing and employee 
share ownership schemes) are most common in large companies, most empirical studies have 
been conducted in small and medium size companies. Therefore, how far the research on 
small and medium size companies generalizes to large organizations is not well known. The 
effect of financial participation may be higher in small companies than in a large 
organization, where any one individual may be perceived to have a comparatively small 
effect on corporate performance. This research investigates the effect of financial 
participation on employee job attitudes in a large organization. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to contribute to the current state of knowledge about 
the effects of financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes) 
on employee job attitudes and behaviours. The specific objective of this thesis is to develop a 
more advanced model of the attitudinal effects of financial participation and participation in 
decision making and then to test the new research model in a large British organization which 
operates two all-employee share ownership schemes together: approved employee profit 
sharing and a Save-as-you-earn (SAYE) scheme. 
The central premise of this study is that both financial participation and participation in 
decision making may have independent effects on job attitudes, and the combination of these 
two would produce a stronger effect than would financial participation on its own. 
To be more specific, this investigation will focus on exploration of four main research 
questions: 
1. What are the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes (financial 
participation) on the job attitudes of individual employees in a large organization? 
2. What are the effects of participation in decision making on employee job attitudes in a 
large organization? 
3. What are the relative effects of financial participation in comparison to the effects of 
individual participation in decisions? 
5 
4. Does the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making 
produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes than does participation in decision 
making on its own? 
1.3. Overview of Research Design 
A quantitative study was carried out to explore these questions. The organization used as the 
subject of the research was one of Britain's largest and well-known multiple food retailers, 
having over 160,000 UK employees. The company operates two all-employee share 
ownership schemes together: approved profit sharing and SAYE schemes. In order to explore 
the effects of financial participation and participation in decision making on employee job 
attitudes, the data were gathered by questionnaire. 
Before constructing the new research model, Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) models 
were tested. In order to investigate the effects of financial participation on employee job 
attitudes, Long's (1978) theoretical framework was tested. Long's theoretical framework was 
chosen because it is regarded as the pioneering work in the area (Keef, 1994). Despite the fact 
that Long's model is frequently mentioned in the literature and serves as a major 
underpinning for much of the thought on employee ownership (e.g., Keef, 1998; Klein, 1987; 
Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1988; Tannenbaum, 1983), surprisingly "it has never 
received adequate empirical testing" (Long, 1989, p.12), recent work, for example by Keef 
(1998), tested only part of Long's model. The results of the replication study of Long's 
(1978) model was that financial participation has significant effects on some job attitudes, 
such as commitment and satisfaction, but it has only a small effect on other job attitudes, such 
as integration, involvement, and motivation. Participation in decision making has significant 
effects on most job attitudes, and it has stronger effects than financial participation. A small 
interaction effect was found between financial participation and participation in decision 
making for job attitudes. In the light of these findings and suggestions from several 
researchers (e.g., Ben-Ncr and Jones, 1992; Ben-Ncr, Han, and Jones, 1996; Cooke, 1994; 
Doucouliagos, 1995; Jones, 1995, 1997; Jones and Kato, 1993; Jones and Pliskin, 1991; 
Kunkel and Lau, 1995; Levine, 1995; Levine and Tyson, 1990; Long, 1996; Margulies and 
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Black, 1987; Moss, 1991; Rosen, 1983), the new research model assumed that favourable 
effects are more likely if financial participation and participation in decision making are 
combined. As participation in decision making was positively and significantly related to 
most job attitudes, apart from the combination of financial participation and participation in 
decision making, participation in decision making alone was regarded as a second main 
independent variable. 
Pendleton et al. (1998) mentioned that it is assumed in the design of many studies that any 
relationship between employee share ownership and job attitudes will be straightforward and 
direct even though most authors (e.g., Buchko, 1993; Klein and Hall, 1988; Pierce et al., 
1991; Rhodes and Steers, 1981) identify several intervening variables between the presence 
of share ownership and employee commitment. This assumption was tested by using 
Florkowski's (1989) theoretical framework. In the light of the findings of the replication of 
the Florkowski study, with the new research model it is assumed that employee participation 
and participation in decision making will affect employee job attitudes if it affects certain 
intervening variables such as perceptions of pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, 
support for profit sharing (PS), support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes. 
Based on variables identified by the Long and Florkowski models and the new research 
model, a comprehensive questionnaire was developed and administrated to 1,000 employees 
in October 1997. In addition to measuring the dependent variables of this study, the 
questionnaire sought information pertaining specifically to the respondents' opinion of the 
situation in the organization and to the background of each respondent. These data were 
analysed using a variety of statistical procedures. Examination of the company reports were 
undertaken in order to collect background information about the company. The information 
about the company's profit sharing and SAYE schemes were provided by the company. 
On the basis of the data, some causal inference will be attempted. However, because of the 
nature of the design and methodology used here, strong causal inferences cannot be made. 
The major purpose of this thesis remains the evaluation of the plausibility of the relationships 
posited by the new research model, and the exploration of the dynamic effects of the 
combination of financial participation and participation in decision making, and of 
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participation in decision making alone on employee job attitudes and behaviours in a large 
organization. 
1.4. Outline of Thesis 
This introductory chapter has outlined the rationale underlying this study. The remainder of 
the thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter Two analyses the historical development of profit sharing and employee share 
ownership schemes. In the first part of the chapter the historical development of the schemes 
in the USA, and in the second part the historical development of the schemes in the UK is 
evaluated. 
In Chapter Three, a theoretical review of the literature is presented. The theoretical review 
examines the topics which look at the macroeconomic and microeconomic effects (including 
the attitudinal effect) of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the employment/inflation, productivity, general performance, 
and attitudinal (integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, participation in decision 
making) effects of employee share ownership schemes are reviewed. A review of the 
theoretical literature on the relationship between employee participation in decision making 
and organizational effectiveness is also presented. 
In Chapter Four, a review of the empirical literature is presented. This chapter reviews those 
previous studies which examined the effects of profit sharing and employee ownership 
schemes on the effectiveness of the organization, the attitudes and behaviours of the 
employees, and other outcomes. In the first section of this chapter, the studies examining the 
macro- and microeconomic effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes 
are reviewed. In the second section, studies examining the attitudinal and behavioural effects 
of the schemes are reviewed. 
Chapter Five reviews the concept and practice of profit sharing and employee share 
ownership schemes in UK organizations. There are four sub-categories of share ownership in 
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the UK: profit sharing (including four types of profit sharing: cash, share, approved deferred 
share trust, and mixed scheme), save-as-you-earn (SAYE), discretionary (executive) share 
option schemes, and employee share ownership plans (ESOPs). All of these sub-categories 
are described under separate headings in the chapter. 
Chapter Six describes the research methodology used to test Long's (1978) and Florkowski's 
(1989) models, and the new theoretical framework created for this study. This chapter 
consists of two parts. In the first part, the new research model is explained in the light of 
theoretical and empirical literature on profit sharing and employee ownership schemes, and 
the findings of the replication of Long's and Florkowski's studies. In the second part, the 
general research strategy, data collection procedures, sample of respondents, variable 
measures, and analytic procedures are described. 
Chapter Seven discusses the limitations of the research methodology. Following the 
definition of 'methodology' and 'method', and the explanation of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, this chapter explains the limitations of quantitative methodology in general 
terms, and the data collection method (questionnaire) in specific terms. 
Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten present the results of the data analysis. Chapter Eight presents 
the results of the replication of Long's study. This chapter attempts to find out the effects of 
(a) financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes) and (b) 
participation in decision making on employee job attitudes and behaviours, and on 
organization attributes in a large organization. The chapter, first, reports employees' opinions 
on the level of employee participation in decision making in the organization. Second, 
employees' current job attitudes and their assessment of current organization attributes are 
summarized. Finally, the independent and the interaction effects of fmancial participation and 
participation in decision making are analysed. 
Chapter Nine presents the results of the replication of Florkowski' s (1989) theoretical 
framework. In this chapter, the attitudinal relationships hypothesized by Florkowski are 
evaluated by using the same methods of statistical analysis which Florkowski used in his 
study. After explaining how support for profit sharing could be created in organizations, this 
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chapter investigates the relationship between support for profit sharing and organizational 
commitment. 
Chapter Ten presents the results of the test of the model developed for this study. This 
chapter attempts to find out the separate and combined effects of financial participation and 
participation in decision making on employee job attitudes and other perceptions. 
Chapter Eleven discusses the findings of the replication of (a) Long's theoretical framework 
and (b) Florkowski's theoretical framework. The chapter then discusses the results of the test 
of the new research model. The chapter also attempts to draw summary conclusions. The 
question of "how this research advances the Long's and Florkowski's models" is answered. 




THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP IN THE USA AND UK 
In this chapter, the development of profit sharing (PS), employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs), and other forms of employee share ownership schemes, such as save-as-you-earn 
(SAYE) schemes in the USA and in the UK will be analyzed. The aim of the chapter is to 
derive several benefits from this analysis. First, one can better understand why the schemes 
have become increasingly popular in these countries. Second, one can realize that the 
American and British governments have played an active role in encouraging some forms of 
employee share ownership schemes. They have created tax incentives to promote the 
voluntary adoption of certain kinds of schemes. Third, as the research will test two theoretical 
models from US research, this chapter will provide brief information about the types of plans 
in the US. These are the main points of the chapter. Moreover, although there has been more 
interest in the schemes in the US and in the UK in the past few years than even before, no up-
to-date and comprehensive study on the development of the schemes has been available. This 
chapter is intended to partially fill that gap. 
2.1. Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the USA 
In this section, the development of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes, 
such as ESOPs and employee savings plans (ESPs), in the USA will be analyzed. 
2.1.1. Profit Sharing in the USA 
Profit sharing plans, perhaps most common incentive plans, allow employees to share in the 
revenue they helped create (Flannery, Hofrichter, and Platten, 1996; Tudor, Trumble, and 
Flowers, 1996). Here, the historical development of this most common of incentive plans will 
be analyzed. Then, the types of profit sharing plans in the USA will be explained. 
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The Historical Development of Profit Sharing in the USA 
Profit sharing as a form of employee compensation has a fairly long history and has become 
increasingly popular in the United States (Engen, 1967; Flannery, Hofrichter, and Platen, 
1996; Fosbre, 1989; Kim, 1996; Long, 1996; Russell, 1988; Sayles and Strauss, 1981; 
Thomas and Olson, 1988; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Coates, 1991). Over the years, 
many thousands of American organizations used profit sharing plans (Poland, 1996). 
Historical development of profit sharing pians in the USA will be analyzed in terms of three 
periods: prior to World War II, World War II, post World War II. 
Prior to World War II: Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury under Presidents Jefferson 
and Madison, has been identified as the establisher of America's first profit sharing plan, 
introduced in 1797 at his glassworks in New Geneva, Pennsylvania (Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 1939; Metzger, 1966; Reilly, 1978; Latta, 1979; 
Peny and Kegley, 1990; Coates, 1991; Kruse, 1993; Long, 1996). Gallatin regarded profit 
sharing as an extension of democracy to industry. He believed that "the democratic principle 
on which this nation was founded should not be restricted to the political process but should 
be applied to the industrial operation as well" (cited in Klein and Rosen, 1986, p.38'7). The 
first profit sharing plan in America, at Gallatin's glassworks, was a cash profit sharing plan, 
like many early plans (Coates, 1991). Although this first plan was successful, profit sharing 
really started to expand in the final decades of the nineteenth century (Latta, 1979; Perry and 
Kegley, 1990; Coates, 1991). 
The source of some of the early profit sharing proposals was primarily religious (Latta, 1979; 
Perry and Kegley, 1990). A group of Protestant clergy regarded profit sharing as a possible 
remedy to some of the social problems that accompanied industrialization. Nicholas Paine 
Oilman, the most influential member of this group and a leader in the pre-1900 profit sharing 
movement (Helbum, 1971), documented 34 profit sharing plans in 1899 (Latta, 1979; Perry 
and Kegley, 1990; Kruse, 1993). He wrote, in his book Profit Sharing Between Employer and 
Employee, that: 
Profit sharing, the division of realized profits between the capitalist, the employer and the 
employee, in addition to regular interest, salary, and wages, is the most equitable and 
generally satisfactory method of remunerating the three industrial agents (Gilman, 1889, 
p.412). 
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Profit sharing advances the prosperity of an establishment by increasing the quantity of the 
product, by improving its quality, by promoting care of implements and economy of 
materials, and by diminishing labor difficulties and the cost of superintendence (p.416). 
In the 1 800s, profit sharing was supported by prominent scholars, such as Charles Babbage, 
John Stuart Mill, and Stanley Jevons (Kruse, 1993). Although much of this early 
development of profit sharing plans was supported by those outside of industry itself, Colonel 
William Cooper Procter was an exception. He introduced profit sharing at the Procter & 
Gamble Company, in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1887 (Monroe, 1896; Metzger, 1966). Lief (1958) 
stated that: 
One problem that American industry had not bothered much about, except in time of strike, 
was factory personnel. Labor was simply a servant, to be kept in its place. A few employers 
thought otherwise. To them the spirit of factory workers and their well-being were at the heart 
of success in production. How to cultivate the concept that the interests of employees and 
employers were identical, in the face of the rising issue of capital versus labor, was a grave 
concern. At P & G the door to new ideas was open, and young William Cooper Procter 
stepped in with a profit-sharing plan. (Cited in Metzger, 1966, p.5.) 
In 1903, under the profit sharing plan, net profits were divided between the company and its 
employees "through the transfer of stock to them" (Foerster and Dietel, 1927, p.6). A semi-
annual cash dividend was paid to each employee according to the ratio of his wage to total 
wages. Procter assumed that profit sharing would increase employee involvement in the 
company and improve efficiency (Perry and Kegley, 1990, p.30). 
During the early years of the twentieth century, profit sharing plans gained a renewed interest 
because of the spread of worker unrest. The National Civic Federation and other 
organizations regarded profit sharing as a means of lessening labour problems. In the early 
1 900s, many employers believed that if they shared company profits with their employees, 
the employees would work toward the same goal of improving company performance. They 
suggested profit sharing as a means of discouraging unionization (Coates, 1991). At the same 
time, the trade unions did not support the idea of profit sharing. In 1916, Samuel Gompers, 
the American Federation of Labor's first president, said of profit sharing: 
This proposition has never been seriously considered by the organizations of labor. I desire to 
say further that it has come under my observation that some employers who have inaugurated 
systems of so-called profit sharing have pared down the wages of their employees so that the 
combined sharing of profits and their wages did not equal the wages of employees in other 
companies in the same line of industry. What we are especially interested in more than profit 
sharing is a fair living wage, reasonable hours and fair conditions of employment. (Cited in 
Perry and Kegley, 1990, p.31.) 
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However, some of the earliest best-known profit sharing plans that are still in successful 
operation today were introduced between 1910 and 1920. George Eastman established a 
profit sharing plan at the Eastman Kodak Company in 1912 "to give Eastman Kodak people a 
very tangible expression of the company's faith in them" (Metzger, 1966, p.5). W. Harris, 
president of the Harris Trust and Savings Bank, introduced the Harris Employees' Savings 
and Profit Sharing Fund in January 1916. The plan was designed to stimulate systematic 
savings among employees and to help them to provide for their financial security through 
sharing with them the profits of the bank. After Mrs. Joseph T. Bowen, a stockholder, 
proposed in a letter to Jullius Rosenwald, president of Sears, "... that some distribution of the 
profit sharing would not only tend to better the feeling between employer and employed, but 
would redound to the interests of the company..." (Metzger, 1966, p.5), on July 1, 1916, Sears 
Roebuck & Company introduced a deferred profit sharing plan for its employees. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., introduced a profit sharing plan in 1917. Mr. H.F. Johnson, chairman, 
stated that: 
Profit sharing is not a theory, it is a practice. Its basis is profitable operation. It is not 
paternalism. It is an honest, sincere and successful means of stimulating the individual to 
outstanding performance and teamwork along sound economic lines (cited inMetzger, 1966, 
p.5.) 
In the United States, during the stock market boom in the 1 920s, some employers shifted their 
emphasis from cash profit sharing to employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) (Coates, 
1991; Perry and Kegley, 1990). According to these plans, an employee will receive his/her 
share of profits in the form of stock or credits on the purchase price of stock. Employees were 
happy with the plans, as stock prices were increasing rapidly. Employers believed that they 
would stimulate more favourable work habits by giving the worker some ownership in the 
company. By 1927, 389 American companies had started some form of employee stock 
purchase plan (Aitken and Wood, 1989; Stern and Comstock, 1978). 
The use of profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans decreased during the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 193 Os as profits disappeared and stock 
values dropped rapidly (Latta, 1979; Perry and Kegley, 1990; Coates, 1991; Aitken and 
Wood, 1989; Metzger, 1974). So, some profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans 
were dropped in response to the Depression (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler, 1990). Industrial 
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Relations Counselors conducted a survey in 1937. The survey gathered definite information 
on 144 out of the 193 plans; of these, only 46.5% were active in 1937 (Metzger, 1966). One 
study by Davies (1933) reported that, of fifty plans surveyed, 62% were dropped between 
1926 and 1932 (Aitken and Wood, 1989). The National Industrial Conference Board survey 
in 1934 found that of the 134 plans surveyed, only 77 were still in operation in that year. As 
these surveys indicate, the stock market crash and the Depression of the 1 930s held up the 
expansion of profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans until just before World War 
II. 
World War II period: A new growth of profit sharing started in the late 193 Os, when there 
were only 37 deferred profit sharing plans, and a few hundred cash plans in operation 
(Metzger, 1966, 1978; Lafta, 1979; Reilly, 1978; Coates, 1991; Metzger, 1974; Perry and 
Kegley, 1990). This renewed growth in profit sharing was begun by Senator Arthur H. 
Vandenberg's Senate Finance Subcommittee study of profit sharing in 1939. Senator 
Vandenberg summarized the committee's study as follows: 
The committee finds that profit sharing, in one form or another, has been and can be 
eminently successful, when properly established, in creating employer-employee relations that 
make for peace, equity, efficiency, and contentment. We believe it to be essential to the 
ultimate maintenance of the capitalistic system. We have found veritable industrial islands of 
"peace, equity, efficiency, and contentment," and likewise prosperity, dotting an otherwise... 
relatively turbulent industrial map, all the way across the continent. This fact is too significant 
of profit-sharing's possibilities to be ignored or depreciated in our national quest for greater 
stability and greater democracy in industry. (Cited in Latta, 1979, p.16.) 
Subsequent to the US Senate investigation and report on profit sharing, companies were 
stimulated through favourable tax legislation to introduce deferred profit sharing schemes for 
broad groups of employees (Metzger, 1974; Reilly, 1978). Internal Revenue Service 
regulations allow employers to deduct their profit sharing contributions as a business 
expense, up to 15% of total compensation, and permit the deferral of this money into a trust 
without any current tax liabilities on employee participants (Metzger, 1974; Engen, 1967). 
So, if employees participate in the schemes, they do not pay any current tax on their 
respective deferred profit shares or on trust investment earnings/appreciation. But when 
participants actually receive benefits, they pay tax, normally at a lower rate. Metzger (1974) 
stated that "cash profit shares are taxed in the year of receipt as ordinary income" (p.21). 
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Although prior to World War II most profit sharing plans were cash plans (Latta, 1979; Perry 
and Kegley, 1990), during the World War II years, deferred profit sharing plans gained 
popularity and grew rapidly. Since that time, deferred profit sharing plans have been more 
popular than cash plans in the USA (Roomkin, 1990). Engen (1967) stated that: 
The immediate cause for the popularity of the deferred plan was a combination of factors 
attributable to the war, such as wage and price control and a tight job market. While the 
employer could not distribute profits currently without adding to inflationary forces, he could 
institute a deferred distribution plan. (p.4) 
Another important factor which played an important role in this new development was 
government tax policy (Engen, 1967; Coates, 1991). The taxes made deferred profit sharing a 
frequent option by discouraging employers from distributing profits for a period of 10 years 
(Coates, 1991). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approved 2,471 deferred profit sharing 
plans, covering 291,634 employees, between January 1, 1940, and August 31, 1946, of which 
over one-half- 1,631, covering 175,862 employees - were introduced during the later part of 
the war, September 1942 through December 1944 (Perry and Kegley, 1990; Engen, 1967; 
Latta, 1979). 
Post World War II period: The substantial growth of profit sharing under the special 
conditions of the war did not continue unabated after the war. The Internal Revenue Service 
approved over 8,400 plans between 1940 and July of 1955, of which around 6,000 plans were 
introduced since 1946. These data show that during the post-World War II period up to 1955, 
profit sharing plans continued to grow at a rate somewhat below that experienced during the 
later part of the war (Engen, 1967, p.4). 
Although there is not enough statistical data for the early postwar period, existing data 
indicate that deferred profit sharing plans were predominant in this period as well. A National 
Industrial Conference Board Study in 1948 reported that 100 of 167 plans studied, or 
approximately two-thirds, were deferred profit sharing plans (Engen, 1967). 
After the period of slow growth in profit sharing, the plans started to grow at a higher rate in 
the mid-1950s. As can be seen from Table 2.1, there were total in 20,117 deferred profit 
sharing plans by December 31, 1959, of which over one-half, 11,875 plans, were approved 




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table 2.1. Growth in Number of Qualified Deferred Profit Sharing, Pension, and Stock Bonus Plans in the
United States 1939 through 1972 (approvals minus terminations)
Growth During Period Cumulative Total
Period Deferred Deferred
Ending Profit Stock All Profit Stock All
31st Dec. Sharing Pensions Bonus Plans Sharing Pensions Bonus Plans
1939 37 622 - 659 37 622 - 659
1944 2,076 5,051 - 7,127 2,113 5,673 - 7,786
1949 1,452 3,302 - 4,754 3,565 8,975 - 12,540
1954 4,677 9,356 - 14,033 8,242 18,331 - 26,573
1959 11,875 15,766 87 27,728 20,117 34,097 87 54,301
Source: Mertzger, Bert, "Profit Sharing USA", Industrial Participation, Spring 1974, p.2 1.
The number of qualified deferred profit sharing plans grew rapidly between 1955 and 1963.
There were 33,522 qualified plans by December 31, 1962 (Metzger, 1966). Metzger (1966)
stated that "more new deferred and combination profit sharing plans were started in the last
five years than in all previous years combined" (p.6). The Internal Revenue Service approved
46,859 deferred profit sharing plans, covering 2,831,933 participating employees, during the
period of July 1955 - June 1966 (Engen, 1967). Deferred profit sharing accounted for 81% of
the total plant and office workers coverage; the remaining 19% was made up of 'current',
'combination current and deferred', and 'elective' distribution plans in 1965 - 1966 (Engen,
1967).
The substantial growth of profit sharing in the period 1955-1966 can be seen from the
analysis of two BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) studies. One study was carried out during
1955-56 and other during 1965-66. These studies reported that in 1965-66 profit sharing
coverage had increased to cover approximately twice the proportion of employees covered 10
years earlier (Engen, 1967).
In the early 1 970s, the decline in stock market values caused problems. The assets of Sears
Roebuck's plan decreased from $3.8 billion in 1971 to $2.9 billion in 1973. In the same
period the assets of Burlington Industries' plan declined from $184 million to $153 million.
Because of the unfavourable experience of these years, some companies decided that it would
be better to discontinue their plans than to risk continuing problems. In 1970, R.J. Reynolds
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closed down its plan. Some companies, such as Dart Industries and Sears Roebuck, modified 
their plans to take ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) into account (Latta, 
1979). The passage of ERISA into law was regarded by some profit sharing advocates as a 
setback (Latta, 1979; D'art, 1992). D'art (1992) stated that "the years between 1974 and 
1977 have been described as the terrible three. Terminations for PS pians in 1975 were 75 per 
cent above the rate for the previous years" (pp. 49-50). Latta (1979) believed that because of 
the absence of sufficient information about ERISA, the introduction of new profit sharing 
plans may have slowed down. He felt that if companies clearly understand the effects of 
ERISA, the long-run trend of growth may continue. He concluded that "there is already 
evidence of a renewal of this upward trend; during 1978, the number of approvals of profit 
sharing plans reached a record 28,634" (Latta, 1979, pp.19-20). 
The introduction of Internal Revenue Code section 401(k) resulted in an increase in the 
number of deferred profit sharing plans in the early 1980s (Coates, 1991). "The rule provided 
tax incentives for employees to save money towards retirement by allowing the employees to 
defer profit-sharing allocations and, thereby, to defer paying taxes on the income set aside" 
(Coates, 1991, pp.21-22). So, in the 1980s, enthusiasm for profit sharing plans did not wane 
(Florkowski, 1989), and the plans gained popularity in the USA (Mukhopadhyay and Pendse, 
1983; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988). A Hewit panel of 250 large employers indicated 
increased popularity of profit sharing over the 1979-84 period (Kruse, 1993). The Profit 
Sharing Council of America estimated in 1985 that approximately 360,000 companies 
established an approved deferred or combination plan covering as many as 20 million 
participating employees (US Congress, 1986). In addition, there were 100,000 to 150,000 
cash plans in the US (Strauss, 1990) but they involved much smaller numbers of employees 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1986). Strauss (1990) stated that "together perhaps 20 to 25 per 
cent of the private sector workforce is covered by one form of plan or another" (p.25). As 
unions have been generally suspicious of profit sharing plans, the majority of plans have been 
established in nonunion companies. However, Katz and Meltz (1991) reported that "in 
response to the 1981-82 recession and demands for concessions the auto workers in the 
United States (the UAW) accepted contracts that shifted away from the three-decades-old 
annual improvement factor and included profit sharing plans" (p.515). So, in the 1980s, 

















Ford, General Motors (GM), Chrysler, Weyerhaeuser, and Caterpillar Tractor as well as a 
number of steel and telephone companies, agreed to share profits in return for wage 
concessions (Strauss, 1990; Katz and Meltz, 1991). The introduction of profit sharing plans in 
these large organizations is a very important indicator of the development of the plan in the 
1980s, because they cover a large number of employees. 
Table 2.2. Cumulative Growth in the Number of Qualified Profit-Sharing Plans, 1939-89 
Year Number of Plans Year Number of Plans 
1939 37 1964 43,092 
1969 87,219 
1944 2,113 1974 186,499 
1949 3,565 1979 261,261 
1954 8,242 1984 374,894 
1959 20,204 1989* 442,771 
*Data for 1989 include only the first 9 months. 
Source: Profit Sharing Research Foundation, the United States Treasury Department, in Coates, Edward M., 
1991, p.23. 
Table 2.3. Percent of Full-Time Employees Participating in Profit Sharing Plans, by Type of Plan, Medium 
And Large Firms, 1985-89 
Type of plan 1985 1986 1988 1989 
Profit sharing 
immediate cash only 















Source: Coates, Edward M., "Profit sharing today: plans and provisions", Monthly Labor Review, Vol.114, 
No.4, 1991, p.22. 
Kruse (1987) reports that 22 million employees, 20% of the US workforce, participate in over 
400,000 workplace profit sharing plans and that since 1970 the number of plans has increased 
by approximately 19,000 per year. As Table 2.2 indicates, there were 442,771 qualified profit 
sharing plans by September 1989. As illustrated in Table 2.3 the larger number of participants 
in profit sharing plans were in deferred plans in the late 1980s. Therefore, Coates (1991) 
stated that "the typical profit-sharing plan offered to workers in the 1980s is significantly 













Kruse (1993) summarized his findings from data on the prevalence of profit sharing in the 
United States. He reported that "roughly one-sixth to one-fourth of companies have profit-
sharing plans, and roughly the same percentage of private-sector employees are covered" 
(pp.11-12). 
Table 2.4. Prevalence of Profit Sharing in Sample 
Distribution of employees 
Distribution of (1990 sum, in 000s) 
PS as PS as 
percent All PS percent of 
All firms PS firms of all employees participants all 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
12 4 33.3 21.9 2.7 12.4 
Nondurable manufac 86 35 40.7 1393.1 345.5 24.8 
Durable manufacturi 86 40 46.5 3153.4 1503.2 47.7 
Communications 11 5 45.5 279.0 44.5 16.0 
Utilities 37 6 16.2 172.2 10.9 6.3 
Wholesale 9 4 44.4 71.1 13.0 18.2 
Retail 15 8 53.3 635.8 187.6 29.5 
insurance, estate 13 6 46.2 210.2 131.3 62.5 
Service 6 4 66.7 85.9 60.2 70.0 
Total 275 I 112 J 40.7 6022.6 2298.9 38.2 
Notes: These numbers consider only the responses from the primary sample, which is based on a systematic 
sample of all firms with at least eight years of employment data over the 1980-89 period. Companies contacted 
to provide matched pairs are excluded from selection rule for pairing. PS = profit sharing. 
Source: Kruse, Douglas L., Profit Sharing (Does It Make A Difference), W.E. Upjhon Institute for Employment 
Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1993, p.15. 
In 1990 a survey was carried out to gather information on profit sharing and other finn 
characteristics in the USA. Table 2.4 shows statistics on the prevalence of profit sharing 
among 275 firms surveyed in the initial sample. As can be seen from Table 2.4, 112 firms, or 
40.7% of the 275 firms, have a profit sharing plan. In 1990, six million employees were 
employed collectively in the 275 firms. 2.3 million employees participated in the plans in 112 
profit sharing firms, representing 3 8.2% of the total employees among the firms in this 
sample. The industry distribution indicates that the higher number of profit sharing 
participants were in durable manufacturing (approximately 1.5 million profit sharing 
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participants), and the lowest in utilities (approximately 11,000 profit sharing participants) 
(Kruse, 1993). 
Types of Profit Sharing Plans 
There are three basic forms of profit sharing programmes in the United States (Czarnecki, 
1970; Kendrick, 1987; D'art, 1992; Metzger, 1974; Kruse, 1993; Metzger, 1966). 
Cash-based profit sharing: This is also known as a current distribution plan. The plan is 
distinguished from the deferred plan in that full payments of profit shares are paid out directly 
in cash (or stock) to participants shortly after profits have been determined. A more 
immediate objective of such plans is to provide employees with an incentive for increasing 
productivity and decreasing unit cost through better cooperation and effort. Amounts 
distributed are deductible business expenses for the employer, but taxable to the employee as 
if they were income. 
As such plans need not be reported to the Internal Revenue Service, they are relatively easy to 
introduce and to administer. The worker can better understand the relationship between his 
effort and current bonuses than he could understand bonuses being set aside for future 
distribution. The main disadvantage of the plan is that if a company makes low profits, it will 
result in reduced or no profit sharing, affecting both workers' income and morale. In addition, 
workers have to pay tax on their profit shares as current income. 
Cash-based profit sharing plans constitute only a small and decreasing percentage of 
American profit sharing schemes. D'art (1992) reported that although only 4.7% of plan types 
were represented by cash plans in 1973, this figure decreased to 2.4% by 1981. The 1989 
PSCA survey indicates that cash-based profit sharing plans are more common in 
manufacturing and among smaller companies, i.e., companies with fewer than 1,000 
participants (Perry and Kegley, 1990). Perry and Kegley felt that "the most likely reason is 





	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	










Deferred profit sharing: Under a deferred distribution pian, profit sharing payments (the
employer's contribution or the amount of profit to be shared) are put into a trust fund
(Broderick and Mitchell, 1987) on behalf of individual employees, and separate participant
accounts are created (Metzger, 1974; Kruse, 1993; D'art 1992; Engen, 1967). The employees
receive these special sums of money, placed in a trust fund, in addition to their regular wages
or salaries (Perry and Kegley, 1990). The participating employees do not pay any tax for the
income until they receive it at retirement (Kruse, 1993). *
Table 2.5. Employer Contributions as Percentage of Pay
Cash Plans Deferred Plans Combination Plans All Plans
1988 5.0 7.9 13.1 8.8
1987 11.1 8.0 12.3 8.7
1986 7.8 8.1 13.5 8.8
1985 9.6 8.4 10.6 8.7
1984 8.7 8.5 10.0 8.8
1983 7.4 8.3 10.8 8.8
1982 8.1 8.5 11.3 8.9
1981 7.6 9.0 10.6 9.2
1980 10.3 8.9 12.4 9.5
Source: Profit Sharing Council of America, Annual Profit Sharing Survey. In, Perry, Charles R., and Kegley,
Deiwyn H., Employee Financial Participation: An International Survey, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton
School, Vance Hall, University of Pennsylvania, USA, 1990, p.36.










Source: Profit Sharing Council of America, Annual Profit Sharing Survey. In, Perry, Charles R., and Kegley,
Delwyn H., Employee Financial Participation: An International Survey, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton
School, Vance Hall, University of Pennsylvania, USA, 1990, p.36.
In the majority of plan types (94%), the company contribution is allocated to participating
employees according to their wages or a combination of wages and length of service (D'art,
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1992). Table 2.5 shows average employer contribution as a percentage of pay between 1980 
and 1988. In this period, employer contributions to all types of plans have indicated only a 
small amount of changes, ranging from a low of 8.7% to a high of 9.5% of pay. However, in 
the 1 980s, employer contributions as a percentage of net profits show a greater fluctuation 
than employer contributions as a percentage of pay (see Table 2.6). Contributions to deferred 
plans have been more stable than those of the other two types of profit sharing plans. Perry 
and Kegley (1990) revealed that "deferred plans are often the only retirement plan in some 
companies, which makes it more important to provide a more consistent stream of company 
contribution" (pp.35-36). Under the plans, employees are also allowed to make voluntary 
contributions. The number of plans in which employees made a voluntary contribution rose 
from 4% in the early 1950s to approximately 60% by 1981 (D'art, 1992). 
Kruse (1993) stated three important features of deferred profit sharing plans. The first is that, 
in addition to the direct company contribution, participating employees may be allowed or 
required to make contributions in many of these plans. The second is that when the company 
contribution is made, it may be mostly invested in the employer's own stock. The employee's 
account value will be affected by the subsequent performance of the company through the 
effect on the stock price. A third important feature of deferred profit sharing plans is that, like 
pension plans, they are subject to rules governing pension plans. 
Deferred profit sharing plans have certain advantages over the cash-based profit sharing plans 
and provide several interesting possibilities to employer and employee (Engen, 1967). Perry 
and Kegley (1990) revealed that: 
The primary purpose of most deferred plans, where there is no pension plan in effect, is 
retirement income. Deferred plans, as well as cash and combination plans, may have other 
objectives as well: 1) to provide benefits for disability, death or employment termination 
(layoff) prior to retirement; 2) to create an incentive for increasing productivity and 
decreasing costs; 3) to accumulate tax-deferred capital reserves for employees, which may 
contribute to capital formation and employee stock ownership; and 4) to attract and retain 
quality personnel by sharing the rewards of the free enterprise system throughout the 
organization (p.34). 
The deferred plans also have some disadvantages: 1) as profit shares are distributed to 
participants at a later contingency, the plans do not increase the participating workers' current 
purchasing power; 2) in some companies, the participating workers may not be allowed to 
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control the fund or to decide how it should be invested. So, if the value of stocks in which 
their shares are invested decreases, it may adversely affect their expectations for retirement 
benefits. Moreover, since the growth of the fund depends upon variable contributions, the 
plans may not be regarded as a satisfactory form of retirement security by the workers. 
However, if the recent growth of such plans is assessed, it could be realized that these 
disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages of the plans (Engen, 1967). Since the 
deferred profit sharing plan represents 82% of plan types, it is regarded as the dominant form 
of American profit sharing plan (D'art, 1992). 
Combination plans: As their title indicates, these plans combine the features of both cash-
based and deferred profit sharing. In a combination plan, a part of the profit sharing bonus is 
paid out directly in cash to the employee and the remainder is deferred into a trust fund 
(D'art, 1992; Perry and Kegley, 1990; Metzger, 1974; Engen, 1967). As combination plans 
include cash plan aspects and deferred plan aspects, the factors mentioned above are relevant 
here also. 
However, it should be noted that, as can be seen from Table 2.5, average employer 
contributions as a percentage of pay have been higher than they have in cash-based deferred 
profit sharing plans. Perry and Kegley (1990) mentioned the cause for the higher employer 
contribution to the plan: "since employers adopting combination plans have dual objectives 
of motivating employees as well as providing retirement benefits, it is likely that more money 
is required to achieve the two objectives" (p.40). 
In the USA, 16% of plan types are represented by combination plans. In 7% of combination 
plans, companies predetermine the division of the profit shares between cash payout and 
deferred payments. Of the remaining 9%, participating employees can determine the limited 
part of the profit shares to be paid in cash (D'art, 1992). 
2.1.2. Employee Share/Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in the USA 
Here, the historical development of ESOPs will be analyzed, and the types of ESOPs in the 
USA will be explained. 
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The History of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
The history of ESOPs in the USA will be analyzed in three periods: prior to the 1950s, from 
the 1950s to 1973, and from the 1970s to the present. 
Prior to the 1950s: Many Americans, perhaps a greater percentage than among any other 
people, have always wanted to work in their own businesses. The findings of a survey 
conducted by the Peter Hart Company for the People's Business Commission have confirmed 
this statement. The survey found that 66% of 1,209 people asked would favour working in a 
company that is employee owned and controlled (Toscano, 1983, p.3). The USA has a history 
of several workers' cooperative movements, which were generated principally in the trade 
union movements of the 1800s, but they were unsuccessful and the union movement turned to 
'business unionism' in the 1930s (Kruse, 1984). The New England factories of the 1840s 
practiced employee stock ownership plans and William Meredith, secretary of the US 
Treasury under President Zachary Taylor, promoted these plans (D'art, 1992). Meredith 
mentioned in his 1849 annual report that "in many of the New England factories, the laborers 
are encouraged to invest their surplus earnings in the stock of the company by which they are 
employed, and are thus stimulated, by direct personal interest, to the greatest extent" (cited in 
Rosen, 199l,pA). 
Russell (1985) revealed that in the 1870s, another wave of interest in employee ownership 
was created in the wake of a series of major strikes. A Congressional committee was formed 
to investigate these strikes, and the chair of this committee, Abraham S. Hewitt, became an 
supporter of 'joint ownership' between labour and capital. Hewitt's duty in this committee led 
him to conclude that "until labor becomes an owner it never will understand the capacity of 
business to pay" (cited in Russell, 1985, p.11). However these early efforts to interest 
employees in the purchase of their own company stock were largely failed (D'art, 1992). 
In 1893, the Illinois Central Railroad proposed an employee stock ownership plan. Minor 
executives and employees of the company supported the plan and purchased a substantial 
amount of company stock. This example was followed by other companies and employee 
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share ownership became less uncommon in the years prior to the First World War. In 1915, 
employee stock purchase plans were operated by about 60 firms. During the war years and 
into the post-war period, employees' real wages rose rapidly and made possible the employee 
purchase of company stock. During that period, as stock prices also rose, such purchases 
became very attractive. 
The war confidence and aggression created the American labour movement. Since 1914, the 
membership of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had more than doubled. By 1920, 
the number of AFL members had risen to over 4 million. The emergence of a broad-based 
movement for industrial democracy was another indication of labour's strength. Employer 
unease was increased by the revolution in Russia. So, employee stock ownership plans were 
initiated as a response by some companies (D'art, 1992). Rosen (1991) stated that "in the 
1 920s, employee ownership became a full-fledged movement, called the New Capitalism, 
replete with theorists, publicists, a national organization, and considerable success" (p.4). 
When socialism and communism were obtaining popularity abroad, employee ownership was 
regarded as a logical American response. It was expected that if employees purchased the 
shares, it would provide a new source of capital and employees would be motivated to 
perform better. The founder of the Brookings Institution, Robert Brookings, mentioned in his 
1929 book Economic Democracy: America 's Answer to Socialism and Communism: 
Many of the large corporations are encouraging the thrift of their employees by assisting them 
to invest their savings in the stock of the corporation ... thus creating a real 'economic 
democracy', which is America's answer to socialism and communism with their inherent 
weaknesses (p.xxiii). 
By 1930, approximately 2.5% of the workforce had purchased shares valued at over $1 
billion, which was the same as the value of employee stock ownership plans in the early 
1980s (Rosen, 1991). 
Although interest in employee ownership in the United States peaked in the 1920s with the 
creation of ownership programmes in railroads, utilities, and manufacturing firms, the 
collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the sharp decrease in stock values pulled down 
participating employees' equity value and along with it the attractiveness of ESOPs (Russell, 
1985; Perry and Kegley, 1990; D'Art, 1992). The index of common stock prices decreased by 
75% between 1929 and 1932. Employees sold their shares into the lowest market of the 
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century and made tremendous losses. 90% of employee stock ownership plans had been 
terminated by the mid-1930s (D'art, 1992). However the idea of employee share ownership 
did not totally die. 
From the 1950s to 1973: Much of the trend toward the present employee stock ownership 
plans should be attributed to the work in the 1 950s of Louis Kelso, a one-time San Francisco 
lawyer and now investment banker. (Knap, 1988; Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Rosen, Klein 
and Young, 1986; D'art, 1992; Whyte, Hammer, Meek, Nelson and Stern, 1983; Rosen and 
Young, 1991; Poole, 1989). Kelso did a great deal to popularise the plans (Goldstein, 1978) 
and has been most responsible for advancing these plans in the US (Kelso, 1958, 1961, 1967). 
Cornford (1990) stated that "the Employee Stock Ownership Plan is an American import, the 
brainchild of Mr Louis Kelso" (p.13). Kelso (1958) wrote his ideas in The Capitalist 
Manfesto, which he co-authored with the well-known philosopher Mortimer Adler. He stated 
that: 
Since everyone has a right to property in the means of production sufficient for earning a 
living, no one has a right to so extensive an ownership of the means of production that it 
excludes others from the opportunity to participate in production to an extent capable of 
earning for themselves a viable income; and, consequently, the ownership of productive 
property by an individual or household must not be allowed to increase to the point where it 
can injure others by excluding them from the opportunity to earn a viabie income (p.68). 
When Kelso examined the United States, he realized that this rule was being broken in an 
enormous way. A congressional committee of 1976 reported that over 70% of privately held 
corporate wealth was owned by only 6% of the American people (D'art, 1992). Therefore, 
Kelso told Americans that "they must not give away their birthright- the right of everyone to 
become an owner" (Copeman, 1976, p.98). 
According to Kelso, capital and labour were two factors of production. He revealed that in a 
modern capitalist economic system, capital is the most productive input; because of that 
capital should gain a greater share income than the other major input, labour. Rosen (1991) 
felt that "the problem was that although all workers owned their labour, only a few owned 
and thus could get more capital" (p.5). Kelso argued that everyone should have productive 
capital eventually building a personal capital estate (Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1986). This 
would be more equitable and build support for a capitalist system. Kelso also claimed, "those 
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who work for the business should be able to share in the ownership of any increase in capital 
arising from their success as a working team" (Copemari, 1976, p.98). He realized that if 
workers obtain stocks and feel like co-owners of firms, their motivation can be increased 
(Russell, 1988). Therefore, productivity would be increased and labour-management conflict 
decreased, while at the same time workers' commitment to the current economic system 
would be strengthened (Whyte, Hammer, Meek, Nelson, and Stern, 1983). He concluded that 
if the ownership of productive wealth or capital were distributed broadly, it would help to sort 
out many of the problems of the US economy (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). Kelso wrote that 
the best way to achieve this goal was to create a mechanism by which corporate finance 
would automatically make workers into owners (Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1986); otherwise 
employees cannot normally afford to purchase shares in any significant amount nor borrow to 
do so either (Cornford, 1990). To start the necessary diffusion of capital "Kelso designed the 
first employee stock ownership plan" (Marsh and McAllister, 1981), which is "the most well-
known of the Kelsonian mechanism" (D'art, 1992). 
An ESOP is a kind of benefit plan which is funded by the company and its assets are invested 
in the employer's stock. If broadened share ownership is established, every employee will 
become a capitalist. They will increase their productivity and their loyalty to both the firm 
and the governing economic system. Since workers become like owners, they will obtain 
dividends as well as wages. Therefore it is expected that "capital ownership will come to 
dominate workers' economic attitudes and lessen the upward pressure on wages" (D'art, 
1992, p.89). 
Kelso thought the ESOP could be carried out under existing law, although some important 
changes would help make the system work. He believed that companies would be encouraged 
to establish the ESOP, as they could deduct both the principal and the interest on the loans, 
instead of just the interest as in a conventional loan, if they could borrow the money via the 
ESOP. 
At first Kelso attempted to stimulate companies to establish ESOPs, arguing that they could 
increase productivity and also obtain tax breaks. When the founders and owners of the 
Peninsula Newspaper Group of California decided to retire, Kelso persuaded the company, as 
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his first company, to establish an ESOP in 1957 (IDS Study 438, 1989; Rosen, 1991; D'art, 
1992). In the company, the employees had become owners of their employer's stock without 
investing their own money by using the 1954 Internal Revenue Service ruling, which 
"allowed a qualified employee trust (e.g. a profit sharing or stock bonus plan) to borrow 
money for investment in employer securities" (D'art, 1992, p.89). Over the next 16 years, 300 
or so companies, largely 'middle-market' companies of a few hundred employees or fewer, 
set up Kelso's plan (Rosen, 1991). 
Kelso's first attempt to persuade companies to establish ESOPs had only limited success. 
Although Kelso demanded tax benefits for his plan (ESOP), "existing laws were ambiguous 
on whether an ESOP would be able to qualify for the tax breaks" (Quarrey, Blasi, and Rosen, 
1986, p.5). Therefore, companies were unwilling to establish plans that might later be 
regarded as illegal. Under current law, companies could establish stock bonus plans to 
provide stock for their employees (Rosen, 1991). Generally, a company's contribution to the 
plan could be either its own shares or cash to buy the shares. Although existing law did not 
clearly say these plans could borrow money to buy the stock or the company could repay the 
loan with tax-deductible dollars, Kelso said they could (Rosen, 1991). Therefore, companies 
were reluctant to see employees as owners regardless of the tax incentives. Kelso understood 
that to create widespread acceptance of the ESOP concept, legislation was needed. 
From 1973 to the present: In 1973, Kelso met with the Louisiana Democratic senator 
Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, which writes tax law (Rosen, 
Klein, and Young, 1986; Rosen, 1991; Quarrey, Blasi and Rosen, 1986). Long was probably 
the most influential member of the Senate. He was also the son of Louisiana governor and 
senator Huey Long, who "became famous in the 1930s for his announced intention of making 
'every man a king' "(Russell, 1985, p.1 1). 
The wisdom of Huey Long's radical proposal did not persuade Russell Long. He was a more 
conservative politician than his father and as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee had 
obtained a reputation for favouring business. But he argued that "capitalism was not working 
as well as it should. There were too few capitalists, and the result was an inequitable 
distribution of wealth" (Rosen, 1991, p.7). He set out to use his power to make every worker 
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at least a capital owner, if not a king (Russell, 1985; Speiser, 1977). Thus Russell Long took 
an interest in Kelso's plan. 
After the meeting with Kelso, Long started persuading his colleagues. As the first practical 
stage in this direction, Long wrote a strong inducement for the construction of ESOPs into a 
pension reform act in 1974. Russell (1985) stated that "the bill authorized firms borrowing 
money for the purchase of new capital to deduct the principal as well as interest from their 
corporate income taxes as they repaid the loan, provided that they allocated an equivalent 
amount of stock to their ESOP" (p.11). Since 1974, Long has wanted to make the use of 
ESOPs more attractive to American businesses and has designed a number of other pieces of 
legislation. These legislations allow tax breaks which make the construction of ESOPs 
appealing to business organizations (Livingston and Henry, 1980). He has promoted bills to 
stimulate a variety of other forms of employee ownership as well. By the mid-1980s, 
employee ownership was supported by Jesse Helms and Jesse Jackson, Ted Kennedy and 
Ronald Reagan, the United Steelworkers and the Chamber of Commerce, the Catholic Church 
and the Republican Party, the New York Stock Exchange and the former Treasury Secretary 
William Simon (Rosen, 1991; Wessinger and Rosen, 1986; Rosen, 1983). 
The powerful legislative promotion created a substantial growth in the number of companies 
that have set up an ESOP (McElrath and Rowan, 1992). Since 1973, Congress has passed a 
series of laws that have encouraged thousands of companies to establish an ES OP. As federal 
legislation, from the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 through to the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, has a strong effect on the growth of ESOPs (Bradley, Estrin, and 
Taylor, 1990; Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990; D'art, 
1992), a brief discussion of the legislative development of the ESOP concept is crucial. 
1. Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 1973: The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 
for the first time legally defined ESOPs. The Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail) was 
established by this act. The new company was established to conduct a study of the potential 
value of using an ESOP to help meet some of the capital requirements of the company. 
Because of this the company was allowed to buy its own company stock for its employees via 
an ESOP if it determined to put one into action (Latta, 1979). 
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ESOP is recognized as an allowable corporate financing technique by section 7 16(e) of the 
act. This section also states that the company stock must be allocated in terms of the relative 
incomes of the participants. Another feature of the act is that employee contribution to the 
plan is not necessary, although it is not forbidden (Lafta, 1979). Although the organizers of 
ConRail eventually rejected the use of an ESOP as a method of financing, the existence of 
ESOPs as a unique type of defined contribution plan had been recognized for the first time by 
Congress (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1974: The second act that defined ESOP was 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (Conte and Kruse, 1991), better known as 
ERISA, of 1974. "Section 407(d), (b) of this Act defined an Employee stock ownership plan 
and identified the general requirements for a plan to attract tax exemption" (Aitken and 
Wood, 1989, p.153). The act defined an ESOP either as a qualified stock bonus plan or as a 
qualified stock bonus and money purchase plan designed to invest primarily in employer 
securities (Latta, 1979; D'art, 1992). Either stock, other equity securities, or a wide range of 
marketable obligations are regarded as a qualifying employer security. 
Although any loan or loan guarantee transaction between a sponsoring employer and a 
deferred employee compensation plan was generally prohibited by ERISA, a loan to a 
leveraged ESOP was expressly excluded from this prohibition (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). 
Thus the Employee Share Ownership Trust (ESOT) was allowed to borrow from the 
company to buy the stock. Latta (1979) revealed that: 
This exemption applies only under certain conditions. First, the loan must be primarily for the 
benefit of the participants or of their beneficiaries. This restriction can be a basis for 
controversy because there is no real definition of what is primarily beneficial to the 
employees. Secondly, the interest rate of the loan must not be deemed excessive by the IRS. 
Also, if any collateral for the loan is required, only qualifying employer securities may be 
used. This requirement gives added support to the ESOP because it enables the company to 
guarantee the loans (p.51). 
3. Trade Act, 1974: According to the Trade Act of 1974, employees must have voting rights 
on the stock allocated to their accounts, and their pay or other employee benefits or the 
surrender of any other rights on the part of them cannot be reduced as a result of the adoption 
of an ESOP (Latta, 1979). 
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Employers were stimulated to adopt an ESOP, as the major aim of this act was to provide 
federal government assistance to reduce economic damage from foreign competition (D'art, 
1992; Latta, 1979). Marsh and McAllister (1981) stated that: 
Among the provisions of this Act was an authorization for the United States Secretary of 
Commerce to approve loan guarantees on loans from private lenders to companies that were 
adversely affected by foreign competition. The secretary was instructed to give preference in 
guaranteeing loans to companies that agreed to channel twenty-five of the loan proceeds 
through a qualified leveraged ESOP (p.561). 
4. Tax Reduction Act, 1975: The Tax reduction Act of 1975 probably encouraged more 
interest in employee stock ownership than any previous legislation. Under this act the 
existing investment tax credit available to corporations was increased from 7% to 10%. D'art 
(1992) stated that "a section of the act allowed companies to claim an additional tax credit of 
an amount equal to 1% of the corporation's investment, provided such an amount was 
transferred in employer stock to an ESOP" (p.92). Therefore, if companies set up the ESOP 
an 11% tax credit becomes available to them. This is a new type of ESOP called a TRAESOP 
(Tax Reduction Act Employee Stock Ownership Plan). 
This act defined the ESOP as previous definitions had in that it contains stock bonus plans, 
stock bonus and money purchase pension plans, and, in addition, profit sharing plans. The act 
provides that: employee contributions cannot be required; existing employee benefits cannot 
be decreased; and employees must have the right to vote the stock distributed to them. 
Employer contributions must be allocated to employees' accounts in terms of their pay (Latta, 
1979). In a TRAESOP all participating employees have fully vested rights in all the assets 
allocated to their accounts (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). 
5. Tax Reform Act, 1976: The 1% investment tax credit for employer contributions to a 
TRAESOP was authorized by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 for the years 1975 and 1976 
only. The Tax Reform Act, passed in 1976, prolonged the credit through January 1, 1981 
(Marsh and McAllister, 1981). 
Under this act, the 1% investment tax credit authorized in the 1975 legislation was increased 
by one-half a per cent. Companies with TRAESOPs could become eligible for this additional 
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credit if they "increased their stock contributions to the plan by an equivalent amount, and if 
this increase was matched by cash contributions from employee participants" (D'art, 1992, 
p.92). If a company met these requirements, it could claim a total investment tax credit of 
11.5%. 
The act created an additional incentive for a company to set up a TRAESOP by providing that 
"within certain limits, the costs of establishing and maintaining a tax credit ESOP trust could 
be included in the 1 per cent tax credit taken for tax credit ESOP contributions" (Mars and 
McAllister, 1981, p.562). The company is allowed to reduce the amount of its contributions 
to the plan by a percentage of the cost of establishing the TRAESOP, "a percentage limited to 
10 per cent of the first $100,000 contributed plus 5 per cent of the excess" (Latta, 1979, p.53). 
The cost of maintaining can be reduced by "the lesser of (1) 10 per cent of the first $100,000 
plus 5 per cent of the excess over $100,000 of dividends paid to the plan or (2) $100,000,, 
(Latta, 1979, p.53). 
6. Revenue Act, 1978: A number of changes in the laws that governed ESOPs were made by 
the Revenue Act of 1978. The changes were mainly concerned with " 'participants' voting 
rights', 'put options', and 'the right of first refusal' "(D'art, 1992, p.93). 
The requirement that TRAESOPs acquire and hold only voting common stock was extended 
to permit the acquisition and holding of preferred stock that was convertible into voting 
common stock. Marsh and McAllister (1981) stated that: 
The requirement that participants be allowed to direct the voting of stock allocated to their 
accounts was relaxed for tax credit ESOPs sponsored by private companies, but these 
modified voting rights requirements were extended to some nonleveraged ESOPs and all 
leveraged ESOPs for the first time. Leveraged and tax credit ESOPs were specifically allowed 
to distribute cash instead of stock, subject to the right of participants to demand their 
distribution be made in the form of stock. If a distribution from a leveraged or tax credit 
ESOP was made in the form of stock that was not readily traded in an established market, the 
sponsoring employer was required to offer participants a put option covering the distributed 
stock (pp.562-563). 
7. Technical Corrections Act, 1979: The current statutory names of leveraged and tax credit 
ESOPs were given by the Technical Corrections Act of 1979. According to the act, 
'employee stock ownership plan' is now the statutory name of a leveraged ESOP, and 'tax 
credit employee stock ownership plan' is now the statutory name of a tax credit ESOP. The 
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voting rights requirements relevant to leveraged ESOPs were also eased by the act (Marsh 
and McAllister, 1981). Marsh and McAllister stated that: 
The technical Corrections Act of 1979 was one of a series of measures enacted by Congress 
since 1973 to encourage the growth of the three types of ESOPs. These acts also established 
strict legal requirements that ESOPs must meet to take advantage of the incentives provided 
by that legislation (p.563). 
8. Economic Recovery Tar Act, 1981: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 modified the 
basis of the TRAESOP, created by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. The Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 provided that "future tax credits would be calculated on a payroll basis. 
Beginning in 1983, companies contributing stock to a tax credit ESOP would receive a tax 
credit amounting to 0.5 per cent of plan participants' payroll" (D'art, 1992, p.93). Therefore 
this modified tax credit ESOP was called a payroll-based stock ownership plan (PAYSOP). 
D'art (1992) revealed that this change from a capital investment to a payroll basis was made 
to achieve two objectives. First, tax credit ESOP would be applied equally to all companies, 
not just capital-intensive ones. Second, employers would be stimulated to maximize the 
number of plan participants by a tax credit based on payroll. 
9. Tax Reform Act, 1984: Tax Reform Act of 1984 created two relatively recent additions to 
the tax advantages of employee stock ownership plans. The act allowed banks and other 
approved lenders a 50% tax exemption on the interest income they obtain from loans to 
ESOPs. Because of this deduction, lenders were stimulated to make loans to ESOPs at lower 
than market rates (Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). The second advantage is that under 
the act employers were allowed a tax deduction for dividends paid to employee stock 
ownership plans and passed on to employees (Aitken and Wood, 1989). 
10. Tax Reform Act, 1986: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further encouraged the establishment 
of ESOPs. The process of allocating funds to ESOPs was modified by making some technical 
adjustments (Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). 
11. Revenue Reconciliation Act, 1989: The interest exclusion on ESOP loans created by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1984 has been restricted by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989. 
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According to the Act of 1989, if an ESOP owns a majority of the company's stock, it can 
benefit from such an exclusion (Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). 
The Spread of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, from the 1970s to the Present 
Since the early 1970s much attention has been focused on the ESOP in the companies where 
US managers and employees work for (Reum and Reum, 1976; Blasi, Gaseway, and Kruse, 
1994). Although companies have been familiar with the ESOP, only a small number of plans 
had been set up until 1974. ESOPs have grown rapidly in the United States since 1974 
(Adams and Hansen, 1992; Keef, 1994; Klein and Rosen, 1986), when the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (EIUSA) provided tax incentives to companies for setting up 
these plans. Employers introduced ESOPs for "financial, tax, and/or motivational reasons and 
operated through management controlled trusts (ESOT5)" (French, 1987, p.4T7). 
Latta (1979) stated that as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not record separately the 
number of ESOPs, it is difficult to supply sufficient figures for the total number of ESOPs. 
However some estimates are available about them. Although it was estimated by the Treasury 
that there were 300 ESOPs in 1975, a leading consulting finn, which specializes in ESOPs, 
reported that 200 plans had been set up in 1977 (Latta, 1979). Therefore, there is no exact 
number of the plans, and estimates differ substantially. The popularity of the ESOPs 
increased considerably towards the end of 1970s. While there were no more than 300 ESOPs 
in 1976, the number of companies that had established an ESOP had increased sharply to 
approximately 3,700 by the end of 1979 in the USA (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). 
In the 1980s, the predominant form of participatory scheme in the United States was 
employee shareholding, typically through ESOPs (Estrin, Geroski, and Stewart, 1988). 
Bradley and Gelb (1986) argued that "ESOPs are by far the most widespread vehicle for 
distributing ownership to employees" (p.20). By the mid-1980s, the growth of ESOPs had 
been so remarkable (Poole, 1989) that a survey (United States General Accounting Office, 
1 986a) found that there were approximately 4,174 active ESOPs covering more than seven 
million participants and approximately $19 billion in assets with a median value of $5,226 


















and Stewart, 1988; Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1986; Bradley and Estrin, 1988; Strauss, 1990;
Conte and Svejnar, 1990).
Table. 2.7. Cumulative Growth of Employee Ownership Plans, 1974-1989
















Source: NCEO, in ROSEN, Corey, and YOUI'TG, Karen M. (Editors), Understanding Employee Ownership,
ILR Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991, p.20.
Table 2.7 shows the growth of ESOPs and ESOP-like plans in the United States between
1975 and 1989. According to the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), the
number of employee ownership plans has grown from 1,601 covering 248,000 employees in
1975 to 10,237 covering over 11.5 million employees in 1989 in the USA. The number of
plans is growing continuously. NCEO reported that "the number of ESOPs in the United
States has been growing at a rate of 600 to 800 additional plans annually since 1974 when the
idea first took hold" (Eisman, 1989, p.5O).
ESOPs exist in all types and sizes of companies (Feinberg, 1989; Marsh and McAllister,
1981; Klein, 1987; McElrath and Rowan, 1992), excluding those with fewer than 15 to 20
employees, as the legal costs are too high for them (Rosen, 1991). Gilbert (1987) stated that
"to be well-suited to have an ESOP, a company should be mid-sized or larger" (p.101). The
Journal of Corporation Law survey in 1980 reported that 37% of ESOPs employ fewer than


















Table 2.8). As can be seen from Table 2.8 most ESOPs (38%) are set up in companies
employing between 100 and 500 people. ESOPs are more common in private companies;
only 19% of the plans are in public companies.
Table 2.8. Company Status and Company Size
Status: Public (N = 43)
Private (N = 186)

















*In terms of the number of company employees.
Source: Marsh, Thomas R., and McAllister, Dale E., "ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee
Stock Ownership Plans", The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.6, No.3, Spring 1981, p.589.
Table 2.9. Company Size Among Public Companies
% of Sample
Size*: 10-50 (N=3) 7%
51-100 (N=2) 5%




*In terms of the number of company employees.
Source: Marsh, Thomas R., and McAllister, Dale E., "ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee
Stock Ownership Plans", The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.6, No.3, Spring 1981, p.590.
The survey found that among the companies that responded, and had three or more years of
experience with either a leveraged or a nonleveraged ESOP, the public companies are
generally much larger in terms of the number of employees than the private companies.






















more than 500 employees while oniy fifteen percent of the companies fall within that 
classification" (p.589). (See Tables 2.9 and 2.10.) 
Table 2.10. Company Size Among Private Companies -
% of Sample 
Size*: 10-50 (N=34) 18% 
51-100 (N=46) 25% 
101-500 (N=77) 42% 
501-1000 (N=19) 10% 
1001+ (N=10) 5% 
Total (N = 186) 100% 
* In terms of the number of company employees. 
Source: Marsh, Thomas R., and McAllister, Dale E., "ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans", The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.6, No.3, Spring 1981, p.590. 
ESOPs are more common in manufacturing and finance sectors. About 43% of all plans are in 
manufacturing, finance, real estate, and insurance (of which 30% are in manufacturing, and 
13% in finance, real estate, and insurance) while only 24% of ESOPs are in the wholesale and 
retail trade (Rosen, 1991). 
Table 2.11. Reasons Companies Formed ESOPs 
Reason Percentage 
Provide an employee benefit 91 
Tax advantages 74 
Improve productivity 70 
Buy stock of major owner 38 
Reduce turnover 36 
Transfer majority ownership 32 
Raise capital 24 
Decrease absenteeism 14 
Avoid unionization 8 
Avoid hostile takeover 5 
Save family company 4 
Exchange for wage concessions 3 
Take company private 1 
Source: Rosen, C. (1991) Employee Ownership: Performance, Prospects, and Promise. In Rosen, C., and 
Young, K. M. (Eds.) Understanding Employee Ownership, ILR Press, Ithaca, New York. pp.1-43. 
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The General Accounting Office conducted a survey in which it asked companies why they 
established ESOPs. Table 2.11 shows the reasons. As can be seen from the table, tax 
incentives, although important, are only one reason for establishing plans. Before ESOP tax 
incentives were created, there was little employee ownership in the United States. ESOPs are 
seldom introduced to save failing companies or to avoid hostile takeovers, although "these are 
the reasons most frequently reported in the press" (Rosen, 1991, p.20). 
Although there are only a small number of ESOPs in which employees hold a majority or all 
of the stock, the number is increasing continuously. There were approximately 700 such plans 
in 1987 in the USA (Quarter, 1989). Prolman (1995) stated that "today, more workers own 
employer stock than ever before." He reported that according to the National Center for 
Employee Ownership (NCEO), 5.8% of corporate equity now is controlled by employee 
ownership plans in the United States. It is clear that ESOPs have been proliferating 
continuously in the USA. 
Types of ESOPs 
There are four basic types of ESOPs: leveraged, non-leveraged, leverageable, and tax credit 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986; Perry and Kegley, 1990; D'art, 1992). 
Leveraged ESOP: The unique characteristic of the leveraged ESOP is that it can set up an 
employee stock ownership trust (ESOT), which can borrow money from lending institutions 
for the purpose of buying stock of the employer (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986; D'art, 
1992). A leveraged ESOP trust can easily borrow money from lending institutions, as the 
repayment of the loan can be guaranteed by an employer that sets up a leveraged ES OP. 
When loan installments come due, the employer makes contributions to the ESOP trust in an 
amount that will allow the trust to pay the loan (Marsh and McAllister, 1981). (See Figure 
2.1.) 
The ESOP trust must use the proceeds of the loan to purchase stock from the company or 
from other shareholders (Perry and Kegley, 1990; Marsh and McAllister, 1981). The proceeds 






1981). The shares acquired are used as collateral for the loan and held in a suspense account 
by the ESOP trust. The shares can be allocated to the individual accounts of participants only 
when the loan is repaid (Kalish, 1987). 
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Source: D'Ai-t, D. (1992). Economic Democracy and Financial Participation: A comparative study, Routledge, 
London, p.98. 
Perry and Kegley (1990) stated that if companies use this method of financing, they will 
obtain two significant tax advantages. First, "the company can deduct its payments (including 
interest) because the ESOP is considered by the IRS to be a 'tax-qualified' stock 
bonus/money purchase pension plan" (Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990, p.38). Second, 
financial institutions and regulated investment companies are allowed to exclude 50% of their 
taxable income on the interest earned from loans to ESOPs (Smith, Lazarus and Kalkstein, 
1990; Perry and Kegley, 1990). Therefore lenders are encouraged to decrease the interest rate 
on loans to ESOPs below prevailing market rates. Because of these two tax advantages of 
leveraged ESOPs, companies can reduce their total borrowing costs compared with 
conventional debt financing (Perry and Kegley, 1990). 
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Leverageable and non-leveraged ESOPs: Leverageable ESOPs are those that are permitted 
to contract debt but that have not done so by a given date (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986; 
Perry and Kegley, 1990), while non-leveraged ESOPs are not allowed to do this. "A non-
leveraged ESOP is not designed to borrow money from lending institutions" (Marsh and 
McAllister, 1981, p.55'7). Both the non-leveraged and leverageable ESOPs can create 
employee ownership through a company's contribution of stock or cash to an ESOP trust 
(Blasi, 1990). Although these plans do not take advantage of the "leveraging incentives for 
equity financing of plant and equipment modernization or debt refinancing" (Perry and 
Kegley, 1990), companies may set them up to "take a tax deduction, within certain limits, 
equivalent to the current fair market value of the stock, or the money to buy stock, 
contributed to the ESOP" (Perry and Kegley, 1990, p.73). If employer contributions to the 
non-leveraged ESOP are in the form of newly issued stock, the company obtains a substantial 
tax savings and increases its liquidity (D'art, 1992). The non-leveraged ESOP does not hold 
the shares in a suspense account. The shares are allocated immediately to the accounts of 
participating employees as they are contributed by the company (Kalish, 1987, p.1 12). 
Tax credit ESOPs: The tax credit ESOP - 'most recently known as a TRAESOP or 
PAYSOPs' (Broderick and Mitchell, 1987; a BNA Special Report, 1987) - was created in the 
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, which allowed participants to gain an ownership interest in their 
employer at little or no cost to the employer (Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Blanchllower and 
Oswald, 1986). Employers are able to claim an investment tax credit for contributions to a tax 
credit ESOP. Blanchflower and Oswald (1986) reported that: 
From 1975-1982 the credit was based upon an employer's eligible investment; a I per cent 
credit could be claimed for contributions up to that amount and an additional 0.5 per cent 
could be claimed for contributions that matched employees' contributions up to that amount. 
Since 1983, a credit of 0.5 per cent of employee payroll has been allowed. (p.18) 
Revisions of the tax code in 1986 took away the tax subsidy for PAYSOPs (Broderick and 
Mitchell, 1987). 
2.1.3. Employee Savings Plans in the USA 
Employee savings plans emerge under a variety of names. They may be called savings plans, 
thrift plans, incentive plans, investment plans, or they may include all or some of these or 
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other names in the title of the plan (Perry and Kegley, 1990; Latta, 1979). The main 
specification of a savings plans is that both employee and employer should make a 
contribution to the plan. Another fundamental requirement of such plans is that the employee 
should be free to decide whether he wants to participate in the plan or not. If he wants to 
participate, he should contribute regularly a predetermined percentage of his wages or salary 
to an account. The company then may or may not match all or part of the employee's 
contribution, and the combined sum is invested by the fund in various ways, such as in 
company stock, bonds, money market funds, or other investment choices. In order to take tax 
advantages, "savings plans must be qualified as, and meet the requirements of, either a profit 
sharing plan, a stock bonus plan, or a money-purchase pension plan" (Perry and Kegley, 
1990, p.57). Since the law and the regulations permit more flexibility to profit sharing plans, 
generally savings plans are fitted to profit sharing plans (Cosloy and Perlmuter, 1987). 
Although a savings plan may be qualified as a profit sharing plan, it should be distinguished 
from profit sharing plans. Under the typical profit-sharing plan employees are not required to 
make contributions, and the company makes contributions in terms of profit levels. In savings 
plans, the employer makes contributions as a function of the level of the employee's 
contribution. Savings plans are aimed at encouraging employee thrift and at attracting a 
productive workforce. Profit sharing plans are not designed to encourage employee thrift, 
although they may help to attract employees to the sponsoring company. 
Savings plans should also be distinguished from stock ownership plans on two basic points. 
First, in the both plans, the employee obtains assets that have been made available to him. 
But, under a stock ownership plan, he usually receives them in the form of stock in his 
employing company, while in a savings plan, he generally receives them either as a lump sum 
or as cash installments. Second, although employee contribution is the basic requirement of a 
savings plan, such requirement is rare in stock ownership plans. 
The enactment of section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1978 was one of the most 
important developments for savings plans. Perry and Kegley (1990) stated that "when section 
401(k) was added to the Internal Revenue Code, it was easier to give employees a choice of 
receiving a cash distribution or choosing to defer earnings (and taxes). The most attractive 
feature of such plans is that they provide employees with the opportunity to save for 
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retirement on a 'pre-tax' basis. Another advantage is that they provide for tax deferred growth 
of income on the employee and company contributions. Prior to this, all contributions were 
on an after tax basis only" (p.58). 401(k) plans are provided by approximately 90% of 
companies in the US with 5,000 or more employees. 
2.2. Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the UK 
In this section, the development of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes in 
the UK will be analyzed. First the historical development of the schemes will be analyzed. 
Then, types of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes currently in operation in 
the UK will be explained. 
2.2.1. The Historical Development of the Schemes in the UK 
The historical development of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes in the 
UK will be analyzed in two periods: prior to 1970 and after 1970. 
Prior to 1970 
Profit sharing and employee share ownership are not new ideas or innovations in the UK 
(Hanson, 1965, 1986; Bell, 1980; Bell and Hanson, 1984; Baddon, et al., 1989; Greenhill, 
1990; IDS Study 641, 1998; Wilson, 1992). They have a long history in Britain (Beacham, 
1979; Fogarty and White, 1988; Bakan, 1995), and at the extreme may be traced back to the 
earlier operation of produce-sharing in agriculture, fishing, and mining (Creigh et al., 1981). 
The schemes, however, have become more popular in recent years (Bolton, 1997), especially 
over the past 20 years (IDS Study 641, 1998). Profit sharing was regarded by several 
prominent economists, such as W.S. Jevons and J.M. Keynes, "as a means of inducing greater 
cooperation between capital and labour and/or better economic performance by business 
firms" (Hanson and Watson, 1990, p.166). In 1870 Jevons stated that "the sharing of profits 
is one of those apparently obvious inventions at the simplicity of which men will wonder in 
an after-age" (Jevons 1883). In the Yellow Book (Britain's Industrial Future, 1928) the 
authors of Book 3, including Hubert Henderson, J.M. Keynes, and Dennis Robertson, wrote 
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that "we think it of great importance that the system of profit-sharing should be extended as 
widely and rapidly as possible, and we have given much thought to the possibilities of 
bringing pressure to bear for this purpose" (p.203). As they considered that the purposes of 
profit sharing must be clear, they stated that: 
The real purpose of profit sharing, in conjunction with the system of organized consultation..., 
is to show that the worker is treated as a partner, and that the division of the proceeds of 
industry is not a mystery concealed from him, but is based upon known and established rules 
to which he is a party". (p.199) 
In the UK, the first recorded profit sharing scheme was begun by Lord Waliscourt on his 
farms in Gaiway in 1829 (Bell and Hanson, 1989; Donaldson and Hawthorn, 1981; Long, 
1996), but "this was an isolated case and no further schemes came into existence until 1865" 
(Bell and Hanson, 1989, p.8). Although the first profit sharing scheme was started in 1829, it 
was the only scheme which was introduced between 1829 and 1865. Because of this 
Metzberg (1966) stated that the first recorded developments took place in 1865, the year in 
which Henry Briggs, Son and Company, a colliery firm in Yorkshire, started its short-lived 
profit sharing plan. Therefore the period between 1865 and 1873 is regarded as the first epoch 
of development, and profit sharing and other forms of industrial partnership were introduced 
by at least 25 employers in Britain in this period (Brannen, 1983; Long, 1996; Poole, 1989). 
Poole (1989) stated that "there can be little doubt that 'philanthropic' managements were 
partly responsible for the emergence of the early schemes" (p.9). After all, the period of 
expansion of profit sharing has closely paralleled the increase of welfare provisions within 
companies, and experimentation in employee fmancial participation occurred only in firms in 
which the employer's 'social conscience' had been stimulated (Melling, 1983; Poole, 1989). 
Increasing trade union activity, favourable economic conditions and industrial disputes 
coincided with the early advance of profit sharing and employee share ownership (Ramsay, 
1977; Church, 1971). 
Between 1865 and 1970 profit sharing continued to spread slowly, but in the 1 970s the rate of 
growth quickened perceptibly. The increase in the number of schemes between 1829 and 












Table 2.12. The Number of Profit Sharing Schemes between 1829 and 1919 
Year/period No. of schemes No. of schemes No. of schemes 
started which had ceased still operating 
toexistbyl9l9 in1919 
1829 
1865-69 17 15 2 
1870-79 18 12 6 
1880-89 49 38 11 
1890-99 100 84 16 
1900-09 79 32 47 
1910-19 116 19 100 
Total 380 198 182* 
*Includjng six schemes described as suspended. 
Source: Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom, HMSO 1920, Cmnd 544, 
pp.9-10. In Bell, ID Wallace and Charles G. Hanson, Profit Sharing And Profitability (How Profit Sharing 
Promotes Business Success), Kogan Page, London, 1989, p.8. 
After the 1865-1873 period, the years 1889-1892, 1908-1909, 1912-1914 and 1919-1920 
were also fruitful periods for new schemes (Metzberg, 1966; Bell and Hanson, 1989; Poole, 
1986, 1988), while 1893-1907 was regarded as a. period of quiescence (Bell and Hanson, 
1989). In Britain, the next stage of advance of profit sharing occurred between 1889 and 
1892. At least 88 schemes were introduced in that period. Poole (1989) stated that "these later 
practices were undoubtedly affected by structural changes in management manifested in the 
rise of employers' organizations and the ascendancy of a determined managerial leadership" 
(p.10). Business welfare policies created to secure the loyalty of the workforce, to maintain 
managerial legitimacy, and to assert workplace control also affected the expansion of profit 
sharing and employee share ownership (Melling, 1983; Poole 1989). This period and the 
periods of activity for profit sharing in 1908-1909 and 1912-1914 also coincided with periods 
of relative economic buoyancy, good employment, industrial unrest, and trade union advance 
(Poole, 1989; Rarnsay and Haworth, 1984; Bell and Hanson, 1989). 
In the early twentieth century, profit sharing was particularly popular in the gas industry, with 
37 gas companies introducing schemes between 1908 and 1914, but was thinly spread among 
both farmers and manufacturers (Heller, 1984; Bell and Hanson, 1989). Burnt, Dennison, 
Gay, Heilman, and Kendal (1918) explained the reason for popularity of profit sharing in the 
gas industry: 
Some phases of the gas industry seem to be of a similar nature. Here are employed a large 





and others, many of whom are engaged in the performance of tasks the measurement of which 
would be difficult or impossible. The joint results of their efforts is the gas produced. This 
characteristic of the gas industry is perhaps one reason why it has been a fruitful field for the 
use of profit sharing. (pp. 22-23). 
According to the 'Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United 
Kingdom', published in 1912 by the British Board of Trade, 28,246 employees of English gas 
companies were employed under profit sharing and cooperative plans. The South 
Metropolitan Gas Company is probably the most widely known enterprise of this sort in 
England (Burnt et aL, 1918). 
Table 2.13. The Distribution of Profit-Sharing Schemes by Broad Industry Groups 
Industry Group Number of Persons Number of 
Number of Schemes Employed Participants 
Agriculture, forestiy, fishing 4 191 180 
Mining and quarrying and treatment of 17 49,855 30,105 
non-metalliferaus mining products 
other than coal 
Chemicals and allied trades 26 141,330 105,577 
Metal manufacture 9 25,389 12,526 
Engineering, shipbuilding and 57 91,000 39,521 
electrical goods 
Vehicles 8 55,782 35,800 
Metal goods not elsewhere specified 6 3,178 2,164 
Precision instruments, jewellery, etc. 4 9,555 9,316 
Textiles 30 23,968 13,874 
Leather, leather goods and fur, clothing 22 30,726 15,195 
Food, drink, tobacco 22 39,022 28,719 
Manufacture of wood and cork, paper 33 21,406 9,944 
and printing 
Other manufacturing industries 9 6,880 3,522 
Building and contracting 7 3,124 982 
Gas, electricity and water supply 4 599 491 
Transport and communication, 29 28,717 21,047 
distributive trades 
Insurance, banking and finance 10 29,672 13,308 
Professional services 7 820 589 
Miscellaneous services 6 3,232 1,932 
Total 310 564,446 344,792 
Source: "Profit-Sharing and Co-Partnership Schemes", Ministiy of Labour Gazette, May, 1956, p.166. 
However, as Table 2.13 shows, there was no single industiy predominant in the field of profit 
sharing schemes in the 1954. Although engineering, ship-building and electrical goods 
industries had the largest number of schemes (57), in terms of the number of participating 
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employees the most important group was chemicals and allied trades, in which over 100,000 
employees participated in schemes. Hanson (1965) reported that this group was dominated by 
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., which introduced the scheme in 1954. In other groups, 
fewer than 40,000 employees participated in schemes. 
As can be seen in Table 2.12, by 1919 relatively few schemes (total 182) remained in 
existence compared to the number of those which had ceased to exist (total 198). Because of 
this, in the 1920 Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-partnership in the UK, a comment 
was made that "the most noticeable feature in the statistics of the profit sharing and co-
partnership movement in this country as a whole is the large proportion of schemes which 
have ceased to exist" (Hilton, 1920). Although many profit sharing schemes had ceased to 
exist, the schemes continued to grow. 
Immediately after the First World War, there was a substantial increase in profit sharing 
schemes. The significant increase in the adoption of schemes occurred in 1919 and 1920. 
Sixty-two schemes were introduced in 1919 and 58 in 1920 in firms such as Bryant and May, 
Westminster and Parr's Bank, and the Distiller's Company (Poole, 1989). It is estimated that 
there were about a quarter of a million employees eligible to participate in a scheme in 1929 
(Estrin et aL, 1987; Smith, 1993). 
During the recession of the I 930s the rate of adoption of profit sharing fell considerably 
(Estrin et al., 1987). However it should be noted that despite this decrease the number of 
existent schemes was significantly higher throughout the 193 Os than in the period of 1910-
1920. In Britain there were approximately 300 to 400 profit sharing schemes in 1936 (Reilly, 
1978). 
Following the Second World War, a further period of growth in profit sharing and employee 
shareholding took place, accompanying the more favourable economic conditions of the 
period. However, as can be seen in Tables 2.13 and 2.14, the growth was slow (Reilly, 1978; 
Bell and Hanson, 1989), so that a survey by the Ministry of Labour (now the Department of 
Employment) in 1955 indicated that at the end of 1954, 297 companies were operating 310 
profit sharing schemes. The total number of employees in the 297 companies amounted to 
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564,446 and only a total of 345,000 employees (or 61% of the total number of employees) 
were participating in the schemes. So, it appears that only 1.5% (or about one in 70) of the 
working population were participating in these schemes (Hanson, 1965; Bell and Hanson, 
1989). 
Table 2.14. The Growth of Profit Sharing in the UK 1894-1954 
1894 1912 1919 1938 1954 
No. of companies 101 133 164 256 297 
No. of companies 28,269 106,189 243,050 386,000 564,446 
No. of companies - - - 219,200 344,792 
Source: Official Reports on Profit Sharing 1897 (Cmnd 7458), 1912 (Cmnd 6496), and 1920 (Cmnd 544) 
and Ministiy of Labour Gazette, August 1939 and May 1956. In Bell, D Wallace and Charles G. Hanson, Profit 
Sharing and Profitability (How Profit Sharing Promotes Business Success), Kogan Page, London, 1989, p.9. 
Hanson (1965) mentioned three main reasons why the numbers participating in profit sharing 
schemes fell short of the total numbers employed in the companies concerned: 
First, a few schemes apply only to 'staff, i.e. salaried employees; secondly, there are limiting 
qualifications such as age and length of service; and thirdly, several schemes cover only 
employees who are able and willing to deposit savings or to purchase shares (p.333). 
After 1970 
Prior to 1978, in the UK, there were a limited number of profit sharing plans, as there were no 
substantial tax incentives to stimulate the adoption of such plans. Some of the companies 
supporting the plans were foreign companies, such as Hewlett-Packard and Kodak, with 
facilities in Britain to which company-wide profit sharing was extended. A few share option 
and share purchase plans also existed prior to 1978. Under these plans employees could easily 
convert the shares into cash as soon as they received them since there usually were no 
conditions attached to prevent employees from disposing of the shares. 
However, since 1978, successive British Finance Acts have provided extra tax incentives arid 
made significant changes to create the modern advance of profit sharing and employee share 
ownership in Britain, notably the Finance Acts of 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1985 
(Beaumont and Harris, 1995; Bradley and Estrin, 1988; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986; 
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Florkowski, 1991; Poole, 1986, 1988, 1989; IDS Study 641, 1998; Marchington, 1987; 
Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor, 1990; Mukhopadhyay, 1988). Durso and Rothblatt (1991) stated 
that "Britain has passed legislation promoting employee ownership, or employee share 
ownership plans" (p. 169). The available evidence clearly shows the quite noticeable growth 
of such schemes in Britain throughout the 1980s (Miliward, Stevens, Smart, and Hawes, 
1992), with further evidence suggesting that such growth has been stimulated by the 
availability of these tax incentives (Smith, 1993). More recently, the new Labour government 
has put forward the idea of "stakeholding", which would mean increased employee 
involvement and financial participation in the companies for which they work (IDS Study 
641, 1998). 
There are three main groups of employee share schemes which acquire tax advantages: the 
Finance Act of 1978 introduced 'approved all-employee share schemes', the Finance Act of 
1980 introduced 'approved all-employee savings-related share option schemes', and the 
Finance Act of 1984 introduced 'approved discretionary share option schemes' (Bradley and 
Geib, 1986; Poole, 1987; Blanchflower, 1991). Under the Finance Act of 1987 a fourth tax-
beneficial scheme, profit related pay, was introduced (Baddon et a!., 1989; Blanchflower, 
1991). ESOPs stemmed from the 1989 Finance Act (Ramsay, 1991). 
2.2.2. Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership Schemes Currently in Operation 
in the UK 
There are a rich variety of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes currently in 
operation in the UK and they can be broadly classified as follows: 
1. Approved Profit Sharing Schemes (APS) 
2. Savings Related Share Option Schemes 
3. Discretionary Share Option Schemes 
4. Profit Related Pay (PRP) 
5. Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
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Approved Profit Sharing Schemes (APS) 
Although some major firms, such as Vauxhall Motors (1935) and ICI (1954), introduced 
profit sharing, the growth of the scheme remained erratic and slow until 1970 (Hanson, 
1986). Then in the 1 970s profit sharing gained popularity so that by the end of that decade it 
had been introduced by some of Britain's best known and most profitable companies. Bell 
and Hanson (1989) stated that "the period between 1974 and 1980 was the period when profit 
sharing in Britain finally came of age" (p.14). 
The government wanted to promote profit sharing schemes in the UK and the Inland Revenue 
approved profit sharing schemes were established under the 1978 Finance Act (Torrington 
and Hall, 1987; Poole and Whitfield, 1994), and came into operation in March 1979 (Smith, 
1993). The aim of the profit sharing provisions of the Finance Act of 1978 was to persuade 
employees to retain shares received as a profit sharing bonus, thereby making them owners as 
well as employees in the company they work for. 
Breakwell (1983) stated that "in the 1978 Finance Act the then Labour Government made 
new tax concessions available for all employees whose employer companies were willing to 
introduce an 'approved' form of profit sharing scheme" (p.3). These tax concessions are 
available to all companies regardless of any organizational and industrial relations 
characteristics. In order to provide income tax concessions, the plans must be approved by 
Inland Revenue. Therefore, these plans are called 'Approved Deferred Share Trusts' (ADST) 
or 'Inland Revenue Approved Profit Sharing' (APS) schemes. According to Hanson and 
Watson (1990) the main aim of the UK government in the 1978 Finance Act when 
introducing these tax concessions was, as Blanchilower and Oswald (1987) termed it, the 
'morale and productivity argument'. Bamett (1978) believes that profit sharing will help to 
improve efficiency and productivity and, therefore, the effectiveness of the corporate sector as 
a whole. 
Although the tax concessions for share-based profit sharing contained in the Finance Act 
encouraged companies to introduce the scheme, it should be noted that they were not the sole 
cause of expansion of the scheme in the 1970s. Previous to the Finance Act of 1978, the 
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scheme was introduced by a number of leading companies, such as Owen Owen (1974) and 
Marks and Spencer (1977) (Latta, 1979). Furthermore, all four of the major clearing banks in 
England had introduced profit sharing by 1978: National Westminster and Barclays 
introduced the scheme in 1974 (Latta, 1979); Lloyds and Midland followed, introducing the 
scheme in 1977 and 1978, respectively. However, in the Finance Act 1978, the provision of 
tax concessions for approved profit sharing is regarded as "a landmark in the history of profit 
sharing in Britain" (Bell and Hanson, 1989). 
In the 1 980s, the growth in profit sharing and employee ownership schemes is related to the 
introduction and extension of legislation sanctioning various forms of tax relief on the gains 
from employee share ownership schemes approved for tax relief purposes by the Inland 
Revenue (Smith, 1993). Blanchflower (1991) reported that when a number of state-run 
enterprises were privatized by the Thatcher government, employees in these organizations, 
such as British Telecom and British Gas, were "given preferential treatment in acquiring 
shares" (p.3). Therefore, Smith (1993) stated that privatisation and other broader changes 
which occurred in Britain in the 1980s, such as increased competitive pressures, product 
market competition, structural changes, and rapid technological change, have also played a 
crucial role in the growth of the schemes in the UK. 
Table 2.15 shows submissions to and approvals by the Inland Revenue of all-employee share-
based profit sharing schemes between April 1978 and March 1987. 
Table 2.15. Submissions to and Approvals by the Inland Revenue of All-Employee Share-Based Profit Sharing 
Schemes, 1978-87 
Submitted Dropped Approved 
Period Annual Cumulative Cumulative Annual Cumulative 
total total total total total 
April 1978-March 1979 96 96 - 3 3 
April 1979-March 1980 132 228 - 114 117 
April 1980-March 1981 99 327 - 93 210 
April 1981-March 1982 73 400 - 68 278 
April 1982-March 1983 76 476 89 66 344 
April 1983-March 1984 76 552 107 48 392 
April 1984-March 1985 83 635 116 70 462 
April 1985-March 1986 98 733 135 70 532 
April 1986-March 1987 112 845 144 102 634 
Source: "Inland Revenue", In Bell, D Wallace and Charles G. Hanson, Profit Sharing and ProfItability (How 








The initial surge of interest in ADST schemes was in 1979/80, the first full year of their 
operation, when 117 schemes were approved by the Inland Revenue. The main reason for this 
interest was that in order to take advantage of the tax concessions offered after 1978 for 
Inland Revenue approved trusts (Bell and Hanson, 1984), many companies, such as ICI, 
which already had profit sharing plans, shifted to ADST plans or "introduced an approved 
scheme to run alongside their previous scheme" (Bell and Hanson, 1989, p.1 7). Therefore, 
after the initial rapid growth of ADST profit sharing plans, the growth rate decreased 
throughout the early part of the 1 980s. The number of new schemes declined to as low as 48 
in the year to March 1984. However, the recessions of the early I 980s would have played a 
significant part in stifling the growth of new schemes in these years (IDS Study 468, October 
1990). 
Table 2.16. Total Number of Profit Sharing Schemes 
Year Ending Total No. of Schemes No. Approved in Year 
March 1990 890 94 
March 1991 962 77 
March 1992 1,015 37 
March 1993 1,076 61 
March 1994 1,111 -
Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 583, Income Data Services Ltd., August 1995, 
p.3. 
Similarly, when the economy recovered, the number of new approved schemes again grew, 
over 100 new schemes being approved in 1986/1 987 and in 1987/1988. With the recession of 
the early 1 990s the number of new schemes declined once more. As can be seen in Table 
2.16, seventy-seven schemes were approved in the year ending March 1991, 61 in 1993 and 
only 37 in 1992. 
As Table 2.17 shows there is still a very limited number of participants to whom shares have 
been allocated each year under ADST schemes. In the 13 full years for which data are 
available in the table the number of participants receiving shares under ADST schemes has 
increased by only just over three-fold, from 225,000 in 1979/1980 to 730,000 in 1991/1992, 
while the number of schemes has increased nearly nine-fold in the same period, from 117 in 
1979/1980 to a total of 1,015 at the end of 1991/1992. 
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Table 2.17. Employee Share Schemes: Profit Sharing Schemes Approved under the Finance Act of 1978
Year Number approved Number of participants Initial market Averager value Cost of
in year receiving share value of shares of income tax
allocations in year appropriated appropriation relief
per participants
(revised) '000 £million £ £million
1979-80 117 225 50 220 15
1980-81 93 350 67 190 20
1981-82 68 300 64 210 20
1982-83 63 285 73 260 20
1983-84 49 300 79 260 25
1984-85 70 580 170 290 50
1985-86 68 360 180 500 50
1986-87 105 780 270 350 75
1987-88 108 600 270 450 70
1988-89 66 850 350 410 85
1989-90 94 900 430 480 100
1990-91 77 890 420 470 100
1991-92 37 730 330 450 80
Total 1,015 2,750
Source: Poole, Michael, and Whitfield, Keith, "Theories and Evidence on the Growth and Distribution of Profit
Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes", Human Systems Management, Vol.13, No.3, 1994, p.213.
Table 2.18. Number of Employees Allocated Shares









Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 583, Income Data Services Ltd., August 1995,
p.3.
As Table 2.18 indicates, in 1992/1993 under approved profit sharing schemes, around
740,000 employees were receiving shares. This is the same as the number allocated shares in
1991/1992. The numbers have decreased substantially from the peak of 900,000 in
1989/1990. According to the Inland Revenue, at April 1996 there were 855 'live' approved









shares in 1995/96 under approved profit sharing schemes. As can be seen from Table 2.19, 
this is the same number as in the financial years 1991/92 and 1992/93. However, the average 
value of appropriation per participant was £640 for 1995/96, which is the highest so far. In 
terms of tax relief, the cost was £110 million, also higher than previous years. Following the 
reduction in tax relief for profit related pay (PRP) announced as part of the November 1996 
budget, the number of new approved profit sharing schemes may increase over the next few 
years as companies move away from PRP to approved profit sharing schemes to retain the tax 
relief. 
Table 2.19. The Average Value of Shares Allocated is Growing 
Average value per 
No. of employees participant Income tax relief 
Year allocated shares () ( million) 
1991/92 740,000 460 80 
1992/93 740,000 420 75 
1993/94 700,000 490 80 
1994/95 640,000 550 85 
1995/96 740,000 640 110 
Source: "Inland Revenue Statistics", 1997. In IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 641, 
Income Data Services Ltd., January 1998, p.6. 
Savings Related Share Option Schemes 
The Finance Act of 1980 contained approved savings-related share option schemes and 
specifically included provision for tax concessions for employee share schemes linked to 
SAYE contracts (Poole, 1989; Poole and Whitfield, 1994). Savings related share option plans 
are similar to savings plans in the United States and are often referred to as SAYE share 
option plans. These plans are adjusted by the Finance Act of 1980 (Wilson and Bowey, 1989) 
and are not dependent upon the profits of the employer. Under the auspices of SAYE 
schemes, employees have obtained an opportunity to buy shares in their companies "on 
favourable terms" (Ramsay, Hyman, Baddon, Hunter and Leopold, 1990, p.1 84). 
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The SAYE plans have an advantage over other types of plans in that "they require a greater 
commitment from the employees and are seen as more likely to result in a higher degree of 
personal interest in the well-being of the employer" (Perry and Kegley, 1990, p.129). 
The 1985 survey by the Department of Employment found that employers regarded both 
profit sharing and share option plans as generally successful. However, the profit sharing 
plans steadily received a higher rating than the SAYE arrangements. The success of profit 
sharing and SAYE plans was rated much higher for the more general objectives, such as 
improving employee identification with the company and improved employee understanding 
of financial issues, than were the more measurable factors such as improved productivity. 
There is some evidence that employees do not want to sell shares quickly but tend to hold 
them if the share price has not risen substantially or the employees have not left the company. 
At least, employees make no rush to sell shares as soon as they become available. A survey 
conducted in 192 companies in 1986 found that only 10% of employees sell their profit 
sharing shares within three years and only 20% within 12 months from the end of the five-
year holding period (Investors Chronicle, 1986, pA.l). 
In small, privately owned companies, share-based plans are still relatively few. A survey in 
1985 by the Department of Employment found that most of these companies had never 
seriously considered adopting approved profit sharing or share plans. A University of 
Glasgow survey in 1985 showed that "companies with more than 1,000 employees were 
significantly more likely to be operating a share scheme than smaller companies" (Baddon, 
Hunter, Hyman, Leopold and Ramsay, 1987, p.16). Reasons often mentioned were that share-
based plans are not suitable to the way these firms operate or that the management had very 
little information about share-based plans. Another assumption is that SAYE, ADST, and 
Executive schemes are widespread in large companies, especially in large publicly quoted 
companies (Poole, 1988), as they are better equipped to develop, administer, and organize the 
schemes (Baddon et al., 1987). Smith (1986) stated that "purely cash-based profit sharing 
schemes on the other hand tended to be more prevalent in smaller private companies" (p.384). 
One of the most important reasons is that cash-based and incentive schemes are regarded by 
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smaller companies as less complicated to apply and withdraw than share-based schemes
(Baddon et al., 1987).
The growth of the scheme in the UK: There is great similarity between the growth in the
total number of approved SAYE schemes and in the total number of ADST schemes in the
UK. Although ADST schemes had a two-year head start on SAYE, there were only 59 fewer
SAYE schemes than ADST schemes by 1984/85, as SAYE schemes have grown at a slightly
greater rate. The gap narrowed sharply and in 1990 there were 891 SAYE schemes, compared
with 890 ADST schemes. Since then, the total number of SAYE schemes has become larger
than the number of approved profit sharing schemes (IDS Study 583, 1995). As Table 2.20
shows, by 1991/92 the number of SAYE schemes totaled 1,058, compared with 1,015
approved profit sharing schemes (see Table 2.17). The recession of the early 1980s would
have played a significant part in depressing the spread of SAYE, certainly in 1982/83 and
1983/84 (IDS Study 468, 1990, p.9). The effects of the recession can be seen from Table
2.20. Although the number of new schemes was 115 in 1981-1982, with the recession of the
1980s seventy-eight new schemes were approved in 1982/1983 and 73 in 1983/1984. As the
economy recovered, the number of new approved schemes increased; 114 new schemes were
approved in 1985/1986.
Table 2.20. Savings-Related Share Option Schemes Approved under the Finance Act of 1980
Year Number Number of Initial value of Average value per Cost of income tax
approved in employees granted shares over which employee relief
year (revised) options during options granted
year during year
'000 £million £ £million
1980-81 22 11 18 16,000 -
1981-82 115 89 151 1,700 -
1982-83 78 95 175 1,800 -
1983-84 73 105 185 1,800 -
1984-85 114 225 560 2,500 5
1985-86 114 200 460 2,300 15
1986-87 103 290 520 1,800 50
1987-88 90 440 970 2,200 30
1988-89 101 370 740 2,000 40
1989-90 84 460 1,020 2,200 55
1990-91 81 550 1,430 2,600 100
1991-92 83 480 1,400 2,900 55
Total 1,058 7,600
Source: Poole, Michael, and Whitfield, Keith, "Theories and Evidence on the Growth and Distribution of Profit

























As can be seen from Table 2.21, there were 1,257 SAYE schemes in the UK in March 1994.
According to the Inland Revenue, at April 1996 there were 1,305 savings related share option
schemes (IDS Study 641, 1998). There was a slight rise in the number of schemes in 1994/95
with 144 new schemes and 116 new schemes in the year 1995/96. The total number of
savings related share option schemes has been higher than the number of approved profit
sharing schemes since 1990.
Table 2.21. Total Number of SAYE Schemes
Year Ending Total No. of Schemes No. Approved in Year
March 1990 891 84
March 1991 972 81
March 1992 1,058 83
March 1993 1,153 95
March 1994 1,257 -
Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 583, Income Data Services Ltd., August 1995,
p.4.
Table 2.22. Options Granted under SAYE Schemes









Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 583, Income Data Services Ltd., August 1995,
p.4.
Table 2.23. The Rising Cost of Income Tax Relief
Average value per Income tax relief
No. of employees granted employee
Year options () ( million)
1991/92 480,000 2,900 55
1992/93 590,000 3,200 90
1993/94 480,000 2,700 120
1994/95 550,000 2,900 120
1995/96 610,000 3,200 270
Source: "Inland Revenue Statistics", 1997.. In IDS Study, "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Study 641,
Income Data Services Ltd., January 1998, p.13.
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Although the number of employees granted options increased from 200,000 in 1985/86 (see
Table 2.22) to 610,000 in 1995/96 (see Table 2.23), the number of participants in savings
related schemes has always been smaller than in profit sharing schemes. According to IDS
Study 641, published in 1998, this is because not only do employees have to save their own
money but they also had to enter five- or seven-year savings contracts. The number for the
year 1996/97 may, however, increase following the introduction of three-year savings
contracts.
Discretionary (Executive) Share Option (ESO) Schemes
Despite the slow development of all-employee profit sharing schemes since 1978, there was a
sharp increase in the number of executive share option schemes since 1978, as senior
executives hurried, even stampeded, to obtain substantial tax concessions (Hanson, 1986).
Although from 1978 to June 1986 562 all-employee profit sharing schemes were approved,
the number of executive share options schemes approved from 1984 to June 1986 were 1,676.
Hanson (1986) stated that "these figures provide a remarkable contrast between the speed at
which directors can move in their own financial interests and their astonishingly casual
approach to the financial interests of employees as a whole" (i.13).
Table 224. Employee Share Schemes: Discretionary Share Option Schemes Approved under the Finance Act
of 1984
Year Number Number of Initial value of Average value per Cost of income tax
approved in employees granted shares over which employee relief
year (revised) options during options granted
year during year
'000 £million £ £million
1984-85 208 50 800 16,000 -
1985-86 1,259 50 870 17,000 -
1986-87 772 55 1,150 21,000 -
1987-88 746 90 1,800 20,000 55
1988-89 855 90 1,660 18,000 30
1989-90 549 105 1,900 18,000 35
1990-91 395 65 1,450 22,000 40
1991-92 305 80 1,350 18,000 45
Total 5,089 10,980
Source: Poole, Michael, and Whitfield, Keith, "Theories and Evidence on the Growth and Distribution of Profit
Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes", Human Systems Management, Vol.13, No.3, 1994, p.213.
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As can be seen from Table 2.24, from 1984-85 to 1991-92 there were a total of 5,089 
approved discretionary share option schemes, compared with 1,058 approved savings related 
share option schemes (from 1980-81 to 1991-92) and 1,015 approved profit sharing schemes 
(from 1979-80 to 1991-92). Although the number of executive share option schemes is far 
greater than the SAYE and profit sharing schemes in the UK, very few people participate in 
them. In the majority of companies operating the schemes fewer than 50 employees have 
these share options (Grout, 1987). 
IDS Study 641, published in 1998, reported that in April 1996 there were a total of 4,486 
approved discretionary and company share options. The number of new schemes approved 
annually peaked in 1994/95 at 488, while the number of new schemes decreased slightly to 
347 in 1995/96. 
The average value of options per employee was highest in 1993/94 at £25,000. There was a 
sharp increase in the number of employees to whom options were granted in 1995/96, 
although the average value per employee was lower. According to IDS Study 641, in part, 
this could represent the impact of the grocery chain ASDA introducing an all-employee share 
option scheme to around 52,000 employees in 1995. 
Profit Related Pay (PRP) 
Profit Related Pay (PRP) stemmed from the Finance Act 1987 (Luther and Keating, 1992), 
which introduced income tax relief for employees who receive part of their wages/salaries in 
the from of PRP. The government has two main aims in stimulating employers to introduce 
PRP schemes. First, by linking a part of employees' pay to company profitability, employees 
participate in some of the benefits of the company's success as well as some of the 
responsibility if profits decrease. The government believes that, because of this 
institutionalized pay flexibility, unemployment may fall. Second, the close relationship 
between employees' pay and company profitability may operate as an incentive to greater 
employee effort and identification with the fortunes of the company (IDS Study 397, 
November 1987). PRP is a part of employees' normal pay and determined by company 
profitability. Therefore, PRP differs from previous employee financial participation schemes, 
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under which the benefits were additional to basic pay (Luther and Keating, 1992; Perry and 
Kegley, 1990). 
The Spread of PRP: The Inland Revenue published its Notes For Guidance on Tax Relief 
for Profit-Related Pay in September 1987. By the end of October 1987, 145 schemes were 
registered with the Inland Revenue, covering 26,411 employees. By the end of September 
1990, there were 1,179 existing schemes covering 229,100 employees (IDS Study 471, 
December 1990). 
The rate of growth in the number of employees covered in live PRP schemes has been 
relatively slow between 1987 and 1990. But the rate of growth increased sharply between the 
end of September 1989 and the end of December 1989. IDS Study 471, published in 
December 1990, reported that "more than a third of the jump in the number of participants 
was accounted for by the conversion to PRP by the John Lewis Partnership, which had 
32,000 eligible employees." 
According to IDS Study 471, during the period of October 1987 - September 1990, the 
average number of participants per live scheme has generally been between 140 and 200. The 
number dropped to 137 in the quarter ending in September 1988 and rose to 204 in the 
quarter ending in December 1989. The small average schemes size indicates that the majority 
of approved PRP schemes cover only a small number of employees. Luther and Keating 
(1992) stated that "organizations for which PRP has proved to be particularly attractive tend 
to be relatively small, profitable, non-unionized firms, where the staff are well paid 'closet 
entrepreneurs' "(p.65). So, PRP schemes are more common among small companies (Perry 
and Kegley, 1990). A few large companies have introduced the schemes, such as the John 
Lewis Partnership (32,000 employees), Nationwide Anglia Building Society (11,000 
employees), Gallaher (4,000 employees), Tioxide (2,000) and Northern Rock Building 
Society (1,300 employees) (IDS Study 471, 1990, pA.). 
Growth in profit related pay advanced rapidly following the government's 1991 budget, in 
which tax concessions given to employees in registered schemes doubled. The first tax relief 
60 
	
was introduced for registered schemes under the 1987 Finance Act. According to the act, 
"one half of PR? was to be free of income tax up to 20% of pay or £3,00, whichever was 
lower" (IDS Study 564, 1994, p.2). Since the 1987 Finance Act, the rules of the scheme have 
been changed under successive acts. The cash limit on the amount of PR? which can be 
eligible for tax relief increased from one-half of £3,000 to one-half of £4,000 under the 1989 
Finance Act. In the finance Act of 1991, maximum tax relief was doubled from one-half of 
£4,000 to the whole of4,000. 
The growth in profit-related pay is directly linked to the increasing tax relief reported in 
successive acts. Following the 1989 and 1991 Finance Acts, the number of registered PR? 
schemes and the number of employees covered by them have increased significantly. The 
1989 Finance Act provided the first encouragement for growth. IDS Study 520, published in 
December 1992, reported that "in the nine months to end-December 1988 the number of 
employees participating in PR? schemes rose by just 32,500, an increase of 36 per cent. But 
between end-March and end-December 1989, the number of employees participating in 
registered profit-related pay schemes jumped from 122,100 to 226,500, an increase of 85 per 
cent in nine months." 
Table 2.25. Figures for Live Registrations 
No. of Schemes No. of Employees 
end June 1988 729 103,800 
end June 1989 902 129,000 
end June 1990 1,172 233,300 
end June 1991 1,329 353,900 
end June 1992 3,066 765,800 
end June 1993 4,904 1,179,700 
end June 1994 7,486 1,856,600 
Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Related Pay", Study 564, Income Data Services Ltd., October 1994, p.4. 
Since the doubling of tax relief in 1991, the growth of registered PR? has accelerated. The 
number of employees participating in registered PR? schemes more than doubled between 
end-June 1991 and end-March 1992 (IDS Study 520, 1992). As can be seen from Table 2.25, 
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the number of registered PRP schemes increased from 1,329 to 3,066 between end-June 1991 
and end June 1992. In the six-year period for which data are available in the table, the number 
of registered PRP schemes increased more than 10 times from 729 to 7,486 between end-
June 1988 and end-June 1994. By June 1994, 1,856,600 employees were participating in 
7,486 registered PRP schemes, "representing almost one in eight of all private sector 
employees" (IDS Study 564, 1994, p.4). According to the Inland Revenue, there were more 
registered PRP schemes - 14,553 in March 1997 covering over four million employees (IDS 
Study 641, 1998). This spectacular growth in PRP is described as the pay revolution of the 
1990s (IRS Employment Review 634, 1997). 
In the next few years, however, the number of PRP schemes is expected to decrease, as in the 
November 1996 budget the Conservative government announced that tax relief for PRP 
would be phased out starting in January 1998. IDS Study 641, published in 1998, reported 
that with the gradual elimination of tax relief on PRP, employers are looking for other tax-
efficient options. The reasons for the elimination of tax relief on PRP were explained in IDS 
Study 641, 1998. According to the study, the move to abolish the tax relief was provoked by 
the rapid rise in the cost of the scheme to the taxpayer. The tax relief on a total of 14,553 live 
PRP schemes in March 1997 cost the Exchequer £1.5 billion in 1996/97 and this was set to 
double over the following years. 
IDS Study 641 reported that, currently, any PRP from a registered scheme is free of income 
tax up to the lower of £4,000 or 20% of pay. This relief will be gradually withdrawn as 
follows: 
• between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 1998, the ceiling is reduced to £2,000 
• between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 1999, the ceiling is reduced to £1,000 
• on or after January 2000, no tax relief is available. 
So, how are businesses reacting to the ending of this form of tax-efficient reward? A survey 
was conducted by the accountancy firm Arthur Andersen in March 1997 over 80 large 
companies (employing more than 1,000 people) which currently operate Inland Revenue PRP 
schemes. IRS Employment Review 634, published in 1997, summarized the findings of the 
survey. Apparently, replacements for PRP do exist, as yet there are no clear trends emerging 




















are considering reverting to pre-PRP arrangements. Among the 14% of respondents planning
on replacing PRP with share-based incentive plans, nearly half are looking at approved profit
sharing schemes. Developing new performance related pay arrangements was a popular
option among participants, with 14% mentioning this as a consideration.
Table 2.26. Recent Variations in Growth
Percentage Growth Over Previous Quarter
Quarter Schemes Employees
June 1990 -.03 0.5
September 1990 0.6 -1.8
December 1990 4.6 15.0
March 1991 3.6 32.9
June 1991 4.1 1.1
September 1991 7.1 4.7
December 1991 44.0 56.7
March 1992 26.7 23.6
June 1992 18.1 6.6
September 1992 6.6 1.9
December 1992 27.0 24.7
March 1993 11.2 19.9
June 1993 6.3 1.1
September 1993 10.2 4.1
December 1993 19.2 27.8
March 1994 9.3 14.3
June 1994 6.4 3.5
Source: IDS Study, "Profit-Related Pay", Study 564, Income Data Services Ltd., October 1994, p.4.
As mentioned before, the average scheme size was small. But as more schemes have been
registered the size of schemes has also grown. As Table 2.26 shows, there are significant
differences between the percentage growth in the number of schemes and the number of
employees. This is the indicator of change in the average size of schemes. For example,
although the net number of registered PRP schemes increased by only 3.6% in the quarter to
March 1991, the net total number of employees covered increased by 32.9% in that quarter.
The average scheme size increased from 182 employees per scheme in October 1987 to 248
employees per scheme in June 1994 (IDS Study 564, 1994, pA.).
Employee Share (Stock) Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
The first UK ESOP was established in the motorway services station organization Roadchef
in 1987 (Pendleton, McDonald, Robinson, and Wilson, 1995), and there were only one dozen
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plans, covering perhaps 12,000 employees in 1989 (European Industrial Relations Review, 
No.181, 1989, p.17). IDS Study 438 reported that only 14 companies are known to have 
introduced an ESOP until July 1989. Although the number of ESOPs is relatively low in the 
UK, it must not be forgotten that there are other methods of transferring ownership to 
employees. It should also be noted that an ESOP is not an alternative to more introduced 
employee share ownership schemes, such as the profit sharing schemes or SAYE schemes. 
ESOP can be regarded as a vehicle for increasing employee shareholding, but New Bridge 
Consultants noted that "those who had hoped ESOPs would help to widen and deepen 
employee share ownership in the UK have so far been disappointed" (IDS Study 568, 1994, 
p.2). 
In the United Kingdom, approximately one-half of the ESOPs were introduced as part of a 
management-led employee buyout. The government's privatization programme has also 
played a very important role in increasing the number of ESOPs (Pendleton et al., 1995). 
According to IDS Study 568, the growth of the use of ESOPs in medium-scale privatizations 
is regarded as the big development since 1989. "It is estimated that there have been 40 or so 
of these, about 25 being bus companies, and the rest being trust ports, local government 
services, and miscellaneous government organizations" (IDS Study 568, 1994, p.2). So, the 
spread of privatization, in the UK, has created a unique opportunity for employee ownership 
to be introduced, as it 'provides financial inducements for employees to buy shares in 
companies transferring from the public to the private domain' (Bradley and Estrin, 1988). 
The National Freight Consortium (NFC) is one of the most successful employee ownership 
efforts. When it privatized in 1982, 10,300 employees subscribed for 82.5% of the company 
(Perry and Kegley, 1990). At the same time, the government provides very crucial support to 
the ESOP concept by encouraging wider share ownership. 
Although the trade union leadership does not support privatization, they also recognise that it 
is unavoidable. As the union leadership has realized that privatization is an unstoppable 
programme, it has been forced to obtain the best deal possible for an industry's employees. 
Perry and Kegley (1990) stated that "in fact, most of the ESOPs have been planned and 
developed with assistance from Unity Trust, a trade union backed financial institution 
organized to provide an opportunity for union members to benefit from equity participation in 
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British firms" (pp.131-132). When the Yorkshire Rider Bus company was privatized late in 
1988, the largest ESOP was introduced in the United Kingdom. The People's Provincial Bus 
company was successfully privatized with an ESOP obtaining 80% of the equity and the 
employees buying the remainder as individuals in 1987 (The Economist, November 12, 1988, 
pp.90-9 1). 
Management buyouts of private companies also provide increasing possibilities for the use of 
ESOPs by managements which have an interest in involving employees in the enterprise 
(Perry and Kegley, 1990). The management buyout of KTM, one of the UK's leading 
machine tool manufacturers, is one of the first ESOPs in the UK. Unity Trust, the trade union 
bank, funded the purchase of the employer shares. If the ESOP borrowings are repaid, the 
ESOP will entitle all eligible employees to get some of its shares. Ultimately, the employees 
could obtain more than 19% of employer shares (Waller, 1988). 
Cramer (1988) reported that "ESOPs provide a solution to the problem of employees 
receiving shares and then immediately selling them at a profit" (p.27). Fluctuating or 
declining of share prices will always be a disadvantage for conventional share packages. 
However, in ESOPs, if employees sell their shares, the shares return to a trust which manages 
their distribution. So, employee shareholding cannot be destroyed even if all employees sell 
their shares. (Cramer, 1988). 
2.3. Conclusion 
Profit sharing and employee share ownership have a long history in the US and in the UK. 
Motives for introducing the schemes were mixed, but probably the main motive was the 
simple economic one of trying to unite the interests of employer and employee to their 
common advantage. 
In the 1 800s, some of the early profit sharing proposals were based on the assumption that 
profit sharing was a possible remedy to some of the social problems that accompanied 
industrialization. In the United States, due to the spread of worker unrest, profit sharing plans 
received a renewed interest during the early years of the twentieth century. At this time the 
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plans were regarded as a means of discouraging unionisation; thus the trade unions did not 
support the idea of profit sharing plans. During the stock market boom in the 192 Os, some 
employers shifted their emphasis from cash profit sharing to employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs). The use of profit sharing and ESOPs decreased during the stock market crash and 
the 1 930s Great Depression as profits disappeared and stock values dropped rapidly until just 
before World War II. 
In the US, a new growth in profit sharing started in the late 193 Os, since subsequent to the US 
Senate investigation and report on the plans, companies were encouraged through favourable 
tax legislation to introduce them for broad groups of employees. From 1945 (after World War 
II) to the 1 980s, there were a number of waves of expansion in the plans. From the early 
1980s, the rapid growth of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes in the US 
was facilitated by a favourable tax system, coupled with extensive support from the banking 
sector. For instance, in 1984 the US Congress let banks deduct half of the interest they 
received on loans to ESOPs for tax purposes. 
There are three basic forms of profit sharing plans in the US: cash-based, deferred profit 
sharing, and combination plans. The ESOP is regarded as a distinct type of share ownership 
in character. Although there have been periodic waves of interest in employee ownership, it is 
only recently the idea has received wide credibility, attention, and use. The current wave of 
interest stemmed from the work of Louis Kelso, who viewed the ESOP as the best way to 
increase employee motivation and company productivity. After a meeting with Kelso, Russell 
Long designed a number of pieces of legislation to make the use of ESOPs more attractive to 
American business. So, by providing tax breaks, United States laws created a substantial 
growth in the number of companies that have set up an ESOP. There are four basic types of 
ESOPs in the USA: leveraged, non-leveraged, leverageable, and tax credit. 
Prior to the 1 970s, there were a number of waves of development of the schemes in the 
United Kingdom. Early advances closely followed favourable economic conditions, 
increasing trade union activity, structural changes in management, good employment levels, 
and industrial unrest. 
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In the UK, until the 1 970s, profit sharing grew slowly, but recently the situation has changed. 
There has been a marked increase in profit sharing and employee share ownership, stemming 
from successive British Finance Acts, which have provided extra tax incentives and made 
significant changes to create the modern advance of the schemes in Britain. In the 1980s, 
apart from the introduction and extension of legislation, a rise in the number of management-
led employee buyouts, the government privatisation programme, and other broader changes 
which occurred in Britain, such as competitive pressures, structural changes and rapid 
technological change, have also played crucial role in the growth and development of the 
schemes in the UK. 
A rich variety of schemes are available to companies in the UK. These include approved 
profit sharing, SAYE, discretionary share option schemes, employee stock ownership plans, 
and profit related plans. 
As a result, profit sharing, ESOPs, and other forms of employee share ownership schemes 
have been growing continuously in the US and in the UK. This chapter indicated that there 
are many reasons for this growth and the development of the schemes, including: 
• The schemes can increase employee involvement and improve efficiency. 
• The schemes are regarded as a means of lessening labour problems. 
• Under the schemes, employees will work for the same goal of improving company 
performance. 
• The schemes discourage unionization and improve teamwork. 
It is expected that if employees purchase the shares, it will provide a new source of capital 
and employees will be motivated to perform better. 
If employees obtain stock and feel as co-owners of firms, their motivation can be 
increased. 
• Government tax policy makes employee ownership financially attractive to business 
owners who want to divest, businesses looking for financing, and businesses seeking a 
market for company stock. 
• Economists regarded the schemes as a means of persuading greater cooperation between 
capital and labour, and/or better economic performance by business firms. 
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'Philanthropic' managements were partly responsible for the emergence of the early 
schemes. 
• Business welfare policies affected the expansion of the schemes. 
• It is believed that the schemes will help to improve efficiency and productivity and, 
therefore, the effectiveness of the corporate sector as a whole. 
• Privatisation, competitive pressure, and structural and technological changes have also 
played an important role in the expansion of the schemes. 
In the next chapter the theory of the schemes will be reviewed. The theories behind profit 
sharing and employee share ownership were based on some of the reasons for the 
development of the schemes reviewed in this chapter. Therefore it can be said that the idea of 
the schemes has been developing continuously from the 1 980s to the present and it is likely to 
continue to develop in the future. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE THEORY BEHIND PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
In recent years, both profit sharing and employee ownership plans have attracted attention 
from researchers and policymakers (e.g., Reich, 1993; US Department of Labor, 1993) in 
most Western countries as compensation schemes with impressive potential to increase both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic performance (Long, 1992; Kruse, 1994). 
The microeconomic potential is founded on the theory that by encouraging employee 
cooperation and effort, increasing employee commitment and motivation, sharing of ideas 
and information, improving firms' ability to attract and retain good employees, and 
improving industrial relations (Bell and Hanson, 1987; Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 1988; Poole 
and Jenkins, 1990; Rosen, 1991), profit sharing and employee ownership can lead to higher 
quantity and quality of output, the significant benefits of the plans for those organizations 
carrying them out (Long, 1992; Kruse, 1994). For instance, profit sharing is often suggested 
as a key to gaining high product quality, in part because it increases teamwork, which in turn 
may be positively related to product quality (Levine and Tayson, 1990; Drago and Heywood, 
1995). 
The macroeconomic potential is founded on the 'share economy' theory that profit sharing 
results in lower unemployment, less employment fluctuation, and greater employment and 
output stability for firms and the economy as a whole by changing employer incentives to 
hire and retain employees (Kruse, 1994). At the macro level, Weitzman (1984) has suggested 
that group incentive plans, especially profit sharing, would be beneficial for the economy as a 
whole. The 'share economy' was developed primarily by Professor Martin Weitzman (1983, 
1984, 1985, 1986) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Hanson, 1986; Steel, 1986). 
Weitzman regards the share economy as a pay system in which an important part of 
employees' pay is related to some index of their company's well-being (Hanson, 1986). 
Weitzman (1984) argued that "a share system promises permanent full employment at 
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competitive remuneration, no inflation, and an improvement in working conditions and 
employer attitudes" (p. 138). 
In the literature, there are a number of economic arguments which have been suggested in 
support of, or against, profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. These 
arguments will be analyzed at both macro level (the wider economy) and micro level (at firm 
and company level). 
3.1. The Macroeconomic Effect 
It is not a new idea that profit sharing could have macroeconomic advantages. It was 
seriously discussed by a number of researchers starting in the 1 920s (Sutcliffe, 1925; Slichter, 
1939; King, 1941). But the idea gained popularity in the 1980s (Mitchell, 1982; Thurow, 
1984; Wallich, 1984; Weitzman, 1984; Meade, 1986). A number of economists have recently 
suggested that employees' remuneration should be related to their company's performance 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1987). It is argued that the 'fixed wage system' works to create 
both excessive unemployment and excessive fluctuations in economic activity (Weitzman, 
1984, 1985; Meade, 1986). On the other hand, the encouragement of profit sharing and 
employee share ownership plans is regarded as the key to improving macroeconomic 
performance. For instance, Meade (1986) claimed that share arrangements may improve 
incentives and industrial relations, and promote a high and stable level of employment. 
Although a system of state-administered savings out of wages in the 1940s had been 
advocated by Keynes, and the ideas about the stabilizing economic impact of profit sharing 
have long been advanced by the economist Vanek, in the 1980s a US economist, Martin 
Weitzman, succeeded in influencing macroeconomics and political thinking about the 
benefits of 'share economy' (Wilson, 1992). There is a remarkable difference between 
Weitzman's argument, that the common use of profit sharing could solve the 
unemployment/inflation dilemma, and the traditional view of share arrangements (Mitchell, 
1987). Although profit sharing was regarded as a means of increasing worker involvement in 
the performance of the organization (Metzger and Colletti, 1971), Weitzman suggests that its 
main benefits are macroeconomic (Mitchell, 1987). In order to benefit from the advantages of 
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profit sharing, Weitzman insists, there must be worker noninvolvement in management 
decisions. His insistence makes him cautious about the role unions and collective bargaining 
might receive in a share economy. However, Mitchell (1987) suggests that if Weitzman' s 
proposal is carefully discussed it could be seen that profit sharing is not inconsistent with 
collective bargaining. He further argues that under some circumstances a union environment 
might be more suitable to profit sharing than a nonunion environment. If Weitzman's 
proposal is fulfilled, unions could have the new role they want to gain in the face of 
decreasing membership and concession bargaining (Mitchell, 1987). 
Before looking at Weitzman's proposal in detail, it is useful to consider Nightingale's (1982) 
argument about the macro effects of profit sharing. Nightingale advocated that "beyond the 
level of the individual firm profit sharing has the potential for addressing many social and 
economic ills" (p. 160). He suggests that if profit sharing is widely adopted throughout 
industry, it could seriously improve labour-management relations. 
As labour and management each regard the other party as an adversary, they are locked into 
an unavoidable 'win-lose' relationship (Nightingale, 1982). If labour has no interest in the 
firm and no sense of responsibility for the company's future, it uses its power to get as many 
concessions as possible from management. Management regards the union as a barrier to the 
effective running of the enterprise and treats it accordingly. Nightingale (1982) suggests that 
the adversarial relationship between management and labour might well be seriously reduced 
if employees receive "a tangible financial stake in the enterprise and the opportunity of seeing 
how company profits are generated and distributed" (p.160). He also argues that as a profit 
sharing payment is related to the creation of wealth, it is also a "non-inflationary wage" 
(Nightingale, 1982, p.161). If saving is encouraged, profit sharing may also have an opposed 
inflationary effect. Capital ownership could also be broadened via profit sharing. 
3.1.1. The Weitzman Model 
Weitzman is regarded as the father of the modem discussion on profit sharing (Sullivan and 
Bottomley, 1991). His theory concentrates on the argument that one of the basic causes of 
both unemployment and inflation is lack of wage flexibility (Poole and Jenkins, 1991). Poole 
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and Jenkins (1990) stated that "Weitzman is best envisaged as part of a long tradition of 
economists who have advocated the introduction of some form of profit sharing scheme, his 
predecessors including Keynes (1940), Meade (1964) and Kelso and Adler (1958)" QD.3). 
Weitzman suggested that the creation of "a new universal remuneration system in which 
profit sharing plays an important role" (Poole and Jenkins, 1991, p.54 .) will be the solution to 
wage inflexibility and thereby unemployment and inflation (Weitzman, 1984). He has 
postulated that "in profit sharing he has found a remedy for the world economic problems" 
(Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 1988, p.11). 
Weitzman (1984, 1985) argues that if the widespread use of profit sharing is encouraged by a 
superior form of government policy, through special tax privileges, non-inflationary full 
employment could be created. As a profit sharing system will maintain the advantages of 
decentralized decision making, it has the potential to automatically act against contractionary 
or inflationary shocks. 
He suggests that the coordination difficulty that can cause some systems to suffer involuntary 
unemployment is related to "one particular property of a conventional wage payment system: 
namely, compensation of each firm's employees is stuck to an outside numeraire (whether 
money, a cost of living index, or other companies' products) whose value is immune from 
anything the firm does" (Weitzman, 1987, p.204). Under the wage payment system, every 
worker is awarded a predetermined fixed wage which is not related to the health of the 
company, and the employment level is chosen by the company. Weitzrnan proposed that if a 
worker's income is tied to the performance of his or her firm, it will create an incentive to 
automatically withstand stagflation. Weitzman states that: 
The lasting solution to stagflation requires going inside the working of a modem capitalist 
economy and correcting the understanding structural flaw directly at the level of the 
individual firm by changing the nature of labor remuneration. An alternative payment systems 
where it is considered perfectly normal for a worker's pay to be tied to an index of the finn's 
performance, say a share of its revenue or profits, puts in place exactly the right incentives 
automatically to resist unemployment and inflation (p.3). 
Profit sharing is one such system which relates employees' income to company performance. 
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Under the profit sharing payment system, employees' remuneration will consist of two 
components: a base wage (fixed wage) and a share of the company's profits (flexible element) 
(Florkowski, 1989; Bradley and Estrin, 1992). The base wage is viewed as the marginal costs 
of labour (Weitzman, 1990) which "would not include the flexible part of remuneration" 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995, p.3) because the employer considers only the fixed wage 
component and ignores the profit share in deciding an appropriate level of employment. 
However, in practice, the average cost of labour is composed of base wage and the profit 
share (the worker's total remuneration) (Bradley and Estrin, 1992; Kruse, 1993). So, in a 
profit sharing firm, the judgment of the labour cost is different (Kruse, 1993). Under a profit 
sharing plan, the firm will attempt to hire and retain workers until the marginal value of the 
workers' output equals the marginal labour costs, rather than the average labour costs (Estrin 
and Wilson, 1986; Jones and Pliskin, 1991). Therefore, Weitzman's theory suggests that 
profit sharing may increase employment by driving a wedge between average and marginal 
labour cost. Bradley and Estrin (1992) stated that: 
It acts like a firm-specific lump sum tax on profits, the proceeds of which are distributed to 
workers as pay in lieu of some proportion of the standing wage payment. In this framework, 
the larger the percentage of remuneration paid via the profit-share, the greater will be the 
expansion in employment (pp.296-297). 
If companies encourage their workers to take more of their income in the form of a share of 
company profits (flexible element) and less in the form of a base wage (fixed wages) that can 
lead to "an unambiguous welfare improvement - with increased aggregate output and 
employment, lower prices, and higher real pay' (Weitzrnan, 1987, p.206). 
Weitzman argues that the base rate is set at a sufficiently low level where the labour demand 
exceeds full employment at every feasible level of aggregate demand (Estrin and Wilson, 
1986; Florkowski, 1989). If the base wage is set at a sufficiently low level, as Weitzman 
argues, the result is that firms create more jobs and employ more labour than they would 
under the other wage systems. Therefore, under profit sharing, firms will help to decrease 
unemployment as they will be in an excess labour demand (Wadhwani and Wall, 1990). The 
share economy encourages firms to create more labour demand to benefit from the advantage 
of reductions in average wages associated with higher employment levels (Cooper, 1988), if 
an initial level of employment subsists. Weitzman (1984) believes that: 
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A share system looks very much like a labor shortage economy. Share firms ever hungry for 
labor are always on the prowl-cruising around like vacuum cleaners on wheels, searching in 
nooks and crannies for extra workers to pull in at existing compensation parameter values. 
Such an economy inherently resists recession (p.98). 
Weitzman (1984) also argues that a share system promises the working class "permanent full 
employment at competitive remuneration, no inflation, and an improvement in working 
conditions and employer attitudes" (p.138). When some part of a worker's pay is tied to the 
firm's profitability, the company automatically will take on more employees in good times 
and lay off fewer workers during bad times (Weitzman, 1990). According to Weitzman 
(1984), "the share system... has a strong built-in mechanism that automatically stabilizes the 
economy at full employment ..." (p.97). 
The permanent excess demand for labour in a profit sharing economy acts as a buffer and 
protects the system against demand or supply side shocks (Florkowski, 1989; Wilson, 1992; 
Bradley and Estrin, 1992). In the share economy if there is a firm- or industry-specific 
negative shock, it does not lead to layoffs, as a marginal worker's cost to the firm is less than 
his/her revenue product. If the shock is too big for a firm to retain all of its workers, other 
firms that are still in an excess labour demand will hire the workers who leave or are laid off 
(Levine, 1989). 
As the remuneration system eliminates unemployment, fiscal and monetary policies can be 
used to withstand inflation without the fear of creating unemployment (Wilson, 1992). 
Weitzman proposes that tax incentives will be necessary to stimulate the wide-spread 
introduction of profit sharing (Bradley and Geib, 1986). Weitzman (1987) concludes that "the 
benefits for the whole economy are clear: the new labor contract means more output and jobs 
- and lower prices. Firms want to hire more workers for the same reason they would be keen 
to acquire more salesmen on commission - nothing to lose, and something to gain." (p.205). 
3.1.2. Criticisms of the Weitzman Plan 
In the literature, there are many criticisms of Weitzman's theory. Hanson (1986) regards 
Weitzman's claim as astonishing. He suggests that "The Share Economy raises large 
questions" (Hanson, 1986, p.12). The most important question is how to encourage 
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employees to give up a significant part of their remuneration for a risky share of the 
company's profits, which would increase and decrease with their company's profitability. 
Hanson (1986) further argued that although Weitzman attempted to give an answer for this 
question, he eventually accepts that "his plan is unacceptable unless accompanied by a large 
tax bribe" (Hanson, 1986, p.12). 
Strauss (1990) reported some major objections to the plan: 
1. Employers and, especially, unions will withstand its introduction. Even if the whole 
working class (including those currently employed and unemployed) might gain from the 
plan, the actual effect on presently employed workers will be a paycut. Under the plan the 
existing workforce will want to resist the hiring of new workers because new employees 
would decrease the amount of remuneration for existing employees (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1986; Summers, 1986; Mitchell, 1987) or because existing employees want to 
maximize their own share of current profits (Nuti, 1987). 
2. According to the plan, if workers' remuneration is decreased, companies can and will 
decrease prices significantly. But labour cost may not be a significant part of total cost. If 
prices are set via oligopoly, managers may not want to cut prices for fear that it will start 
competitive retaliation. The plan also assumes that when an additional worker produces 
additional output, it will be sold easily. But sometimes this does not work as the market may 
be relatively inflexible to price cuts. 
3. In a dynamic share economy, while some firms' profits may increase, others' may 
decrease. If this is the case, employees' compensation will differ from company to company. 
Under conditions of full employment, employees would quickly move from the companies 
offering lower compensation to the companies offering higher compensation. Such rapid 
movements in the labour force could cause some undesirable results, such as waste of firm-
specific training and damage to the economy's overall efficiency. In addition, large 
differences in employees' compensation between firms may be in opposition to the principle 
of equal pay for equal work (Derrick, 1963; Mitchell, 1987; Poole and Jenkins, 1991). 
4. Efficiency wage theory argues that companies pay more than the market-clearing wage in 
order to decrease employee turnover, take on better employees, inhibit employees from 
shirking their job duties, and to encourage loyalty and commitment via receiving a 'gift'. 
These advantages might be eliminated by cutting employees' compensation. Even if 
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compensation cutting were realized through reducing profit sharing bonuses, the same result 
would occur. But new employees would not be taken on without cuts in present employees' 
compensation. 
A number of other authors have also criticized Weitzman's assertions. Estrin, Jones, and 
Svejnar (1987), Summers (1986), and Meade (1986) argue that employers may be disinclined 
to invest in new capital, as some of the resulting profits will be shared with workers. Estrin, 
Jones, and Svejnar (1987) also argue that if tax incentives are provided for profit sharing, 
employers and employees may create 'cosmetic' schemes to obtain tax advantages without 
the desirable properties of 'true' profit sharing. Levine (1987, 1989) suggests that if new 
workers are hired it would decrease the productivity of all workers since some efficiency 
wage theories predicted that labour productivity is contingent upon workers' compensation. 
This would lead to the loss of the excess demand for labour property. 
Some authors, such as Estrin and Wilson (1986), Blanchflower and Oswald (1987a), and 
Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani (1987), have criticized Weitzman's theory for its sensitivity to 
the assumption that whether the base wage or total remuneration (base wage plus the profit 
share) is the marginal cost of labour. In Weitzman's theory, only the base wage, not the profit 
share, is considered as a marginal cost of labour. But as companies can attract workers only 
by providing the going rate for total pay, they must regard total pay, not only the fixed 
element of pay, as the marginal cost of labour (Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995). It was further 
argued that if a firm does not pay "the going rate in terms of the total remuneration package 
offered" (Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani, 1987, p.23), its workers will flow to other firms. In 
such situations, if firms regard the total remuneration package as the marginal cost of labour, 
"the employment advantages of profit-sharing described by Weitzman are dissipated" 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995, p.3). Furthermore, it has been discussed that under profit 
sharing, employment levels may not be increased unless the firm has exclusive power over 
the level of employment, "perhaps because of the role of unions" (Jones and Pliskin, 1991, 
p.46). 
76 
3.2. The Microeconomic Effect 
Although the idea of profit sharing has existed since the 1 800s, it has received new attention 
and became increasingly common in many advanced industrial economies in recent years 
(Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor, 1990), partly because of its effect on productivity growth 
(Kruse, 1992). Despite this recent growth of employee financial participation, "little is known 
about its likely effects on company performance and productivity" (Bradley, Estrin, and 
Taylor, 1990, p.3 85), and "how profit sharing actually affects employee work effort and 
productivity.., is still an open question" (Kruse, 1992, p.24). Advocates of profit sharing 
viewed it as a way of increasing work effort and eliminating the traditional strains between 
labour and management, therefore promoting company performance (Gilman, 1891, 1899; 
Cable and Fitzroy, 1980a,b). 
3.2.1. Profit Sharing, Employee Share Ownership and Productivity 
One of the primary claims made for a profit sharing system is that it can "increase 
productivity relative to a wage system" (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990, p.97). Theoretically, it 
has been claimed that employee share schemes may increase productivity mainly either 
because they act as an incentive scheme or because such schemes may lead to general 
changes in employee attitudes (Wadhwani and Wall, 1988; Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 1988). 
Profit Sharing as an Incentive Scheme (Working Harder and Productivity) 
Supporters contended that employee profit sharing can lead to a number of desirable 
consequences for employers and employees, including increased productivity (Bell and 
Hanson, 1987) and profitability to the employer, and greater financial rewards and 
employment security to the employee (Tyson, 1996). It is argued that since under profit 
sharing a worker has some stake in the outcome, he or she will work harder and produce more 
output than under a rigid pay system. Under a fixed wage system, with effort costly to 
monitor, "too little output is produced as the marginal value of an extra unit of effort exceeds 
its marginal costs" (Wadhwani and Wall, 1990, p.5). Kruse (1984) also argued that since 
employee ownership provides employees 'a piece of the action' it increases employee 
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motivation and productivity by acting "as an incentive scheme" (Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 
1988, p.1 1). Alabama Senator Donald Steward stated that: 
While it is not a panacea, it is clear that when employees own a piece of the action, they are 
going to work harder. This increased productivity will help ease inflation, will increase tax 
revenues, and will reduce the balance of payments deficit" (House Committee on Small 
Business, 1979:9, cited in Kruse, 1984, pp. 5-6). 
Some authors, such as Bradley (1986), Estrin, Groud, and Wadhwani (1987), Mukhopadhyay 
(1988), Bradley and Nejad (1989), Poole and Jenkins (1991), and Bradley and Estrin (1992), 
claim that by linking employees' financial reward to companies' profits, employees will work 
harder to increase productivity as they realize that increased productivity will lead to higher 
profits that "directly accrue to them in the form of increased dividends and/or stock prices" 
(Brooks, Henry, and Livingston, 1984, p.19). 
Kruse (1993) argued that profit sharing has long been regarded as a way to increase company 
performance by relating the incentives of the employees more closely to those of the owners 
and managers. Such incentives are claimed to stimulate employees to make an extra effort 
('working harder'), or to generate ways to decrease costs or increase quality ('working 
smarter'). He suggested that profit sharing, as a group incentive, is planned to stimulate such 
activity in collaboration with other employees. Such collaboration can be "productive in 
itself and can encourage 'peer pressure' or 'horizontal monitoring', so that employees 
encourage better performance by their fellow employees" (Kruse, 1993, p.45). 
So, employees in profit sharing and employee share ownership plans are expected to be more 
productive than employees in firms that do not have the plans, as under the plans "high 
productivity is rewarded with more pay" (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990, p.98). However, 
Weitzman and Kruse (1990) argue that this basic model fails to mention certain aspects of 
reality. The authors considered that there are three most crucial deviations from the basic 
model, which are 'the free rider problem', 'risk-bearing issues', and 'codetermination issues'. 
The free rider problem and game theory: It is sometimes claimed that there may be an 
inducement to the free rider phenomenon because in a group incentive scheme like profit 
sharing, each employee receives only a small part of any additional profit due to his or her 
own effort (Blasi, Conte, and Kruse, 1996). Whenever a single employee's contribution is 
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difficult to monitor, especially in large organizations (Coates, 1991), a free rider problem 
seems to occur (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). Coates (1991) defined a 'free rider' as "an 
employee who ignores his or her responsibilities, believing that other workers will pick up the 
slack" (j.20). Weak individual incentive is created if there are n employees in a plan and 
profit shares are allocated equally and an individual acquires only 1/n of the extra profits 
created by his or her effort (Kruse, 1992). It is claimed that "clearly the individual incentive 
becomes weak, even negligible, as n grows large" (Kruse, 1993, p.46). Therefore, the free 
rider problem will lead to an inefficiently low level of effort, which gets lower as the number 
of employees in the plan (n) gets larger. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) claimed that if 
employees hinder the effort while attempting to free-ride off others, profit sharing might not 
have a substantial impact upon a large organization. 
The idea of a positive effect of profit sharing on productivity, historically, has been viewed 
sceptically by economists, since "the direct financial incentive to individual workers from 
exerting greater effort rapidly approaches 0" (Shepard, 1994, p.453). Due to the free rider 
problem, claims of a positive effect from profit sharing generally depend on theories about 
"how group incentives like profit sharing affect group norms or corporate cultures favoring 
increased effort" (Shepard, 1994, p.453). 
As Weitzrnan and Kruse (1990) believed that "in a repeated game setting the conclusions may 
be quite different" (J).99), they analyzed profit sharing by applying game-theoretic arguments 
as a form of prisoner's dilemma. They argue that if everyone works harder, all members of 
the group are potentially better off. Nonetheless, if one employee's effort is reduced, it will 
not much affect per capita output and the reward of any employee of the group. But a much 
richer set of strategies arises in the resulting non-cooperative 'supergame', if the game is 
repeated. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) stated that: 
Depending on the specifics of how the technology of observation and production is modeled, 
workers may punish shirking workers by withholding their own effort or, if feasible, 
ostracizing the offending antisocial shirkers. In such a setting an enormous number of 
dynamic equilibrium strategies can exist. Among the equilibria, if the participants' discount 
rate is sufficiently small, is the cooperative strategy in which all participants choose to work at 
the socially optimal level. (p.99). 
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Thus, they claimed that in a repeated game setting, profit sharing may defeat the prisoner's 
dilemma and free rider problem and creates greater productivity in a multiperson setting. 
However, the theory that Weitzman and Kruse (1990) have discussed is not without its 
problems. Although profit sharing may induce greater productivity, it is possible that other 
outcomes like narrowly self-interested shirking can be seen as well. 
Fitzroy and Kraft (1992) stated that "in the formal context of the repeated prisoner's dilemma 
game, an efficient equilibrium may be enforced by credible (or sub-game perfect) punishment 
of deviations, say by peer-group sanctions" (p.211). 
Kruse (1993) argued that if one worker generates better performance which increases profits 
while other workers continue a stable baseline performance, all workers have a share in the 
increased profits from the one worker's increased performance. However, the one worker 
may be worse off because the extra effort is personally costly and exceeds 1/n of the extra 
profits. Therefore, the cost of increased effort will be greater than the individual incentive for 
that effort. Kruse (1993) stated that "if, however, the 'game' is repeated in an ongoing 
relationship (or if the continuation of the game is uncertain), workers can collectively 
establish an agreement to work harder, and the financial rewards from sharing in the 
increased profits might outweigh the individual costs from participating in the agreement" 
(p.47). According to Kruse, there are many potential equilibria that lead to this solution. A 
'cooperative equilibrium', in which performance and profits are higher, is one of them and 
might be established by the workers. He regards a cooperative equilibrium as a solution to 
prisoner's dilemma situations. However, after establishing a cooperative agreement, some 
workers may defect from the cooperative solution since they may want to have a share in the 
higher profits without expanding the extra effort that other workers are expending. The fellow 
workers will punish the 'shirkers' from the cooperative agreement through "nonpecuniary 
sanctions such as social ostracism, or by personal guilt or shame" (p.47). 
Weitzman and Kruse (1990) argued that, in the end, a complicated message about the likely 
effects of profit sharing on productivity in a multiperson organization is delivered by the 
repeated game theory. It is possible that profit sharing will or will not lead to increased 
productivity. The outcome would seem to be contingent upon whether an organization can 
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persuade its employees that "everyone pulling together is essentially a better idea than 
everyone pulling separately" (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990, p.100). Therefore, Weitzman and 
Kruse (1990) and Kruse (1993) concluded that a group-based reward system, such as profit 
sharing, can improve productivity but the introduction of a profit sharing system alone is not 
enough to achieve this result. If organizations want to get the productivity-enhancing effects, 
they may need to do something more to develop a corporate culture that emphasizes company 
spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforcement mechanisms, and so forth 
(Blasi, Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). 
Risk issues: The second theoretical problem, according to Weitzman and Kruse (1990), is 
risk aversion. If pay is related tightly to performance, it might result in higher productivity by 
encouraging "the socially optimal degree of effort" (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990, p.101). But 
Weitzman and Kruse attempted to answer the question "what happens in the presence of 
uncertainty?" (p.101). They claimed that a high degree of profit sharing relative to the base 
wage will evoke more effort from the employees but will also expose them to greater risk. 
Under such a pay system, employees receive more variable income, which they may not want 
to obtain. The authors mentioned that these issues has been broadly analyzed in the 
theoretical literature under "the heading of the so-called principal-agent problem" (Weitzman 
and Kruse, 1990, p.101). They stated that, on the one hand, an efficient contract should relate 
the agent's reward closely to output because that will evoke greater work effort. On the other 
hand, in the presence of uncertainty the agent's reward should be made relatively steady, 
because the agent is generally more averse to risk than the principal. After appealing to the 
literature on the so-called principal-agent problem, they concluded that optimal contract 
definitely mixes profit sharing with a base wage. 
Codetermination issues: The third issue relates to the proper role of labour and capital in 
decision making. It is argued that increased worker profit sharing may result in increased 
worker demands for codetermination in company decision making and that such participation 
necessarily weakens efficiency. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) stated that "in this view, profit 
sharing would be associated with lower productivity because of more shirking, increased 
enjoyment of on-the-job leisure, slowed or incorrect managerial decisions, a too-short time 
horizon, an excessively risk-averse attitude due to a nondiversifled pay portfolio, and the 
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like" (p. 103). They do not support this argument and claim that if workers can monitor, 
supervise, and motivate each other more effectively than mangers can, or where workers can 
give technical information to management, then worker participation may actually increase 
productivity. The authors propose, once again, that the efficient pay contract consists of the 
base wage and profit sharing. 
General Changes in Employee Attitudes and Productivity: 
It is argued that profit sharing increases productivity by inducing changes in employees' 
attitudes toward the organization (Fawcett, 1865; Ely, 1889; Jones and Pliskin, 1989). Ben-
Ner and Jones (1995) stated that "employee ownership affects organizational productivity 
through the influence of control and return rights on individual motivation and performance 
as well as structural organizational variables" (p.537). Increased employee participation in 
ownership or profits may be related to higher labour and ultimately higher company 
productivity because of increasing employee satisfaction with working 'for themselves', and 
to a higher level of employee motivation, promoting employee commitment to the 
organization, thereby increasing effort and reducing employee turnover and absenteeism 
(Bradley and Nejad, 1989; Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor, 1990; Livingston and Henry, 1980; 
Jones and Pliskin, 1989). 
Fogarty and White (1988) also claimed that the productivity effect of profit sharing schemes 
comes from either the direct incentive effect of schemes or more general changes in employee 
attitudes. They stated that "there may be greater identification with and loyalty to the firm, 
less labour turnover, less feeling of 'them and us', more cost-consciousness, or a new 
awareness of the importance of profitability and more interest in the firm's financial 
performance" (p.8). Jones and Kato (1993) argued that employee share ownership plans may 
have indirect psychological effects on productivity. They suggested that if employees regard 
their company as a mere means to earn money, they may develop a strong "sense of identity 
or loyalty to the company, or at least may become more interested in what the company does 
and how well it competes with other companies" (p.336). This development in general 
employee interest in the company would result in more active participation and involvement 
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in different productivity-enhancing activities, such as quality control (QC) circles, and 
smoother and less costly collective bargaining. 
Kruse (1984) argued that part of the increased productivity is supposed to stem from a 
decreased amount of labour management conflict, as everyone in an employee-owned firm 
theoretically works to obtain the same organizational goal: higher profits. He stated that some 
supporters working from this perspective believe that unions are 'unnecessary' in an 
employee-owned firm. Therefore, if the unions are eliminated, the labour-management 
conflict decreases. 
Kruse (1992) claimed that profit sharing can be hypothesized to increase productivity through 
increasing the skills of the workforce. He argued that this hypothesized relationship between 
profit sharing and productivity - that worker skills are increased- must depend on the idea that 
profit sharing decreases employee turnover and thereby stimulates additional investment in 
firm-specific human capital. According to Kruse (1992), profit sharing may decrease 
employee turnover if it results in greater employee identification with the company, or if 
employees appreciate the stronger perceived relationship between compensation and work 
effort that profit sharing offers. Jones and Pliskin (1989) stated that lower turnover would 
decrease training costs and might be accompanied by more firm-specific human capital. 
Other Issues Surrounding Profit Sharing and Productivity 
Monitoring and productivity: It is argued that profit sharing engenders the issue of 
managerial incentives to monitor workers (Jones and Meckling, 1979; Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). The productivity-enhancing effects of profit sharing are debated by the authors, who 
claim that if workers share in the firm's profits, managers will have an incentive to avoid 
their monitoring function, and both owners and workers are hurt by the lower efficiency that 
results. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that in order to create the optimal level of 
monitoring within a company, the monitor should receive the residual income (profits) from 
the activity being monitored. 
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Kruse (1993) stated that this argument is based on several assumptions, including that "there 
are no principal-agent problems between owners and managers, and that the decrease in 
monitoring by management will not be accompanied by an increase in workers monitoring 
each other" (pp.48-49). He believes that one part of the claim for the significance of central 
monitoring is that a more optimal labour effort is encouraged by more monitoring. It has also 
been claimed that existing forms of capitalist hierarchy have a tendency to be more efficient 
than other forms of work organization because of the lower information and transaction costs 
of getting worker compliance in the former (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Stiglitz (1975) also 
claimed that workers actually desire a hierarchy of managerial control and worker 
compulsion on behalf of capital, since it hinders fellow workers from shirking and thereby 
creates a larger product and higher rewards for all workers. 
Putterman and Skiliman (1988) argued that monitoring may generate either an accurate or a 
'noisy' signal of effort. An increased level of monitoring will generally create positive 
incentive effects, if the signal is accurate. However, if the signal is 'noisy', it means there is 
some error in evaluating a worker's real effort, and thereby worker effort may be increased or 
decreased by increased monitoring. The monitoring argument is extended by Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), who claimed that as the workforce grows, each individual will have a more 
effective incentive to shirk. Therefore shirking will become more difficult and more 
expensive to observe. 
However, Levin (1 980a, b, 1982) argued that, in a worker-managed and worker-owned firm, 
workers have a strong incentive to monitor their fellow workers to prevent them from 
shirking. This phenomenon does not exist in the capitalist firm. He states that although in the 
capitalist firm workers are rewarded only for their time rather than for their product, in the 
cooperative and labour-managed firm (LMF) the workers' economic returns will depend 
heavily on the collective success of the firm. Therefore, in the former firm, workers will have 
an incentive to shirk and the shirker will decrease his effort if he is not being observed by a 
supervisor. But in the latter firm, workers will desire to increase the productivity and work 
efforts of their fellow workers via both peer pressure and collegial support. It is argued that a 
group incentive such as profit sharing can stimulate productive co-operation and peer-group 
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sanctions against shirking, when it is difficult to monitor individual performance (Fitzroy and 
Kraft, 1992). 
Levin (1982) also claimed that since the workers in the cooperative and labour-managed firm 
have incentives to produce a good product, higher productivity stems from reduced needs for 
supervisory and quality control personnel. 
Employee self-selection and productivity: Kruse (1993) argued that the type of 
compensation system that a company runs will clearly have an impact on the kind of 
employee it attracts and retains. If higher-quality employees are attracted by profit sharing or 
other forms of employee ownership programmes, the argument that companies with profit 
sharing andlor employee share ownership plans have higher productivity may have nothing to 
do with the incentive impact of the plans, but may simply indicate the higher labour quality of 
the companies. But it should be noted that it is not definite that the companies would attract 
high-quality employees because of the plans. However, some authors, such as Rosen, Klein, 
and Young (1986), argue that employee ownership can "help attract and keep quality, 
experienced employees" (p.47). 
Conte and Svejnar (1990) and Kruse (1993) mentioned that the self-selection argument is that 
employees who want to be paid according to their own performance are themselves more 
likely to be more productive persons and will be attracted to firms that employ performance-
dependent compensation systems. Thus, the existence of profit sharing and employee share 
ownership as part of the compensation structure might help managers to select a high-quality 
workforce. However, Kruse (1993) argued that such workers may instead be drawn to 
individual performance related compensation systems, while lower-quality workers may be 
drawn to "group-based systems in which the costs of shirking are shared with co-workers" 
(p.50). 
3.2.2. Profit Sharing, Employee Share Ownership and General Company Performance 
Metzger (1978) argued that there are many factors which make for business success. While 
holding all other factors stable, the isolation of the effects of one variable is very difficult. 
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Nevertheless, he stated that "it is possible to find correlations between results and the 
presence of conditions/programs which seem to have significance" (p. 17). He suggests that 
there is positive correlation between 'system incentive' programmes like profit sharing/share 
ownership and superior corporate performance, although this is definitely not a perfect 
correlation. Jones (1982) mentioned that substantial individual worker ownership is identified 
as the principal factor evoking high levels of performance. 
Shepard (1994) claimed that profit sharing may improve performance through five channels: 
1. It provides a direct monetary incentive for greater effort by each employee individually, as 
well as for decreased absenteeism and turnover; 
2. It can act as an incentive for employees to cooperate more fully in training, assisting, or 
monitoring fellow workers in the production process; 
3. It encourages employees to take better care of the capital equipment and plant; 
4. It can promote information flows within a company; 
5. It can provide more readiness on the part of employees to accept changes in technology. 
In the behavioural literature, since some researchers, such as Long (1978) and Goldstein 
(1978), found that employee share ownership results in higher levels of commitment to 
organization goals, involvement in organization activities, and expectations of income and 
wealth, it is claimed that "motivational effects of employee share ownership have positive 
effects on organization performance and the morale of employees" (Aitken and Wood, 1989, 
p.157). 
Aitken and Wood (1989) stated that employee ownership stimulates motivational states, such 
as commitment, involvement, and expectations, which then result in higher levels of job 
effort by individual employees and increased organizational performance (see Figure 3.1). 
Increased morale of employees is also assumed to result in indirect improvements in 
organization performance by making reductions in employee absenteeism, turnover, and 
grievances. Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986) mentioned that the most obvious way in which 
employee ownership might have an impact on company performance is through employee 
motivation. A large individually owned capital stake is regarded as essential for creating a 
motivated and committed workforce (Oakeshott, 1978). Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986) 
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believed that "employee owners may work harder, smarter, or more productively, while using 
resources more carefully" (p.46). They further argued that employee ownership can also 
increase company performance because employee owners may accept or even embrace "the 
introduction of new technologies, new work rules or routines, a willingness to forego short-
run earnings for long-run investment, or any number of other efforts" (p.47) which are 
regarded as the keys to a company's success and which non-owning workers may avoid. 























Source: Aitken, M. J., and Wood, R. E. (1989). Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Issues and Evidence. Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 31, 2, p.156. 
It is accepted that economists have rarely considered the relationship between employee 
participation - including participation in ownership, profits, and decision making - and 
company performance (Defourney, Estrin, and Jones, 1985; Aitken and Wood, 1989). 
However, according to Aitken and Wood (1989), the existent economic arguments are 
generally compatible with the behavioural arguments, "although differing in the specific 
relationship" (p.157). Some economists, such as Vanek (1970), Horvat (1982), and Cable and 
Fitzroy (1980a, b), suggest a large positive relationship between employee ownership and 
company performance. Vanek (1970) and Horvat (1982) have noted that shared ownership of 
company resources will result in higher morale; then the higher morale of participatory 
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companies will translate itself into greater effort. Aitken and Wood (1989) criticized their 
argument by applying behavioural theory, which suggests that there is no direct relationship 
between morale and effort, but morale can only indirectly affect performance through its 
effect on withdrawal and grievance behaviours. 
Cable and Fitzroy (1 980a, b) have acknowledged that employee ownership has a direct effect 
on organizational performance. Bernstein (1976) argued that if workers agree to co-operate in 
maximizing the joint wealth of owner and employees, they will also want to have a share of 
profit, or any extra income above contractual rents and wages. Therefore, Cable and Fitzroy 
(1980a, b) observe the potential for sharper material incentives via profit sharing and 
hypothesize that "profit sharing should motivate efficient behaviour" (1980b, p.103). Aitken 
and Wood (1989) rested their arguments on the assumptions that "dividend disbursements are 
viewed in incentive terms, that is, as likely rewards for increased job effort, and that increases 
in employees' job effort leads to improved organizational performance" (p. 158). 
Some authors, such as Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986) and Rosen (1990) mentioned that it 
would be contended that employee ownership will have an impact on corporate performance 
only if linked with opportunities for employees to share their ideas and information about 
how to perform their own jobs better. Rosen (1990) stated that: 
What is happening here is that ownership is providing the motivation, while participation is 
providing the structure to use the motivation effectively. Companies that have only 
participation programs have a means to improve performance, but employees lack the 
financial incentive to put out the extra effort necessary to excel. On the other hand, companies 
that have employee ownership, but lack a participation structure, have employees who would 
like to contribute but few opportunities to do so. (p.69). 
Cable and Fitzroy (1980a) stated that the interaction between employee participation in 
decision making and profit sharing is important and "merits further exploration" (p.166). 
They believe that the motivating effect of profit sharing is likely to rest on workers' 
opportunities for having some say in managerial decisions which determine the level of 
profitability. When workers participate in decision making, it will lead to both increased 
workers' consciousness of a reliable relationship between their individual effort and received 
profit shares, and reduced "fears that managerial opportunism will deprive them of the fruits 
of their extra labour" (Cable and Fitzroy, 1980b. p.104). When worker participation in 
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decision making does not exist, profit shares are more likely to be viewed as unrelated to 
workers' effort. Therefore, they hypothesize that there will be a relationship between the 
effects of worker participation in decision making and the effects of profit sharing on 
performance. Bernstein (1976) also argued such a relationship, although he accepts that if 
other conditions necessary for good performance are not satisfied, this relationship may be 
clouded. 
In contrast to optimistic predictions about the effect of profit sharing and employee 
ownership on corporate performance, Jensen and Meckling (1976, 1979) view employee 
participation as always having harmful effects on firm performance. Their analysis rests on 
the theory of contractual agency relationship. Their reasoning stems from the assumption that 
the set of contracts specifying the disposition of costs and rewards in large part determines 
the behaviour of agents in the firm. They identified three types of agency costs: monitoring 
expenditures by the principals, bonding expenditures by the agents, and a residual loss. 
As, in a modern corporation, the objective of managers is taken to be their own utility 
maximization, they will use the company's assets to promote their own goals without 
regarding the objective of the owners, which is assumed to be wealth maximization. They 
will do it easily if there is no monitoring; thus monitoring is necessary but costly. A broad 
spread of decision-making right is costly, because monitoring costs are supposed to increase 
with the number of agents. 
The second argument is that bonding costs, which are regarded as the cost of ensuring that 
"managers will not engage in malfeasance or anti-contractual activities" (Conte and Svejnar, 
1987, p.63), will be higher in participative companies, as they have more managers. The third 
argument is that in participatory firms the residual loss will be greater because a greater 
number of persons with contractual rights will share in residual gains. This will lead to a 
weak incentive for each to take on "the effort and stress associated with reaping these gains 
and the worse the economic performance of the firm" (Conte and Svejnar, 1987, p.63). 
Because of these three arguments, Jensen and Meckling concluded that there is a negative 
relationship between employee participation and organizational performance. 
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Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor (1990) also mentioned that because of the potential (negative) 
effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on: "(i) company objectives; 
(ii) the discretionary power of managers; (iii) employee motivation; (iv) the firm's capital 
structure; and (v) investment and growth" (pp.386-387), the schemes may reduce company 
performance. 
3.2.3. Profit Sharing, Employee Share Ownership, and Employee Job Attitudes and 
Behaviours 
The effect of profit sharing and employee share ownership on employee job attitudes and 
behaviours is not a current argument. It has long been claimed that profit sharing and 
employee share ownership schemes have a significant effect on employee job attitudes and 
behaviours, and therefore on organizational performance (Lloyd, 1898; Holyoake, 1906; 
Williams, 1913; Webb, 1912; James, Dennison, Gay, Kendall, and Burnt, 1926; Weber, 
1947). 
Weber (1947) argued the motivational importance of ownership, even as the expansion of 
industrialization made an substantial contribution to there being a growing number of 
labourers and employees who neither owned nor controlled the conditions of their work. For 
Weber, the most technically productive system for the organization of work in large firms 
was provided by a hierarchical bureaucratic structure separating ownership from control. 
However, he also claimed that "the appropriation of the means of production and personal 
control, however formal, over the process constitute among the strongest incentives to 
unlimited willingness to work" (Weber, 1947, p.263). Webb (1912) also postulated that "by 
making [an employee] a shareholder in the business employing him ... it stimulates his zeal 
and careful working and, as part owner of the capital which he works, he feels ... a share of 
responsibility of the business ..." (p.138). It is argued that employee share ownership schemes 
can create a partnership between the company and employees (Bergin, 1996). These ideas are 
compatible with the ideas of many behavioural scientists, such as McGregor (1960), Likert 
(196 1), and Argyris (1964), who have emphasized the importance of aligning the needs and 
goals of employees with those of the organization for effective organizational performance. It 
has been argued that profit sharing and employee share ownership arrangements encourage 
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beneficial organizational outcomes (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler, 
1990) because employees covered by such schemes have incentives to enhance performance 
to increase their incomes (Schwochau, Delaney, Jarley, and Fiorito, 1997). 
Nevertheless, in the literature of organizational behaviour or industrial psychology, profit 
sharing and employee share ownership have not been broadly studied. Before the 1970s, only 
a small amount of empirical research was conducted to analyze the effect of profit sharing 
and employee share ownership on employees' job attitudes and behaviours, and only rarely 
has employee ownership been incorporated as a variable of interest in theories of job 
performance or motivation (O'Toole, 1979; Tannenbaum, 1983). But in the last 20 years, 
psychologists of industrial and organizational behaviour have started to consider the 
implications of ownership in the workplace, and to analyze differences in the way owners and 
nonowners conduct their work and define their roles (Long, 1984; Russell, 1 985a). 
The Schemes and Integration 
Sharing gains is regarded as powerful medicine (Markowich, 1994) because it will give 
employees a selfish financial reason to continue thinking about what is best for the company, 
since it also will be what is best for the employee. Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (1991) 
suggested that "employees who psychologically experience organizational ownership become 
integrated into the ownership experience" (p.131). This integration or psychological bonding 
shows itself in the development of such attitudes as organizational commitment and the 
opinion that there is a common interest that associates management and the employee owners. 
As mentioned before, Webb (1912) argued that a sense of 'shared responsibility' is created by 
ownership. She suggested that ownership performs by creating a 'common interest' and 
together this common interest and the sense of responsibility encourage a 'zeal and careful 
working'. Argyris (1964) has accepted Webb's argument and regarded this process as 
"integrating the individual with the organization" (p.37). Whyte (1964, 1978) argued that 
through employee ownership a joint-payoff [responsibility] relationship, where two or more 
people put together their effort and financial resources in order to gain rewards from the 
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environment, is created and through this process the individual becomes integrated into the 
organization. 
Lawler (1977) argued that the psychological condition of a perceived common interest occurs 
in the relationship between ownership and a set of employee attitudes and behaviours. It is 
believed that employee stock ownership in general generates a positive working relationship 
between employees and the employer (Webb, 1912; Williams, 1913) by creating perceptions 
of common interest and commitment to shared goals or organizational success (Lawler, 
1977). By the same token, Hammer and Stem (1980) claimed that "under employee 
ownership some form of psychological partnership may develop between groups of owners 
that leads to individuals to act on behalf of common goals" (p.79). Long (1978a) argued that 
"employee share ownership would be expected to greatly increase integration" (p.34). 
The Schemes and Involvement 
Employee involvement has been proposed as critical to produce improvements in satisfaction, 
reductions in costs, and improvements in quality substantially (Allen and Allen, 1992; Roth, 
1994; Fenton-O'Creevy, 1998). It has also been argued that there is a clear tie between job 
involvement and organizational commitment (Jamal and Baba, 1991; Mathieu and Farr, 1991; 
Igbaria and Siegel, 1992; Mayer and Schoorman, 1998). 
Lodahi and Kejner (1965) defined job involvement as "the degree to which a person is 
identified psychologically with his work, or the importance of work in his total self-image" 
(p.24). Morrow and Goetz (1988) defined job involvement as "the extent to which a person's 
work performance affects his or her self-esteem" (p.97). McElroy, Morrow, Power, and Iqbal 
(1993) defined job involvement as "the extent to which an individual psychologically 
identifies with his or her job" (p.366). Employee involvement in planning and decision 
making at work can be increased through pay plans (Guzzo and Katzell, 1987). The advocates 
of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes argue that the schemes strengthen 
employees' sense of involvement with the company (Strauss and Sayles, 1980; Heller, 1984). 
Such schemes motivate employees to work harder and make them feel like partners in the 
organization. Coords (1979) stated that "I see profit sharing, as a management practice, 
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increasing as the best form of employee motivation and involvement ... I believe there are 
many companies that will see the benefits of profit sharing over all other forms of employee 
involvement arid motivation" (p.3). 
Poole and Jenkins (1991) suggest that management may introduce profit sharing and share 
ownership schemes for a number of reasons, among which are "to improve the productivity of 
their employees, increase their sense of loyalty to the company or to augment the level of 
employees' direct participation in the company" (p.63). Because of this, they devised part of a 
managerial strategy to affect the level of output, the degree of commitment, and the level of 
joint decision making between management and employees. Moreover, Poole and Jenkins 
consider that employees receive a substantial opportunity to increase their involvement in the 
workplace and to improve their level of financial understanding and the degree of 
communication between management and employees through profit sharing and especially 
employee share ownership schemes. 
Long (1 978a) claimed that an employee who obtains a share of ownership would more likely 
feel like a part of the organization for several reasons. First, Long regards his shares as 
physical and legal evidence of his association with the organization. In addition, he could 
psychologically feel involved due to the effect of the act of acquiring shares itself. As 
employee share ownership schemes change the employee's status from one of 'employee' to 
'owner', they can create a link between employee interests and the interests of shareholders 
and the company (Poole and Jenkins, 1991). Second, he can receive additional information 
which nonshareholders would probably not receive. Poole and Jenkins (1991) mentioned that 
increased communications between management and the employee shareholder over and 
above that of the employee non-shareholders stimulate the identification with the 
organization. Therefore, employee shareholders acquire "the company's annual financial 
report and other shareholder information in addition to existing disclosure of information 
arrangements in the company (whether through management's own initiatives or through 
collective bargaining)" (Poole and Jenkins, 1991, p.65). Finally, since feelings of shared 
goals and the feeling that one's fate is tied to the fate of the organization would almost 
undoubtedly be anticipated to increase feelings of solidarity, employee ownership may lead to 
increased involvement indirectly through increased integration. 
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The Schemes and Commitment 
In the literature, there are diverse definitions and measures of employee commitment (Liou 
and Nyhan, 1994; McElroy, Morrow, Crum, and Dooley, 1995; Randall, Fedor, and 
Longenecker, 1990; Romzek, 1989). Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982) noted 10 different 
definitions of organizational commitment. Morrow (1983) identified 25 different 
organizational commitment conceptualizations and measurements used by researchers. The 
works of Buchanan (1974), Etzioni (1975), Hall, Schneider, and Nygren (1970), Hrebiniak 
and Alutto (1972), Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian (1974), Salancik (1977), and 
Sheldon (1971) represent most, but not all, of that diversity. Sheldon (1971), for example, 
defined commitment as "an attitude or an orientation toward the organization which links or 
attaches the identity of the person to the organization" (p.143). Following Allen and Meyer 
(1990) and O'Reilly and Chatman (1986), Becker, Billings, Eveleth, and Gilbert (1996) stated 
that "employee commitment refers to the psychological attachment of workers to their 
workplaces" (p.464). Bashaw and Grant (1994) defined organizational commitment as "the 
relative strength of an employee's psychological identification with and involvement in the 
organization for which they work" (p.43). Allen and Meyer (1996) defined organizational 
commitment as "a psychological link between the employee and his or her organization that 
makes it less likely that the employee will voluntarily leave the organization" (p.252). 
Putterill and Rohrer (1995) summarized commitment as "the desire of employees to remain in 
the organization, exerting work effort while accepting organizational goals" (p.5 7). Within 
this body of research, the various definitions share a common component: a view of 
employee commitment as a sense of attachment to a work organization. Several researchers 
(e.g., Angle, 1983; Gould, 1979; Steers, 1977; Wiener, 1982) have also defined 
organizational commitment "as an affective response to the organization" (Penley and Gould, 
1988, p.44). Researchers generally agree that organizational commitment is a desirable 
employee behaviour (Aven, Parker, and McEvoy, 1993) and a necessary factor in 
organizational success (Besser, 1995). 
However, based on Meyer and Allen's (Meyer and Allen, 1991; Allen and Meyer, 1990) 
three-component models of organizational commitment incorporating the major 
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conceptualizations described in the literature, many writers (such as, Allen and Meyer, 1993, 
1996; Aven, Parker, and McEvoy, 1993; Benkhoff, 1997; Brett, Cron, and Slocum, 1995; 
Gellatly, 1995; Liou, 1995; Jaros, Jermier, Koehier, and Sincich, 1993; Liou and Nyhan, 
1994; and Meyer, Irving, and Allen, 1998) described three different types of organizational 
commitment: affective, continuance, and normative commitment. Affective commitment 
refers to the employee's emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the 
organization. Conceptually, the affective form of organizational commitment is believed to be 
characterized by at least three factors, including "(a) a strong belief in and acceptance of the 
organization's goals and values; (b) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization; and (c) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization" (Mowday, 
Porter, and Steers, 1982, p.27). Affective commitment is expected to develop on the basis of 
work experiences that increase the employees' feelings of challenge and 'comfort' in the 
organization (Allen and Meyer, 1993). It is expected that employees whose work experiences 
are consistent with their expectations and satisfy their basic needs will develop a stronger 
affective attachment to the organization than will those whose work experiences are less 
satisfying (Meyer, Allen, and Smith, 1993). 
Continuance commitment is based on costs that an employee associates with leaving the 
organization. It refers to a general awareness of the costs associated with leaving the 
organization, and is affected by anything that increases the perceived costs of leaving. 
Gellatly (1995) stated that "this type of commitment increases when employees believe that 
suitable alternatives do not exist andlor when the personal costs of leaving are too high" 
Normative commitment is described by a feeling of loyalty based on what the(p.470). 
employee thinks the organization expects of him or her (Reilly and Orsak, 1991). 
Affective commitment is arguably the most studied form of commitment (Aven, Parker, and 
McEvoy, 1993; Randall, 1993), and is frequently measured by the Organizational 
Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) developed by Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian 
(1974). This thesis focused on the more established and well-known concept of affective 
commitment. 
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Since employees usually have little idea of how the business runs, companies requesting 
greater commitment from people are often hindered. It is always difficult to asses how far a 
financial participation scheme makes a contribution to better understanding and so helps in 
encouraging a constructive attitude to work, but definitely a scheme can present a useful tool 
in this respect (Confederation of British Industry, 1978). The advocates of profit sharing and 
employee share ownership argue that the transfer of ownership (of a number of shares to 
employees) leads to fundamental changes in worker/management attitudes and behaviour and 
this will result in increased commitment to, and comprehension of, the prospects and 
problems of the company (Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, Leopold and Ramsay, 1987). Profit 
sharing has the objective of increasing the general level of cooperation and commitment to 
the company as a whole (Child, 1984). 
Hammer, Stem, and Gurdon (1982) hypothesize that joint labour-management ownership will 
have a positive effect on worker commitment to the organization and its goals, and that it will 
decrease alienation from work if workers believe that "they are the true owners of the 
enterprise" (p.91). Kohn and Schooler (1973) mentioned that employees who have a 
substantial amount of share in the organization in which they are employed react to their job 
situations differently than to those who own less. They claimed that employee shareholders 
not only control assets but also feel themselves as owners. Therefore, when workers become 
owners via the purchase of shares, Hammer, Stem, and Gurdon (1982) argued, the more 
shares an employees owns, "the more committed he or she should be to organizational 
success, and the more responsibility he should feel for the welfare of the company" (p.91). 
However, they argued that ownership is not necessarily reflected only in terms of the amount 
of shares owned. The act of purchasing shares may be more important than the actual amount 
purchased. Long (1977) and Gurdon (1978) found that the number of shares each individual 
has bought varies, and some have not bought shares at all. Therefore they argued that in 
determining worker-owners' attitudes towards their organization, the ownership status itself 
is more important than is the number of shares held. 
Rhodes and Steers (1981) suggested that employee shareholders in the cooperative will have 
higher perceptions of "participation in decision-making, pay equity, performance-reward 




(p. 1016) (see Figure 3.2). These organizational perceptions, in turn, will lead to an increased 
commitment to the organization. Therefore, worker-owners in cooperatives will be more 
highly committed to their organization than employees in conventional organizations. 
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Source: Rhodes, S. R., and Steers, R. M. (1981). Conventional vs. Worker-Owned Organizations. Human 
Relations, 34, 12, p.1017. 
Klein (1987) reviewed the employee ownership literature and identified three alternative, but 
not mutually exclusive, perspectives of the psychological effects of employee ownership. 
Each of the three models are based on the assumption that "if employees are satisfied with the 
employee ownership plan, they will feel committed to the company and motivated to keep 
working there" (p.320). Each model assumes that different employee ownership conditions 
are related to high employee satisfaction with stock ownership, high organizational 
commitment, and low turnover intentions. 
The first model is referred to as the intrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership and 
suggests that the employee ownership itself increases employees' commitment to and 
satisfaction with the company. According to this model, the benefits of employee ownership 
are derived directly from the fact of ownership, rather than from a more specific characteristic 
of the employee ownership plan or of the company as a whole. 
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The second model is termed the instrumental satisfaction model of employee ownership, and 
suggests that employee ownership increases employees' influence in company decision 
making activities, which in turn increases employee commitment to the company. Advocates 
of this model, such as Long (1978a, 1978b, 1979), Hammer and Stern (1980), and 
Tannenbaum (1983), suggest that employee ownership has a positive effect on employee job 
attitudes if workers are provided substantial opportunities for participation in decision 
making. Therefore, according to this model, the benefits of employee ownership are derived 
indirectly from the added control and influence brought by ownership, rather than from the 
fact of ownership. 
The third and final model is the extrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership. This 
model posits that if the employee ownership experience is financially rewarding to 
employees, employees' organizational commitment will increase. Klein and Hall (1988) 
stated that "the more money employees gain through employee ownership, the happier they 
are with the plan" (p.637). Katz and Kahn (1978) regarded an employee share ownership plan 
as a 'system reward' that may increase employee commitment and decrease employee 
turnover. 
French (1987) reviewed literature and suggested that much of the writing on employee 
ownership assumes that when employees obtain shares in companies they work for, they 
expect to have more influence in making decisions than they had earlier, and more influence 
than employees who do not have shares. After reviewing the research on employee 
ownership, he concluded that there was little empirical evidence to support either the intrinsic 
and the instrumental model of employee ownership. Consistent with the extrinsic satisfaction 
model, he raised a different idea that employees might participate in an employee ownership 
system due completely to an investment expectation. Therefore, employee owners regard 
themselves simply as investors who own shares in companies where they work and "limit 
their expectations to a satisfactory rate of return on their investment rather than greater 
control over organizational decisions" (p.429). According to French, if shares are viewed 
solely as investments, it would be expected that work attitudes and actions of employees who 
hold a large number of shares will differ markedly from those who hold smaller numbers. He 
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claims that the economic significance of the holding of the employee-owners may affect 
worker attitudes and actions. In addition, ownership strengthens perceptions of common 
interest with others in the organization and leads to greater organizational identification. 
Therefore, he claimed that employees with a large number of shares would have greater 
identification with and commitment to the organization than those with a smaller of number 
shares have. 
Mitchell, Levin, and Lawler (1990) mentioned that some companies have introduced their 
profit sharing plans to educate employees about the financial situation of the business. When 
employees actually have a share in the profits, they become conscious of "what profits mean 
for the firm and how they are calculated" (p.72). Therefore, they suggest that group-based 
financial incentives (profit-sharing and employee share ownership schemes) indirectly 
increase employee effort and commitment by promoting communication about company 
performance and educating employees about the significance of profits and organizational 
effectiveness. 
The Schemes and Motivation 
Psychologists define motivation as "that which gives impetus to our behaviour by arousing, 
sustaining, and directing it toward the attainment of goals" (Wortman and Loftus, 1992, 
p.353). In today's skill-driven marketplace, nomnanagement employees are expected to make 
an increasing number of important decisions, and to process more information than ever 
before (Prolman, 1995). The advocates of share schemes claim that they motivate employees 
to work harder, to work more effectively, and to have a sense of personal responsibility by 
giving them a financial stake in the success of the company (Eisman, 1994; Fosbre, 1989; 
Kunkel and Lau, 1995; Strauss and Sayles, 1980; Prolman, 1995). Smith, Lazarus, and 
Kalkstein (1990) argued that employee share ownership plans seem to represent a win-win 
proposition to improve employee motivation and morale under the following circumstances: 
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a) Providing increased financial incentive: As a simple statement of 'expectancy theory" in 
the motivation literature (Lawler, 1969), it is argued that harder work probably leads to higher 
productivity and higher profits, leading to monetary rewards for the employees. Bakan (1995) 
stated that, according to expectancy theory (Graen, 1969; Lawler, 1973; Porter and Lawler, 
1968; Vroom, 1964), "if effort leads to performance, and performance leads to desired 
rewards, the employee is satisfied and motivated to perform again" (p.102). According to 
Kruse (1984) expectancy theory claims that employee motivation is determined by two 
variables: the expectancy that more effort will result in a reward, and the expected value of 
the reward. For Kruse (1984) both of these variables may be affected by employee ownership. 
He argued that "a perceived link between the performance of the employees and the profits 
they receive as owners may cause increased employee effort to raise profits (the first 
variable), while a right to a share of the profits increases the potential rewards to an employee 
(the second variable)" (p.38). 
Under the employee stock ownership plan, employees share and thus, probably, will "take an 
interest in the equity growth of their companies" (Smith, Lazarus and Kalkstein, 1990, p.39). 
The plan provides the employees a 'piece of the action' through ownership of company stock 
(Reum and Reum, 1976). When the company's wealth increases, it will result in an increase 
in the value of employees' stock accounts. Therefore, employees are motivated to work 
harder and to do their jobs better in order to increase their companies' wealth, and so too the 
value of their stock accounts. The motivational effect of employee ownership depends on 
employees' perception that their effort has a significant effect on company performance. If 
they believe that there is a significant relationship between their effort and company 
performance, they may believe that they can increase the value of their stock account by 
working harder. It is also argued that the motivational effect of employee ownership depends 
on the size of the stake (Rosen, 1984; Heller, 1984). Employees can be motivated through 
"Several variations on this theme have been proposed, most of them having to do with alternative 
multiplicative ways of combining the expected values assigned to each of the components" (Pate, 1987, p.60). 
Although the labels vary considerably across expectancy theories, there seems to be agreement on the following 
main components which are interrelated in determining what employees actually do: 
(1) Expectancy - employees' expectation of whether or not effort (E) will actually lead to the desired behaviour 
(B). 
(2) Instrumentality - employees' beliefs about what the outcomes (0) will be from performing the behaviour 
(B). 
(3) Valance - the extent to which employees attach reward (R) value to the outcomes. 
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ownership if the company provides a significant amount of stock for them. Heller (1984) 
stated that "the higher the degree of ownership, the greater the level of motivation" (p.28). 
b) Creating a new set of attitudes: Employee ownership plans may stimulate a philosophical 
shift concerning the employees' role perceptions in the company. Rather than viewing 
themselves as employees, employee ownership plans encourage them to view themselves as 
co-owners of the company because "the financial fortunes of the company and employees are 
becoming more closely linked" (Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990, pp.39-40). They may 
be entitled to obtain some ownership rights, such as representation and a share in the 
company's wealth. Therefore, it is argued that as employees feel as owners, they will be more 
committed to the organizational goals and so work harder and more effectively (Strauss, 
1990: Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). They will be motivated to increase not just 
profits but the company's fundamental worth when they believe that they rather than 
someone else will take advantage of their company's fortunes. 
It must be noted that employees do not feel and act like owners if they do not know they are 
owners (Rosen, 1984). Therefore, Rosen (1984) suggests that employees must understand the 
employee share ownership plans. To increase employees' understanding of employee 
ownership, a company may benefit from an effective education programme, which "may 
convey the value of ESOP participation to employees who otherwise may not understand or 
have an interest in a distant and abstract benefit" (Marsh and McAllister, 1981, p.582). Marsh 
and McAllister (1981) further argued that: 
One goal of an educational program might be to change the perceptions employees hold of 
their role in the company. Rather than viewing themselves as outsiders contesting with 
stockholders for current income, employees may begin to view themselves as co-owners who, 
through cooperation with management, can boost the value of the company to benefit 
everyone (p.582). 
c) Building teamwork: Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein (1990) argued that under many 
incentive systems, employees in different departments frequently regard themselves as in 
competition with one another and are rewarded in terms of different goals. Because of the 
differences between the goals of their incentive plans, some conflicts may occur between 
employees and managers. While employees are focused on relatively narrow performance 
measures, managers are generally tied to broader outcomes like profits or return on 
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investment. The efforts of others and the overall performance of the organization can be 
weakened as each group wants to achieve its own goals. But Smith et al. (1990) suggested 
that everyone should, to some extent, be rewarded on the same basis, as they should be 
working toward a common goal. Under an employee share ownership plan a substantial 
growth in organization wealth is everyone's common objective. Consequently, supporters 
view the advantages of the employee share ownership plans to be those of "motivating the 
employee as a member of the team and of creating a more positive working environment" 
(Latta, 1979, p.5). They feel that the plans promote labour relations and indicate that the 
organization is a 'good' employer. Managers can introduce a new set of expectations and 
attitudes throughout the company by using the plans as vehicles. They should provide 
employees the opportunity to participate in decision making, if they want such a change 
(Smith et al., 1990). 
Limitations of the motivational effect of employee ownership plans: The following issues 
limit employee ownership plans' intrinsic value to employees: 
a) Timing of the reward: Under employee share ownership plans, employee shares are held in 
trust for a predetermined time. For instance, in the UK, the shares are held by a trust for a 
minimum of two years under the approved profit sharing schemes (IDS Study 583, 1995; 
Inland Revenue, 1R96, 1996). Under the approved SAYE share option schemes, employees 
can buy shares only from the proceeds of a SAYE saving contract (IDS Study 583, 1995). 
These contracts last for a period of three, five, or seven years (Inland Revenue, 1R98, 1996), 
"at which time employees may either use the proceeds to buy shares or withdraw their 
savings plus a bonus" (IDS Study 583, 1995, p.9). So employees are rewarded in the long 
term under both approved profit sharing and SAYE schemes. Employees must wait at least 
two years before being able to cash in their shares in approved profit sharing schemes. They 
have to wait three, five, or seven years to take out SAYE contracts, depending on the 
contract. Since employees are rewarded several years behind work performance, they 
recognize little "concrete relationship between how hard they work and how much they get" 
(Strauss and Sayles, 1980, p.640). In other words, "this tends to weaken the perceived 
relationship between present job performance (motivation) and the potential reward (ESOP)" 
(Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990, p.42). Whitney (1988) argued that deferred forms of 
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profit sharing or plans that require an employee contribution to be matched in a savings 
programme will have significantly less motivational impact on many employees because of 
the delayed nature of the reward. Appelbaum and Shapiro (1991) also argued that the delay in 
feedback, resulting from the time elapsed between the performance and the attribution of the 
reward, takes away some of the incentive power of profit sharing schemes. However, the 
relevant motivation theories, such as expectancy and reinforcement theories, recommend a 
short chronological relationship between employee effort and reward. If the lag between 
effort and reward is shorter, the reward will have more impact on employee job attitudes and 
behaviours. 
b) Personal control over reward: Overall company profits and the value of employee shares 
depend on a great many factors other than an employee's own performance, such as the 
performance of other employees and departments in the company, the state of the market, 
sales efficiency, technological development, and so forth (Strauss and Sayles, 1980; Smith, 
Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). When these factors have a substantial effect on company 
performance, an employee may not believe that he can control the value of his shares (Marsh 
and McAllister, 1981). Although employees work hard and effectively they recognize that the 
value of their efforts and their stock accounts are reduced by factors mentioned above. 
According to motivational theories, if the value of an employee's reward is, to a great extent, 
determined by factors outside the employee's control, the reward will have less motivational 
effect on employee behaviour. 
c) Weak relationship between effort and reward: Some supporters of employee ownership 
plans, especially profit sharing, do not view plans as a direct incentive to encourage a greater 
employee effort, a function that they believe is performed best in piecework payment systems 
(Latta, 1979). The plans, by themselves, are viewed as less-effective motivators (Lawler, 
1987) since the relationship between shares received and individual employee effort is very 
weak (Cheadle, 1989; Hamner, 1975). This is particularly correct in large organizations 
(Lawler, 1987; Cheadle, 1989; Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Kruse, 1984), where one 
person's performance rarely has more than a negligible effect on corporate performance and 
profits (Kruse, 1984), and the relationship between individual performance and stock price is 
nearly nonexistent (Lawler, 1987). In contrast, an employee ownership plan may encourage 
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more employee motivation in small companies where employees are more likely to believe 
that their individual efforts have a significant effect on company performance (Marsh and 
McAllister, 1981). Long (1997) stated that "many commentators - especially those with a 
traditional economics perspective - believe that profit sharing will be most effective as a 
motivator in smaller firms, where the linkage between individual employee effort, company 
performance and individual rewards should be most apparent" (p.716). However, even in 
large organizations, profit sharing and employee share ownership plans can act as an indirect 
incentive (Cheadle, 1989) by pointing out to everyone that "they are part of one organization 
and that joint effort is needed" (Lawler, 1987, p.81). Therefore, employees recognize that, for 
organization effectiveness, their cooperation, flexibility, and acceptance of change are 
required (Beicher, 1974), and consequently they may still work harder "as part of perceived 
'group effort' by all employees" (Kruse, 1984, p.38) to increase company performance and 
profits. 
It is also argued that profit sharing may not offer enough incentive to motivate employees, as 
the financial share in the employees' profit sharing scheme may be too low to function 
(Huang, 1997). 
The Schemes and Satisfaction 
There are numerous definitions ofjob satisfaction in the literature. Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 
(1969) defined job satisfaction as the "feelings a worker has about the job" (p.25). Locke 
(1976) defined job satisfaction as "a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the 
appraisal of one's job or job experiences" (p.1300). Consistent with Locke's definition, 
Cranny, Smith, and Stone (1992) defined job satisfaction as "an affective (that is, emotional) 
reaction to a job, that results from the incumbent's comparison of actual outcomes with those 
that are desired (expected, deserved, and so on)" (p.1). According to Rogers, Clow, and Kash 
(1994) job satisfaction refers to "the individual's attitude toward the various aspects of their 
job as well as the job in general" (p.15). Motowidlo (1996) suggested that job satisfaction is a 
judgment about the favourability of one's work environment. According to Brief (1998) job 
satisfaction is an attitude toward one's job. After reviewing the literature, Brief (1998) 
defined job satisfaction as "an internal state that is expressed by affectively andlor cognitively 
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evaluating an experienced job with some degree of favor or disfavor" (j.S6). For this study 
Locke's (1976) definition was chosen because it appears to be widely used. 
One of the most frequently cited advantages of profit sharing and employee share ownership 
is increased job satisfaction. Higher job satisfaction is supposed to occur through employee 
ownership in a few possible ways. In the employee ownership literature it is considered that 
share ownership may affect employee satisfaction by meeting employee needs and 
expectations for financial gains, strengthening feelings of solidarity with and loyalty to others 
in the organization, and increasing employee influence in company decision making and 
involvement in the company (Eisman, 1994; Long, 1978a, 1979; McAdams, 1995; 
Tannenbaum, 1983; French, 1987; Klein, 1987; Poole and Jenkins, 1991; Klein and Hall, 
1988). 
It is argued that employee ownership can increase employee job satisfaction by giving 
employees a right to share in the profits of the enterprise (Kruse, 1984; Long, 1978a). 
According to French (1987) when employees regard ownership solely as a financial 
investment and concentrate on their expectations for financial reward (rights to profits) rather 
than control, other issues may be viewed as critical by employee-owners. The company's 
financial performance as reflected in the stock price and dividend level, and trends in sales 
and profits, he argues, may be the most important issues. When employees expect share 
ownership to meet only their expectations for financial reward, the effects of ownership on 
satisfaction with jobs and companies depends on employees' perceptions of the company's 
performance. Since employee shareholders gain more direct financial advantages on the 
company's success than employee non-shareholders, when company performance is 
perceived as favourable, it is likely that the former will be more satisfied than the latter. By 
contrast, when performance is perceived as unfavourable, it is less likely that employee 
shareholders will be more satisfied than employee non-shareholders because the company's 
financial problems will harm the former more directly than the latter. 
Employee's job satisfaction can also be improved if employee ownership makes the working 
climate of the company better (Kruse, 1984). In such a working situation, employees want to 
work together for a common goal and help each other. 
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The intrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership suggests that the simple fact of 
ownership increases employees' satisfaction with the organization (Klein, 1987). According 
to this model "the benefit of employee ownership derives directly from ownership, not from a 
specific characteristic of the employee ownership plan or of the company as a whole" (Klein, 
1987, p.320). In other words, increased employee satisfaction is derived simply from 
employee ownership, under which employees feel as co-owners of the company (Kruse, 
1984). However, it is assumed that employee ownership itself will tend to increase 
employees' expectations concerning control or democratic participation (French, 1987; 
Rothschild-Whitt and Whitt, 1986). Employee shareholders want to have rights to participate 
in company decision making to protect their investments and increase their feeling of being 
part-owners of the company. But if employee ownership does not realize these expectations 
and traditional power relations remain intact, employee shareholders who want more 
participation will be disappointed and their satisfaction with their jobs and the company may 
also suffer. Therefore, the extent to which employee ownership increases employee 
satisfaction depends on changes in the power relationship that meet employee shareholders' 
expectations of control or democratic participation. Rothschild-Whitt and Whitt (1986) stated 
that "taken together, the many recent case studies of worker-owned (ESOP) firms strongly 
indicate that the less participation accompanies ownership, the less effective is ownership by 
itself in improving work satisfaction" Q.302). They suggested that the fuller potential of 
employee ownership is realized only when it is associated with added opportunities for 
employee involvement in decision making and control. 
Kruse (1984) further argued that not only might the effects mentioned above not occur, but 
also employee ownership could lower employee job satisfaction if employees' expectations 
(for a better working climate, better economic performance, more participation in decision 
making, more information on the company, or anything else which employees may couple 
with employee ownership) are raised and then disappointed. 
3.2.4. Employee Ownership and Participation 
From the human relations school up to the quality-of-working-life movement, organizational 
psychologists have claimed with insistence that worker participation in organizational 
106 
decision making is a substantial ingredient in job satisfaction, motivation, and work 
performance as well as in the psychological growth and development of the worker (Argyris, 
1964; Flackman, 1975; Herzberg, 1966; Maslow, 1954; Lawler, 1977; Likert, 1961). Several 
authors and investigators suggest that if profit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes are combined with employee participation in decision making, they produce a 
stronger effect on job attitudes (Eisman, 1989; Rothschild-Whitt and Whitt, 1986), and on 
company performance (Rosen, 1990; Klein, 1987; Long, 1 978a,b,c; Rosen and Quarrey, 
1987; Cable and Fitzroy, 1980; US General Accounting Office, 1987). After reviewing the 
literature, Blinder (1990) concluded that "worker participation apparently helps make 
alternative compensation plans like profit sharing, gain sharing, and ESOPs work better and 
also has beneficial effects of its own" (p. 13). Therefore, as a significant interaction between 
employee participation in decision making and profit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes could be expected, this part of the chapter will (a) discuss the ways in which 
employee ownership will result in increased participation, and (b) shed light on the question 
of how participation leads to what kinds of outcomes based on theoretical literature. 
Ownership and Participation 
Employee ownership is regarded as "an opportunity (or a demand) to push (and perhaps pull) 
decision making downward" (Bartkus, 1997, p.336). Long (1978) argued that there are 
several ways in which employee ownership will lead to increased worker participation at the 
organizational policy, departmental, and job levels. He proposed three major ways in which 
this may occur: "(1) through the legal rights attaching to ownership, (2) through increasing 
worker desire or motivation to participate and (3) by increasing the willingness and desire of 
managers for worker participation in decisions" (p.21). (See Figure 3.3). 
a) Employee share ownership and influence: Employee share ownership in and of itself 
imparts certain rights to influence organizational decisions, especially at the policy level 
(Long, 1978). Shareholders have the right to elect the board of directors, to receive financial 
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Source: Long, R. J. (1978). The effects of employee ownership on job attitudes and organizational performance: 
An exploratory study. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, Business Administration, p.22. 
However, Berle and Means (1932) mentioned that mere share ownership often amounts to 
little real influence by shareholders. It is here claimed that employee shareholders are in a 
much better position to exercise influence than the non-employee shareholders in a large 
organization for several reasons. First, employee shareholders receive more detailed 
information about the affairs of the company by working there. Second, in the typical stock 
ownership structure, shareholders are widely dispersed. By contrast, employee shareholders 
are concentrated and interact on a daily basis. French (1987) stated that "because of the 
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physical proximity and relationships with one another, employee owners are more capable of 
mobilizing opposition to management than most outside stockholders" (p.432). Finally, 
employee shareholders are more interested in company matters and in exercising their 
influence, since organizational decisions are much more important to them than they are to 
typical shareholders. When the company's performance decreases, employee owners have a 
greater incentive to interpose than outside stockholders, since the company's financial 
problems threaten their jobs as well as the value of their stock (French, 1987). 
However, advocates of self-management, such as Bernstein (1976), Johnson and Whyte 
(1982), and Vanek (1975), have doubted whether financial ownership is sufficient grounds 
for worker control and influence over the organization's decision-making process. Although 
employee shareholders gain the legal right to cast votes and effect major policy decisions, this 
does not guarantee that they will have much actual influence on the decision making 
(Hammer and Stern, 1980). But actual participation by worker-owners may occur if the 
workers are motivated to take an active role in decision making and if the company's 
managers are willing to share control with other members of the workforce (Long, 1978; 
Hammer and Stern, 1980). 
b) Workers' desire for participation: According to Long (1978) the increase of workers' 
desire for more influence is the second way in which employee ownership may create 
pressure for workers' influence. If increased worker influence is not desired by workers, it is 
hardly likely to occur. In other words, ownership without a desire for control and influence is 
unlikely to create changes in the decision-making process (Hammer and Stern, 1980). Kruse 
(1984) argued that employee ownership leads employees to desire more participation in 
decisions made about their company and their jobs. There are two major ways in which this 
effect may occur: monetary interest and non-monetary interest. Employee shareholders desire 
more participation in decisions because of their monetary interest. In a booklet of the 
Confederation of British Industry (1978), it is argued that "as the employees' stake grows, so 
do their levels of expectations that they will share in the decisions that affect them" (p.7). 
When an employee is a shareholder, he can feel that he has much right to influence company 
affairs as any other traditional shareholder. Since employee ownership entitles employees to a 
share of the profits, share appreciation, and dividends if the firm prospers, it increases 
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employee interest in ensuring that company decisions are being made well. Therefore, 
nonmanagerial worker-owners may desire influence over factors that directly impact the 
economic condition of the organization, decisions that traditionally are made by owners and 
managers (Dachier and Wilpert, 1978), especially if their trust in management is less than 
total. Employees may also believe that if they could have rights for participation in job-
related decisions they could raise the productivity of their own jobs, and employee ownership 
may present the incentive for such participation (Kruse, 1984). 
Apart from any monetary interest, some authors (French, Israel, and As, 1960; Holter, 1965) 
believed that desire for employee participation is affected by one factor: whether worker 
influence is regarded by workers as legitimate. Employee ownership may not create the desire 
for participation (Kruse, 1984) but should enhance the legitimacy of employee participation 
because the right of employee shareholders to influence organizational decisions is well 
embedded both in law and the social values of Western society (Long, 1978). 
According to Kruse (1984) employee ownership does not cause employees to desire more 
participation in the company's decision-making processes for any of a number of foreseeable 
reasons. First, if there are no opportunities for increasing participation, employees may view 
participation desires as pointless. Second, employees may regard participation as simply too 
much trouble. Finally, as the monetary interest may increase desire for participation, it may 
also decrease it if employees become more interested in profit-maximizing and trust 
managers to make the best decisions. For instance, after reviewing research on employee 
ownership, Strauss (1982) concluded that owning stock within the organization structure does 
not create an inevitable dynamic for greater participation. Pateman (1970) and Dahl (1956) 
have argued that workers do not necessarily want industrial democratization. They may 
prefer to leave the company's decision-making processes in the hands of expert managers 
(Locke and Schweiger, 1978; Strauss, 1963) at least until they feel self-confidence in their 
ability and job experience to make policy-level decisions. According to French (1987) when 
some employee shareholders treat ownership as an investment, it makes little sense to claim 
that shareholding always increases employees' desire for influence. From this perspective, it 
is expected that employee investors will be satisfied with traditional patterns of decision 
making as long as the returns on their investments are satisfactory. 
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Long (1978) mentioned that although workers desire more participation in decisions, it will 
not necessarily result in increased participation if this is not desired by managers. 
c) Managers' desire for workers 'participation: Long (1978) suggested that there are at least 
four ways in which employee ownership could affect managers' attitudes toward workers' 
influence. First, if managers do not discern that workers desire more participation, they are 
unlikely to desire increased worker participation. Although Long (1978) believed that 
employee ownership may increase workers' desire for participation, as discussed before, 
others, such as French (1987) and Strauss (1982), claimed that employee ownership does not 
always lead to increased worker desire for influence. Second, managers' perceptions of the 
legitimacy of worker participation may be increased by employee ownership. Third, worker 
share ownership may increase the commitment and loyalty of workers to the organization and 
its goals. If managers become aware of these changes in worker job attitudes, they would 
almost certainly be more amenable to worker participation. Finally, if the amount of influence 
held by managers is increased through increasing total organizational influence by employee 
ownership, it make managers, in turn, more ready to allow employees greater influence. 
Hammer and Stern (1980) argued that education also plays a role in top managers' 
preferences to allocate power to employees as a group. Better-educated managers seem to be 
more receptive to changes in traditional power distributions and more sensitive to the rights 
of their co-owners. 
Long (1978) further argued that "overall, although employee ownership may create forces for 
increased participation, a number of factors may prevent this from actually occurring" (p.25). 
Long categorized these constraints as personal factors and situational factors. Personal factors 
might include a lack of knowledge of or ability to adopt roles vital for effective participation 
on the part of either superiors, subordinates, or both. Certain personality factors of 
supervisors andlor subordinates, which might moderate desire for worker participation, might 
also be included in personal factors. The technology and organization of work in the 
enterprise are viewed by Long as situational factors. In certain situations general worker 
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participation might be exceedingly costly to the organization and might require extensive re-
organization of work, if possible at all. 
The Relationship between Employee Participation and Organizational Effectiveness 
In this section, the relationship between employee participation in decision making and 
organizational effectiveness is analyzed, based on the theoretical literature, to explain how 
individual influence could result in organizational effectiveness. Managers consider employee 
participation vital to making organizations more competitive in the marketplace (Tjosvold, 
1998). Employee participation in decision making has been proposed as critical to reducing 
costs, improving product quality, enhancing employee motivation, and creating positive 
changes in employee attitudes (Leana, Ahlbrandt, and Murrell, 1992). Participation is defined 
as joint decision making (Locke and Schweiger, 1978; Vroom, 1960) or as influence-sharing 
between hierarchical superiors and their subordinates (Mitchell, 1973). Participation is also 
defined as "a process in which subordinates are allowed to contribute to decision making; the 
degree of involvement valying from consultation by the leader of the unit with his 
subordinates to real group decision making" (Mulder and Wilke, 1970, p.432). Although 
there is a broad literature regarding participation, particularly as it applies to industrial 
organizations, there are only a small number of comprehensive expressions of its effects 
(Likert, 1961; Lowin, 1968; McGregor, 1960). 
Participation is a core issue of study in the organizational sciences. Following Lewin's (1947) 
early study on participative decision making, the topic has received substantial attention in 
the literature (Lowin, 1968). It is suggested that workers' participation in decision making 
can help make work organizations more effective and responsive to their members' needs 
(Blumberg, 1968; Russell, Hochner, and Perry, 1979). After reviewing the literature Russell 
(1988) concluded that "quite large numbers of American employers are currently attempting 
through one means or another to increase their employees' participation in decisions that take 
place at or close to the shop floor" (p.380). The most likely reason for doing this is that they 
hope that these innovations will at least make their employees more satisfied with their jobs, 
more loyal to their companies, and less likely to leave their organizations, or will make 
employees more productive (Russell, 1988). 
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Researchers have identified a variety of mechanisms through which participation can have 
positive impacts on organizational outcomes (Schwochau, Delaney, Jarley, and Fiorito, 
1997). The affective model argues that participation leads to attainment of employees' higher-
order needs, which in turn leads to increased morale and satisfaction and decreased resistance 
to change (Miller and Monge, 1986). Effects on performance come not directly, but through 
participation's impacts on satisfaction and motivation (Miller and Monge, 1986). 
More direct effects on performance are suggested to occur through motivational and cognitive 
mechanisms (Locke and Schweiger, 1979), which ultimately encourage employees to 'work 
harder' and 'work smarter', respectively (Leana and Florkowski, 1992). Within the 
motivational mechanism, participation in workplace decision making enhances employee 
commitment, reduces alienation and resistance to change, and increases trust. These, in turn, 
motivate employees to work harder, which results in increases in productivity. The cognitive 
model posits that participation increases performance because it increases the flows and use 
of information in organizational decision making. The increased top-down information flows 
necessary to involve employees in decisions enhances employee understanding and 
acceptance of those decisions (Leana and Florkowski, 1992). Scholars have suggested 
bottom-up information flows are particularly important (Cooke, 1990, 1992; Leana and 
Florkowski, 1992; Levine and Tyson, 1990; Miller and Monge, 1986). The use of employees' 
unique information increases organizational performance and indirectly enhances satisfaction 
(Miller and Monge, 1986). 
It is also argued that "benefits from participation may be realized, however, even when 
employees are not directly involved in decisions relating to change" (Schwochau, Delaney, 
Jarley, and Fiorito, 1997, p.3 82). In other words, if employees perceive that they are involved 
in decisions, this may be sufficient to increase morale and satisfaction and reduce resistance 
to change. It may not be necessary for employees to participate directly in making decisions 
(Schwochau et al., 1997). 
Considerable research has been dedicated to understanding the impacts of participation in 
decision making (Margulies and Black, 1987). Researchers have analyzed the relationship 
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between participation and outcomes such as motivation, satisfaction, commitment, and 
productivity and generally concluded that those relationships are at least moderately positive 
(Coch and French, 1948; Lawler, 1982; Strauss, 1963; French, Israel, and As, 1960; Lawler 
and Hackman, 1969; Mayer and Schoorman, 1998; Miller and Monge, 1986; Guzzo, Jette, 
and Katzell, 1985; Schweiger and Leana, 1986; Spector, 1986; Bass and Leavitt, 1963; 
Denison, 1984; Wagner and Gooding, 1987). The theoretical rationale for these relationships 
is that participation promotes feelings of independence, influence, and esteem among 
employees, which in turn increase morale and commitment (Locke and Schweiger, 1979). In 
the light of various experiments and other empirical studies the major advantages of 
participation in decision making can be summarized as the following: 
1. Greater fulfillment of psychological needs, and therefore, greater satisfaction (Hrebiniak, 
1974; Kearney and Hays, 1994; Locke and Schweiger, 1979; Patchen, 1970; Wagner, 
1994). 
2. Greater acceptance of organizational change (Blumberg, 1968; Coch and French, 1948; 
Durand, Pecaut, and Willener, 1965; Alutto and Belasco, 1972; Feldman and Kanter, 
1965; Gill, Beaupain, Frohlich, and Krieger, 1993; Kearney and Hays, 1994; Wexley and 
Yuld, 1977). 
3. Greater work achievement (Patchen, 1970). 
4. Greater individual integration into the organization (Feldman and Kanter, 1965; Patchen, 
1970). 
5. Greater organizational commitment (Buraway, 1979; Hackman and Oldham, 1980; 
Morris and Steers, 1980; Kearney and Hays, 1994; Wallace, 1995). 
6. Greater job involvement (Hall, 1977; Ruh, Johnson, and Scontrino, 1973). 
7. Enhanced employee motivation (Huang, 1997; Ruh, Johnson, and Scontrino, 1973). 
8. Higher levels of morale and lower levels of distress (Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg, 
1996; Huang, 1997). 
9. Greater understanding and acceptance of decisions by subordinates (Coch and French, 
1948). 
10. Greater commitment to implement decisions (Davis, 1963). 
11. Greater understanding of objectives (Lawler and Hackman, 1969). 
12. Greater social pressure on all members to comply with decisions (Mitchell, 1973; 
Sashkin, 1976). 
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13. Greater team identity, cooperation, and coordination (Davis, 1963) and higher level of 
interpersonal trust among subordinates (Urebiniak, 1974). 
14. Better means of constructive conflict resolution (Strauss, 1963). 
15. Better decisions (Vroom, 1969). The cognitive model of participation serves as a 
theoretical argument for the widely held observation that many employees know more 
about their jobs than their supervisors do and, if consulted, could contribute to a higher 
quality of decision making than their supervisors would achieve on their own (Wagner, 
Leana, Locke, and Schweiger, 1997). 
In contrast, some studies including quantitative reviews have failed to prove substantial 
participation-outcome relationships (e.g. Locke, Feren McCaleb, Shaw, and Denny, 1980). 
For instance, after reviewing several studies, Filley and House (1969) concluded that 
although there was a general tendency for participation to be positively related to satisfaction, 
there was not a positive relationship between participation and productivity. Powell and 
Schiacter (1971) found that there was no increase in the productivity of work groups who 
where provided the opportunity to plan their own work schedules. Locke, Schweiger, and 
Latham (1986) reviewed 50 studies of the relationship between participation and performance 
and concluded that the majority of these studies yielded inconclusive, mixed, or negative 
results. Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-FIall, and Jennings (1988) conducted a review to 
analyse the effects of participation on both employee satisfaction and performance and also 
found a mixed record, but concluded that permanent increases in participation that are 
designed into employees' daily jobs have been indicated to be substantially more effective 
than consultative or representative forms of participation like employee representation on 
company boards or quality circles. So, existing evidence shows that in some circumstances 
participation is effective, while in other cases it is not. Therefore, Long (1978) suggested that 
the question is not so much whether or not participation is effective but rather how 
participation results in what kinds of outcomes, and under what conditions these outcomes are 
minimized or maximized. 
After reviewing the relevant literature, Long (1978) stated that "employee participation has 
been hypothesized to lead to organizational effectiveness in at least four major ways: 









(2) through enhancing work motivation 
(3) by positively influencing employee attitudes toward change 
(4) by improving the quality of organizational decision." (p.29). (See Figure 3.4). 
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Before moving on to the relationship between participation and job satisfaction and work 
motivation, it will be helpful to give a brief explanation about the term 'participation' used in 
this study. 'Workers' participation' is regarded as one of the more slippery concepts in 
industrial relations (Jam and Giles, 1985), because it has seldom been clearly defined 
(Vroom, 1959) and different people and groups have used it in different ways. Participation is 
a frequently supported managerial technique for involving employees and allowing them to 
share in the decision-making process (Coach and French, 1948; Morse and Reimer, 1956; 
Vanek, 1975). French, Israel, and As (1960) defined participation as follows: 
Participation refers to a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making 
certain plans, policies, and decisions. . . The amount of participation of A may be defined as 
the amount of A's influence on the decisions and plans agreed upon, or equivalently the 
amount of influence that B,C.. . accept during the joint decision-making process. (pp.3-4) 
So, participation is a process of joint decision making by two or more parties in which the 
decisions will have impacts on those making them. 
According to Jam and Giles (1985) workers' participation varies in three important ways. 
First, participation may take place at any of a number of the organizational levels. They 
identified three levels: 
(1) The corporate level: At this level long-term strategic policy decisions are made, such as 
product and market choice, major financial decisions and planning, and distribution of profits. 
(2) The establishment or plant level: Short- and medium-term administrative decisions are 
made at this level, such as limited resource distribution decisions, plant-wide work 
arrangements, production layouts, employment decisions, and cost and quality control. 
(3) The workplace level: At this level day-to-day operating decisions are made, such as work 
scheduling, working practices, and speed of production. 
Wang and Heller (1993) classified decision tasks into three categories: long-term decisions 
(organizational level), medium-term decisions (departmental level), and short-term decisions 
(job level). Some researchers (e.g., Sockell, 1985; Long, 1978, 1988; Keef, 1991) measured 




	 	 	 	
	 	
	
Figure 3.5. A Continuum of Employees' Participation in Decision Making 
LOW SUBORDINATE HIGH SUBORDINATE 
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Own decision Own decision Consultation Joint decision Delegation 
without with making 
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Source: Heller, F. A., and Yukl, G. (1969). Participation, Managerial Decision-Making and Situational 
Variables" Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance, 4, p.230. 
Second, participation may vary according to the degree of participation employed by the 
participants. Figure 3.5, for example, shows the hypothesized relationship between the 
influence continuum and five decision procedures that have been found to be relatively clear 
and meaningful for managers (Heller and Yukl, 1969). So, employee participants may 
influence company-decision making processes along a continuum. At the lower end of the 
continuum, employees might be discouraged from influencing the -management of an 
enterprise. Employers might rely instead on a traditional authoritarian management style and 
hierarchical organization structure. At this end management has total responsibility for 
decision making, and nonmanagerial employees conducting that which they are ordered to do. 
At the upper end of the continuum, employee participants may have complete control over 
the management process. They have final say over decision making. Hespe and Wall (1976) 
stated that "strictly speaking, participation can only refer to the intermediate stages, between 
these two extremes" (p.413) where both management and nonmanagement have influence 
over the company's decision making. According to them, the extremes do not represent 
participation, they represent management and worker control, respectively. A number of other 
alternatives exist between these two extremes: "disclosure of information to workers (usually 
as a means of winning their consent to decisions made elsewhere or as a means of 
organizational control); consultation with workers through advisory bodies (joint labour-
management committees); collective bargaining; and co-determination (i.e. workers' veto 
rights over decisions)" (Jam and Giles, 1985, p.'74.9). 
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Here, the Vroom and Yetton (1973) model of managerial decision making should be 
mentioned because it is regarded as one of the focal points for thinking about participation 
(Beach, 1997). In their model, Vroom and Yetton argue that an organization's members can 
participate to different degrees in managerial decision making and that the leader's task is to 
select the right level of member involvement in light of the characteristics of the decision 
problem. The lowest level excludes them altogether; the leader makes the decision. The 
second level merely invites them to contribute information; the leader makes the decision, 
which may or may not reflect the input. The third level provides them with information about 
the problem and asks for each individual's ideas and suggestions; the leader makes the 
decisions, which may or may not reflect the input. The fourth level provides them with 
information and asks for their collective ideas and recommendations; the leader makes the 
decision, which may or may not reflect the input. The fifth level provides them with 
information about the problem and meets them as a group to arrive at a consensus that 
becomes the organization's fmal decision. 
Third, the form of participation may be direct or indirect, and formal or informal (Huang, 
1997). Direct participation refers to "the immediate, personal involvement of organization 
members in decision-making" (Dachier and Wilpert, 1978, p.12), whereas indirect 
participation refers to involvement through representation of some kind, such as works 
councils and worker directors (Keef, 1991). Within each of these forms there are alternative 
participative structures, such as face-to-face informal contact or meetings in the case of direct 
participation and supervisory boards, trade union representatives, joint consultation, and 
employee directors in the case of indirect participation. Lischeron and Wall (1975) found that 
employees preferred direct participation on issues directly concerning their jobs (hiring and 
firing of co-workers, materials, purchasing, etc.) and indirect participation on issues indirectly 
affecting their jobs (hiring and firing of managers, organizational policy). Dickson (1980) 
stated that "direct participation could increase decision acceptance, and indirect participation 
could increase satisfaction with organizational policies and hence acceptance of the 
organization as a place to work" (p.226). Formal participation is embodied in a decision-
making structure created by explicit rules. Informal participation refers to "the receptivity and 
responsiveness of managers and supervisors to the ideas and suggestions of subordinates" 
(Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, Vianello, and Wieser, 1974, p.51). Participation may be any 
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combination of these forms, such as both informal and direct, formal and indirect, even both 
formal and informal together, and so on. Gallie, White, Cheng, and Thomlinson (1998) 
identified four main modes of participation: direct participation, in which employees are 
personally involved in decisions that go beyond their immediate work task; communicative 
involvement, where employee involvement is sought through the development of better (two-
way) communications; indirect consultative participation through some type of works council 
or joint consultative committee; and union representation, where the terms and conditions of 
employment are jointly regulated by the employer and representatives of the employees. 
As it is in Long's (1978) study, for the purpose of this study two types of participation, 
distinguished by Vroom (1959), will be used: objective participation and perceived 
participation. Vroom (1959) defined objective participation as "the amount of influence he 
[the employee] actually does have on decision-making" while perceived or psychological 
participation is defined as "the amount of influence he [the employee] perceives he has on 
decision making" (p.323). Although it is obvious that actual decision quality will be 
influenced by 'objective participation', it is not well known which is more important in 
influencing job satisfaction, motivation, and attitudes towards change (Long, 1978). 
Participation and motivation: Since the relationship between participation and motivation 
is complex (Vroom, 1967), a brief background is needed regarding motivation in order to 
adequately discuss the relationship. Motivation is defined as attitude towards performance 
(Mitchell, 1973) andlor a result of people's beliefs about the consequences of their actions 
(Lawler, 1973; Pinder, 1984). Lawler (1986) stated that "people are motivated to perform an 
action when they perceive that the consequences of the action are favourable to them; that is, 
when they perceive that they will achieve goals or outcomes that they receive" (p.28). He 
suggested that in most situations individuals are confronted with a number of possible 
behaviours. If people are given a choice, they behave in the way they think has the most 
favourable consequences. "The identification of a need is the starting point of the process of 
motivation" (Bakan, 1995, p.14). Therefore, behavioural thinkers (Maslow, 1954; Herzberg, 
1966; Herzberg, Mausner, and Synderman, 1957; McClelland, 1975) developed 'need 
theories' which "concentrate on the content of motivation in the form of the fundamental 
human needs" (Bakan, 1995, p.14). In order to better understand individuals' desires, these 
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theories and other writings on the nature of human needs are relevant. They state that 
"individuals have multiple needs" (Lawler, 1986, p.28), some of which can be satisfied by 
extrinsic rewards such as pay, praise, promotion, recognition from the boss, recognition from 
other people, and security. They also point out that individuals have intrinsic needs for such 
things as personal growth and accomplishment. These needs can be satisfied by intrinsic 
rewards, such as responsibility "(feeling the work is important and having control over one's 
own resources)" (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994, p.34), freedom to act, feelings of personal 
growth, accomplishment, and self-fulfillment. According to Lawler (1986), it is very 
important to make a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards, 
such as money and promotion, can be formally provided by management and have an 
immediate and strong effect, but this will not necessarily continue for long. Intrinsic rewards, 
such as feelings of competence, achievement, responsibility, influence, and personal growth, 
have to be provided by the individual to himself or herself (Lawler, 1986) although the 
organization may encourage them by setting up conditions where this is possible. The effects 
of intrinsic rewards are deeper and longer-term, because they are "inherent in individuals and 
not imposed from outside" (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994, p.34). 
Expectancy theory is one the most relevant motivation theories in explaining the relationship 
between participation and motivation. According to Lawler (1986) "motivation theory 
emphasizes that it is people's perception of a situation that is crucial. Reality affects 
perception but people act directly on the basis of their perceptions" (p.29). Thus, expectancy 
theory argues that individuals will be strongly motivated to perform well when the following 
conditions exist: 
(1) Effort is perceived to result in performance. 
(2) Rewards are perceived to be tied to performance. Individuals must see the 
relationship between their rewards and performance. 
(3) The rewards that are related to performance are valued by employees. 
(4) Employees must perceive that effective performance is achievable. 
Although an organization may tie employees' rewards to performance it cannot motivate 
employees simply because if employees do not perceive that the behaviour or performance, 
that results in a valued reward, is achievable. The centre of attention in expectancy theory is 
the individual (Besser, 1995). 
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According to Lawler (1986) the relationship between participation in decisions and 
motivation is not straightforward; it can exist only under certain conditions. The participative 
process makes it possible for employees to get rewards that satisfy people's needs for control, 
competence, achievement, self-fulfillment, and personal growth. Therefore the effect of 
participation in decisions depends on such needs. He argues that the most direct relationship 
between participation and motivation may occur when individuals participate in determining 
goals and commit themselves to achieving these goals. If individuals participate in 
determining goals and receive information about their performance, for Lawler, two things 
happen. First, since they determine goals, they view the goals as achievable. Second, they are 
strongly motivated to achieve the goals, as their feelings of self-esteem and competence 
becomes tied to achieving them. So, participation can encourage or create a relationship 
between a particular level of performance and the receiving of intrinsic rewards. This 
indicates that "participation in goal setting can have a significant impact on motivation" 
(Lawler, 1986, p.30). The most important point here is that participation can have an impact 
on motivation only when people participate in work performance decisions. If people have a 
say in decisions such as how the company's cafeteria will be decorated or which kind of 
coffee will be drunk in the factory and so on, such participation may not motivate employees 
to do their jobs well. 
Lawler (1986) also suggested that if individuals are given interesting tasks, participation in 
decisions about how the work is to be done, what methods are to be used, and how their day-
to-day work activities are to be carried out, and feedback about performance, they feel 
responsible for how well the work is performed. So, their intrinsic motivation to perform the 
work well will be higher. Intrinsic rewards such as self-esteem, self-fulfillment, and a sense 
of competence are related to how well the work is performed. Individuals want to produce a 
high-quality product or service because this "satisfies their needs for competence and self-
esteem" (Lawler, 1986, p.31). 
Vroom (1960) also argued that if an individual participates in decision making in his job, he 
will be motivated for effective performance. According to Vroom, "the positive effects of 
participation on motivation will vary directly with the strength of independence needs and 
inversely with the degree of authoritarianism" (p.38). If persons have a high need for 
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independence they will be more motivated by situations which allow them to participate in 
decision making than those with a lower need for independence. He defined independence as 
"a predisposition to strive for self-reliance, to do things alone without help" (Vroom, 1960, 
p.38). On the other hand, highly authoritarian persons will be less motivated by participation 
in decision making in their jobs. 
In his later book, Vroom (1964) stated that when an individual has a say in making decisions, 
he will be more 'ego-involved' with those decisions and will perform his work well to make 
those decisions successful. He also emphasized that participation increases "the strength of 
group norms regarding execution of the decisions" (Vroom, 1964, p.229). 
Mitchell (1973) regarded expectancy theory as the "most prevalent in today's literature" 
(p.670), and used this approach to motivation to explain possible ways in which participation 
might increase motivation. He claimed that participation may increase employee perceptions 
of the positive existence of effort-performance and performance-reward contingencies. 
Participation and job satisfaction: Since the concepts of motivation and satisfaction could 
be confused, it will be helpful to give some brief background information about them. 
According to Lawler (1986) motivation and satisfaction are very different. He stated that 
"motivation is influenced by forward-looking perceptions concerning the relationship 
between performance and reward, while satisfaction refers to people's feelings about the 
rewards they have received" (p.32). Therefore, although satisfaction is a result of past events, 
motivation is a result of expectations about the future. Individuals' expectations about the 
future are not completely determined by the past, they are only partially based on the past 
events (Lawler, 1986). While individuals are very satisfied with their jobs, they may not be 
motivated to perform them well. As a result, it cannot be assumed that participation will 
automatically affect both motivation and satisfaction, because, as Vroom suggests, they are 
not closely related. 
It is generally accepted that employees "desire and gain satisfaction from increased 
involvement in matters of direct relevance to their own activities" (Lischeron and Wall, 1975, 
p.501). Blumberg (1968) summarized a number of studies and noted that "far up on the list of 
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factors making for satisfaction in work is the desire, among all groups, for autonomy, 
responsibility, control, and decision-making power on the job" (p.119). Blauner (1960) also 
stated that when a worker has greater control in his job, his job satisfaction will be higher. So, 
greater participation is desirable as a means of promoting satisfaction (Clarke, Fatchett, and 
Roberts, 1972). It has been claimed by Tannenbaum (1966) that participation may be 
regarded as an effective approach in creating "a work environment that is more rewarding 
psychologically to organization members" (p.94). He argued that since organization members 
desire to exercise control, they "find in participation an important source of gratification" 
(p.98). According to Tannenbaum participation can create three types of satisfactions. First, 
the need for independence is satisfied. Second, participation yields participants material 
rewards as the decisions arrived at are likely to be more consistent with self-interest, and the 
control exercised viewed as less arbitrary. Third, participation decreases frustration and is 
intrinsically satisfying and challenging. It is argued that involvement of an organization's 
members in group decision making leads to better decisions and greater satisfaction with, and 
greater confidence in, the decisions on the part of the participants (Beach, 1997). 
Participation in making job-related decisions (Patchen, 1970; White and Ruh, 1973) has a 
positive impact on job satisfaction (Sekaran, 1989). Lawler (1986) also argued that the 
opportunity to participate in decisions and control one's own work results in higher levels of 
satisfaction, if individuals have needs for control, participation, self-esteem, and self-
fulfillment. When organizations do not provide these opportunities, they may not satisfy their 
employees, and this, in return, may lead to high rates of absenteeism and rapid turnover. In 
contrast, when organizations provide these opportunities, they can satisfy their employees 
because employees "enjoy participating in making decisions about wages, hours, and working 
conditions not only because of the social experience, but also because it gives them an 
opportunity to improve their work situation in these respects" (Vroom, 1960, p.64). 
According to Vroom (1960), although many needs are undoubtedly met by the various 
sources of satisfaction in participation, it could be argued that at least some of these sources 
would not have the same effect on persons who have different characters. He regarded two 
personality variables, independence and authoritarianism, as moderators of the relationship 
between participation in decision making and job satisfaction. He hypothesized that persons 
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with (a) a high need for independence and (b) low authoritarianism would be more likely to 
be satisfied by participation in decision making than persons having the opposite 
characteristics. Any conditions that allow the individual to decide his own behaviour without 
help from or interference by others satisfy the need for independence. Therefore, Vroom 
assumed that participation can satisfy the need for independence. He described authoritarians 
as "preferring strong powerful leaders; equalitarians, on the other hand, prefer more equitable 
power relationships" (f).64). Participation in decision making, for Vroom, results in more 
satisfaction for equalitarians than for authoritarians. 
In summary, it is generally accepted that participation can increase job satisfaction through 
satisfaction of such needs as independence, autonomy, and self-esteem. Job satisfaction, in 
turn, has a favourable impact on such variables as absenteeism, turnover, and grievances 
(Herman, 1973). Therefore, job satisfaction is related to organizational effectiveness but not 
necessarily to higher motivation. 
3.3. Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) Theoretical Framework 
After reviewing the theory of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes, the 
emphasis will now be placed on the explanation of two well-known theoretical frameworks in 
this area developed by Long (1978) and Florkowski (1989), because these two models will be 
tested in this study. 
3.3.1. Long's (1978) Theoretical Framework 
Long's (1978) model (see Figure 3.6) argues that employee ownership operates by first 
affecting organizational identification. Following Patchen (1970) and Rotondi (1975), he 
defines organizational identification as dividing into three interrelated phenomena: (a) 
feelings of shared characteristics and common goals (integration), (b) feelings of 
'belongingness' or solidarity with the organization (involvement), (c) support of the 
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Integration, the belief that good organizational performance will lead to a reward to the 
individual, is expected to create a favourable attitude toward performance (motivation) both 
directly by increasing the performance-reward contingency, and indirectly through favourably 
affecting work group norms. It is also expected to increase employees' involvement and 
commitment to the organization. It is argued that employee ownership will increase 
integration by strengthening the relationship between organizational performance and 
individual rewards, and by creating common goals with management - specifically the 
generation of profits through increased organizational performance. 
Involvement is expected to enhance perceptions of task interdependencies, and, in 
conjunction with integration, to result in cooperative behaviours. It may also result directly in 
general satisfaction with the organization by satisf'ing certain social and ego needs. 
Employee ownership is expected to increase involvement in several ways. First, shares 
provide tangible and legal evidence of the employee's association with the organization. The 
act of obtaining the shares itself may also result in greater psychological involvement. 
Second, the employee is now entitled to receive more information than nonshareholders do. 
Finally, employee ownership should also increase involvement through enhancing 
integration, since feelings of shared goals should result in feelings of solidarity. 
Commitment is expected to be evident in various behaviours supporting the organization, 
such as greater willingness to innovate, decreased turnover, absenteeism, and grievances. It is 
expected that employee ownership will increase commitment directly by increasing the 
employee's financial and emotional stake in the organization, and indirectly through 
integration and involvement. 
Although all of these variables are expected to contribute to organizational effectiveness, 
there are variables that may moderate these relationships. For example, for motivation to 
occur, the individual must believe that either his/her individual performance or that of others 
in the organization can have a significant effect on the performance of the organization. 
Increased cooperation is expected to operate by enhancing general satisfaction, and by 
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increasing the relationship between motivation and job effort, by creating circumstances 
where increased individual effort will result in improved individual performance. 
Finally, Long argues that two conceptually separate phenomena - employee share ownership 
and employee participation in decision making - may have impacts on the same job attitudes 
and behaviours (dependent variables). If employee ownership also creates increased 
employee participation in decision making, then employee ownership may indirectly result in 
favourable consequences additional to those mentioned earlier. 
3.3.2. Florkowski's (1989) Theoretical Framework 
Florkowski (1989) suggested that personal feelings about "the importance of the plan, pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making" (1989, p.104) 
are expected to affect one's support for the profit sharing plan (see Figure 3.7). It is expected 
that plan members continually compare job responsibility, performance, and other inputs to 
profit sharing outcomes when evaluating pay equity. Feelings of inequity should arise if 
financial participation is not "enlarged to match the required change in inputs, with a 
corresponding drive to reduce this tension as the shortfall widens" (Florkowski and Schuster, 
1992, p.510). Consequently, plan support will be weakened by the feeling that profit sharing 
does not enhance pay equity, and strengthened by the perception that it does. It is also 
expected that support for profit sharing among individuals should increase as the perceived 
relationship between goal accomplishment (improved unit effectiveness) and promised 
outcomes (supplemental earnings) increases. Individuals who have stronger instrumentality 
perception are expected to support profit sharing more vigorously. If individuals participate in 
decision making, it will result in increased support for the profit sharing plan. After 
explaining how support for profit sharing could be created in organizations, Florkowski 
argued that profit-sharing support should, in turn, affect positively the organizational 


































Florkowski and Schuster (1992) further suggested that although profit sharing may increase 
one's opportunities for rewards and input, the plan cannot be regarded as a panacea for all 
workplace problems. For example, dissatisfaction about skill variety, task identity, autonomy, 
and affiliation needs would not be directly addressed by profit sharing per se. Participants' 
satisfaction with their immediate task environment may be substantially weakened by one or 
more of these factors. Individuals' overall job satisfaction should impact on their abilities to 
"align philosophically with the firm and work hard on its behalf' (1989, p.1 12) even if profit 
sharing receives acceptance and creates new work challenges. Therefore he suggested that the 
relationship between support for profit sharing and organizational commitment would be 
moderated by current job satisfaction, and will be greater for individuals with high job 
satisfaction than for those with low job satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
This chapter reviews the previous studies of profit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes, examining their impacts on the effectiveness of the organization, the attitudes and 
behaviours of the employees, and other outcomes. The aim of this chapter is to obtain a better 
understanding of the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. 
In the first section of this chapter, the studies examining the macro- and microeconomic 
effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes will be reviewed. Then, in 
the second section, the studies examining the attitudinal and behavioural effects of the 
schemes will be reviewed. Some studies were conducted in companies with only one form of 
employee ownership plan, such as profit sharing (Bradley and Estrin, 1987; Kruse, 1987; 
Freeman and Weitzman, 1987; Jones and Pliskin, 1989; Bell and Hanson, 1987; Florkowski, 
1989) or ESOPs (Livingston and Hemy, 1980; Brooks, Henry, and Livingston, 1982; Marsh 
and McAllister, 1981; Hamilton, 1983; Cohen and Quarrey, 1986; Rosen and Quarrey, 1987; 
NCEO, 1985; Park and Rosen, 1990; Cottham, 1991). Many studies, however, investigated 
the effects of more than one employee ownership plan in the same company (such as Wider 
Share Ownership Council-Copeman, 1986; Poole and Jenkins, 1988) or different companies 
(such as Conte and Tannenbaum, 1978; Cable and Fitzroy, 1980; Rosen and Klein, 1983; 
Trachman, 1985; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, Leopold, and 
Ramsay, 1989; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995). Other studies examined other forms of employee 
ownership plans, such as worker buyouts, employee stock benefit plans (ESPs), stock 
purchase plans, and SAYE plans (e.g., Zwerdling, 1980; NYSE, 1982; Henry and Livingston, 
1984; Dunn, Richardson, and Dewe, 1991). Accordingly, the economic and the attitudinal 
and behavioural effects of employee share schemes will be reviewed, namely the effects of 
profit sharing, employee stock ownership plans, and other forms of employee ownership 
schemes. 
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4.1. Studies Examining the Economic Effect of Profit Sharing and Employee Share 
Ownership Schemes 
Considerable research has been conducted on the economic impact of profit sharing and 
employee share ownership schemes. The economic consequences of the schemes have been 
examined at both macro and micro levels. 
4.1.1. Macroeconomic Effects 
Economists, such as Weitzman (1984), have discussed the impact of profit sharing and other 
types of share schemes on the macroeconomic performance of nations. They stressed that 
"profit sharing and share-ownership schemes occasion a reduction in unemployment and in 
inflation by making wages more responsive to changes in economic performance" (Poole and 
Jenkins, 1991, p.53). Most of the research evidence of the effects of the schemes was 
obtained using enterprise-level data. Sixteen studies that investigated the employment effects 
of profit sharing, ESOPs, and other forms of employee ownership will be reviewed. 
Employee Ownership and Employment 
Five studies examined the employment effect of employee ownership schemes. Rosen and 
Klein (1983) surveyed the capacity of employee-owned firms (both ESOP and other kinds of 
employee-owned companies) to create jobs. These authors analyzed data on 43 of the 98 
employee-owned companies they contacted. They took the annual employment growth rates 
of these companies and compared them to those for their broadly defined industry. They 
found that employment in the employee-owned companies grew at an average rate of about 
3.87% per year compared to a weighted rate of about 1.14% for conventional firms (in a 
national sample of firms). Although that can be seen as a small difference, it means a growth 
rate three times higher than that of the average conventional finns. As their sample size was 
limited, the authors could not address why this growth occurred. 
In a related 1984 study, they examined a sample of over 350 fast-growing, high-tech 
companies and found that there was a strong positive correlation between employment 
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growth and the degree to which these firms, through various plans, shared ownership with 
employees (cited in Rosen, Klein and Young, 1986, p.49). In that study, the employee 
ownership companies had employment growth rates over twice those of companies that had 
no employee ownership. Furthermore, companies that shared ownership with more, most, or 
all of their employees had growth rates over three times those of companies that shared 
ownership only with key employees. 
Economist Gorm Winther and colleagues conducted a survey of 28 employee ownership 
companies in Washington State in the US. They found that employee ownership per se had 
little or no effect on corporate performance, but did have a significant effect when combined 
with participative management. The Washington employee ownership companies that 
incorporated participative management grew in sales by 6% and in employment by 10.9% 
more per year than would have been expected (cited in Prolman, 1995). 
Trachman (1985) compared the growth of sales and employment between various high-
technology companies offering stock options or an ownership plan, which might be an ESOP, 
and those offering no employee ownership plan. Compared to the no-ownership firms, the 
companies with some form of employee share ownership grew one-third faster in terms of 
sales, but at about the same rate in employment. The study does not report whether the 
differences are statistically significant. However, companies that share ownership with a large 
percentage of their employees grew substantially faster than companies having no ownership 
plans or plans limited to key employees. Other important findings emerged from Trachman's 
study when the performance of the no-ownership companies (conventional companies) was 
compared to that of companies offering ownership only to key employees (managers). Under 
management ownership, growth rates were 50% less than in comparable no-ownership 
companies. This finding indicates that in determining ownership's effect, the pattern of stock 
distribution among employees may be an important factor. However, if he had reported 
whether the differences were statistically significant, his findings would have been more 
convincing. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1987) used survey data on 637 manufacturing establishments 
from the 1980 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS-I), in an attempt to find out 
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whether or not the existence of employee share ownership schemes had favourable effects on 
employment. In contrast to the positive findings of other studies, they found that employee 
share ownership schemes did not have a statistically significant effect on employment level in 
their sample of British plants. According to Jones and Pliskin (1989), Blanchflower and 
Oswald's results are less than definitive, because they "did not have data on remuneration and 
had only qualitative measures of the level of and the change in demand for each firm's 
products" (p.279). 
Profit Sharing and Employment 
As mentioned before, according to Martin Weitzman (1984, 1985), if profit sharing were 
practiced on an economy-wide basis, it would create non-inflationary full employment. Six 
studies have attempted to test the merits of this theory. Metzger and Colletti (1971) analyzed 
the employment experience of American retailers over an 1 8-year span and found that the 
average annual compound rate of employment growth was 4.3% for profit sharers, compared 
with 3.4% for non-sharers. 
Two British studies (Estrin and Wilson, 1986, and Bradley and Estrin, 1987) found that profit 
sharing has a favourable effect on employment level. In a study of 52 firms in the engineering 
and metal working sectors over the 1978-1982 period, when the British economy was in a 
deep recession, Estrin and Wilson (1986) found high employment levels in profit sharing 
firms. About 13% more individuals were employed by profit sharers than by their non-profit 
sharing counterparts. As expected, higher employment was incorporated with lower 
remuneration. Profit sharing firms paid about 4% less in total remuneration than non-sharing 
firms. In their case study, Bradley and Estrin (1987) examined the effects of profit sharing on 
the level of employment between 1970 and 1985 in the John Lewis Partnership, a large retail 
chain. The profit share varied between 13% and 24% of workers' income in this firm. They 
found that employment at the John Lewis Partnership exceeded employment at each of four 
competitors by 20 to 30 percent after controlling for remuneration, sales, retail sales, and 
employment in the previous year. However, profit sharing did not have any substantial effect 
on the rate of change of employment. As Weitzman predicted (Weitzman's wedge effect), the 
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study found that employment is affected separately by the base wage and the bonus rather 
than base wages alone. 
Kruse (1987) analyzed the effect of profit sharing on the variability of employment by using a 
panel data set of 1,491 American firms (both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms) 
over the 1971-1985 period. As no data were available on cash-based profit sharing plans, 
profit sharing data were limited to deferred (tax-qualified) profit sharing plans. Kruse found 
that when nation-wide unemployment decreased, employment in firms with profit sharing 
plans responded similarly to employment elsewhere; however, when unemployment 
increased, employment in profit sharing firms decreased less than in other firms but, for some 
specifications, significantly so only for firms in the manufacturing sector. Therefore 
Weitzman's claim that profit sharing stabilizes employment was supported by these results. 
The main limitation of the study is that it lacked information on cash-based profit sharing 
plans. However, it should be noted that deferred profit sharing plans constitute the vast 
majority of plans in the United States. 
Freeman and Weitzman (1987) conducted a study in Japan to examine employment effects. 
They used aggregate, time series data and found that employment responded positively to the 
size of per-worker bonuses and negatively to the level of wages, holding aggregate employer 
revenues and previous employment levels constant. One explanation of this finding is that 
employment grew when profit sharing was used more broadly. 
Jones and Pliskin (1989) investigated the employment effects of profit sharing in a panel of 
127 British firms in the printing, footwear, and clothing industries that were characterized by 
a variety of sharing arrangements, including firms completely controlled by their workers 
(producer cooperatives), profit sharing firms, and firms with no share features at all between 
1890 and 1975. Their principal finding was that the employment effect of profit sharing is 
dependent on (a) the way in which profit sharing is measured and (b) whether or not measures 
of employee participation in decision making were included in the employment equation. 
When such a measure was included they found that employment effects were not stable and 
ranged from -6% to +6% for a typical profit sharing firm. In general, when profit sharing was 
represented by a dummy variable, the estimated effect of profit sharing on employment was 
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negative and significant. When the continuous measure of profit sharing was used, a positive 
and significant effect was sometimes found. Jones and Pliskin concluded that these findings 
suggest that the effect of profit sharing may depend substantially on aspects of the 
institutional setting, in addition to profit sharing. They suggested that worker participation in 
decision making had an important impact on the employment effect of profit sharing. 
ESOPs and EmpJoyment 
Five studies have investigated the employment effect of ESOPs. The Senate Finance 
Committee (1979) found that employment growth in 75 ESOP companies was triple that in 
all US corporations as a whole during the period 1976-1978. In a study of 10 ESOP firms and 
10 matched firms (non-ESOP firms) in one industry, the electrical and machinery equipment 
and supplier industry, during the period 1978-1981, Hamilton (1983) found that employee 
ownership firms had greater employment growth than conventionally structured firms did. 
Using a relatively large sample (about 600 ESOP firms and 2,600 non-ESOP firms) of wholly 
publicly traded firms, Bloom (1985) argued that sponsoring an ESOP has no impact on 
employment. In his sample of ESOP firms, employment in 1981 grew 80.3% faster than it did 
in his non-ESOP sample. But when the match between the samples was statistically refined, 
so that more similar firms can be compared, employment growth among ESOP firms was 
20.4% slower than among the non-ESOP firms. His various analyses of employment growth 
over time indicated small, statistically insignificant differences, some negative and some 
positive. Bloom concluded that these findings showed that ESOPs have no effect on 
employment growth in publicly traded firms. 
Cohen and Quarrey (1986) found that the average annual percentage employment growth in 
28 firms which had established ESOPs for the purpose of buying out a retiring owner was 3.4 
times higher than the average annual employment growth in their overall industries. At one 
company in the sample, employment grew at an amazing rate (70% per year) after the owner 
left. But even when this high performer was excluded from the data, employment growth in 
ESOP firms was 1.75% greater than the firms' overall industries. Rosen and Quarrey (1987) 
compared 45 ESOP firms to a matched sample of 292 non-ESOP firms (conventional firms). 
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As profit statements were not available, the authors compared the companies in terms of 
growth. They found that during the five years before sponsoring an ESOP, the future ESOP 
companies grew 1.21% faster in terms of employment and 1.89% faster in terms of sales. 
However, after adopting employee ownership, the growth rate was significantly greater in the 
ESOP companies. They grew 5.05% faster in terms of employment and 5.4% faster in terms 
of sales. In addition, after converting to employee ownership, 73% of the ESOP companies 
significantly improved their performance. 
4.1.2. The Microeconomic Effects 
The last 20 years have seen the emergence of a growing body of empirical literature that has 
tried to find a link between profit-sharing/employee shareholding and the measures of 
company performance. Some studies examined the effects of the schemes on productivity 
(e.g., Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Hamilton, 1983; Metzger, 1966; O'dell and McAdams, 
1987; Lee, 1988) or profitability (e.g., Livingston and Henry, 1980; Brooks, Henry, and 
Livingston, 1982; Hamilton, 1983; Bloom, 1985; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986; Bell and Hanson, 
1987). Many studies (e.g., Metzger and Colletti, 1971; Metzger, 1975; Hanson and Watson, 
1990; Cottham, 1991), however, also investigated the effects of the schemes on company 
performance by using various measures of organizational performance, such as sales, 
earnings, earnings to sales ratio, earnings to total capital ratio, unit cost, rate of growth, return 
on equity, return on sales, share price movement, and net operating margin. Therefore, the 
studies dealing exclusively with the effects of the schemes on productivity or profitability 
will be reviewed under the separate subheadings. 
ESOPs and Corporate Performance 
Eight studies investigated the effect of ESOP on company performance. Swad (1979) 
examined the economic performance of ESOP firms in three industrial sectors analyzing 
survey data from a single year. When he compared operating income as a percentage of sales 
in ESOP firms to the same ratio for comparably sized firms in the industry as a whole, he 
found a statistically significant association in the manufacturing and processing sectors but 
not among retailers and wholesalers or service organizations. In addition, he found that two 
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aspects of ownership, (a) the percentage of common stock owned by the ESOP and (b) the 
percentage of employee participation in the plan, showed small but statistically significant 
relationships with economic performance. Neither the size of the most recent company 
contribution to the ESOP trust nor the age of the ESOP was a critical factor. 
In a study of 242 employees in seven American firms in different industries, the relationship 
between adoption of an ESOP and financial performance was investigated. Financial 
performance was measured for the two years before and two years after adoption of the 
ESOP. Although sales growth, earnings growth, earning to sales ratio, and earnings to total 
capital ratio did not increase significantly, employees' personal motivation did. In the 
companies, group problem-solving processes did improve, but in spite of this co-workers did 
not stimulate each other to be more productive. After the ESOP's adoption, managerial 
leadership and/or organizational climate did not improve. The study, however, found a 
relationship between changes in managerial leadership and positive changes in peer 
encouragement and improved group problem-solving processes (Franklin, 1979). 
Jochim (1982) analyzed the data on the economic performance of 75 ESOP firms 
participating in a Senate Finance Committee survey for the years 1976-1978. He found that 
ESOP performance compared favourably to overall corporate performance during the same 
period. 
Case study data on 37 ESOP companies that have participated in a NCEO survey have been 
analyzed to evaluate performance in employee-owned firms. Overall, these studies have 
indicated that the employee-owned firms perform at least as well as or better than matched 
conventional firms and industry averages (NCEO, 1985). In a study of 28 companies sold to 
the employees by departing owners, sales figures from Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar 
Directory were compared to figures for five comparable companies in the Standard and 
Poor's Index of Corporations. The companies were studied from the time of the owner's 
departure until 1984. The research found that sales in ESOP companies grew on average 1.3 
times faster than those of comparable non-ESOP companies (Cohen, 1985). 
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In another well-known survey analyzing the impact of employee ownership, the US General 
Accounting Office (GAO, 1987) compared 111 finns that established ESOPs during their 
1976-1979 tax periods to a comparison group matched for size and industry without ESOPs. 
The GAO aimed to determine whether the rate of growth of profitability was greater after the 
adoption of ESOPs. The GAO found that ESOPs have little effect (not statistically 
significant) on either profits or labour productivity. However, the study reported that ESOP 
firms in which non-managerial employees participated in company decisions had a 
significantly higher rate of productivity growth (52% or more) than firms that did not, all else 
being equal. So, the study found a positive and significant relationship between participation 
and productivity. 
Park and Rosen (1990) analyzed the performance of leveraged ESOP firms. The authors 
investigated 38 ESOPs that obtained considerable debt to buy the company, and they 
compared them to the averages of companies of comparable asset size in the same industry. 
They found that the leveraged ESOPs had much bigger debt than the average company but 
that financial efficiency, gross profits, and solvency were comparable. 
The only case study of ESOP performance for the UK is Cottham's (1991) investigation of 
the Yorkshire Rider Bus Company post-privatization. He compared the company's 
performance before and after an ESOP was adopted by using the company's own data and 
accounts. He reported that although there were very significant improvements in productivity 
and financial performance following deregulation in 1986, ESOP has allowed Rider to 
achieve further major gains in efficiency. He wrote "in the two years following the buyouts: 
sickness/absenteeism and labour turnover reduced by 15 percent and 23 percent respectively; 
unit costs fell by 12 percent in real terms; group turnover expanded from £66m to £84m; net 
profits increased by 200 percent and return on turnover rose by 130 percent; share value 
increased seven fold" (p.11). Therefore, the general conclusion of the study is that ESOPs 
lead to greatly improved corporate performance. Cottham regarded the creation of a corporate 
culture which is conducive to the concepts of employee ownership as an essential factor to the 
success of an ES OP. This includes "the development of an integrated communications 
programme and an effective mechanism for stimulating genuine participation by the 
workforce in the development of the company" (p.10). 
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ESOPs and profitability: Six studies examined the effects of ESOP on profitability. Conte 
and Tannenbaum (1977) compared 30 ESOP firms to 30 conventional counterparts and 
reported that the ESOP firms have slightly higher profit levels than the conventional firms. 
They found that the largest single predictor of profitability was unrelated to employee 
participation, worker representation on the board of directors, the nature of employee-
shareholder voting rights, and whether ownership was direct or based on an ESOP trust. The 
Senate Finance Committee (1979) found that during the period 1976-1978 profits in 75 ESOP 
companies increased twice as fast as in all US companies as a whole. In a sample of 165 
manufacturing companies, Swad (1979) found that ESOPs are positively associated with 
operating profits. 
One of the first studies on the effects of ESOPs on profitability was that of Livingston and 
Henry (1980), followed by Brooks, Henry, and Livingston (1982). The authors used data on 
the annual profits of 51 firms with employee stock ownership and compared them to data 
from 51 privately owned, non-employee ownership firms which were matched for size and 
industry. They found that profit rates were significantly lower for those firms which include 
the stock ownership than for firms without these plans. In their sample, employee ownership 
plans were initiated between 1916 and 1966 and thus are not ESOPs. The authors actually 
sampled employee stock purchase plans, but they described the study as dealing with 
'ESOPs'. Employee stock purchase plans are quite different from ESOPs in a number of 
ways, as stock purchases are paid for largely by the workers themselves and employees 
participate in them only on an individual and voluntary basis. Therefore it is doubtful whether 
this study can be regarded as a study on the effects of ESOPs on profitability. 
In a study limited to ESOPs in a single industry, Hamilton (1983) tested four measures of 
profitability: net profits to net sales, to net worth, and to net working capital and net sales to 
tangible net worth. He found that the ESOP firms outperformed the non-ES OP firms on the 
first three measures of profitability for the last two years of the period of 1978 through 1981. 
For the last measure of profitability, the ESOP firms outperformed the non-ESOP firms for 
all four years. However, since there were no statistically significant differences between the 
ESOPs' performance and the conventional firms' performance, except for the first two years 
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on the single measure of net sales to tangible net worth, Hamilton concluded that his research 
does not provide strong support for the superior profitability performance of ESOP firms. 
In his study, Bloom (1985) concluded that ESOPs had little or no positive effect on 
profitability among his sample of about 600 publicly traded ESOP firms. After statistically 
controlling for differences in profit-relevant factors, he found that three of his estimates of the 
ESOP effect on profitability were small, positive, and statistically insignificant. A fourth 
estimate comparing ESOP and non-ESOP manufacturing firms in 1981 was statistically 
significant, but indicated a negative impact of 13% associated with the ESOP. However, 
Bloom argued that this negative estimate was actually an artefact of ESOP firms being more 
capital-intensive on the average, and that it would approximate zero if further and more 
detailed statistical controls were made. 
ESOPs and productivity: Ten studies analyzed the effects of ESOP on productivity. The 
Senate Finance Committee (1979) found that productivity grew four times faster in 75 ESOP 
firms than in all US firms as a whole from 1976 to 1978. In case studies of two newspaper 
companies, it was concluded that ESOPs could provide an incentive for improving 
productivity and the flow of information in the company. There were no broader comparisons 
(Taylor, 1981). 
In 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985 four surveys of companies with employee stock ownership 
plans were conducted by the ESOP Association. The results of the survey were based on the 
data obtained from subjective reports by the managers of ESOP finns. Seventy percent of 
ESOP companies surveyed in 1982 claimed that 'motivation and productivity' of their 
employee-owners was improved because of ESOPs. The figure was 72% in 1983, 74% in 
1984, and 76% in 1985 (ESOP Association 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985). 
Using a list compiled by the US Department of Labor of 1,400 companies interested in 
establishing ESOPs, Marsh and McAllister (1981) conducted a survey of the characteristics 
of performance of these firms. But they received productivity data from only 128 firms and 
overall data from 229 firms. The authors computed the annual average increase in 
productivity for their ESOP firms between 1975 and 1979, and compared it to unpublished 
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nationwide figures obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They found that the average 
productivity (total annual compensation/total annual sales) of the ESOP firms increased 
annually by 0.78% from 1975 to 1979, while in the weighted national average it declined by 
0.74% per year over the same period (see Table 4.1). In other words, according to the study, 
128 ESOP companies showed an average annual productivity growth rate 1.52 percentage 
points higher than that of conventional companies in the period 1975-1979. In addition, they 
did not find a correlation between productivity and employee coverage, voting rights or 
percent of company stock held in the ESOP trust among the companies providing the 
necessary data. 
Table 4.1. Comparison of Average Productivity of ESOP Companies with National Productivity Average 
for 1975-79 
Average Productivity National 
of ESOP Companies Productivity Average 
1975-76 +.42% (N=115) +.05% 
1976-77 +2.72% (N = 129) -.42% 
1977-78 ±.91% (N=134) -1.19% 
1978-79 -.93% (N=134) -1.3 9% 
1975-79 (Annual Avg.) +.78% (N = 128) -.74% 
Source: Marsh, Thomas R., and McAllister, Dale E., "ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies With Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans", The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.6, No.3, Spring 1981, p.614. 
Hamilton (1983) compared the net sales per employee in a matched sample of 10 ESOP firms 
and 10 non-ESOP firms in the electrical and electronic machinery, equipment, and supplies 
industry. He did not report statistically significant improvement (at the 0.05 level of 
significance) in productivity for ESOPs over the period of 1978 to 1981. The average 
productivity in non-ESOP firms generally equaled or surpassed that of the ESOP firms, but 
during 1980 and 1981, the ESOP firms consistently outperformed the non-ESOP firms, and 
reasons for this were not explained. Although the productivity of the non-ES OP firms 
remained fairly stable over the years studied, the productivity of the ESOP firms tended to 
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improve. However, there were no statistically significant differences (at the 0.05 level) in 
productivity between the two types of firms. 
Bloom (1985) compared the sales per employee of about 600 ESOP firms and 2,600 non-
ESOP firms for 1981 and during the period 1971-1981. Although ESOP firms tend to be 
more productive than non-ESOP firms, when the study more closely matched ESOP firms to 
non-ESOP firms, the superiority of ESOP firms tended not to be statistically significant. 
Bloom further suggested that ESOP firms tend to be more productive for reasons other than 
ESOP adoption, for example firms with above-average productivity were more likely to 
become ESOP firms. He concluded that there is no strong evidence for a positive productivity 
effect for ESOPs. 
Two studies by Jones and Kato (1993a, and 1993b) and a working paper by the same authors 
(1992) investigated the effects of Japanese ESOP plans on company performance. In their 
1993 papers they reported the massive use of ESOPs by Japanese companies. According to 
them, 91% of the companies listed on the Japanese stock market had an ESOP and 45.8% of 
employees of these companies participated in the programme in 1988. In their working paper, 
Jones and Kato estimated production functions for Japanese manufacturing companies which 
had ESOPs and provided bonuses. The introduction of an ESOP increased productivity by 
3%, however, its impact usually began several years later. They also found that a 10% 
increase in the level of bonuses increased productivity by 2% for an ESOP company, whereas 
the same rate of increase in the level of bonuses decreased productivity by 2% for non-ES OP 
companies. They also found that the productivity effect was more significant in companies 
with more employees and less capital. 
Kruse (1992) analyzed data covering a sample of over 2,000 publicly traded companies 
during the period 1971-1985. His study focused on profit sharing but included information on 
ESOPs within the sample. Although the study found positive productivity effects for profit 
sharing, the positive effects for the existence of ESOPs were not statistically significant. 
According to the results, ESOP has a long-term impact. As Kruse stated "ESOPs have a slight 
immediate effect (on productivity) but the effect increases with time" (p.31). Kumbhakar and 
Dunbar (1993) found 1.8-2.7% higher productivity for each year that an ESOP has been in 
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existence. Using a unique panel data set containing Japanese firms with and without an ESOP 
and firms with varying degrees of the bonus payment system, Jones and Kato (1995) found 
that firms enjoyed a 4-5% increase in productivity by introducing an ESOP. They reported 
that the productivity effect of an ESOP did not appear immediately following its introduction, 
but rather it took three to four years for the firm to begin reaping the benefits. 
Profit Sharing and Performance 
Nine studies investigated the effect of profit sharing on company performance. Jebring and 
Metzger (1960) found that large retailers experienced substantial financial efficiency and 
growth in the existence of profit sharing. Metzger and Colletti (1971) concentrated on a 
single industiy and compared eight large department store chains with six non-profit sharing 
counterparts. Nine financial measures were used to compare the profit sharing firms with 
non-profit sharing firms for the period 1952 to 1969. The profit sharing companies surpassed 
the non-profit sharing companies by substantial and widening percentages on all financial 
measures that were reviewed. Metzger and Colletti noted that superiority of the profit sharing 
companies over non-profit-sharing companies is increasing. Over a 17-year period, profit 
sharing companies widened their sales by 35% more than the non-profit-sharing companies, 
net worth by 47%, net income per employee by 80%, earnings per share by 88%, dividends 
per share by 68%, and market price per share by 98% more. 
In a 1975 study Metzger compared the economic performance of 33 large, profit sharing 
companies with the average economic performance of comparable, but non-profit sharing, 
companies. The return on sales for the 23 profit sharing manufacturing firms is 28.3% higher 
than the return on sales for the Fortune 500 largest industrials; and the return on equity is 
5.3% greater. The return on sales for the 10 profit-sharing retailers is 96.9% higher than the 
return on sales for the Fortune's 41 retailers; and the return on equity is 5.2% greater. His 
sample actually was 38 profit sharing firms and presumably five of them did not do as well as 
the control groups. 
In their study, Howard and Dietz (1969) concluded that there was a strong relationship 
between profit sharing and corporate financial performance. They applied 10 measures of 
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income, investment, sales, and corporate stock to 175 companies in nine industries. After 
comparing annual median values for sampled companies, the authors found that profit sharing 
companies generally surpassed non-profit sharing companies in yearly performance level and 
rate of growth from 1948 to 1966. Across industries, 75.9% of the profit sharing companies 
performed at least as effectively as those without such plans. In eight of the nine industries 
studied, profit sharing firms consistently operated better than non-profit-sharing firms. In a 
1979 study, Howard replicated the previous (1969) analysis and compared 16 operating ratios 
and growth rates of 202 companies in six industries for the period 1958-1977. Profit sharing 
companies' median levels of performance surpassed those of non-profit-sharing companies in 
two-thirds of the comparisons that were made. In three of six industries studied, profit sharing 
companies outperformed their non-profit sharing competitors, while equaling their 
performance in two others. However, there was no difference between the two groups in the 
trend of performance over time. 
In a study of 83 members of the Profit Sharing Council of Canada, Nightingale (1980) 
reported that profit sharing is strongly supported by management as an effective means of 
improving employee morale as well as enhancing the profitability of the company. The study 
found labour turnover rates to be lower than industry averages for 64% of the profit sharing 
companies, and significantly higher for only 6%. 
In a study by Hanson and Watson (1990), the performance of 113 profit-sharing companies 
was compared with that of 301 non-profit sharing companies by analyzing the data set used 
by Bell and Hanson's (1987) study. These 414 companies were all UK public companies 
which were listed in the Financial Times in both 1978 and 1985. The study found that profit 
sharing companies outperformed non-profit sharing companies to a statistically significant 
extent. For both return on equity and return on sales, the profit sharing companies 
outperformed non-profit sharing companies in all of the eight years investigated. The 
difference between the two groups over the 1978-1985 period averages 4.4% and 2.7% for 
return on equity and return on sales, respectively. The profit sharing group obtained higher 
annual growth in sales in six out of the eight years and higher annual investor returns in seven 
out of the eight years. The percentage growth in sales for the two groups differs by an average 
of 1.7% per year in favour of the profit sharing companies. A 'before-and after analysis' 
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provided evidence of an improvement in economic performance, and especially a growth in 
sales, in a short time after the introduction of profit sharing. The study also found a 
relationship between share price movements and profit sharing, but the direction of the 
linkage is less clear. 
In a study by Stoy Hayward, over 70% out of a sample of 50 companies with profit-sharing 
schemes reported that their share prices outperformed those of their rivals and the market 
(Accountancy Age, 1991). In a sample of 44 large Canadian manufacturing firms Long (1994) 
found that even if individual worker performance does not change one iota because of profit 
sharing, profit sharing will still be beneficial to company performance, if it enables reduction 
of the costly external controls otherwise necessary. In a survey of 308 Taiwan enterprises 
Huang (1997) concluded that profit sharing is a better choice than a stock ownership plan for 
improving organizational performance. 
Profit sharing and profitability: Four studies analyzed the effect of profit sharing on 
profitability. Estrin and Wilson's (1986) study was based on a sample of 87 British 
engineering and metal working companies in the Midlands and Northwest over the period 
1978-1982. They found that profit sharing firms have higher factor productivity and rates of 
return on capital, and lower quit rates and working days lost. In four of the five years that 
were studied, profit sharing companies earned higher profits per unit of capital. However, the 
authors did not discuss the relationship between profitability and the size of plan-related 
earnings. In a sample of 65 medium-sized German metal working firms, Fitzroy and Kraft 
(1986) examined the effect of profit sharing on profitability (measured as the ratio of cash 
revenues to assets) with simultaneous estimation of an equation for the amount of profit 
sharing. The authors found quite strong positive effects of profit sharing on their measure of 
profitability. Profit sharers received a higher gross return on capital than did non-profit 
sharers. Interestingly, there was no relationship between profitability and the amount of 
profits that were shared. Both of the coefficients on profit sharing were positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Bell and Hanson (1987) attempted to establish a correlation between profit-sharing and 
profitability. They studied 113 profit-sharing companies and 301 non-profit sharing 
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companies in the United Kingdom and compared their performance on the basis of nine 
financial ratios from 1977/1978 to 1984/1985. Taking the composite results of all 414 
companies, they concluded that the average economic performance of profit sharing 
companies as a group over the eight years was superior to that of the non-profit sharers as a 
group on every one of the nine financial ratios used. Moreover, on an average of averages, the 
average ratios of the profit sharing companies were 27% higher than those of the non-profit 
sharing companies. However, the authors noted that the profit sharing companies did not 
perform better just because they introduced profit sharing schemes; it was because they had 
other management characteristics which also contribute to greater success. Using panel data, 
Bhargava (1994) investigated 114 UK companies with profit sharing schemes for the years 
1979 to 1989. The results showed that profit sharing had a positive impact on profitability. 
Specifically, the introduction of profit sharing was likely to increase profits by 5% in the 
short run. 
Profit sharing and productivity: A 1995 report by OECD, based on reviewing the 
published studies from nine of the 25 OECD countries (namely, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA) stated that the consistency of 
the findings is remarkable. Regardless of methods, model specification, and data used, in 
every study profit sharing is associated with increased productivity (cited in IRS Employment 
Review 596, 1995). Here 13 studies that examined the effect of profit sharing on productivity 
will be reviewed. 
In an early study, Metzger (1966) found that profit sharing had favourable effects on 
productivity among companies whose net worth ranged from less than $10,000 to more than 
$1 million. At least 60% of the respondents regarded profit sharing plans as being very or 
moderately effective in improving cooperation and morale, reducing time and materials 
waste, and increasing productive efficiency. In their study (mentioned before), Estrin and 
Wilson (1986) found that profit sharing companies have higher productivity and higher rates 
of return on capital employed (p < .05) compared with non-profit sharing companies. Though 
the authors warned about assuming causality here, association was clear. This finding is 
supported by evidence from Fitzroy and Kraft's study. Fitzroy and Kraft (1986, 1987a, 
1 987b) examined the effects of profit sharing on (total factor) productivity and on the return 
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on assets (measured by the ratio of cash flow to the book value of assets) in a sample of 65 
companies in the German metalworking industry from 1977 and 1979. The authors found that 
both productivity and the return on assets were positively related to profit sharing (p < .01), 
which was measured by the profit share income per employee. In contrast, the existence of 
works councils, an indicator of employee participation in decision making, was negatively 
related to productivity. They disclosed that profit sharing companies experienced greater total 
factor productivity than non-profit sharing companies did. So, according to their results, 
productivity is positively related to profit sharing but negatively related to employee 
participation in decision making. 
A study by Rutgers University's Institute of Management and Labor relations found that 
profit sharing companies were more productive than non-profit-sharing companies in 13 of 15 
years from 1971 to 1985 (Profit Sharing, 1988). Shepard (1986) conducted a survey on a 
sample of 20 US chemical companies with publicly traded stock from 1975 to 1982. Out of 
the 20 companies studied, nine had profit sharing plans. The authors used a production 
function framework with value added as the dependent variable, and concluded that the profit 
sharing companies had 9-10 percent higher value added than did the non-profit sharing 
companies. Out of the 14 regressions reported, 13 had positive profit-sharing coefficients 
significant at the 5 percent level, with an average t-statistic of 3.41. Using the same sample 
Shepard (1994) developed a factor augmentation model of production to measure the impact 
of profit sharing on productivity. The empirical results obtained in this study were consistent 
with those obtained in other recent studies and suggested that profit sharing positively 
influences productivity. The overall impact was found to be positive and significant for each 
of the models tested, with the impact ranging from 9 to 11 percent on the value added of the 
firm. 
A survey of 508 personnel/industrial relations managers by Broderick and Mitchell (1987) 
was one of the few samples that included employers without profit sharing plans. The authors 
compared several types of plans (including ESOPs, tax credit ESOPs, gainsharing, and simple 
incentives), and found that 28% of all managers regarded profit sharing as the best alternative 
for raising productivity (second to simple incentives, reported by 42%), and that 48% of 
managers regarded it as the best plan for increasing loyalty. Only simple incentives, such as 
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piecework, scored a higher percentage (41%) as the best productivity enhancer. In addition, 
profit sharing was viewed as the easiest plan to administer, and much easier to explain to 
employees than ESOPs, tax credit ESOPs, and gainsharing plans were. 
In the American Productivity Center Survey (O'Dell and McAdams, 1987), approximately 
11,000 professionals in 4,500 different organizations or locations were surveyed, and 1,598 
respondents representing either a total organization or operating units within an organization 
returned the surveys. Sixty-five percent of respondents reported that profit sharing has a 
'positive' or 'very positive' impact on productivity. Moreover, 74%, 70% and 56% of 
respondents reported that profit sharing has a positive or very positive effect on performance, 
quality and turnover, respectively. 
In a 1984 study, managers in 343 unionized firms in Wisconsin were surveyed about their 
companies' experience with gainsharing, profit sharing, ESOPs, employee participation, and 
joint union-management committees. Voos (1987) asked managers to evaluate the effects of 
the various programme on the dimensions of product quality, productivity, unit labour cost, 
and profits. The study found that the coefficient on gainsharing or profit sharing was always 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, with the largest perceived effects 
on productivity and product quality. Voos concluded that managers regarded profit sharing, 
gain sharing, and participation as the programmes most likely to have positive effects on firm 
performance. In terms of employers' views, the Wider Share Ownership Council (1985) 
found that 45% of companies considered that profit sharing increased productivity, 77% 
considered it 'improved loyalty or attitudes', and 39% thought that it reduced staff turnover, 
with its attendant favourable effects for productivity (cited in Wadhwani and Wall, 1988). 
Florkowski (1989) conducted case studies on four US manufacturing companies with profit 
sharing plans. Productivity data were available from three companies. In the two companies 
that set up profit sharing within the sample period, productivity trends increased in both 
cases, whereas productivity levels increased in one company and decreased in the other (none 
significant at the 5 percent level). In a third company, which changed the profit sharing 
formula in the sample period by funding a pension plan out of the profit shares, there was a 
large and statistically significant decrease in the trend of productivity (with a small 
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insignificant increase in the level). He concluded that the introduction of profit sharing 
coexisted with productivity improvement in one company but had no effect in another; in a 
third company a shift in the profit sharing formula toward deferred payments coexisted with 
decreased productivity. Kruse (1988) used IRS data for the period 1971-1985 linked to 
COMPUSTAT estimates of productivity (sales per employee), then found that the firm-
intercept and first-difference panel regressions indicated consistently positive and statistically 
significant increases in productivity associated with the adoption of profit sharing plans, with 
a range of 2.8-3.6 percent for manufacturing firms and 2.5-4.2 percent for nonmanufacturing 
firms. The t-ratios ranged from 2.25 to 3.5. 
In order to test the effect of profit sharing on productivity Estrin, Perotin, Robinson, and 
Wilson (1997) used a British data set covering a random sample of 93 manufacturing firms 
observed over four years from 1988-1991. They found that profit sharing increased 
productivity by about 6%. They suggested that firms which use profit sharing obtain levels of 
factor productivity about 6% higher on average than firms which do not use such schemes. 
The Effect of Other Forms of Employee Ownership on Corporate Performance 
Eleven studies examined the effect of employee ownership on company performance. Of 
these, five studies analyzed exclusively performance in worker buyouts. Cable and Fitzroy 
(1980) conducted a survey in a sample of 42 out of 700 West German companies which 
involved some type of profit sharing and worker ownership. Their study was regarded as one 
of the first to use a production function approach to measure the effects of non-traditional 
firms on productivity. When the data were analyzed as a whole, they did not indicate the 
impact of capital ownership on productivity. However, when the data were separated, based 
on the degree of participation, the highly participatory companies showed a positive and 
significant correlation with productivity and those companies with low participation showed a 
negative and significant correlation with productivity. This result suggests that if companies 
want to obtain efficiency gains, those companies which have some form of employee 























	 	 	 	
Wagner (1984) investigated the performance of 13 publicly traded firms that were at least 
10% employee owned. The author matched each of the 13 companies with its public non-
employee ownership competitors within the same industry and ranked against them on the 
basis of various financial measures. In terms of overall return to investors, the employee 
ownership companies performed equally as well as their competitors. However, on net 
operating margin, sales growth, book value/share, and return on equity, the employee 
ownership firms outperformed their competitors by 62-75 percent. In a study of 364 
electronic and computer companies in 1985, Trachman (1985) found that companies sharing 
ownership with employees grew two to four times faster than did companies where 
employees did not have stock. If the companies offered stock to the key employees 
(managers) alone, the growth rate was 50% lower than if the companies did not offer stock to 
any employees. Moreover, if the companies encouraged broadened stock ownership and 
participation, they grew 275% faster than companies that offered stock to managers alone. 
The important limitation of this study is that it does not report whether the differences are 
statistically significant. 
Table 4.2. Average Annual Percentage Share Price Changes for Certain Types of Firms, 1978-1984 




1978-9 5 n.a (0) 13 (15) 20 
1979-80 27 -20 (4) -3 (11) -1 
1980-1 8 7 (8) 3 (7) -2 
1981-2 69 48 (9) 2 (6) 19 
1982-3 16 11 (12) 51 (3) 19 
1983-4 30 47 (15) n.a. (0) 34 
1978-84 26 19 13 15 
n.a. = not applicable 
Figures in brackets indicate the number of firms in the category. 
Source: Richardson, Ray, and Nejad, Aaron, " Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the UK - an Evaluation", 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.24, No.2, July 1986, p.245. 
151 
In a sample of 41 firms, with and without employee share ownership schemes, chosen from 
the UK multiple stores sector, Richardson and Nejad (1986) investigated the impact of 
employee share ownership schemes on share price movements over the period 1978-1984. By 
the end of 1984, twenty-three out of 41 firms studied were operating at least one scheme. 
They found that (a) companies 'enthusiastic' about employee share ownership schemes had 
an annual average share price increase of 26% in the study period; (b) 'more cautious' 
participators in the schemes saw an average increase of 19%; (c) those without employee 
share ownership schemes had an average rise of only 15% (see Table 4.2). 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) used the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey to 
investigate how the financial performance of companies was related to the three types of 
employee share schemes, including share ownership, cash profit sharing, and value-added 
bonus. All three types of share schemes were represented by dummy variables. It was found 
that none of the coefficients on the dummy variables was individually significant. In other 
words, none of the variables, either individually or when taken together, significantly affected 
the probability of a company having higher performance. The main determinants of this 
probability were size of the establishment, growth of demand for the company's product, the 
percentage of turnover accounted for by wages and salaries, and unionization. 
In the literature, it is argued that if a significant portion of executive salary is related to 
corporate profits, managers should have a strong incentive to fulfill policies that maximize 
shareholder wealth. This argument has been examined in several studies in which the 
financial performance of companies with a stock-based compensation programme has been 
compared to the performance of matched companies in which executive compensation is 
based mainly on salary. It was reported that companies using executive stock bonuses 
indicated superior stock market performance (Mason, 1971; Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970). 
In their studies, Palmer (1973) and Stano (1976) compared average profit rate and stock 
return in owner-controlled and management-controlled companies. They found that owner-
controlled companies consistently out-performed management-controlled companies. Apart 
from the stock-based compensation programme, other performance-based executive 
compensation systems, such as profit sharing, are also regarded as managerial incentives. In 
some studies, such as Metzger (1975) and Metzger and Colletti (1971), it was reported that 
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companies using profit sharing as an incentive for managerial performance have 
outperformed other companies by a wide margin on a variety of standard indicators of growth 
and profitability. However, it should be noted that not all studies report the same kind of 
results favouring owner-management. Moreover, external factors also play a significant role 
in determining both the success of corporate strategies and the value of corporate stock. 
There are a number of case studies of small businesses that were purchased by their 
employees as part of a corporate divestiture process. These studies provide some information 
about economic performance in worker buy-outs. In 1975, a metal cutting and machine tool 
manufacturing company was purchased by employees from its parent corporation at South 
Bend Lathe. In the first year after conversion, a productivity increase of 25% over the year 
prior to purchase was reported in this 100% employee-owned company. Moreover, during the 
three years following purchase pretax profits rose to 9% of sales, and wages rose 35% 
(Zwerdling, 1980). In the first year following conversion at Vermont Asbestos, a 20% return 
on sales and 1,500% return on equity was reported (Johannesen, 1979). At Saratoga Knitting 
Mills, it was reported that returns on equity increased 80% in the first year of employee 
ownership and within two years of purchase, common stock value had increased 200% 
(Gurdon, 1978). 
Long (1980) analyzed the effect of employee ownership on organizational performance in 
three employee-owned companies (a trucking firm, a knitting mill, and a furniture firm). 
Although the companies were employee owned, they had varying degrees of employee 
ownership. The trucking company was wholly employee owned, the knitting mill was largely 
employee owned (70%), and the furniture firm was partly employee owned (34%). Although 
the trucking company and knitting mill had made substantial losses before conversion to 
employee ownership, they started making consistent profits after conversion. The furniture 
firm also showed an increase in profitability, but not as large. Frieden (1980) summarized 
reported data on the economic performance of worker buyout and concluded that, overall, 
substantial improvement has occurred after conversion to employee ownership. 
In their study, Granrose, Applebaum, and Singh (1986) compared employee-owned 
supermarkets to conventional supermarkets in Philadelphia. The employee-owned 
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supermarkets originally had been owned by the same chain that owned the conventional 
supermarkets but had converted to avoid being closed. In 1981, before conversion, the 
conventional supermarkets had significantly higher profits and lower unit labour costs than 
the employee-owned supermarkets. But, in 1983, after conversion, the employee-owned 
supermarkets had significantly lower labour costs than the conventional markets and 
significantly higher profits than some of the conventional supermarkets. However, in a study 
of three unionized, employee-owned firms, Sockell (1985) provided evidence that 
performance benefits of employee ownership are not always enduring. 
Using data on 562 public companies that had more than 5% of stock owned by employees in 
1990/9 1 (which the researchers refer to as employee ownership firms, or EOFs), Blasi, Conte, 
and Kruse (1996) compared the performance levels and growth of EOFs with those of all 
other public companies in their data set (which number 4,716). They concluded that there was 
clearly no automatic connection between employee ownership and corporate performance, 
but where differences did exist, they tended to indicate better performance by EOFs than by 
non-EOFs. 
The effect of other forms of employee ownership on corporate performance as measured 
by profitability: Eight studies investigated the effect of employee ownership on profitability. 
Conte and Tannenbaum's 1978 study is the earliest major study of the effect of employee 
ownership on profitability. Their survey involved 98 companies that actually were found to 
have some component of worker ownership. Of these, 68 had stock ownership plans, and 30 
had direct ownership. The authors asked these firms to provide data on their pretax profits 
and sales in 1976. They received profit data from 30 companies and then compared the ratio 
of pretax profits to sales (as a basis for gauging profitability) for the responding firms to the 
average ratio for their industries. They found that in those 30 companies where profit data 
were available, profits were 1.5 times higher than the average figures for their industries; 
however, the difference was not statistically significant. In addition, they also found that the 
more equity the workers own, the more profitable the firms, other things being equal. The 
results suggested that, in general, employee ownership, in one form or another, may be 
associated with the profitability of a firm. 
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Wagner's 1984 study (mentioned before) found that companies with at least 10% employee 
ownership surpassed two-thirds of comparable non-employee ownership companies in the 
same industry in terms of average profits per dollar of revenues as well as average return on 
equity (Wagner and Rosen, 1985). However, most research findings about the effects of 
employee ownership on profitability are inconclusive or negative. Certainly, Livingstone and 
Henry (1980), Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1984), and Edwards (1987) found that, on 
average, employee share ownership had an unfavourable impact on profitability. Both studies 
by Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1984) and Livingstone and Henry (1980) reported that 
companies with employee share ownership are less profitable than those without such 
schemes. 
Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohman (1984) did a follow-up to the Conte and Tannenbaum study 
of 1978. The new study included 55 of the companies they studied before, and 60 additional 
employee ownership companies. They matched a total of 115 employee ownership companies 
with 99 comparable, traditionally owned companies. The authors found no evidence of higher 
profitability in the employee ownership companies. There was no significant difference in 
profitability between employee-owned and non-employee owned companies. However, they 
found that employee ownership companies were 10% less likely to go out of business over 
the 1976-1982 study period. In a sample of 45 matched pairs of large companies with and 
without employee stock benefit plans (ESPs) in diverse industries, Brooks, Henry, and 
Livingston (1984) found that financial portfolios of ESP firms substantially underperformed 
those of non-ESP firms. In addition, the findings of the study indicated that windfall gains did 
not accrue to shareholders of companies with established ESPs. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1986, 1987) investigated a sample of 637 British manufacturing 
establishments, drawn from the 1980 Workplace Industrial Relations (WIRS) data, in an 
attempt to find out whether or not the existence of employee share ownership schemes had a 
favourable impact on employment and investment. They did not find that the existence of 
such schemes had an impact on companies' decisions about the number of jobs. Similarly, 
they discovered that the presence of share ownership schemes had no statistically significant 
effect on a company's investment behaviour over the preceding two to three years. In their 
study of 562 public companies Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996) (mentioned earlier in this 
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chapter) found that employee ownership firms (EOFs) had levels of profitability similar to 
those of other firms of the same size in the same industry in 1990, but significantly stronger 
1980-90 growth on three of the researchers' four measures (with no significant differences by 
size of employee holdings). The researchers' analysis by size class, however, indicated that 
the positive relationship between employee ownership and profitability growth was strongest 
among the smallest companies. 
The effect of other forms of employee ownership on corporate performance as measured 
by productivity: Nine studies analyzed the effect of employee ownership on productivity. 
Although they did not give specific figures, Conte and Tannenbaum (1978), and Conte, 
Tannenbaum, and McCulloch (1981) reported that when managers were asked about the 
effect of employee ownership on productivity, they were in general very supportive of the 
employee ownership plan and regarded the plan as contributing to the productivity of the 
firm. The New York Stock Exchange (1982) asked mangers to evaluate the efficacy of stock 
purchase plans. Sixty-two percent of the respondents reported that their plans were successful 
in improving productivity. Seventy-six percent of the respondents felt that profit sharing 
plans were very or somewhat successful in raising productivity. Estrin and Jones (1988) 
assessed simultaneously the determinants of worker ownership, co-op membership, and 
productive efficiency by using data on French producer co-operatives. Unlike the earlier 
studies, this study attempted to model the complex relationship between the ownership and 
productivity variables in greater depth. The main finding of the study is that the effect of 
ownership on productivity remained positive and statistically significant (cited in Conte and 
Svejnar, 1990). 
In her doctoral dissertation, Lee (1988) used a 1983-1985 panel of data from 50 employee-
owned and 51 conventional companies in Sweden. She modeled a number of production 
functions and calculated total factor productivity. The study indicated that there were no clear 
effects of employee ownership on productivity. Berman and Berman's (1989) study 
confirmed Lee's findings. They used data from worker-owned and conventional plywood 
companies in the US. In the study a production function with a dummy variable indicating 
worker-owned companies was estimated. They found that the coefficient for the dummy 
variable was negative and significant, pointing out the possibility of lower productivity in the 
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cooperative. Bartlett, Cable, Estrin, Jones, and Smith (1992) analyzed the differences between 
the behaviour of private firms and that of producer cooperatives in a matched sample of 85 
firms in Italy. They found that the cooperatives apparently had higher productivity, more 
labour-intensive production methods, lower income differentials, and a more tranquil 
industrial relations environment than the private firms. Craig and Pencavel (1995) found 6-
14% higher productivity in cooperative plywood firms than in non-cooperatives, although the 
differences were not statistically significant. 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) used survey data on some 1,500 British workplaces from the 1990 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS3) to examine links between employee 
involvement, contingent pay, and different forms of collective representation and six different 
outcomes. One of their main findings was that the presence of profit sharing or employee 
share ownership schemes and merit pay each has a positive and statistically significant link 
(at the 10% level or better) with productivity levels or growth and the change in employment. 
In their study of 562 public companies, Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996) (mentioned earlier in 
this chapter) found mixed results on productivity of employee ownership firms (EOFs). They 
reported that employee ownership had no strong relationship to sales per employee in any of 
the specifications. Among the minority of firms reporting labour expense information, the 
EOFs in 1990 had higher value-added per employee (concentrated among the smallest EOFs), 
and higher compensation per employee (which appeared to have been evenly distributed 
across the different sizes of EOF5), than the non-EOFs had. 
4.2. Studies Examining the Attitudinal and Behavioural Effects of Profit Sharing and 
Employee Share Ownership 
During the last two decades, organization theorists and psychologists have showed a tendency 
to explore indicators of the less tangible benefits such as commitment, involvement, job 
satisfaction, and integration. Thus a number of studies probed the behavioural and attitudinal 



















	 	 	 	 	
4.2.1. ESOPs and Employee Job Attitudes and Behaviours
Seventeen studies analyzed the effect of ESOPs on employee job attitudes and behaviours.
One of the first studies on the effects of ESOPs was conducted in a sample of 180 ESOP
companies. Seventy percent of the companies studied cited improved employee motivation as
a benefit of the plan, but most respondents were unsure of the actual effects. The study argued
that if the work atmosphere was not good to begin with, an ESOP by itself could not
measurably improve morale and motivation (UCLA, 1977).
As part of a study of 68 majority employee-owned ESOPs, 51 managers and employees out
of a workforce of 500 were interviewed 18 months after the 100-percent buyout of South
Bend Lathe, in which most employees participated. The study reported that both labour-
management cooperation, and the quality and quantity of work improved, and motivation
increased, but 65% of managers and employees interviewed felt that their participation in
decisions affecting them had not changed through ownership. Due to serious distrust between
labour and management and lack of employee involvement in the company, two years after
the buyout the firm suffered a major strike. In the related survey of managers in 68 ESOPs,
managers consistently supported employee ownership but did not include worker
participation in decisions as one of its components (Survey Research Center, 1978).
Table 4.3. 'Measurements' of Employee Performance Since Adoption of the ESOP
Employee Performance
Better Same Worse Total
Measurements*: (in %'s)
Employee turnover (11= 165) 36% 59% 5% 100%
Quality of work (N = 166) 32% 67% 1% 100%
Employee grievances (N = 144) 18% 81% 1% 100%
Employee absenteeism (N = 153) 10% 89% 1% 100%
Employeetardiness (N= 151) 8% 91% 1% 100%
* Only those companies that maintain records of the performance measurements are considered in the table.
Source: Marsh, Thomas R., and McAllister, Dale E., "ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies With Employee
Stock Ownership Plans", The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol.6, No.3, Spring 1981, p.61 2.
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Mars and McAllister (1981) reported that personnel managers in many ESOP firms perceived 
that ESOP had a significant impact on each of five different factors which affect the 
workplace atmosphere, including employee interest in company progress, employee morale, 
worker/management communications, cooperation among employees, and employee 
suggestions. Direct measure of employee performance indicated that approximately 30% of 
companies sampled rated employee turnover and quality of work as 'better' since the 
introduction of the ESOP (see Table 4.3). In a lower percentage of firms (less than 18%), 
managers reported a reduction in employee grievances, absenteeism, and tardiness. The 
ESOP Association 1982 ESOP survey reported that 55% of survey respondents said that the 
motivation and productivity of their employee-owners was somewhat improved, and another 
15% claimed that motivation and productivity were strongly improved. 
Toscano and Grady (1982) conducted a survey in an 800-employee textile company in the 
US. Because of threatened liquidation by a conglomerate parent, the company became 
employee-owned. The researchers administered a questionnaire to employees at this company 
and a comparable non-ESOP company. The study reported that 33.6% of the ESOP 
participants claimed that employee ownership made work satisfying. However, no significant 
differences in several measures ofjob satisfaction were reported by the workforces of the two 
companies. Ford (1982) studied an ESOP company in the aircraft industry in Texas. The 
author reported that overall job satisfaction was approximately 14% higher in this company 
than in a recent national sample. In the ESOP company, 14.6% more respondents claimed 
that they would take the same job again than in the national sample. But Ford did not mention 
whether or not the ESOP was partly responsible because she did not analyze these 
differences. However, the results of the study indicate that the ESOP may have created higher 
job satisfaction. 
Kruse (1984) surveyed attitudes at two US companies with ESOPs. He compared attitude 
surveys within the companies to a national sample from the Quality of Employment Survey. 
In one of the case study companies, a unionized ESOP valve-manufacturing firm, employees 
reported lower job satisfaction than the national sample. Workers who had increased say in 










	 	 	 	
	 	
affect this identification. In another case study company, a non-unionized retail store chain 
ESOP, managers claimed that employees were more motivated by the ESOP than did 
employees themselves. Although the company has a relatively open style of management, 
approximately 88% of the workers believed that the ESOP made no difference in employee 
participation in decision making. However, in principal, employees did not state more of a 
desire for participation with the ESOP; only older employees reported more willingness to 
participate in decisions on safety and the organization of work. 65.4% said that the ESOP 
made no difference to their pride in being an employee, and 79% reported that the ESOP 
made no difference to their job satisfaction. Comparing this to the national sample, 
employees reported much the same job satisfaction and interest in changing jobs. Kruse 
concluded that the existence of the ESOP had no effect on employee attitudes. 
Table 4.4. Correlations between ESOP Characteristics and Employee Attitudes 
ESOP Satisfaction Organizational Job Turnover 
Commitment Satisfaction Intention 
Percent of Company Stock Owned .05 -.13 -.07 -.04 
by ESOP 
Voting Rights .16 15 .08 -.07 
Reason Why Company Established F= 1.20 F= 1.92 F=1.45 F=.62 
Its ESOP 
Employee Ownership Philosophy 49** .36* _37* 
ESOP Communications 40* .27 .03 
Company Contribution to ESOP • 54* * * 53** 
Stock Change .23 .29 .28 -.29 
* p<.05 **p<.Ol ***p<.0o1 
Source: Rosen, Corey M., Klein, Katherine J., and Young, Karen M., Employee Ownership in America: The 
Equity Solution, Lexington Books, 1986, p.110. 
Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986) and Klein (1987) conducted probably the most extensive 
study in the area of employee motivation and behaviour. Their sample was 37 ESOP 
companies with a total of 2,804 employees. The companies had different characteristics. The 
study primarily focused on the relationship between characteristics of the ESOP and positive 
employee attitudes, such as ESOP satisfaction, organizational commitment, job satisfaction, 
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and intention to stay with the company. The authors conducted a questionnaire that included 
questions relating to satisfaction, organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and turnover 
intention, which were used as dependent variables. Voting rights, the percent of company 
owned by the ESOP, the reason why the ESOP was established, the employee ownership 
philosophy, ESOP communications, company contribution to ESOP, and stock change were 
independent variables. The study found that the amount of the annual company contribution 
to the ESOP was the major factor that significantly explained the dependent variables (see 
Table 4.4). Management's philosophical commitment to employee ownership indicated a 
similar effect. Employees whose companies had more of a commitment to employee 
ownership showed more-positive attitudes. The study reported that employees are most 
satisfied and most committed when the company makes large contributions to the ESOP, 
when management has a strong philosophical commitment to employee ownership, and when 
there are significant communications by management. Employee attitudes were not affected 
by the size of the company, the reason for establishing the ESOP, its public or private status, 
the presence of a union, voting rights, or the sharing of financial information with employees. 
In addition the study found a final interesting result, which is the relative insignificance of the 
percent of stocks owned by the employees. Although management philosophy and work 
influence were related to positive attitudes, the study did not report clearly the direction of 
causality. A follow-up analysis by Klein and Hall (1988) using the same data set investigated 
predictors of individuals' satisfaction with their ESOP. Although the previous study by Klein 
and her colleagues examined the data at the company level, this study analysed both company 
and individual characteristics to predict individual responses. According to the results, 
satisfaction with the ESOP was related to company characteristics, such as philosophy of 
management, size of contribution, and ESOP age. Additionally, individual characteristics, 
such as salary, tenure, and education were related to satisfaction. Finally, the study found that 
a number of interactions between individual characteristics and ESOP characteristics were 
significant. 
Dostart (1986) surveyed a privately held Boston bank, which is 46.5% controlled by its 
leveraged ESOP with an additional 23.5% held individually by the president and four 
directors. Although management regarded the ESOP as an opportunity to reward and retain 
employees, they mostly initiated it for financial reasons and in their own interests. In the 
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company, employees did not have stock voting rights or participate in decisions, but there 
were good supervisory relations and an open-door policy. The study showed that although 
employees felt more committed to the bank's success, they did not feel a strong sense of 
ownership through ESOP. Nonma.nagerial employees, in general, reported that there was little 
connection between the ESOP and their work effort. Workers did not perceive a high degree 
ofjob freedom or job variety. Forty-four percent of the employees reported that owning stock 
did not make them want to stay with the bank. The results of the study indicated that there 
was a substantial gap between perceived and desired influence among nonmanagers, and 
ownership did not increase employees' influence at any level. 
Tucker, Nock, and Toscano (1989) examined the impact of an ESOP on job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, and perceived influence in a small graphics company. All 40 
employees were surveyed six months before and nine months after the ESOP began. The 
study discovered that both job satisfaction and commitment rose over time, with commitment 
having the larger increase, although perceived influence showed little change. In Ettling' s 
(1990) study, 903 respondents were surveyed in 29 ESOPs that were at least two years old 
and had more than 30 employees. The study examined conditions that should result in a sense 
of psychological ownership plus ownership satisfaction, job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, internal work motivation, and intention to leave the organization. 
Only satisfaction with ownership was significantly predicted by stock value change. 
However, ownership satisfaction, pay satisfaction, organizational commitment, and intentions 
to quit were significantly predicted by a variable that summarized the economic policies 
resulting in psychological ownership. Additionally, a number of interactions were significant. 
The interactions showed that where psychological ownership was low, increasing stock prices 
could result in more negative employee attitudes. 
Lengnick-Hall (1991) investigated the impact of ownership stake on employee attitudes in a 
somewhat unique situation in a Midwestern American utility. As ESOP laws changed in 
1986, the utility modified its ESOP, and three groups of employees with very different 
ownership stakes in the ESOP were created, directly benefiting long-term employees, slightly 
benefiting moderate-tenure employees (6 to 15 years), and eliminating benefits for short-term 
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employees. The study found that the degree of ownership was unrelated to organizational 
con-unitment and employee job satisfaction, except satisfaction with the ESOP. 
In a series of studies, Buchko (1992a, 1992b, 1993) investigated the effects of ESOP on 
employee job attitudes in a medium-sized media and communication firm located in a 
medium-sized Midwestern US city. The firm employed 376 persons. In his 1992a study, 
Buchko tested Klein's (1987) three theoretical perspectives: the intrinsic satisfaction model, 
the instrumental satisfaction model, and the extrinsic satisfaction model. He found the 
greatest support for the instrumental satisfaction perspective, in which ownership affects 
employee attitudes (including organizational commitment, job involvement, job satisfaction, 
ESOP satisfaction, arid turnover intention, p's<.Ol) primarily through providing greater 
perceived influence and control. Additional support was found for the extrinsic satisfaction 
perspective, with employee attitudes (including job satisfaction, p<.O5; ESOP satisfaction, 
p<z.O5; turnover intention, p<.O5; and organizational commitment, p<.IO) affected by the 
financial value of ownership. No support was found for the intrinsic satisfaction perspective, 
because employee ownership in itself did not affect employee job attitudes. In his 1992b 
study, Buchko examined the effects of ESOP on employee attitudes and actual turnover 
behaviour over an extended time period. He found that employees with greater perceived 
influence as a result of the ownership programme and those with a greater financial value in 
the ownership programme were more satisfied with the ESOP programme (p<.O1), more 
committed to the organization (p<.O1), had lower turnover intention (p<.O1), and were less 
likely to exit the company. In his 1993 study, Buchko investigated the effects of ESOP on 
employee job attitudes. He found that the financial value of the ESOP was positively related 
to satisfaction with the ESOP plan (b=.357, p<.001), but was not related to job satisfaction 
and organizational commitment. Perceived influence in company decision making that results 
from ownership were positively and significantly related to employees' satisfaction with the 
ESOP programme (b=.591, p<.001), job satisfaction (b.500, p<.001), and organizational 
commitment (b=.233, p<.001). ESOP satisfaction (b=.157, p<.O5), job satisfaction (b=.314, 
p<.001), and organizational commitment (b=.235, p<.Ol) were negatively related to turnover 
intention. ESOP satisfaction (b=.255, p<.O5) and turnover intention (b=.452, p<.00I) were 
related to actual employee turnover behaviour. 
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Wilkinson, Marchington, Ackers, arid Goodman (1994) conducted a case study, which was 
part of a larger study of Employee Involvement of 25 UK companies funded by the 
Employment Department between 1989 and 1991, in a light engineering company on the 
south coast employing about 300 staff. The study found tenuous links between the ESOP and 
industrial relations. Although the workforce clearly reported inadequate say at work, they did 
not regard ESOP as a way to provide greater influence for them. The authors stated that even 
the limited participative opportunities were not offered by the ESOP. In order to analyze the 
changes of employee attitudes, they conducted a representative questionnaire survey and a 
number of interviews. They found that although employees were supportive of the principle 
of the ESOP, they were suspicious about its effect on their attitudes and working lives. The 
respondents did not give very positive answers to the questions covering the ESOP's actual 
effect. For instance, only 27% regarded it as an incentive to work harder for higher profits, 
and only 25% reported that it increased employee commitment to the company. Therefore, 
the authors concluded that there was little evidence of a fundamental change of employee 
attitudes towards the company. 
Pendleton, Wilson, and Wright (1998) investigated the effect of employee ownership on 
employee attitudes, using attitudinal data obtained from four UK bus companies which had 
adopted the ESOP form of employee ownership. The findings of their study supported 
intrinsic and instrumental models of ownership, and indicated that feelings of ownership were 
significantly associated with higher levels of commitment (p<Z.01), satisfaction (j)<.OS), 
integration (p<.05), and involvement (p<.05). In the light of these results Pendleton et a!. 
(1998) concluded that ownership does make a difference. 
4.2.2. Profit Sharing and Employee Job Attitudes and Behaviours 
Eighteen studies investigated the effect of profit sharing on employee job attitudes and 
behaviours. Knowlton (1954) stated that 82% of the managers in 283 profit sharing 
companies assessed their plans as successful or very successful. Brower (1957) surveyed 204 
executives of US manufacturing firms varying in size from under 250 to over 10,000 
employees. More than 75% of the corporate officials questioned by her reported that profit 
sharing had been extraordinarily or moderately effective in improving morale, creating 
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employee interest in the organization's welfare, and reducing turnover. Generally, the results 
of the study indicated that approximately 90% of respondents felt that profit sharing 
improved employee attitudes. Jebring (1956) conducted a survey in 202 US companies and 
found that 81% of the respondents believed that the profit sharing plan had been very 
successful or successful for the company. 
One study compared answers across profit sharing and non-profit sharing employees 
(Opinion Research Corporation, 1957). The study reported that profit sharing employees were 
more likely than non-profit sharing employees to feel that they benefit from company growth 
and that workers get credit for company progress. In addition, a majority of profit sharing 
employees (over 60%) mentioned that their interests are not substantially different from those 
of management and owners. In this study profit sharing was rated by employees as the second 
most important advantage of working for their companies. Best (1961) examined individual 
responses to the plans of more than 33 American profit sharers. Although Best did not report 
the exact number of firms, he stated that 16% were small companies, 44% were medium 
sized, and 40% of the sample were large. Employees with profit sharing were much more 
likely to show that they obtained proper credit for company success, a fair share of employer 
prosperity, arid gains when they decreased costs than were those without profit sharing. 
In Metzger's 1966 study of 130 US companies with fewer than 500 employees, mostly but 
not necessarily with profit sharing plans, about 82% of the respondents appraised profit 
sharing as very successful or successful. In addition, a majority of respondents thought that 
profit sharing improved morale and cooperation (93%), and that it was effective in cutting 
costs (64%). In Metzger's 1975 study of 38 large US companies, 100% of the respondents 
rated their plans as being very successful (53%) or successful (47%) overall in achieving 
expected aims. 
In one US company, Colletti (1969) reported very positive attitudes about profit sharing 
plans. Over 60% of the production employees felt that profit sharing was an incentive in their 
daily jobs (67%), that it allowed substantial participation in the firm's growth (89%), that it 
gave financial gains by cost cutting (80%), and that it made them want to do a better job 
(72%). In a survey of 83 member firms of the Profit Sharing Council of Canada, Nightingale 
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(1980) reported that profit sharing was strongly supported by management as an effective 
means of improving employee morale. Eighty-nine percent of companies in this sample 
reported that profit sharing had positive effects on employee attitudes. In none of the firms 
was a negative attitudinal effect reported. In 84% of the firms, executives felt that profit 
sharing was effective in attracting and holding desirable employees, and in increasing 
employee satisfaction. Seventy-two percent of firms reported that their plans were effective in 
improving employee teamwork and co-operation. Respondents also showed that workers 
were less likely to leave their jobs after introduction of the plans. 
Bell and Hanson (1984, 1987) administered a questionnaire in 12 profit sharing companies 
late in 1983 and early in 1984. 2,703 questionnaires were returned (a response rate of 67%). 
The authors found that at least 47% of respondents reported that they agreed, or strongly 
agreed, that profit sharing strengthens loyalty to the firm (47%), makes people work more 
effectively so as to help the firm to be successful (5 1%), creates a better atmosphere in the 
firm (65%), and is good for company and employees (86%). In addition, 73% of respondents 
thought that profit sharing did improve employee attitudes in a company and 68% felt that the 
introduction of profit sharing had improved their own view of their company as an employer. 
The Wider Share Ownership Council (WSOC) (1985) carried out a survey of employers and 
found that 77% of respondents thought that profit sharing plans improved loyalty or attitudes, 
and 39% reported that the plans reduced staff turnover (cited in Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 
1988). 
Wilson and Cable (1988) examined the current UK sample and found that there was a 
significant difference in the means of labour turnover and absenteeism between subsamples 
of profit sharing and non-profit sharing companies. In contrast Cable (1986) examined a 
sample of German companies, about half of which were profit sharing, and found that labour 
turnover was even higher in profit sharing firms (cited in Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 1988). The 
American Productivity Center Survey (O'Dell and McAdams, 1987) (mentioned before) 
concluded that profit sharing increased employee commitment and reduced turnover. Estrin 
and Wilson (1989) used a panel of 52 companies in the engineering and metal working 
sectors over the period 1978-1982. They found that profit sharing was broadly regarded as an 
employee incentive scheme, likely to increase labour commitment and reduce anti-
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management attitudes. In every year of their survey the quit rate was lower in their profit 
sharing group than in the non-sharers. 
In three profit sharing companies, Florkowski (1989) surveyed 154 employees and used 
several indexes to predict positive responses toward profit sharing. Perceptions of greater 
performance-reward contingencies, organizational commitment, job satisfaction and pay 
equity were related to positive attitudes about profit sharing, but perceived influence on 
decision making did not have a strong relationship. In a sample of 160 individuals, 
Florkowski and Schuster (1992) tested propositions from Florkowski's (1987) profit sharing 
model. They found that performance-reward contingencies and pay equity were significant 
determinants of support for the profit sharing plan (p's<.Ol). Profit sharing support, in turn, 
was an important determinant of organizational commitment (p<Z.01). The hypothesized 
relationship between influence on decision making and plan support was not substantiated, 
nor was there evidence that job satisfaction moderated the relationship between support for 
profit sharing and organizational commitment. In a survey of 308 Taiwan enterprises, Huang 
(1997) concluded that employee participation in profit sharing is useful in promoting 
employees' motivation. 
4.2.3. Other Forms of Employee Ownership and Employee Job Attitudes and 
Behaviours 
Twenty-six studies investigated the effect of employee ownership on employee job attitudes 
and behaviours in companies with other types of employee share schemes, or in companies 
that had introduced more than one type of share scheme. Four of the studies were carried out 
in producer cooperatives. One of the first studies which directly and systematically measured 
employee job attitudes was conducted by Tannenbaum and Conte (1977). Their study was of 
the 500-employee South Bend Lathe company, which was bought by the employees in the 
face of a threatened shutdown. Fifty-one employees and managers were interviewed 18 
months after the conversion. Eighty-four percent of the respondents mentioned that the 
attitude of employees toward their work had changed for the better, and a number of 
employees reported specific factors such as 'less waste', 'less absenteeism', 'greater 
precision', 'better quality', and 'greater quantity of work'. Although there were some 
167 
	 	






















	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
employee representatives on the board, 65% of the respondents said that there had been no
change in the way company decisions that affect them were made. Therefore, it could be said
that the changes in employee attitudes were obviously not due to increased employee
participation in decisions.
Table 4.5. Differences between Stockholders and Nonstockholders, Selected Dependent Variables
Stockholders Nonstockholders Sig. of Diff.
Variables Mean n Mean n ta p<b
Integration 5.317 1.16 41 4.417 1.22 18 2.70 .01
Involvement 5.829 .67 41 5.028 1.02 18 3.06 .01
Commitment 5.902 .94 41 4.778 1.59 18 2.79 .01
Motivation 5.358 1.02 41 5.204 1.15 18 .51 .32
General Satisfaction 5.925 .89 40 5.463 .85 18 1.85 .05
a Standard Student t values (pooled variance) are used where an F-test indicates that the probability that the two
variances are unequal is not greater than .10 (two-tailed).
b One-tailed test
Source: Long, Richard J., "The Effects of Employee Ownership on Organizational Identification, Employee Job
Attitudes, and Organizational Performance: A Tentative Framework and Empirical Findings", Human
Relations, Vol.31, No.1, 1978a, p.43.
Long examined employee attitudes in employee-owned companies by conducting a variety of
studies. In one study, Long (1978a) attempted to address the question of how employee
ownership is related to employee job attitudes, behaviours, and organizational performance.
He collected the data in two ways in a medium-sized regional trucking firm that had been
purchased by its employees about six months before the start of the study. During the study
stockholding was restricted to employees, and approximately 70% of the employees owned
stock. First, Long obtained objective organizational performance data through examination of
financial and other records. Second, he administered comprehensive questionnaires to all
managers and employees. He found that the majority of the employees reported increased job
effort (66.7%), job security (65.9%), communication with management (69%), and overall
job satisfaction (8 1%). The author compared the responses of stockholders to those of non-
stockholders. Employee stockholders reported significantly higher levels of overall









stockholders (see Table 4.5). In addition, the study found that employee ownership improved 
motivation for both stockholders and non-stockholders, through the operation of group 
norms. 
Table 4.6. Combined and Independent Effects of Share Ownership and Participation, Controlling for Length of 
Service 
Beta weights 
R2 Share ownership Participation 
3Øal4.7%aIntegration .24 





Source: Long, Richard J., "The Relative Effects of Share Ownership vs. Control on Job Attitudes in an 
Employee-Owned Company", Human Relations, Vol.3 1, No.9, 1978b, p.759. 
However, when Long (1978b), in the same firm, took into account length of service and 
participation in decision making, he indicated that differences in satisfaction and integration 
were not statistically significant. Using multiple and partial regression coefficients, Long 
measured combined and independent effects of the two independent variables, employee 
share ownership and employee participation, on a given set of dependent variables (see Table 
4.6). When combined, share ownership and participation contributed significantly to the 
variance in integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, and motivation. When the 
author separately measured the independent effects of share ownership and participation he 
found that participation made a significant contribution to integration, involvement, 
satisfaction, and motivation, while share ownership had significant effects on involvement 
and commitment, and positive but not quite statistically significant effects on integration and 
satisfaction. Share ownership showed an exactly zero relationship to motivation. Therefore, 
Long concluded that these results did not support the notion that share ownership and 
participation would be most effective when used together, because the study found very small 













although share ownership had beneficial effects on certain job attitudes, employee 
participation in decision making had stronger effects. 
Table 4.7. Tabular Summary of Findings 
Trucking Company Knitting Mill Furniture Firm 
Degree of employee High Moderate to low Low 
ownership 
Change in traditional Moderate Moderate to low Low 
influence relationships 
Job attitudes Considerable improvement Some improvement Little change 
Turnover Down Down Little change 
Grievance rates Down sharply N/A No decline 
Worker performance Up Up N/A 
Profitability Up sharply Up sharply Up somewhat 
Share price Up 300% Up 252% Cannot change 
N/A = Not applicable or available 
Source: Long, Richard J., " Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance Under-Employee Ownership", 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol.23, No.4, 1980, p.733. 
In another study, Long (1980) compared the trucking company to a knitting mill, located in 
the northeastern United States, and a firm manufacturing library furniture, also located in the 
northeastern United States. All three companies were relatively similar in size, employing 
about 165, 120, and 200 persons, respectively, but had quite different ownership structures. 
The trucking company was wholly employee owned (100%), the knitting mill was largely 
employee owned (70%), and the furniture firm was partly employee owned (34%). Employee 
ownership showed considerably different effects across the three firms, but in none of the 
cases did it have negative effects. The study found that job attitudes and employees' 
perceptions of influence improved most in the trucking company and least in the furniture 
firm, with the knitting mill falling in between (see Table 4.7). However, Long did not present 
a direct, quantitative comparison among the companies. 
Long (1981) found negative results in a study of an electronics firm which converted to 
partial employee ownership. In order to examine the possible effects of the introduction of 
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formal employee participation in ownership and decision making on patterns of 
organizational influence, Long administered an extensive questionnaire to all company 
employees about seven months before conversion (wave 1), about seven months after (wave 
2), and again 18 months after conversion to employee ownership (wave 3). Regarding 
participation desire, Long found that shareholders had an initial decrease in desire for 
employee participation in all three decision levels (job, departmental, and organizational 
decisions). Long concluded that either an influx of new employees had made shareholders 
more wary about employee participation in decision making, or that, as Hammer and Stern 
(1980) concluded, shareholders wanted to delegate more decision-making power to expert 
managers in order to protect their investment and increase profits. Regarding perceived 
participation, Long concluded that although some increases in employee participation in 
decision making, at all three levels, occurred right after the conversion, these increases did 
not continue, and 18 months later patterns of employee participation returned to pre-
employee purchase levels. In this same company, Long (1982) analyzed the effect of 
employee ownership on integration, job involvement, commitment, motivation, and general 
satisfaction. None of these attitudes indicated a significant change after conversion to 
employee ownership. Long also examined non-managerial employees who perceived no 
changes in participation after conversion to employee ownership by conducting a finer 
analysis, and found that the attitudes actually became more negative. After comparing 
employees making high stock purchases to comparable employees making low stock 
purchases, Long found few differences between the groups. 
Hammer and Stern (1980) conducted a study in a small, employee-owned furniture 
manufacturing firm in the US. They found that employee share ownership did not create a 
desire for participation, and that employee owners and employee non-owners largely agreed 
on the distribution of power and the degree of participation in decision making they perceived 
they had. Employee shareowners desired less personal influence on decisions and preferred to 
delegate more to management. The related study by Hammer, Landau, and Stem (1981) 
examined the effect of ownership on absenteeism in the same employee-owned 
manufacturing firm. They found that voluntary absenteeism declined after conversion to 
employee ownership, but that, contrary to expectations, involuntary absenteeism increased (p 
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<.05). In addition, the study found that job satisfaction did not have an impact on 
absenteeism. 
French and Rosenstein (1981) investigated the relationship of shareholding with financial 
information and desired influence among employees with varying degrees of control in an 
employee-owned plumbing and heating company. Their results provided little support for the 
assumption that the effects of shareholding on attitudes and behaviour are more asserted 
among employees with more authority, influence, and status in the company. These aspects of 
employee control did not affect the relationship of shareholding with general satisfaction. By 
contrast, the study data suggested that only one dimension of employee control, formal 
authority, affected the relationship of shareholding with organizational identification. But 
surprisingly and unexpectedly the relationship between ownership and organizational 
identification was stronger and more positive for lower-level employees who have lesser 
authority. The data also showed that employee status affected the relationships of 
shareholding with fmancial information, and the relations were more positive among white-
collar and blue-collar employees. The study disputed the existence of a significant 
relationship between ownership and satisfaction levels. 
Goldstein (1978) carried out a survey in a West Australian firm and compared the data 
obtained from questionnaires completed by employee shareholders with those completed by 
non-shareholders about the perceptions of all employees (shareholders and non-shareholders) 
towards aspects of their work. He found that support and satisfaction were the only two 
dimensions for which the success of shareholders was lower than that of non-shareholders, 
although the difference in both was not significant (see Table 4.8). Regarding the two other 
dimensions, 'stability' and 'career', there were no significant differences between the scores 
of shareholders and non-shareholders. Challenge, responsibility, commitment, income, 
wealth, application, and participation were the other dimensions for which the scores of 
shareholders were significantly higher than those of non-shareholders. Measuring the chi-
squares and gammas the study found that the association between share ownership and the 
dimensions of challenge, responsibility, commitment, income, wealth, application, and 
participation was strong and significant. However, for stability and career the association was 
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quite strong but not very significant, whereas for support and satisfaction the association was
weak and not significant.
Table 4.8. Mean Scores and t-Test Between Shareholders and Non-Shareholders
All Employees Shareholders Non-Shareholders
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-Value
Challenge 2.22 .76 2.42 .74 2.09 .76 -2.77t
Support 2.06 .68 2.03 .65 2.05 .70 .19
Responsibility 2.22 .70 2.42 .69 2.10 .69 -2.91t
Commitment 2.64 .55 2.78 .50 2.56 .57 -2.52
Income 2.07 .70 2.25 .70 1.97 .69 -2.44
Wealth 2.03 .68 2.24 .69 1.92 .65 -2.77t
Stability 2.39 .72 2.51 .72 2.30 .72 -1.71
Satisfaction* 1.74 .44 1.69 .47 1.77 .43 1.01
Career 2.27 .66 2.39 .61 2.20 .67 -1.92
Application 2.36 .64 2.52 .65 2.27 .62 -2.48
Participation 2.09 .82 2.30 .84 1.98 .79 -2.39
Aggregate Mean 2.29 2.40 2.19
* max. value = 2, all other max. values = 3.
t p<.Ol (two-tailed test).
p<.O5 (two-tailed test).
Source: Goldstein, S.G., "Employee Share-Ownership and Motivation", The Journal of Industrial Relations,
Vol.20, No.3, September 1978, p.321.
In addition, one of the most important findings of the Goldstein's study was that the amount
of shares employees owned had a significant impact on employees' perceptions about their
work lives. Although small shareholders and non-shareholders had almost the same
perceptions about their work lives, large shareholders were more differentiated from non-
shareholders. Large shareholders' scores for career and stability, which for all shareholders
were not significantly different, were significantly different from those of non-shareholders.
Challenge, responsibility, commitment, income, wealth, career, and application were the




	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
(see Table 4.9). However, between large and small shareholders the mean scores were not
significantly different for support, stability, satisfaction, and participation.
Table 4.9. Mean Scores and t-Test Between Small and Large Shareholders
Large Shareholderstt Small Shareholderst
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-Value
Challenge 2.70 .60 2.16 .77 3.13*
Support 2.10 .61 1.97 .70 -.79
Responsibility 2.80 .41 2.06 .72 5.03*
Commitment 3.00 0 2.57 .63 3.58*
Income 2.52 .64 2.00 .67 2.94*
Wealth 2.52 .58 1.96 .69 3.22*
Stability 2.59 .64 2.43 .79 -.85
Satisfaction 1.77 .43 1.63 .49 -1.21
Career 2.57 .57 2.22 .61 2.33**
Application 2.77 .43 2.28 .73 3.22*
Participation 2.47 .78 2.13 .89 -1.59
Small shareholders own between 10 and 200 shares. Large shareholders own between 300 and 10,00 shares.
* p<Z.005 (two-tailed test).
** p<.OS (two-tailed test).
t-test between mean scores of small shareholders and non-shareholders show no significant values.
if t-values between mean scores of large shareholders and non-shareholders have a significance of p<.005
except stability (p<.OS) and support and satisfaction (not significant).
Source: Goldstein, S.G., "Employee Share-Ownership and Motivation", The Journal of Industrial Relations,
Vol.20, No.3, September 1978, p.322.
In another study, worker-owners were compared to hired non-owner workers in the same
cooperatives and similar workers in municipal and private companies. Worker-owners
reported a better work environment and were more satisfied and committed to the company.
But, as worker-owners had tendency to allocate more difficult tasks to hired nonowner
workers, they did less work than comparable workers in other companies (Perry, 1978).
Conte and Tannenbaum (1978) (mentioned before) reported that managers, on average, felt
that their employee-ownership plans had a substantially positive effect on the attitudes of
employees.
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In a study of a community employee-owned furniture company and a knitting mill, Hammer, 
Stem, and Gurdon (1982) found that the amount of stock owned by a worker had no 
relationship to satisfaction or alienation. It had only a weak impact on job-related attitudes, 
slightly increasing perception of self-benefit, the feeling of ownership, and the sense of 
commitment to the organization. Although both employee owners and non-owner employees 
had similar feelings of control and self-benefit, employee-owners were more committed to the 
organization and less alienated than non-owners. In general, the job attitudes of owners 
differed somewhat from non-owners'; however both groups believed that management kept 
the most control and obtained the most benefit from the ownership. Although white-collar 
nonmanagerial employees had a greater sense of ownership than did blue-collar workers, they 
had lower job satisfaction. When all employees were divided in terms of hierarchical 
position, such as production workers, office workers, middle managers, and top managers, 
and compared according to their job attitudes, the results indicated that ownership had only a 
limited potential to overcome traditional occupational or class barriers. 
Sockell (1985) collected data from three employee-owned companies through surveys and 
semi-structured interviews during the summer of 1980. She found that stock ownership had 
no effect on employees' desires for influence in company decision making, perceived needs 
for a union, or willingness to strike. A survey was conducted by Michael Landon and 
presented by Copeman (1986) on behalf of the Wider Share Ownership Council in a sample 
of 192 companies, which represented a wide cross-section in terms of size and industrial 
sector. These companies operated on average two types of employee share schemes. Fifty-
one percent had profit sharing share schemes, 72% had savings-related share option schemes 
and 78% had executive share option schemes. Companies reported that the scheme increased 
employees' understanding of the company's financial position and improved the loyalty or 
enthusiasm of the workforce. Over 80% of companies with profit sharing or savings-related 
share option schemes mentioned that their schemes had showed either a small or a significant 
effect in these areas. These were the most significant effects reported by companies. A 
substantial minority (over 40% of companies with profit sharing) reported that their schemes 
had helped management in negotiations with employee representatives, facilitated 
recruitment, and reduced staff turnover. According to a higher proportion of companies, profit 
sharing schemes were more effective in all categories than savings-related schemes were. 
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Companies believed that discretionary schemes played an important part in senior employees' 
motivation and total remuneration package and helped recruitment and retention at the senior 
level. 
An interesting study was carried out by Granrose, Applebaum, and Singh (1986). They 
compared employee-owned supermarkets and conventional supermarkets, with and without a 
quality of work life (QWL) programme. The results showed that employees in the employee-
owned supermarkets regarded themselves as participating more in daily decisions and in 
long-term decisions. In the conventional supermarkets, perceptions of participation did not 
increase due to the existence of QWL programmes. In the employee-owned supermarkets, job 
and life satisfaction were higher than in those without a QWL programme, but there were no 
differences between the employee-owned and traditional firms with a QWL programme. The 
authors suggested that a combination of employee ownership plus a QWL programme would 
be the most effective situation. 
Poole and Jenkins' (1988) research was based on case studies of 22 major UK companies, but 
they reported the views of nearly 2,000 employees in 12 of these firms in their paper. Of these 
companies 17 had Inland Revenue approved profit sharing schemes, 14 had approved SAYE 
schemes, and 16 firms had approved executive share option schemes. Fourteen firms operated 
non-approved schemes which typically ran in parallel with the approved schemes. The 
adoption of schemes was related to improvements in job satisfaction and in communications 
within the company (see Table 4.10). But employees reported less improvement in work 
practices and in other modes of employee involvement. Over two-thirds of employees 
reported no change in work effort, or in the amount of productive work done after a scheme's 
introduction. However, only a minority regarded the schemes as promoting increased 
commitment or increased employee integration. 
A study by Buchko (1988) analyzed the effect of employee ownership on absenteeism and 
grievances. Buchko investigated these variables over six years in a media firm, and found that 
absenteeism did not change, but grievances increased after the adoption of employee 
ownership. Rooney (1988) conducted a survey in 61 conventional and employee-owned 




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
different areas, such as setting wages, hiring/firing, work rules, and investment decisions. The 
study found that even with majority employee ownership, most companies did not inform or 
consult employees on all 12 issues assessed, and the vast majority did not provide for a 
significant worker input into decision making. 
Table 4.10. Employees' Assessments of the Effects of Schemes on Aspects of Their Work. 
Effects of introduction of Decreased 





2 3 4 5 6 







Overall satisfaction in 
working for firm 
1 2 4 48 28 12 3 3 
Feeling ofjob security 1 2 6 72 11 5 1 3 
Effort put into work 0 0 1 67 17 8 4 3 
Amount of productive 
work done 
0 0 1 68 16 8 3 3 
Amount of effort other 
people put into jobs 
0 1 3 68 18 5 1 3 
Employees' say 
concerning jobs 
1 3 5 74 11 2 0 3 
Employees' say in 
departments 
2 3 5 75 11 2 0 3 
Employees' say in overall 
policies of firm 
2 3 5 73 10 3 1 4 
Your say in decisions 
concerning job 
2 2 4 75 11 2 1 3 
Your say in decisions 
concerning department 
2 2 4 76 10 3 1 3 
Your say in decisions 
concerning overall 
policies of firm 
2 2 3 84 5 0 0 3 
Communication between 
management and workers 
3 5 5 57 22 4 1 3 
Source: Poole, Michael, and Jenkins, Glenville, "How employees respond to profit sharing", Personnel 
Management, July 1988, p.33. 
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Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, Leopold, and Ramsay (1989) conducted various case studies in UK 
companies. They found that attitudinal differences between those participating in profit 
sharing andlor SAYE schemes and those not participating were relatively modest. In a sample 
of 52 UK engineering firms, Wilson, Cable, and Peel (1988, 1990) examined the effect of 
profit-sharing/share ownership schemes, voice mechanisms, and worker participation on the 
rate of voluntary labour turnover (quits). They found that firms that introduced profit sharing 
andlor share ownership schemes showed significantly lower quit rates. The authors also 
reported that a relatively high level of employee participation in decision making was also 
associated with lower voluntary labour turnover rates. Similarly, according to the study, 
'voice' mechanisms (through union or other channels) exerted a negative influence upon 
voluntary labour turnover. Nichols and O'Connel Davidson (1991) found negative attitudes 
relating to share ownership in their study of the recently privatized water industry. Ninety-
four percent of managers and 87% of manual workers reported that the employee share 
scheme had not eliminated 'them and us' attitudes. 
In their longitudinal case study of a Midlands manufacturing company, Dunn, Richardson, 
and Dewe (1991) examined the effects of a specific share ownership scheme, a SAYE option, 
on employee attitudes. They compared the attitudes of both joiners and non-joiners in the 
share scheme at a point just before the scheme was introduced and about a year later (see 
Table 4.11). They found no significant change in attitudes towards the firm among those who 
joined the scheme and the largest group of those who did not joint the scheme. The non-
joining group showed a generally cooler attitude towards the firm on a number of dimensions 
but its attitudes did not change substantially over the year. There was a second group of non-
joiners, who had initially been tempted but decided not to join. The last group developed 
more hostile attitudes towards the firm (see Table 4.12). The authors concluded that the 
scheme had virtually no effect on attitudes, at least not in its first year of operation. In a study 
of six organizations (of six organizations three organizations had profit sharing and/or 
employee share ownership schemes) Marchington, Wilkinson, Ackers, and Goodman (1994) 
reported that in one organization nearly all respondents indicated that employee share 
ownership had not enhanced their commitment, and in two organizations only a small 
minority (14% in one organization, and less than a third in the other organization) felt that 


















Table 4.11. Changes in Average Attitude Scores, Phase ito Phase 2, Joiners and Non-Joiners
Changes in Average Attitude Score
All Respondents Joiners Non-Joiners
I feel loyalty to the firm -0.06 0.15 -0.09
It wouldn't take much for me to leave this firm 0.05 0.29 -0.01
This firm looks after its workers well -0.03 0.27 -0.08
Things would be better here if more workers 0.29*** -0.32 _0.28***
joined the union
The firm is a fair employer 0.19** 0.42** _0.15*
Things are getting better here 0.05 0.15 0.03
The firm pays pretty well 0.16* 0.08 0.20**
= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level
Number ofjoiners = 26; number of non-joiners = 184
Source: Dunn, Stephen, Richardson, Ray, and Dewe, Philip, "The Impact of Employee Share Ownership on
Worker Attitudes: A Longitudinal Case Study", Human Resource Management Journal, Vol.1, No.3, Spring
1991, p.8.
Table 4.12. Changes in Average Attitude Scores, Phase ito Phase 2, Joiners and Two Groups of Non-Joiners
Changes in Average Attitude Score
Actual Joiners Tempted Other Non-
Joiners
I feel loyalty to the firm 0.15 0.22* -0.03
It wouldn't take much for me to leave this firm 0.29 -0.07 0.06
This firm looks after its workers well 0.27 1.28** 0.02
Things would be better here if more workers -0.32 0.30** 0.28**
joined the union
The firm is a fair employer 0.42** 0.26** -0.09
Things are getting better here 0.15 0.29** 0.20
The firm pays pretty well 0.08 _0.33** -0.14
= significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level
Number of actual joiners = 26; number of tempted = 57; number of other non-joiners = 127
Source: Dunn, Stephen, Richardson, Ray, and Dewe, Philip, "The Impact of Employee Share Ownership on
Worker Attitudes: A Longitudinal Case Study", Human Resource Management Journal, Vol.1, No.3, Spring
1991, p.9.
Oliver (1990) hypothesized that positive employee attitudes, such as commitment and
involvement, would be greater for certain types of employees in an employee-owned firm. He
analyzed the effect of employee work values, demographic characteristics, and organizational
rewards on levels of organizational commitment, involvement, identification, and loyalty in a
UK employee-owned petrochemical industry. He distributed questionnaires to all 350
employees, of which 120 were returned completed, a response rate of 36%. Work values were
significantly related to the employee attitudes, but most of the demographic variables were
unrelated (see Table 4.13 and 4.14). Salary and education made no significant contribution to
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commitment, identification, involvement, and loyalty; but tenure was significantly related to
only two cases, commitment and loyalty. Participatory values were significantly related to
commitment, identification, and involvement. Employees with strong values for participation
had more positive attitudes. Moreover, instrumental values that valued job security, income,
and work conditions were negatively and significantly related to commitment and
involvement.
Table 4.13. Correlations among Employee Characteristics and Dependent Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 -
1 Age 1.00
2 Tenure Ø59C 1.00
3 Education 0.13 0.16 1.00
4 Salary 0.40C 0.42C 0.51 C	1.00
S Task values 0.13 0.00 -0.04 0.01 1.00
6 Participatoiy 0.17 0.02 0.20b -0.12 Ø34C 1.00
values
7 Instrumental 0.2lb 0.24b ..033C 0.35c 0.42C 0.49C 1.00 -
values
8 Commitment 0.36C	0.31 C	0.07 024b 0.13 022b ..025b 1.00
9 Identification 0•27b O.23b	0.07 022b -0.04 0.02 -0.13 Ø77C 1.00
10 Involvement 0.37C 0.27b	o.17a	0.33 0.29b 024b 0.19a O.72a	Q54C 1.00
11 Loyalty 030b 0 •25b -0.12 0.11 0.04 0.15 -0.13 0,79C 0.49C 0.33C 1.00
ap< .05 bp<01 cp<001
Source: Oliver, Nick, "Work Rewards, Work Values, and Organizational Commitment in an Employee-Owned
Firm: Evidence from the U.K.", Human Relations, Vol.43, No.6, 1990, p.521.
Table 4.14. Multiple Regression Analysis
Betasa
Tenure Education Salary Task Participatory Instrumental Overall Ar2	F
values values values rewards
Commitment 025b 0.11 -0.00 0.06 0.3lC ..030b 043d 0.53d 12.27
Identificatio 0.10 -0.03 0.17 0.08 026b -0.27 030b 029d 507
n
involvement 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.21 0.31C 0.38c 0.21 0.36d 6.66
Loyalty 0•27b -0.04 0.01 -0.00 0.17 -0.10 Ø42d 033d 5.83
a Betas denote standardized regression coefficients
b ,<.05 c d p<.00i.
Source: Oliver, Nick, "Work Rewards, Work Values, and Organizational Commitment in an Employee-Owned
Firm: Evidence from the U.K.", Human Relations, Vol.43, No.6, 1990, p.523.
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Keef recently conducted two studies to investigate the effect of employee share ownership on 
employee job attitudes. In one study (1994a) he used discriminant analysis, based on selected 
job attitudes (such as commitment, motivation, integration, and job satisfaction) to generate a 
function to distinguish between employees (in a specified middle-management grade) who 
were or were not shareholders in a large leading financial institution. He then used a 
discriminant function to classify those employees who had been shareholders but who had 
subsequently sold their shares. The evidence indicated that those who had sold their shares 
('sellers') had significantly higher job attitudes than those who had never purchased shares 
('nevers'), but were only marginally, and not statistically significantly, less than those who 
are current shareholders. In another study (1998), Keef examined the causal association 
between share ownership and attitudes of New Zealand managers, using part of Long's 
(1978) theoretical framework. The results of his longitudinal study showed that the changes 
in the six attitudes, namely loyalty, involvement, identification, job satisfaction, participative 
environment, and actual participation, were independent of employee share ownership. Keef 
concluded that becoming a shareholder did not result in the expected improvement in 
attitudes compared with non-shareholders. 
Four studies examined employee job attitudes and behaviours in producer cooperatives. 
Rhodes (1978) attempted to study motivation in a cooperative and a conventional plywood 
mill in the northwestern US. She found that organizational commitment and perceived 
participation in decision making were higher among worker members in a cooperative than 
among workers in a conventional firm, and perceived participation in decision making was 
positively related to organizational commitment. The author found no empirical support for 
the hypothesis that organizational commitment is negatively related to absenteeism, tardiness, 
and accidents. Additionally, turnover and grievance rates were higher in the conventional 
firm than in the cooperative, but absenteeism, tardiness, and accidents were the same. Russell, 
Hochner, and Perry (1979) analyzed the amount of influence and job attitudes of employees 
in worker-owned refuse collection cooperatives in the San Francisco area. They compared 
worker-owners in refuse collection firms with non-shareholders in those firms, and with 
municipal and private employees performing refuse collection. The authors found that 
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worker-owners had higher levels of influence, greater identification with company goals, and 
greater job satisfaction. 
Greenberg (1980) tested the impact of ownership on attitudes in plywood cooperatives, 
comparing four cooperatives and one larger conventional plant. The author reported that 
worker-owners in cooperatives had higher levels of job satisfaction than employees in 
conventional mills did. Moreover, several measures of perceived participation were highly 
correlated (.29 to .46) with job satisfaction. Greenberg concluded that higher levels of work 
satisfaction stemmed from direct participation in enterprise governance. 
Greenberg (1986) distributed questionnaires to over 200 members of the plywood 
cooperatives in the Northwest and over 100 employees in various privately owned plywood 
companies in the same region. His study provided evidence that members of a cooperative are 
more motivated than individuals in a conventional firm. Respondents in the cooperative were 
more likely (55.9%) to respond that 'they not only do the best work they can, but they do 
whatever extra needs to be done' than were those in a conventional firm (39.7%). 
4.3. Summary and Conclusion 
The majority of previous studies reviewed here have been conducted in the United States 
(e.g., Metzger and Colletti, 1971; Kruse, 1987; Russell, 1-lochner, and Perry, 1977; Marsh and 
McAllister, 1981; Shepard, 1986; Florkowski, 1989; Long, 1978; Hammer and Stern, 1980; 
Toscano and Grady, 1982; Best, 1961), and the United Kingdom (e.g., Dunn, Richardson, and 
Dewe, 1991; Wilson, Cable, and Peel, 1988, 1990; Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, Leopold, and 
Ramsay, 1989; Poole and Jenkins, 1988; Wilkinson et al., 1994; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986, 1987; Hanson and Watson, 1990; Cottham, 1991; 
Pendleton, Wilson, and Wright, 1998), but also included were studies from Australia (e.g., 
Goldstein, 1978), Germany (e.g., Cable, 1986; Cable and Fitzroy, 1980), Canada (e.g., 
Nightingale, 1980), France (e.g., Estrin and Jones, 1988), Sweden (e.g., Lee, 1988), Japan 
(e.g., Jones and Kato, 1992; Freeman and Weitzman, 1987) and New Zealand (e.g., Keef, 
1994a, 1998). Therefore, the results of the studies may have been influenced by the 
differences in the political, economic, legal, and cultural contexts of the countries. 
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The previous studies reviewed here also used different research designs, types of measures, 
and variables. A number of studies compared sets of companies that have the schemes, 
including profit sharing, ESOPs, and other forms of employee ownership schemes, with 
companies that do not have them, using either a matched design (e.g., Rosen and Quarrey, 
1987; Hamilton, 1983; GAO, 1987; Livingston and Henry, 1980; Brooks et al., 1984) or a 
non-matched design (e.g., Trachman, 1985, Estrin and Wilson, 1986; Bloom, 1985; Bell and 
Hanson, 1987; Granrose et al., 1986; Greenberg, 1980, 1986). Some studies conducted a 
'before and after analysis' (e.g., Cottham, 1991; Hanson and Watson, 1990). Others have 
examined the effects of the schemes in either sets of companies with such schemes (e.g., 
Nightingale, 1980; Bell and Hanson, 1984, 1987; Long, 1980; Sockell, 1985) or single 
companies that have some employees that participate in such schemes and some employees 
do not (e.g., Hammer and Stern, 1980; Long, 1978a; Goldstein, 1978; Dunn et al., 1991). 
They obtained data from company accounts (e.g., Cottham, 1991; Long, 1978a), survey 
questionnaires of individual attitudes (e.g., Toscano and Grady, 1982; Rosen, Klein and 
Young, 1986; Bell and Hanson, 1984, 1987; Long, 1978a, 1981; Goldstein, 1978; Oliver, 
1990; Greenberg, 1986), and existent survey data (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 1987; 
Hanson and Watson, 1990; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995). 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 summarize the main findings of this chapter. The studies included in 
Table 4.15 are those which analyse the effects of profit sharing, ESOPs, and other forms of 
employee ownership schemes on productivity, profitability, employment levels and growth, 
sales growth, and overall company performance. A total of 32 studies examined the effects of 
such schemes on productivity. Twenty-seven of the studies provided a strong indication that 
the schemes and productivity are positively related. However, one study, by Berman and 
Berman (1989), found the possibility of lower productivity in the cooperative; three studies, 
by Florkowski (1989), Cable and Fitzroy (1980) and Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996), reported 
mixed results; and only one study, by Lee (1988), found no clear effect of employee 
ownership on productivity. 
A total of 19 studies analyzed the effects of such schemes on profitability. Fourteen of the 
studies exhibited a positive relation, while three studies found a negative, and one study, by 
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Bloom (1985), a mixed result. Only one study, by Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohman (1984), 
did not report a profitability effect of the schemes. Fifteen out of 20 studies reported a 
positive effect of the schemes on companies' performance. None of the studies showed a 
negative effect, but four studies (Sockell, 1985; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1986, 1987; Blasi, 
Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Long, 1994) found no effect of the schemes on performance. 
Sockell's (1985) study, for instance, concluded that performance benefits of employee 
ownership are not always enduring. Blanchflower and Oswald (1986, 1987) found no 
significant effect of the schemes on a company's investment behaviour. Two studies (Blasi, 
Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Long, 1994) also found no automatic connection between the 
schemes and company performance. Only one study (Trachman, 1985) found a mixed result. 
A great majority of the studies found that the schemes do have beneficial employment effects. 
Compared to the companies without schemes, or to the industry average, 12 out of 14 studies 
reported that employment levels and growth were higher in companies with the schemes. 
None of the studies reported a negative result, but one study, by Bloom (1985), found a 
mixed result. Blanchflower and Oswald (1986, 1987) found no significant effect on 
employment. All studies that examined the effect of the schemes on sales reported an 
improvement in sales growth. 
In Table 4.16 the results of the studies of attitudinal and behavioural change under the 
schemes are summarized. The majority of the studies provide evidence that the schemes have 
a positive effect on such variables as motivation (nine out of 10 studies), satisfaction (13 out 
of 19 studies), commitment (16 out of 18 studies), integration (five out of six studies), 
involvement (four out of six studies), and morale (four out of four studies). Some studies 
reported a reduction in turnover (10 out of 11 studies), absenteeism (three out of six studies), 
quit rates (three out of three studies), and grievances (two out of three studies). However, 
only French and Rosenstein's (1982) study found a negative effect on job satisfaction, and 
Cable's (1986) study did not report a reduction in turnover. Remaining studies reported either 
mixed results (three studies for satisfaction, and one study for absenteeism) or no effect, such 
as Long's studies in 1981 and 1982 on motivation, satisfaction, commitment, integration and 
involvement; Bucho's (1988) and Rhode's (1978) studies on absenteeism; Marchington, 
Wilkinson, Ackers, and Goodman's (1994) study on commitment; and Keefs (1998) study 
on job satisfaction, involvement, and loyalty. 
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It is not possible to expect profit sharing, ESOPs, and other forms of employee share schemes 
to be a magic ingredient for success. The studies showed that there is a wide range of possible 
consequences, and their findings as a whole are unclear. A number of studies reviewed have 
reported positive findings. However, other studies suggest that such schemes have no effect 
or a negative effect. A few studies also cast doubt on the relationship between employee 
ownership and the desire to participate in decision making (e.g., Long, 1979, 1981; Hammer 
and Stem, 1980). But it is difficult to argue that such schemes do not have a positive effect on 
employee job attitudes and behaviours and on organizational performance. Although the 
findings are mixed, it appears that such schemes can (but do not always) have a positive 
effect on organizational productivity, profitability, and overall performance, and on employee 
job attitudes and behaviours in different countries and cultural systems, at different times in 
history and economic growth cycles. It is not clear, however, how much of any change is due 
to the schemes' adoption. Jenkins and Poole (1990) stated that" in particular, we believe that 
the observed improvement in performance may be a reflection of generally good corporate 
management and industrial-relations practices. That is, profit-sharing may be merely one 
element of an integrated business strategy which leads to improved performance, rather than 
profit-sharing possessing any causal influence on its own" (b.180). Therefore, the findings of 
studies reviewed here do not indicate that the schemes on their own are a major cause of 
favourable changes in the attitudes and behaviours of employees, or in company performance. 
Most of the previous studies were conducted on small and medium-sized companies. Thus, it 
is not clear whether or not the schemes would have the same effects in larger organizations 
that distribute their shares to a great number of people. This is the focus of this research, 
which contributes to the literature by filling this gap. 
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Table 4.15. Summary of the Findings of the Previous Studies that Examined the Economic Effect of Financial
ParticipationSchemes ________________ _______ ______ ______ ______
Authors Sample Comparison Prodc. Proft. Empi. Sales Overall
_____________________ ____________________ _________________ _______ ______ ______ ______ perf.
Rosen & Klein (1983) Employee owned Conventional firms +
__________________________ flrms(a) _____________________ _________ ________ _______ _______ __________
Rosen & Klein (1984) EO companies Non-EO companies _______ ______ +(b) ______ ________
Metzger & Colletti PS firms Non-PS firms +
(1971) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Estrin&Wilson(1986) PSfirm Non-PSfirms + + +
Bradley & Estrin (1987) PS firm _________________ ______ +
Kruse (1987) PS firms Nation-wide level _______ ______ +(c) ______ ________
Freeman & Weitzman +(d)
(1987) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Cohen & Quarrey (1986) ESOP Industry average _______ ______ +
Rosen & Quarrey (1987) ESOP firm Non-ESOP firms +" +"
Jochim (1982) ESOP +
NCEO (1985) ESOP Matched firms _______ ______ _____ _____ +
Cohen (1985) ESOP Non-ESOP _______ ______ +
GAO(l987) ESOP Matchedfirms +' +
Cottham (1991) ESOP Before and after +
Conte & Tannenbaum ESOP Non-ESOP +(SH)
(1978) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ ______ ______ ________
The Senate Finance ESOP All US companies + ± +
Committe(1979) ____________________ as a whole _______ ______ ______ ______ ________
Livingston & Henry Stock purchase plans Matched firms
(1980), Brooks et al.,
(1982) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Hamilton (1983) ESOP Non-ESOP +' +
Bloom (1985) ESOP Non-ESOP Mixed
_____________________ ____________________ _________________ _______ -(SS) ______ ______ ________
ESOP Association, 1982, ESOP (A) +
83, 84, 85 ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Russel, Hochner & Perry Employee-owned Non-employee +
(1977) ____________________ owned _______ ______ ______ ______ ________
Marsh & McAllister ESOP Industry average +
(1981) ____________________ _________________ _______ ______ -______ ______ ________
Jones & Kato (1982) ESOP Non-ESOP +
Kruse( 1 992) Some ESOP _________________ _______ ______ ______ ______ ________
Jehring & Metzger PS +
(1960) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ ______ ______ ________
Metzger & Colletti PS Non-PS firms + +
(1971) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ ______ ______ ________
Metzger (1975) PS Non-PS +
Howard& Dietz PS Non-PS ______ _____ _____ _____ +
Howard(1979) PS Non-PS _______ ______ ______ ______ +(ND)
Hanson & Watson (1990) PS Non-PS + +(SS)
Before and after + +
Fitzroy & Kraft (1986) PS (profit sharers) Non-profit sharers _______ +(SE) ______ ______ ________
Bell & Hanson (1987) PS Non-PS +
Metzger(1966) PS (B) __________________ +
Fitzroy & Kraft (1986, PS Non-PS +
87a, 87b) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Rutgers University, PS Non-PS +
Institute of Management
and Labor Relations,
(1988) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Shepard (1986) PS Non-PS +
O'Dell & McAdams PS (C) + +
(1987) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _________
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Table4.15. (continued) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Authors Sample Comparison Prodc. Proft. Empi. Sales Overall
_______________________ ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ perf.
Florkowski (1989) PS Mixed
________________ _______________ _____________ (D) _____ _____ ____ ______
Kruse (1988) PS +
Cable & Fitzroy (1980) PA and WO 0 (e)
_____________________ Participation __________________ + (f) _______ _______ ______ ________
Wagner (1984) EO Non-EQ firms + +
Trachman (1985) EO Non-EQ firms ________ ______ ______ ______ Mixed
Blanchflower & Oswald (g) +***
(1988) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Zwerdling (1980) EO in employee owned + +
____________________ company _________________ ________ ______ ______ ______ ________
Long (1980) EO in employee owned +
________________________ companies ____________________ _________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Sockell (1985) EQ in employee owned 0 (h)
_______________________ companies ___________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ _________
Granrose, Applebaum, & Employee owned Non-employee +
Singh (1986) supermarkets owned supermarkets ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Conte & Tannenbaum EQ Industry average +***
(1978) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Bhagat, et a!. (1984) EQ companies Non-EQ companies ________ -
Tannenbaum et al. (1984) EO companies Non-EO companies ________ 0 ______ ______ ________
Brooks et al. (1984) ESPs Matched firms -
Blanchflower & Oswald Employee share 0 0 (i)
(1986, 87) ownership schemes __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Conte & Tannenbaum EO (E) + +
(1978), Conte et al.
(1981) ______________________ ___________________ ________ _______ _______ _______ ________
The New York Stock Stock purchase plans +
Exchange(1982) (F) _________________ ________ ______ ______ ______ ________
Estrin & Jones (1988) EQ in producer +(SS)
________________________ cooperatives ____________________ _________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Lee (1988) EQ in employee owned Conventional 0 (j)
_______________________ companies companies(non-EO) ________ _______ _______ _______ ________
Berman & Berman Worker owned Conventional - (k)
(1989) companies plywood companies ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Fernie & Metchalf (1995) 1 + +
Blasi, Conte, & Kruse EQ firms Non-EQ firms Mixed +
(1996) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Barlett, Cable, Estrin, EO firms Non-EQ firms +
Jones, & Smith (1992) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Craig & Pencavel (1995) EQ firms Non-EQ firms +
Shepard (1994) PS - +
Estrin, Perotin, PS firms Non-PS firms +
Robinson, & Wilson
(1997) _____________________ __________________ ________ _______ _______ ______ ________
Blasi, Conte, & Kruse EQ firms Non-EO firms 0(m)
(1996) ____________________ _________________ ________ ______ ______ ______ ________
Jones & Kato (1995) ESOP firms Non-ESQP firms +
Kumbhakar & Dunbar ESOP - +
(1993) _______________________ ____________________ _________ _______ _______ _______ _________
Long (1994) PS - 0
Huang (1997) PS - +
Bhargava (1994) PS - +





a: Both ESOP and other kinds of employee owned companies. 
b: A strong positive correlation between employment growth and the degree to which the firms shared ownership with 
employees. 
C: Profit sharing stabilizes employment. 
d: Employment grew when profit sharing was used more broadly. 
e: When the data were analyzed as a whole, they did not indicate the impact of capital ownership on productivity (PS and 
WO= 0). 
f: When the data were separated, based on the degree of participation, the highly participatory companies showed a 
positive and significant correlation with productivity. 
g: How the financial performance of companies was related to the three types of employee share schemes, including share 
ownership, cash profit sharing, and value-added bonus. 
h: Performance benefits of employee ownership are not always enduring. 
i: Employee share ownership schemes had no significant effect on a company's investment behaviour. 
j: No clear effect of employee ownership on productivity. 
k: Possibility of lower productivity in the cooperative. 
1: PS, employee share ownership schemes, and merit pay (each have a positive link with productivity level and the change 
in employment). 
m: No automatic connection between employee ownership and corporate performance, but where differences did exist, 
employee ownership firms had better performance than non-employee ownership firms. 
A: The results of the surveys were based on the data obtained from subjective reports by the managers of ESOP firms. 
B: Based on respondents' views. 
C: Based on respondents' views. 
D: The introduction of profit sharing coexisted with productivity improvement in one company, and decreased productivity 
in another. It had no effect in a third company. 
E: Based on respondents' views. 
F: Based on respondents' views. 
* :Significant)y greater 
** :Little effect 
Not statistically significant 
SH: Slightly higher SE: Strong effect 0: No difference or no effect 
SS: Statistically significant WO: Worker ownership ESPs: Employee stock benefit plans 
PS: Profit Sharing EO: Employee ownership ESOP: Employee stock ownership plans 
Mixed: Both positive and negative findings 
188 
	




























+ C.) + + 
I-









++ • • + + 




- , E E 
CC — 
V C.? C) t 
CID 00CD 2 
- E rr 
V 0 00 0 




C) C) CO 0) 
0, 0.0, 0,0..00 0 000 00 00 
C.# C.ID C, 00 iD V rID 0 CI) rID CI) CI) CI) CI) Cl) CI) CI) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) 0 












	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	






	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	




	 	 	 		 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	
	
	






	 	 		 	




	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	




	 	 		 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
I : : I
.
I : : - +
I I
o i I I
I : I :
C) i p p p p
Cl2 I I I S I
.o :
I : : : :
I I I S
I :
I I : +
. : : I
° : :
: : * * 1
- 1+1 + 1+ 1+ 1
bt
1 1* 1
1* • * * 5* 5
- :i.: + :-i- 1+ 1 +
E
E 1 1 1
o 1 * I * *
:+: + : 1-4- 1+0 + + +
- S S S S S *
1 * 1 * i4 : :
- + 1+1 + 1+ 1+ 1+o + + +
I 1





) ) . 0 E -0 CO I.-. C) CO&CCn C)
0. C): -.
E U S C)0 0 C) U o C)0 C) Q..9 0.C) CoC)Q.°0 .i..0
0 C)
>s 0
CO CC C) C) C) Co I..
0. 0. CO
° S EC)0.
. . >.I .
.9 . 0 0.
C) 0. C) ..-
a 0 0 5
0 C) C) > C)C)
CC
>.. 0 0 C)0_ <C)
ID 0 0 Q
0. 0. > > > . 0.
S S CC v .2
C) C) 0. 0. 0. oO 0. . .2 E C)
0 0 5 E .5 E C)
CC CC COO 0 U U >--o >00.0 CO
.5 • .9 • . .
o o o a a o
LL IC) ID.IC)L
00
0 0.00 ,-. C"
.0 I C\ 00C) -E oo -
c:0 C)0 Co - 00'-i	0000
I-.' _ S oa•a_ .9
0 .0 • - C) 0. 00 - 0
'.th Cl) Q<oo
- C\ C' C' C s - ' C) -
-< - , C)l) cJ o'-
C
.0 = S000000b 0 Q-.
CO 0 0 0 CCC'o0-.E o o-











	 	 		 	 	

































+ + + ++ + C 
0 
+ + + 
- )0= - 0._O 








































































































. .9 C) 








9 .5 >. 
.2 - ... 
o .00)0 













.9 • E 
C_C2 
o 
C. >•C - - E 
0000C)00) 
- U . 
0 
C)











I- — C) - -0) o C) 
C














•0 -0 tI' 





S —C C) 00 _
>C) C) 
C)
•C)C) ,, CC C) 
. 




C .9 C. 
0 
— 0 C) 0































c0.r Q•0 . * * * © 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE 
SHARE OWNERSHIP IN UK ORGANIZATIONS 
There are four sub-categories of share ownership in the UK: approved profit sharing, save-as-
you-earn (SAYE), discretionary (executive) share option schemes, and employee share 
ownership plans (ESOPs) (Wilkinson, Marchington, Ackers, and Goodman, 1994). As the 
aim of the research is to analyse the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes on employee motivation, in this chapter the concept and practice of profit sharing 
(including four types of profit sharing, namely, cash, share, approved deferred share trust, and 
mixed schemes) and employee share ownership will be reviewed. 
5.1. Profit Sharing (PS) 
The distinctive element of a genuine profit sharing plan is its being based on profits (Engen, 
1967). This concept does not underlie most employee benefit plans, such as savings plans, 
stock purchase plans, individual or group incentive plans, or the conventional pension plan 
offering pre-determined benefits regardless of profits (Engen, 1967). 
The International Congress on Profit-Sharing held in Paris in 1889 accepted that the term 
'profit sharing' should apply "to those cases in which an employer agrees with his employees 
that they shall receive, in partial remuneration of their labour, and in addition to their wages, 
a share, fixed beforehand, in the profits realised by the undertaking to which the profit-
sharing scheme relates" (cited in Hanson, 1965, p.331). This definition has served as a guide 
for the development of later definitions. Later definitions did not vary in principle but varied 
in scope. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) carried out the first comprehensive study of 
this subject in 1916 and used a more flexible approach. It said that "profit sharing is an 
agreement or understanding between an employer and his employees under which a fixed 
proportion (to be definitely determined in advance) of the earnings of an enterprise is 
distributed to at least one-third of the total number employed" (cited in Engen, 1967, p.1). In 
the 1 960s, the Council of Profit Sharing Industries used a still more flexible approach. It 
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defined profit sharing as "any procedure under which an employer pays or makes available to 
regular employees subject to reasonable eligibility rules, in addition to prevailing rates of pay, 
special current or deferred sums based on the profits of the business" (cited in Engen, 1967, 
p.1). 
Nightingale and Long (1984) defined profit sharing as "any arrangement whereby an 
employer shares with a designated group of employees a portion of the profits derived from 
the business" (p.7). Hume (1995) regarded profit sharing as "a system of PRR [Performance 
Related Remuneration] where the employer gives to employees, in addition to their normal 
remuneration, a proportion of the pre-tax profits of the organization" (p.190). Molander 
(1989) stated that "profit sharing is a way of providing an additional bonus, related to profit, 
over and above established wages and salaries. While this bonus will rise or fall in 
accordance with profit levels, rates of pay will remain the same" (p.85). 
In terms of these definitions, a profit sharing scheme must have four main features: there 
must be agreement between employer and employees; employees must receive their shares in 
addition to their wages or salaries; the share must be fixed beforehand; and the employees' 
shares must be related to profits. The term 'profit-sharing' is generally taken to refer to 
definite systems under which employees regularly get in addition to their wages or salaries a 
share on some pre-determined basis of the profits of the organization (Ibbetson and 
Whitmore, 1977). Under the plans, employees receive a bonus which is normally based on 
some percentage of company profits, or profits beyond some fixed minimum (Strauss, 1990). 
Organizations introduce profit sharing schemes as a means of indicating to their employees 
that their contributions to the business are valued and valuable. 
5.1.1. Forms of Profit Sharing 
Profit sharing schemes can take the form of cash, shares, approved deferred share trust 
(ADST) or approved profit sharing, and mixed schemes (Smith, 1990; Armstrong and Murlis, 
1994; Hume, 1995). 
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Cash Schemes 
Cash schemes are the simplest method of distributing profits to employees. Under this 
system, a proportion of profit is set aside and paid in cash direct to employees. In most cash 
schemes all employees except directors are eligible (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994). At James 
Beattie, 10% of net profit is set aside for distribution, "with individual entitlement based on 
years of service" (Smith, 1990, p.149). In British Airways, employees receive one week's pay 
for every £50 million operating surplus above £150 million. 
There are three basic methods of calculating profit shares. First, a predetermined formula can 
be used for distributing a fixed percentage of profits. Second, the company's board can decide 
the amount to be distributed without the use of any predetermined or published formula. The 
third method is a combination of the first and second methods. 
There are four ways of distributing profit shares in cash schemes Profits are distributed: (a) as 
a percentage of basic pay with no increments for service, (b) as a percentage of earnings with 
payments related to length of service, (c) in proportion to pay and some measure of individual 
performance, (d) as a fixed sum irrespective of earnings or service (Armstrong and Murlis, 
1994). The payments made to employees are subject to PAYE income tax and National 
Insurance deductions (Smith, 1990; Hume, 1995). 
For instance, in the UK, Norwich Union, Sun Life Assurance, and Thomas Cook operate cash 
schemes (IDS Study, 583, 1995). In Thomas Cook, there are three eligibility criteria. First, 
employees must be permanent. Employees on temporary contracts are excluded from the 
scheme if they have not worked throughout the fmancial year. Second, employees must have 
received at least a 'standard' performance rating. However, if employees have received a 
lower performance rating, they may receive a profit share payment when their performance 
has improved over a period of months. Finally, employees must be in their post at payment 
date if they have not left due to normal retirement or redundancy. In 1995, there were 7,500 
eligible employees in the organization. Employee share is calculated as a percentage of salary 
as at 31 December (IDS Study, 583, 1995). 
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Share Schemes 
Instead of employees receiving a cash bonus, the total amount of profits set aside is used to 
buy shares in the company, which are then distributed to employees. Again employees are 
linked for PAYE income tax and National Insurance contributions on the value of the shares 
(Smith, 1990; Hume, 1995). Under the schemes if employees prefer to receive cash, they may 
sell their shares straightaway. 
Approved Deferred Share Trust (ADST) or Approved Profit Sharing Schemes 
These schemes were initially set up under the terms of the 1978 Finance Act and subsequent 
amendments, and are subject to Inland Revenue approval (Marchington, 1987; Peny and 
Kegley, 1990; Smith, 1990; Torrington and Hall, 1991; Hume, 1995). The schemes provide 
income tax concessions to employee participants, and must be approved by the Inland 
Revenue (Baddon et al., 1989; Perry and Kegley, 1990; Smith, 1993; Hume, 1995; IDS 
Study, 583, 1995). 
Under the schemes, the company allocates periodically a proportion of profit to a trust fund 
which acquires shares, by subscription or purchase, on behalf of the employees, and then 
allocates them, free of charge, to designated employees (Vemon-Harcourt and Shoebridge, 
1987; Roots, 1988; Torrington and Hall, 1991; Miliward, Stevens, Smart, and Hawes, 1992, 
Hume, 1995). Individuals do not actually receive the shares for two years (Baddon, et al., 
1989) and the shares are held by the trustees on the employees' behalf (Storey, 1993) for a 
certain period (Marchington, 1987) to avoid income tax. The trust normally holds shares for 
five years and then distributes them to employees (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1987). 
Outline of the scheme: a) The trust: An approved profit-sharing scheme must be established 
under a trust, and trustees must be appointed to run it (IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study, 468, 
1990; IDS Study, 641, 1998). "Shares are set aside, or appropriated, on an employee's behalf 
and are held by a trust for a minimum of two years" (IDS Study 641, 1998, p.4). The trustees 
must be resident in the United Kingdom and obtain shares with the money from participating 
companies (Vernon-Harcourt and Shoebridge, 1987). If there is a group of companies, a 
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single scheme may be set up by the controlling company to cover all of the employees in the 
group. 
The company must make cash payments to the trustees, who must use the money to purchase 
shares on behalf of employees. The shares are held by the trustees, but are set aside for 
named, individual employees taking part in the scheme (IDS Study, 468, 1990; Armstrong 
and Murlis, 1994; IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
b) Number of shares: The value of the shares set aside for any employee in any one tax year 
must not be greater than a certain limit (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994). Under an approved 
scheme, an employer may set aside shares for an employee up to an annual maximum value 
(currently £3,000) or, if greater, 10% of the employee's salary, subject to a ceiling (currently 
£8,000) in any one tax year (Inland Revenue, JR 96, 1996; IDS Study 641, 1998). This does 
not mean that employees with a 'salary' of less than £30,000 must receive shares to a value of 
£3,000; it means that this is their maximum entitlement. 
c) Income tax advantages: If employees receive share from their employer, they are normally 
liable to pay income tax as they would be liable to pay tax on the value of a cash bonus (IDS 
Study, 583, 1995). However, a participant in an approved profit sharing schemes is not liable 
to any income tax on the value of the shares at the time they are appropriated (Inland 
Revenue, 1R96, 1996) nor is he or she liable to income tax when the shares are sold, 
"provided that they are not sold for at least three years" (IDS Study, 641, 1998, p.4.). 
Employees who participate in profit sharing schemes which have been approved by the Board 
of Inland Revenue must agree to their shares remaining with the trustees for a minimum 
period of two years - "described in the legislation as the period of retention" (Inland Revenue, 
JR 96, 1996, p.1). During the two-year period of retention employee participants cannot 
normally sell their shares (except in the case of retirement, redundancy, injury and death) 
(IDS Study, 468, 1990). However, if they sell their shares after the period of retention, they 
may be liable to income tax on the proceeds depending on when shares are sold. If the shares 
are held for over three years, employees do not pay any tax (IDS Study, 641, 1998). If the 
shares are sold after two years, and before three years (IDS Study, 641, 1998) "tax is payable 
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on either their value at the date they were set aside, or on the proceeds of the sale, whichever 
is lower" (Armstrong and Murlis, 1994, p.344). The qualifying period for gaining tax relief 
was reduced from five to three years by the 1996 Finance Act. 
The shares may be sold immediately irrespective of the length of time they were held, when a 
participant retires, becomes disabled, or is laid off. "If such disposals of shares take place 
before the third anniversary of the date of appropriation of the shares, tax is charged on 50% 
of the original value of the shares (or of the sale proceeds if smaller)" (Inland Revenue, JR 96, 
1996, p.2). If the shares are disposed of three years or more after the date of appropriation, 
there is no liability to income tax at all on the disposal. If an employee leaves the scheme for 
any other reason, the shares cannot be sold during the period of retention (the first two years) 
(IDS Study 583, 1995). However, the employee can choose to leave his or her shares in the 
scheme. If an employee participant dies, his or her shares may be sold with "the proceeds 
going to the estate" (IDS Study, 583, 1995, p.9). Income tax is not charged in this situation no 
matter how long the shares have been held. 
Although the shares are held by trustees, employees receive the dividend payments, which are 
taxed in the usual way. When the bonus is paid in cash rather than shares, it will be subject to 
both income tax and national insurance (IDS Study 641, 1998). Under these schemes, 
however, shares do not attract NICs (National Insurance Contributions) at any time, even 
when they are sold. When an employee sells his shares, he may be liable to capital gains tax. 
The capital gain or loss will be "the difference between the net sale proceeds and the market 
value at the date of appropriation" (Inland Revenue, JR 96, 1996, p.61). But tax will not be 
payable if the employee's net capital gains in any year does not exceed the exempt amount 
for that year (IDS Study, 306, 1984). For 1997-98 the exempt amount was £6,500 (IDS Study 
641, 1998). 
d) Eligibility: To gain approval, the scheme has to be open to all employees with at least five 
years' service. Until the 1995 Finance Act, part-time employees who are working fewer than 
25 hours a week could be excluded from profit-sharing schemes. Now, all employees of the 
participating companies who have been employed for at least five years must be entitled to 
participate in the scheme. An employer is free to let employees with fewer than five years' 
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service participate (IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study 641, 1998). The Involvement and 
Participation (IPA) survey in 1989 reported that under 10% of companies with approved 
profit sharing schemes and savings related share option schemes operated a five-year limit, 
whereas around three-quarters of companies had a qualifying period of two years or under 
(Smith, 1993). The service requirement is, for example, four months at BAT, while at 
Railtrack, Severn Trent, and Barclays Bank employees become eligible after six months' 
service (IDS Study 641, 1998). 
All employees within a scheme must participate on 'similar terms' (IDS Study, 397, 1987; 
IDS Study 641, 1998). This does not, however, mean that every participant must be allocated 
the same number of shares. According to the Inland Revenue guidance: "a company may take 
into account the level of a participant's remuneration, length of service, or similar factors. 
The appropriation of shares must, however, be made against objective factual criteria, clearly 
and unambiguously set out in the scheme rules and leaving no room for discretion" (cited in 
IDS Study, 641, 1998, p. 5). The scheme must not exclude, discourage, or favour particular 
employees or certain groups of employees (IDS Study, 468, 1990). A scheme will not obtain 
approval where it has features that will discourage employees from participating, or that will 
benefit higher-paid employees or directors (IDS Study, 583, 1995). 
e) A tax advantage for the company: Approved profit sharing arrangements are grouped as a 
business expense for the purpose of corporation tax (IDS Study, 641, 1998). As shares for 
employees are bought by the trustees with money provided by the employers, the expense is 
deductible from the company's taxable profits. Further, the money may flow back to the 
company if it issues new shares to the trustees. 
Mixed Schemes 
In a mixed scheme, the employee has a choice of whether to take the proportion of profit 
allocated to him or her as cash or as shares, or as cash or ADST, or as part cash and part 
shares (Smith, 1990; Hume, 1995). Under mixed profit sharing schemes, organizations 
operate two different types of scheme under one umbrella: this is generally an approved 
deferred share trust (ADST) scheme plus a cash scheme. In some organizations, the employee 
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has a choice between taking the ADST bonus in cash or shares. If he or she chooses cash 
when taking the ADST bonus, he or she will be liable to PAYE and National Insurance 
contributions. However, if the employee chooses to take the ADST bonus in shares, he or she 
will benefit from tax relief as for the ADST scheme (Baddon et al., 1987). For instance, in the 
UK the Bank of Scotland, National Westminster Bank, and Royal Insurance operate approved 
profit sharing schemes but with the option to take cash or a combination of cash and shares. 
Sainsbury's operates an approved profit sharing scheme but with the entitlement to take the 
bonus in shares, cash, or a combination of both. Some organizations, such as Barclays Bank, 
British Airways, and TSB Bank, operate approved schemes but with the option to take cash 
instead of shares. 
5.1.2. The Schemes in Practice 
In the Bank of Scotland, employees with six months' continuous service are entitled to 
participate in the scheme. In 1995, there were 14,460 eligible employees in the organization. 
In June 1997, 15% of annual basic salary was paid (IDS Study, 641, 1998). In the National 
Westminster Bank, all staff who are in their posts for the entire period between advance 
payment dates, usually March each year, are entitled to join in the scheme. Employee share is 
calculated as a percentage of salary, and the March 1995 payout was seven percent of salary. 
In March 1997, 2.88% of salary was paid as shares, or 2.4% as cash (IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
In Royal Insurance, all staff working at least 10 hours a week and with one year's continuous 
service in the previous calendar year are eligible. In 1995, there were about 5,800 eligible 
employees. Employee share is calculated as a proportion of salary. In June 1994, a profit 
sharing bonus of 8.5% of salary was paid. In Sainsbury's, all staff who have worked in their 
posts for a full financial year and are still working at the allotment date are eligible. In 1995, 
there were 87,000 eligible employees. Employee share is calculated as a proportion of salary, 
subject to service. For staff with three years' service or more the profit sharing percentage is 
applied to full pay; to staff with two years' service it is applied to three quarters of pay; to 
staff with one year's service it is applied to half of the employee's pay. In Barclays Bank, 
employees with six months' service at the end of the scheme year (31 December) are eligible. 
In 1997, there were around 65,000 eligible employees (IDS Study, 641, 1998). Employee 
share is calculated as a proportion of basic salary as at 31 December. In March 1995, a profit 
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sharing bonus of 7.5% of basic salary was paid from a pooi of £76.5m. (IDS, Study, 583, 
1995). In March 1997, nine percent of basic salary was paid (IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
How companies determine the profit sharing pooi in practice: The size of the profit pooi 
which is distributed to employees can depend on a stated formula or may have less specific 
criteria (IDS Study, 641, 1998). The amount of payments made to the pool, if any, will often 
be at the board's discretion. 
Some companies decide a percentage of profits which will be paid to employees. At Barclays 
Bank, for example, five percent of group profits make up the profit sharing pool. 
Telecommunications giant BT announced in advance that a budget worth two percent of pre-
tax profits would be allocated for distribution of free shares to all staff in 1997 (IRS 
Employment Review, 652, 1998). BAT employs an 'umbrella' profit sharing scheme in 
which there are sub-schemes for the subsidiary operating companies. The maximum value of 
its profit sharing pooi is five percent of profits. 
Some employers only pay into the profit sharing pooi when a certain percentage payout is 
triggered by the attainment of a set profit level. At the Co-op Bank, for instance, five percent 
of pre-tax profits will be distributed providing the return on shareholders' funds is at least 
15%. At NetWest, the trigger for the group-wide scheme is profits of £600 million or more. 
After this a sum equal to three percent of the profit up to £1,200 million is paid and five 
percent of any profits above that level (IDS Study, 641, 1998). By contrast, the new scheme 
at British Aerospace requires the board to make an annual decision on the proportion of profit 
to be transferred into the profit sharing scheme, following the announcement of results (IRS 
Employment Review, 652, 1998). 
After the set profit level is triggered there is often a scaled increase in the distribution. IDS 
Study 641 reported that "at the Bank of Scotland, a return on proprietors' funds of at least 
12% triggers a minimum profit share of two percent, with scaled increases to a maximum 
profit share of six percent from a return of 30% or more. At Thames Water, the target is a 
profit of £325 million. For every two percent by which the target is exceeded, an amount 
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equal to one percent of the basic pay bill is allocated, with a maximum allocation of five 
percent" (p.7). 
The size of the profit sharing pooi at HP Bulmer is calculated according to a formula decided 
each year by the Holdings Board. "The formula calculates the pool as a percentage of pre-tax 
profits with the scaled percentages triggered once the current year's pre-tax profits exceed the 
previous year's pre-tax profits. In 1997/1998, the maximum profit share is five percent once 
the current year's profits are 115 percent of the previous year" (IDS Study, 641, 1998, p.7). 
How is the profit sharing pooi distributed? Once the size of the profit sharing pooi has 
been determined, the next issue is how to distribute the money to employee participants. 
There are two main ways an employee's share of the profit pooi is decided: as a percentage of 
salary or as a fixed sum (IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
A profit sharing scheme may calculate the employee's share according to salary. This is 
normally paid as a percentage of basic salary, as at the Bank of Scotland, Tesco, and 
Barclays. The employee share, however, may be a percentage of basic salary and shift pay 
over the previous 12 months, as at Eurotunnel. 
A profit sharing scheme, however, may pay a fixed sum to all employee participants 
regardless of salary or grade. At British Aerospace, for example, all employees received an 
equal allocation of shares. At Railtrack, a fixed sum, £1,000 worth of shares, was paid to all 
full-time employees and a pro-rata amount to those who worked less than 15 hours a week in 
1997 (IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
5.2. SAYE Share Option Schemes 
SAYE share option schemes are sometimes referred to as savings-related share option 
schemes or sharesave schemes. Smith (1990) regards the SAYE share option schemes as the 
most popular type of employee shareholding scheme for shopfloor and office staff. These 
schemes were initially established under the terms of the 1980 Finance Act (IDS Study, 641, 
1998; Perry and Kegley, 1990; Storey, 1993), and the essence of the approach is to "place 
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employee savings in an approved saving scheme with the option to buy shares at the end of 
the savings period" (Smith, 1990, p.1 53). The schemes are not dependent upon profit of the 
employer. Although there may be different reasons for introducing such schemes, the most 
common reason seems to be "to make employees feel they are a part of the company and to 
create a feeling of involvement and interest in the company's fortune" (Perry and Kegley, 
1990, p.128). 
Under the scheme, employees are allowed to buy shares in their company on a specified 
future date at, or within an allowed discount to, the share price at the beginning of the 
contract. The employees can purchase shares only from the proceeds of a SAYE savings 
contract. Since the 1996 Finance Act, these contracts last for a period of three or five years 
(IDS Study, 641, 1998), at the end of which time employees may either buy the shares, which 
must be part of the company or parent company ordinary share capital, or the savings, plus 
interest, may be received as cash (Smith, 1990). Employees must decide at the beginning 
whether to get a three-, five-, or seven-year share option (IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
If share prices have increased over the contract period, then the option price will be less than 
the market price and a profit will be made. Whether employees choose shares or cash, they 
will not be liable to pay income tax (IDS Study, 583, 1995). 
It is crucial to mention one of the most important differences, which was stressed by Dewe, 
Dunn, and Richardson (1988), between SAYE share schemes and profit sharing share 
schemes. Under the form of profit sharing share schemes given tax relief in the 1978 Finance 
Act, all eligible employees, regardless of their own effort or inclinations, are included and 
they receive their bonuses in the form of shares. They have no obligation to save part of their 
pay each month and do not have to pay any initiation pay. The main idea behind the scheme 
is to provide a benefit for eligible employees. By contrast, "participation in an SAYE-linked 
share scheme is not obligatory and an individual has to pay a price, by savings, to belong" 
(Dewe, Dunn, and Richardson, 1988, p.4.). So, under the SAYE share option schemes 
employees must make an effort to participate in the scheme. 
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5.2.1. Outline of the Schemes 
a) Eligibility to participate: The Inland Revenue explained eligibility criteria in its booklets 
on 'Approved SAYE Share Option Schemes' published in 1996. "The scheme must permit 
participation at any given time by every person who: 
- is then an employee, or full time director (that is, one who is normally 
devoted to his duties 25 hours or more a week excluding meal breaks), of the 
company which has established the scheme, or, in the case of a group 
scheme, of a participating company, and 
- has been such at all times during a qualified period not exceeding five years 
and ending on the date of grant of the option" (JR 98, 1996, p.12). 
As with approved profit sharing schemes, participation in SAYE scheme must be open to all 
employees and may not be restricted to senior executives (Wynn-Evans, 1995). However, an 
eligible director or employee may not want to participate (Inland Revenue, 1R98, 1996) 
because of the voluntary nature of SAYE share option schemes (Dewe, Dunn, and 
Richardson, 1988). Wynn-Evans (1995) stated that "employees are not obliged to participate" 
(p.45). Before the 1995 Finance Act, part-time employees could be eccluded, but the Act 
reveals that they must be entitled to participate in all new registered schemes (IDS Study, 
583, 1995; IDS Study 641, 1998). Employees or directors with less than the qualif ring period 
(which may be set to five years) and part-time directors may be allowed to participate at the 
company's discretion (Inland Revenue, 1R98, 1996; IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study 641, 
1998). However, the employees who have not fulfilled a minimum service qualification may 
be excluded from participation (Wynn-Evans, 1995). 
All participants satisfing the conditions of the eligibility must be allowed to participate on 
'similar terms', and all employees and directors who do participate must do so on 'similar 
terms'. Inland Revenue (1996) explained the expression 'similar terms' as covering "not only 
the share price and the circumstances in which the options can be exercised, but also the 
number of shares for which each option is granted. The fact that the number of shares may 
vary in accordance with such criteria as level of remuneration or length of service will not be 
regarded as meaning that the participants are not eligible to participate on similar terms" (JR 
98, 1996, pp.12-13). 
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b) The savings contract: To participate in the scheme the employee must enter into a SAYE 
savings contract approved by the Board of Inland Revenue for the aim of this scheme (Bell, 
1980; Vernon-I-Iarcourt and Shoebridge, 1987). SAYE sharesave contracts are available only 
to individuals aged 16 years or over who have a right to participate in a company-approved 
savings-related share option scheme (Vernon-Harcourt and Shoebridge, 1987; Inland 
Revenue, 1R98, 1996). SAYE savings accounts are run by building societies, banks, or 
authorized European savings institutions (the savings body). Among the building societies, 
The Abbey National and Halifax are regarded as market leaders, but other societies also give 
good advice and help (Vernon-Harcourt and Shoebridge, 1987). Until the end of November 
1994, SAYE accounts could also be run by National Savings, but then the Chancellor 
announced that it would no longer run such accounts (IDS Study 583, 1995). 
Under the savings contract, the individual must agree to pay to the savings body a fixed 
regular monthly contribution over a three-year or a five-year period. The monthly 
contribution must be not less than £5, more than £250, or in multiples of £1 between those 
two figures. Savings will normally be deducted from employee's pay. After making monthly 
contributions over a three-year or a five-year period, the individual may apply for a 
repayment of his 36 (for three years) or 60 (for five years) contributions, "together with a 
bonus which will be equal to a specified number of monthly contributions" (Inland Revenue, 
JR 98, 1996, p.22). For the five-year contract only, if the repayment is not requested for a 
further two years, the bonus is doubled from nine to 18 monthly contributions. Inland 
Revenue (1996) reported that "the rates of bonus payable under the SAYE Contractual 
Sharesave Scheme Prospectus (April 1996) on repayment are under: 
- the three year savings contract, equal to three monthly contributions 
- the five year savings contract claimed after five years, equal to nine monthly 
contributions, and 
- the five year savings contract claimed after seven years, equal to 18 monthly 
contributions" (1R98, 1996, p.22). 
A participant has either to complete his savings contract in order to be able to exercise his 
share option or lose the benefits of his option (Vernon-Harcourt and Shoebridge, 1987). If an 
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employee does not complete his savings contract, he may then apply for a refund of his 
savings and interest. Inland Revenue (1996) stated that: 
Simple interest at the rate of, currently, 3% a year will be payable on uncompleted contracts 
repaid between the first and third anniversaries (first and fifth anniversaries for five year 
savings contract) of the commencement of savings. If the repayment is taken before the first 
anniversary, no interest will be payable. 
If, in the case of the five year savings contracts, repayment is taken between the fifth and 
seventh anniversaries, compound interest at, currently, 3% a year will be payable on the 
amount due at the fifth anniversary (including the bonus) for the period between the fifth 
anniversary and the month in which the repayment takes place. (IR 98, 1996, p.23). 
All interest and bonuses are free of United Kingdom income tax. An employee who leaves off 
employment may, by arrangement with the savings body concerned, continue to make 
monthly contributions under the SAYE contract through a different method of payment. 
c) The share option: Options may be granted under a SAYE share option scheme at a price of 
not less than 80% of the middle-market value of the company's shares (Association of British 
Insurers, 1995; IDS Study 641, 1998). Participants with a five-year option can exercise their 
right to purchase shares at a pre-determined price after five years. They can choose as an 
alternative to get their savings plus a bonus, or a combination of shares and cash, or leave the 
savings for a further two years for an additional bonus, in which case their option to purchase 
shares lapses (IDS Study, 583, 1995). SAYE share option schemes can be run on a yearly 
basis or less frequently. An employee can participate in more than one scheme, provided that 
his or her total savings is not more than £250 a month (IDS Study 641, 1998). 
d) Conditions relating to the exercise of options: An option granted under an approved 
savings-related share option scheme must not normally be exercised before the bonus date 
(Greenhill, 1990; IDS Study 641, 1998), nor later than six months after it (IDS Study, 583, 
1995). The bonus date must be taken as either the earliest date on which a bonus is payable 
(i.e., three years for a three-year savings contract, and five years for a five-year savings 
contract) or the earliest date on which the maximum bonus is payable (seven years) (Inland 
Revenue, JR 98, 1996). However, if a participant dies before the bonus date the option must 
be exercisable within the 12 months following the date of death. If the death occurs within the 
six-month period after the bonus date, the SAYB scheme must provide for the rights to be 
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exercisable only within 12 months of the bonus date (IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study 641, 
1998). 
If a person leaves the company under any of the circumstances listed below, he or she must 
be allowed to exercise the option at any time within six months of leaving work. The 
circumstances are "injury, disability, redundancy, retirement on reaching the 'specified age' 
in the scheme rules (from 60 to 75, and the same for men and women), retirement at any other 
age in accordance with the contract of employment" (IDS Study, 583, 1995; IDS Study 641, 
1998). If a participant reaches the specified age but continues in employment he or she must 
be allowed to exercise the option at any time within six months of that date (Inland Revenue, 
JR 98, 1996). If an employee who has held a SAYE contract for more than three years leaves 
for any reason other than those listed above, the rules of the scheme may allow the employee 
to exercise the right to purchase shares within six months of leaving. If an employee has held 
a contract for less than three years, "the contract lapses and the rights are lost" (IDS Study, 
583, 1995, p.10). 
Under SAYE share option scheme approved by the Inland Revenue, "no tax is payable when 
an option is granted, nor is tax charged on any national gain over the option price at the time 
it is exercised, provided that it is in accordance with the scheme's rule" (Wynn-Evans, 1995, 
p.45). Capital gains tax is payable at 23 or 40 percent when the shares are sold, but only if the 
gains in any one year are greater than the individual's threshold, which is £6,500 at present 
(IDS Study, 641, 1998). 
5.2.2. The Schemes in Practice 
Income Data Services (IDS) Study 583, published in August. 1995, gave details of SAYE 
share option schemes in 30 UK companies. The following information is based on these data. 
In the UK, there are a number of companies that run SAYE share option schemes, such as 
Abbey National, Associated British Ports, Bank of Scotland, Barclays Bank, Bass plc., BHS 
plc., Boots the Chemists, British Aerospace Airbus, British Gas, BT, Cadbury Schweppes, 
Enterprise Oil, General Accident, Next, Royal Insurance, Sainsbury's, Shell, and TSB Group. 
In most companies, SAYE contracts can run for a period of five or seven years, such as 
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Abbey National, Bank of Scotland, Barclays Bank, Boots the Chemists, BT, Royal Insurance, 
and TSB Group. In British Aerospace Airbus, British Gas, and Sainsbury's, the contract 
period is five years. 
Eligibility rules vary from company to company. In Abbey National, all permanent 
employees with six months' service are eligible to participate in the scheme. In 1995, there 
were 17,700 eligible employees in the company. In the Bank of Scotland, all employees with 
three years' continuous service are eligible, but the company requires them to work at least 16 
hours a week before they can participate. In 1995, there were 11,923 eligible employees. In 
Barclays Bank, the eligibility rule is five years' service for all employees irrespective of hours 
worked. In 1995, about 59,000 employees were eligible to participate. In Boots the Chemists, 
all employees with 12 months' service at the qualifying date have a right to participate in the 
scheme. In BT, eligibility rules are variable and qualifying arrangements are determined by 
the Board Employee Share Schemes Committee each year. In 1995, there were 86,000 
participants in the company. In Sainsbury's, all staff with one year's service can participate in 
the scheme. Although some companies require employees to work a minimum number of 
hours before qualifying, such as Bank of Scotland and Shell (at least 16 hours a week), 
British Aerospace Airbus (37 hours a week), British Gas (eight hours), Royal Insurance (10 a 
week), other companies did not, such as Abbey National, Barclays Bank, Boots the Chemists, 
General Accident, Next, and Sainsbury's. 
The average monthly amount saved by employees in SAYE schemes ranged widely in 
companies. Some companies have an average monthly savings of £50 or less, such as the 
Bank of Scotland (E38), British Aerospace Airbus (12), BT(f44), Sainsbury's (22.50), 
General Accident (E50), while other companies have an average monthly savings of over £50, 
such as British Gas (1 10.40), Cadbury Schweppes (E88.85), and Shell (143). 
Income Data Services (1995) reported that "employee participation rates in the SAYE 
schemes vary from around ten per cent of those eligible to over 70 percent" (IDS Study, 583, 
1995, p.6). Barclays Bank has the highest overall participation rate, 75%. In 1995, employee 
participation rates in the SAYE schemes was 26.5% in Abbey National, 53% in Bank of 











Sainsbury's. As Table 5.1 indicates, participation rates in the majority of schemes were 
between 20 and 30 percent. Therefore, although SAYE share option schemes are regarded as 
'all-employee' share schemes, in practice, many eligible employees choose not to participate. 
Table 5.1. Employee Participation in SAYE Schemes 
Participation Rate No. of Schemes 
70% and over 2 
60 - 69.9% 4 
50-59.9% 3 
40 - 49.9% 2 
30-39.9% 2 
20-29.9% 10 
Less than 20% 3 
Not available 4 
Source: IDS "Profit-Sharing and Share Options", Income Data Services, Study No.583, August, 1995, p.6. 
5.3. Executive Share Option Schemes 
Share and share option schemes designed to attract, retain, and motivate senior management 
employees are more common and have a longer history than schemes open to all employees 
(Roots, 1988). Consequential to the 1984 Finance Act, the Conservative government set up 
an approved share option scheme which lets employers decide who participates (Hume, 
1995). Such schemes are now known as executive share option schemes, and are designed as 
an incentive for senior management employees. Although other employee share schemes (for 
example, ADST, SAYE) must be open to the majority of employees, in an executive share 
option scheme options may be granted to all or any of the full-time employees at the 
company's complete discretion (Arrowsmith and Anderson, 1992; IDS Study, 641, 1998; 
Storey, 1993). The company can restrict the scheme to those employees selected by the Board 
of Directors (Hume, 1995). 
The schemes must be approved by the Inland Revenue. The working of the share option 
schemes gives the executives the option of purchasing company shares "on a stated future 
date at a share price fixed at the time of being granted the option" (Hume, 1995, p.199). There 
is no income tax liability, if the shares are held for at least three years and exercised within 10 
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years. However, any gains made from the sale of the shares will be subject to capital gains 
tax. The number of shares which can be bought is £100,000, or four times the executives' 
PAYE salary, whichever is the greater (Smith, 1990). 
Executive share option schemes may be distinguished from savings-related share schemes in 
a number of ways: there is no SAYE savings contract (Steel, 1986; Storey, 1993); the limit on 
the market value of shares over which an option may be granted is "four times the 
participant's annual taxable emoluments or £100,000, whichever is greater" (Hume, 1995, 
p.1 99); and, most importantly, the company is not under obligation to include all employees 
(Storey, 1993). 
In 1996 'company share option plans' were introduced as a replacement for executive share 
options. The changes in the Inland Revenue rules which cover schemes of this type will now 
be briefly discussed. 
5.3.1. Company Share Option Plans 
The following information on the changes in the Inland Revenue rules which cover executive 
share options and company share option plans was obtained from IDS Study 641, published 
in 1998. 
a) New rules after Greenbury: As a result of the Greenbury committee's report on directors' 
remuneration, the rules governing discretionary schemes changed. When the report was 
published in July 1995, the government acted quickly on its recommendation that "gains from 
executive share options should in future be taxed as income rather than capital gains" (IDS 
Study, 641, 1998, p.19). From 17 July 1995 anyone exercising his or her share options had to 
pay income tax on the profits made over and above the grant price. 
Following huge criticism, on 27 July 1995 the government backtracked and introduced a set 
of transitional arrangements. These allowed any executives or employees who held options 
on or before 17 July 1995 to continue to have their profits made subject to capital gains tax 
only. This concession was also extended to employees who had a written offer of share 
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options or who had an invitation to apply for them, as long as the options were granted within 
30 days. 
b) A ceiling on the value of shares: The 1996 Finance Act replaced executive share options 
with new rules for company share option plans. These work in a similar way to executive 
share options, but with a new, lower ceiling on the value of the shares that can be granted. 
This limit is £30,000 of shares, which includes shares under other approved schemes but not 
savings-related share options. 
In addition to cutting down the tax benefits available under discretionary share options 
schemes, the government decided to end the right to grant discounted options. Previously, 
companies could grant discounted discretionary share options up to 15% below the market 
price as long as there was an all-employee share scheme. The granting of such discounted 
share options is no longer possible. 
c) Tax relief: The treatment of tax relief by the Inland Revenue depends on when the options 
were granted. IDS Study 641, published in 1998, states the following: 
"- Approved schemes before 17 July 1995: these will continue to qualify for 
tax relief on exercise of options in accordance with the old ceiling, the 
greater of four times salary or £100,000. This includes options granted after 
17 July if a written offer or invitation was made before that date and options 
were granted within 30 days. 
- Between 17 July 1995 and 28 April 1996: these will qualify for tax relief 
under the new £30,000 ceiling. Thus they will be free of income tax so long 
as they do not cause the employee's total holding of options to exceed 
£30,000. Shares must not be granted at a discount. 
- Approved schemes after 29 April 1996: these will also be covered by the new 
ceiling. However, after this date, all approved schemes will be deemed to 
incorporate the new rules." (p.19). 
From 28 April 1996, income tax is not payable for options granted under an approved share 
option scheme when the employee uses the option to buy shares as long as it has been at least 
three years and no more than 10 years since the employee received the option. Also, it must 
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be more than three years since the employee last used an option under an approved share 
option scheme (other than a savings-related share option scheme). 
If the share option does not qualify for tax relief then the employee must pay income tax on 
the 'gain' made when using the option to buy shares. The amount of the gain is what the 
shares are worth when an employee buys them, less the price paid for the shares and less the 
amount (if any) paid for the option itself when the employee received it. If there is any other 
benefit from the share option (apart from using it to buy shares), income tax will have to be 
paid on the gain. 
d) Price of shares: The price at which shares may be acquired on the exercise of option rights 
must be decided at the time the rights are obtained. The price of the shares must not be less 
than market value. 
5.4. Employee Share/Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
The ESOP is a different type of share ownership in character and a relatively new 
phenomenon in the UK (Wilkinson, Marchington, Ackers, and Goodman, 1994). The plans 
stemmed from the 1989 Finance Act and were supported by the UK government partly to 
stimulate wider share ownership, but also to relate employees' pay and rewards to company 
performance, as part of the 'enterprise culture' (Allen et al., 1991; Wilkinson et al., 1994). 
Although in the UK the dominant form of employee financial participation is share ownership 
(Wilkinson et al., 1994), Pendleton (1992a) regards the ESOP as a potentially more advanced 
form of share ownership. It is defined by the ESOP Centre as "an employee benefit trust 
linked to a share profit scheme" (Wilkinson et a!., 1994, p.125). Therefore, an employee 
benefit trust is associated with a profit sharing trust, with the former obtaining shares in the 
employing company and the latter allocating the shares over time to employees free of tax 
(Wilkinson et a!., 1994). Under the plan, an Employee Benefits Trust can hold the entire 
stock of the company for distribution to the workforce through the Approved Deferred Share 












Wilkinson (1992) stresses that the role of an ESOP trust makes an ESOP scheme very 
different from a conventional approved employee profit share or share scheme. Reid (1992) 
stated that "a trust under English law is the basis of the ESOP" (p.35). 
Figure 5.1. The Classic ESOP Model 
BANK 
Movement OF Money Movement of Shares 
1- -----RePaYme fLoan 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUS :: --tI I 
II
Payments Payments For Shares I I 
for shares I I 
on I I 
leaving Payments COMPANY - - -I I (on leaving) 
for shares 
Gifts ______ Ii_.*!
PROFIT SHARING TRUST - i 
Contribution if required I 
EMPLOYEES T_ J.. 
Source: IDS "Employee Share Ownership Plans", Income Data Services, Study No: 568, December 1994, P.4. 
The company features of all ESOPs are indicated diagrammatically in Figure 5.1. The 
company sets up an employee benefit trust which is enabled to borrow money from the 
company or from external sources such as a bank. The trust uses the money to buy shares 
from the company. Because the provisions of the trust entail that shares must be distributed 
only to employees (including directors), this directly makes the company x percent employee-
owned, even if an individual employee does not hold any shares (IDS Study, 568, 1994). 
Because of this new source of capital from the sale of shares, the company's profitability 
increases and the company can make payments from its pre-tax profits to the profit sharing 
trust. This money is used by the profit sharing trust to buy shares from the Employee Benefit 
Trust. Although these shares are approved to individual employees, the profit sharing trust 
holds them for five years to avoid tax (IDS Study, 568, 1994). The ESOP trust repays its 
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borrowing from "voluntary contributions from the company which may be tax deductible. 
This effectively enables the ESOP to play a corporate finance role since the company may be 
able to benefit from tax relief on both the principal and interest on its borrowings" (Wilson, 
1992, p.3). 
According to Pendleton (1992b), there are quite significant differences between ESOPs and 
other forms of share ownership. In particular, he reports that in most private-sector companies 
the unions have been actively interested in the design of the ESOP although the initiative may 
have come from management. Pendleton (1992b) stated that "it is true that some unions have 
actively encouraged ESOPs. The General Municipal Boilermakers Union (0MG), for 
instance, was instrumental in the establishment of the ESOPs at Roadchef' (p.231). 
Moreover, high levels of union membership exist in most private company ESOPs. The bus 
companies (Yorkshire Rider, Chesterfield Transport, Cleveland Transit, Grampian Transport, 
Busways, Peoples' Provincial Busses) all have at least 90% of their workforce in union 
membership. This is in sharp contrast with the findings of the studies on share ownership 
schemes in general, which indicate that less than 10% had union involvement (Baddon, 
Hunter, Hyman, Leopold, and Ramsay, 1989). Second, Pendleton stresses that new forms of 
employee participation had often been created alongside the ESOP. He mentions that in 
contrast to other share schemes, ESOPs can help achieve a much greater degree of employee 
involvement and control over management policy. 
5.4.1. The Types of ESOPs 
There are three basic types of ESOP in the UK: 'case law' ESOPs, 'statutory ESOPs', and 
'unapproved ESOPs' (Pendleton et al., 1995). 
Case Law ESOPs 
The first type of ESOPs is known as 'case law' ESOP since at the time ESOPs were 
originally introduced to the UK in 1987, there was no ESOP legislation and the structure of 
the first schemes is based on existing tax and corporate legislation, ratified for tax relief 
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purposes by the Inland Revenue on a case-by-case basis (Blagbum, 1992; Pendleton et a!., 
1995). A case law ESOP, typically, is composed of one or more employee benefit trusts and a 
profit sharing trust. When the ESOP is set up, the employee benefit trust obtains equity in the 
company, "in most cases by purchase but by gift in some, generally using a loan repayable 
over five to ten years" (Pendleton et al., 1995, p.46). Although, in most of the early ESOPs 
the trade union bank Unity Trust provided these loans, more recently, a wide range of 
financial institutions have been used. The Profit Sharing Trust receives a portion of 
company's profits to buy shares from the employee benefit trust for distribution to 
employees, "in most cases free of charge and on equal terms" (Pendleton, et al., 1995, pA.6). 
The employee benefit trust uses the source of capital from this activity to repay the original 
loan. At the same time, as the employee benefit trust will need to buy shares from departing 
employees, it will get further loans or financial contributions from the company to finance 
this. Pendleton et al. (1995) stated that "in effect, money circulates around institutions 
connected to the trading part of the company, to provide a zero-cost, low risk vehicle for 
employees to acquire a share of their company's equity" (pp.46-47). Employees are not liable 
for any income tax on the value of their acquired shares as a benefit from employment, if the 
shares are held in trust for five years. 
Statutory ESOPs: 
There are a number of uncertainties on the case law ESOP; because of this, specific ESOP 
legislation was created in the Finance Act 1989 (Comford, 1990) which gave approval for 
'statutory ESOP' schemes (Blagburn, 1992). The key characteristics of a statutory ESOP are 
as follows: 
a) There must be a unified trust structure in which an Employee Share Ownership Trust 
(ESOT) or Qualifying Employee Share Ownership Trust (QUEST) acquires, holds, and 
distributes shares in the founding company (IDS Study, 568, 1994; Pendleton et al., 1995). 
b) There must be at least three UK-resident trustees, one of whom must be "a representative 
of a trust corporation or a solicitor or other professional" (IDS Study, 568, 1994, p.8). The 
majority of the trustees must be employees who have been elected by a majority of 
employees (Blagbum, 1992; Pendleton et al., 1995) and who are not and have never been 
directors of the organization (IDS Study, 568, 1994). 
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c) All employees who have been employed for five years or more and who work 20 or more 
hours a week must be beneficiaries. Beneficiaries may include employees and directors with 
at least one year's service (IDS Study, 568, 1994). 
d) Shares must be distributed to the beneficiaries on similar terms. But 'similar terms' allows 
for distribution to "vary according to salary level, length of service, or other such factors" 
(IDS Study, 568, 1994, p.8). 
e) Trustees must pass shares to the employees within seven years (Pendleton et a!., 1995). In 
the 1994 Finance Act, the time limit of seven years between acquiring and transferring shares 
was extended to 20 years (IDS Study, 568, 1994). 
If a company makes a gift to a statutory ESOP a corporation tax deduction is guaranteed, 
provided that within a certain time limit the money is expended for a" 'qualifying purpose', 
i.e. to buy shares in the company, pay loan interest or capital, pay money to employees or 
meet expenses" (Arrowsmith and Anderson, 1992, p.83). 
Unapproved ESOPs 
The third type of ESOP is known as 'Unapproved ESOPs' because the ESOP structure in its 
entirety is not submitted for Inland Revenue approval and no tax deduction is guaranteed on 
equity transfers to the Benefits Trust (Pendleton et al., 1995). This form of ESOP started after 
the 1989 Companies Act let public limited companies buy their own shares in certain 
circumstances (Pendleton et a!., 1995). Typically, a company with an unapproved ESOP uses 
an offshore trust to buy shares in the company on the open market. Pendleton et al. (1995) 
stated that "the main reason for using this mechanism is to acquire existing equity for 
distribution to employees through existing Inland Revenue-approved profit-sharing, share 




This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the new research model is explained in the 
light of the ownership literature and the findings of the replication of Long's (1978) (see 
Chapter 8) and Florkowski's (1989) (see Chapter 9) study, and the findings of previous 
studies on profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. The second part consists of 
six sections which describe the research strategy and the procedures utilized in this study for 
data collection and analysis. The first section describes the general research strategy. The 
second section describes the procedures for data collection. The third section describes the 
sample of those responding to the questionnaire. The fourth section describes the study 
variables and the questionnaire scales used to measure them. The fifth section describes 
sample reliability for the scale of variables. The sixth and final section describes the 
procedures used to analyse the data and discusses the difficulties with and limitations of their 
use. 
6.1. Research Model 
Figure 6.1 presents a model of the possible effects of (a) the combination of financial 
participation and participation in decision making (hereafter employee ownership), and (b) 
participation in decision making (PDM) on employee job attitudes and behaviours. This new 
model was mainly based on the findings of the test of Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) 
theoretical frameworks, as well as an analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature. The 
central premise is that (a) employee participation, and (b) participation in decision making 
have both direct and indirect effects on three main job attitudes (integration, involvement, and 
commitment). They directly affect such attitudes through the effects of share ownership, 
participating in the profits of the organization, and participation in decision making. They 
may also have indirect effects on these job attitudes by favourably influencing other job 
attitudes and behaviours, such as perceived pay equity and performance-reward 
contingencies. Employee participation and participation in decision making are expected to 
enhance perceptions of pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on 
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decision making. These perceptions will, in turn, directly enhance organizational 
commitment. Apart from their direct effects, it is expected that these perceptions will also 
indirectly lead to organizational commitment through favourably influencing support for 
profit sharing (PS), support for save-as-you-earn (SAYE) schemes, and satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes. 
Increased integration is expected to create motivation directly, and indirectly through 
improving group work norms. Integration also may lead to greater involvement, commitment, 
and cooperative behaviour. Increased involvement is expected to increase general satisfaction, 
and commitment and, in conjunction with integration, results in cooperative behaviours. 
Satisfaction is expected to enhance organizational commitment. 
The new model aims to explain the relationships between (a) employee participation and (b) 
participation in decision making, and job attitudes. As mentioned earlier, prior to the 
construction of the new model, Long's and Florkowski's theoretical frameworks were tested. 
As the results, in general, supported the main arguments of Long's and Florkowski's models, 
the new research model was based on the findings of their models. 
However, the new model is an extended model of employee financial and non-fmancial 
participation for the following reasons. First, it is a comprehensive model for ascertaining the 
attitudinal consequences of the combination of financial participation and participation in 
decision making, which is its most important feature. Second, it is the first model to explore 
the possible determinants of participants' support for SAYE and their satisfaction with profit 
sharing and SAYE schemes. Prior models have not mentioned the relationships between 
support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE, and perceptions about pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, or influence on decision making. This model extends the 
existing knowledge considerably regarding the potential precursors of support for SAYE and 
satisfaction with PSJSAYE schemes. Third, although Long refers only to employee share 
ownership, and Florkowski refers only to profit sharing, the new model concentrates on both 
financial schemes (PS and SAYE) because many large organizations nowadays are operating 
both schemes (IDS Study, 641, 1998). Estrin, Perotin, Robinson, and Wilson (1997) reported 



















6.1.1. Employee Participation/Participation in Decision Making ' Commitment, 
Involvement, and Integration: 
In the employee ownership literature it is argued that financial participation has an effect on 
integration (Webb, 1912; Argyris, 1964; Lawler, 1977; Whyte, 1978; Long, 1978; Hammer 
and Stern, 1980; Blasi, 1980; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 
1991), involvement (Long, 1978; Coords, 1979; Strauss and Sayles, 1980; Heller, 1984; 
Aitken and Wood, 1989; Poole and Jenkins, 1991), commitment (Long, 1978; Katz and 
Kahn, 1978; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Hammer, Stem and Gurdon, 1982; Child, 1984; Klein, 
1987; French, 1987; Baddon, Hunter, Hyman, Leopold, and Ramsay, 1987; Aitken and 
Wood, 1989; Florkowski, 1989, 1992; Mitchell, Levin, and Lawler, 1990; Smith, Lazarus, 
and Kalkstein, 1990; Kelly and Kelly, 1991; Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991; Buchko, 
1993), motivation (Webb, 1912; Long, 1978; Strauss and Sayles, 1980; Rosen, 1984; Kruse, 
1984; Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990; Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991; Prolman, 
1995), and job satisfaction (Long, 1978; Tannenbaum, 1983; French, 1987; Klein, 1987; 
Klein and Hall, 1988; Poole and Jenkins, 1991). 
Figure 6.2. Relationships between Employee ParticipationlParticipation in Decision Making 
and Commitment, Involvement, Integration 
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION I I PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKiNG 
Involvement 
Commitment Integration 
As mentioned earlier, before constructing the new research model, Long's and Florkowski's 
theoretical frameworks were tested by replicating the statistical analyses that they used. 
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Hereafter, employee participation refers to the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making. 
In his model, Long (1978) suggests that employee share ownership increases integration, 
involvement, and organizational commitment. This, in turn, has a beneficial effect on other 
attitudes and behaviours, such as motivation, group work norms, satisfaction, and 
performance-reward contingencies. These attitudes and behaviours, then, lead to an increase 
in organizational performance. 
The relationship of profit sharing/employee share ownership (financial participation) to the 
dependent variables was analysed by using a partial correlation analysis (see Table 8.9). It 
was found that financial participation has a statistically significant effect on organizational 
commitment (p<z.O5), general satisfaction (p<Ol), and performance-reward contingencies 
(p<.05), but a negligible effect on integration, involvement, and motivation, after controlling 
for length of service and age. The result of the partial correlation analysis indicated that 
participation in decision making (PDM) had statistically significant effects on integration, 
involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, performance-reward 
contingencies, attitude towards change (p' s<.00 1), effort-performance contingencies (p<.05), 
j oh security (p<.0 1), and perceived task interdependencies (p<. 10). These results showed that 
both financial participation and participation in decision making have separate effects on 
employee job attitudes and behaviours, even if financial participation has little effect (not 
statistically significant) on some attitudes and behaviours. This fmding was supported by the 
results of the multiple regression analysis. 
As Table 8.10 in Chapter Eight shows, while participation in decision making was seen to 
explain a significant amount of the variance in all five job attitudes - integration, involvement 
(p's<.00l), satisfaction, motivation (p's<.Ol), and commitment (p<.05) - fmancial 
participation was significantly related to only two job attitudes - organizational commitment 
and general satisfaction (p's<.05). In comparing the impacts of fmancial participation and 
participation in decision making, it was concluded that with the exception of commitment 
(both have a similar effect), participation in decision making has a stronger effect on job 
attitudes than financial participation. 
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The results of the replication of Long's model supported his hypothesis that not only share 
ownership but also participation in decision making has independent effects on job attitudes. 
Financial participation showed a negligible effect on some job attitudes and the study argues 
this may not be the full potential of financial participation, following Hammer and Stern, who 
argued that "the failure to obtain increased influence may reduce such hypothesized benefits 
of common ownership as increased worker motivation and performance" (1980: 79). As some 
researchers (e.g., Rothschild-Whitt and Whitt, 1986) have argued, the study suggests that the 
fuller potential of financial participation may be realized when ownership is coupled with 
added opportunities for employee influence on decision making and control. This argument 
has been supported by several investigators (e.g., Challenge, 1995; General Accounting 
Office, 1987; Klein, 1987; Long, 1978, 1978a, 1978b; Pendleton et al., 1998; Rosen and 
Quarrey, 1987) who found that financial participation, coupled with participation in decision 
making, produces stronger effects on employee job attitudes and company performance. 
For some researchers (e.g., Long 1978, 1979; Tannenbauin, 1983), employee ownership leads 
to increased levels of worker participation and control. After all, through employee share-
ownership, employees possess certain control rights which they would otherwise not achieve. 
Long (1978), for instance, has concluded that employee share-ownership increases worker 
influence at organizational policy levels. Employee ownership increases employee's desire 
for worker participation, because ownership presents a legitimate right to participate in 
decision making. It also increases 'organization identification', which, in turn, leads workers 
to become more involved in the affairs of their workplaces. These additional rights and 
stronger organizational identity thus increase employees' desire for more influence in 
decision making at the policy, departmental, and job levels in the company (Poole and 
Jenkins, 1991). 
However, some analyses of individual firms have found no significant relationship between 
employee ownership and desired or perceived worker influence (Hammer and Stem, 1980). 
The results from many studies of employee share ownership and profit sharing schemes have 
been almost identical. Employees almost invariably feel they have not acquired any more say 
or influence in their company as a result of these schemes (Baddon et al., 1989; Fogarty and 
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White, 1988; Klein and Rosen, 1986; Kruse, 1984; Long, 1980, 1982; Pendleton et al., 1998). 
Therefore it can be said that financial participation does not necessarily increase employee 
influence in decision-making processes, but, as some researchers (e.g., Bartkus, 1997; 
Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg, 1996; Hammer and Stern, 1980; Hansen, 1992; Kenny, 
1987; Poole, 1988; Rothschild-Whiff and Whitt, 1986; Smith, 1992) have argued, it may raise 
employees' expectations of future input into decisions. In this study, financial participation 
did not seem to increase employee influence in decision-making activities, because the 
majority of managers and non-managers reported decisional deprivation at job, departmental, 
and organizational levels (see Table 8.3). They reported that there is less "non-managerial 
employees' influence" and "personal influence" than there should be at all three decision 
levels. 
It should also be mentioned that, as Long (1978) hypothesizes, not only share ownership but 
also participation in decision making has independent effects on job attitudes. Positive results 
of participation in decision making have documented by many investigators (e.g., Maier, 
1952; Argyris, 1955; Leavitt, 1955; McGregor, 1960; Maier and Hayes, 1962; Flippo, 1966; 
Guest, 1962; Shepard, 1965; Tannenbaum, 1966; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Lowin, 1968; 
Patchen, 1970; Long, 1978; Miller and Monge, 1986). Some of these positive findings are as 
follows: cooperation between managerial and non-managerial employees, attitude towards 
change, productivity, morale, motivation toward organizational objectives, commitment to 
organizational goals, integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and reduced turnover, 
absenteeism, grievances, tension, and stress. 
After reviewing the literature, Blinder (1990) concluded that "worker participation apparently 
helps make alternative compensation pians like profit sharing, and gain sharing, and ESOPs, 
work better and also has beneficial effects of its own" (p. 13). In their study of the effects of 
ESOPs in Japanese organizations, Jones and Kato (1993) concluded that "our fmdings 
support the conclusion of Blinder (1990) and others that both decision participation and 
financial participation are needed in order for improvements in business performance to be 
realized" (p.366). In combination, participation and profit sharing schemes can encourage 
self-monitoring by employees through peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Participation 
programmes can reduce the free-rider problems generally associated with profit sharing by 
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creating a social climate where shirking by individuals is not allowed by the group 
(Schwochau, Delaney, Jarley, and Fiorito, 1997). Jones (1997) argues that in the case of 
schemes which provide participation in economic returns alone, without any participation in 
control, the outcome may be ambiguous: it may be positive or it may be negative. The 
outcome will also tend to be small. He suggests that the likelihood of there being a large and 
sustained impact on the economic performance of the organization is greater when there is a 
combination of participation in control rights and participation in return rights. He stated that 
the effect of the combination of participation in economic returns and workplace democracy is 
likely to be greater than the sum of the separate effects . . . [M]uch of the empirical work 
tends to have measures only of financial participation but not measures of participation in 
decision making (p.23). 
Ben-Ner, Han, and Jones (1996), Ben-Ner and Jones (1992), Doucouliagos (1995), Giblin, 
Lederer, and Murphy (1995), Jones and Pliskin (1991), Kardas (1997), Kunkel and Lau 
(1995), Levine (1995), Levine and Tyson (1990), Margulies and Black (1987), Moss (1991), 
and Winther and Marens (1997) provided further evidence indicating that it will be more 
likely for there to be favourable effects when workplace democracy is combined with 
participation in financial returns. Investigating value-added per employee, Cooke (1994) 
found that in nonunion manufacturing firms, the impacts of the combination of participation 
and profit-sharing programmes were greater than the impacts of either programme in 
isolation. Jones (1997) stated that "my main point is that favorable results are much more 
likely if the two types of scheme, work-place democracy and financial participation, are 
combined" (p.24). Rosen (1983) argued that "in fact, the joining of employee ownership and 
participation seems to provide a very effective combination" (p.53). Long (1996) stated that 
"evidence indicates that, when combined with employee participation in decision making, 
employee ownership is usually associated with a substantial improvement in company 
performance" (p.4,151). Maaloe (1993) suggested that "ownership in conjunction with 
participation is one way to replace the theatricals of the past with a genuine and shared 
interest in reality" (p.146). A study conducted by City University Business School examined 
the extent of financial participation in 43 of the UK's top 100 companies. The research found 
that only in combination with good communications and participative management styles can 
financial participation (employee and executive scheme and profit sharing) make a difference 
to productivity and performance (cited in IRS Employment Review, 625, 1997). 
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Pendleton, Wilson, and Wright (1998) stated that "yet US studies provide compelling 
evidence that the extent to which employee ownership facilitates employee participation in 
decision-making has a decisive effect on employee attitudes" (p.103). For instance, Rhodes 
and Steer's (1981) comparison of an employee-owned and a 'conventional' firm found that 
employee participation in decision making was higher in the employee-owned firm, and that 
the greater the perceived extent of participation in decision-making, the higher the level of 
organizational commitment. As Pendleton et al. (1998) mentioned, this finding has been 
reproduced by Russell et al. (1979), Long (1980), Klein (1987), Klein and Hall (1988), and 
Buchko (1992). Hammer, Landau, and Stem (1981) concluded their study of the ownership-
absenteeism relationship by arguing that the utility of employee ownership may stem from 
the fact that ownership may create a mechanism through which employees perceive that they 
can have a voice in bringing about organizational change. According to Klein's (1987) study, 
ownership when coupled with participative management practices and financial rewards was 
found to be positively related to worker attitudes. In Buchko's (1992) study, employee-
owners who perceived that the ESOP authorized them to have a greater voice in company 
decisions were more committed, more satisfied, and more involved with their work. 
In the light of these explanations it can be argued that if the full favourable effect of financial 
participation is not obtained because employees' expectations of more influence in decision-
making processes are not satisfied, then fmancial participation and participation in decision 
making will only have an increased combined effect when decisional deprivation for 
participation in decision making is reduced. The combination of the two will achieve the full 
favourable effect of financial participation and, at the same time, the independent effect of 
participation in decision making. This is one of the main arguments of the new research 
model. Therefore, it is proposed that the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making will favourably affect employees' integration, involvement, 
and commitment. It is also proposed that participation in decision making alone will 
favourably affect such attitudes. 
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Employee Ownership and Integration 
The integration of the individual with the organization is seen as a primaiy goal of 
organizations (Winfield, 1994). Following Argyris (1964) and Long (1978), 'integration' is 
here defined as the degree to which the individual perceives that attainment of organizational 
goals will lead to satisfaction of his personal goals and needs. Employee share ownership 
would be expected to increase employee integration. Since a main aim of most business 
organizations is to make a profit for owners, employees will get financial reward from better 
organizational performance, if they are owners, through receiving the profits as dividends. 
Due to the good performance of the organization, the employee's investment in share capital 
will be protected and appreciated. 
Integration might increase employee motivation directly by increasing the perception that 
increased performance will result in certain valued outcomes or rewards. In this sense, 
employee ownership may serve as a type of incentive plan. If, through diligent effort, 
employees can increase their productivity and thereby the profitability of the organization, 
then, all things being equal, the value of their share accounts will rise. Following Mitchell 
(1973) and Long (1978) 'motivation' is here defined as 'an attitude towards job 
performance'. Long (1978) defined job performance quite broadly to include innovative and 
other behaviours, as well as quantity and quality of output. 
Integration may also indirectly improve motivation through creating group work norms. Even 
if an individual sees little relationship between individual performance and organizational 
performance, he may realize that the performance of others is in fact related to organizational 
performance. Therefore, he/she would be expected to encourage others to perform well. 
Integration may increase cooperation between organizational members. According to Long 
(1978), perceptions of shared goals would certainly be expected to create cooperative 
behaviours. An improved cooperation might be expected to be more satisfying to 
organization members than an atmosphere of conflict and lack of cooperation. 
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Employee Ownership and Involvement 
Organizational involvement is defined as a feeling of membership or belongingness, a feeling 
of solidarity with the organization. This term is borrowed from Long (1978), who uses it in 
the same sense as it is used here. Poole and Jenkins (1991) argue that profit sharing and 
particularly share ownership schemes offer employees the opportunity to increase their 
involvement in the workplace. An employee who acquires a share of ownership would likely 
feel to a greater extent like a part of the organization, since his shares provide physical and 
legal evidence of his association with the organization. Ownership may lead to increased 
involvement indirectly through increased integration, since feelings of shared characteristics 
and common goals would be expected to increase feelings of belongingness or solidarity with 
the organization. 
Organizational involvement might be expected to result in increased cooperation, satisfaction, 
and organizational commitment. The 'feelings of solidarity' might result in cooperative 
behaviours. 'Feelings of belongingness' could satisfy a set of human needs within Maslow's 
(1954) categories of social and ego needs and therefore result in greater general satisfaction. 
Employee Ownership and Commitment 
Organizational commitment is described as a sense of loyalty to the organization. 
Commitment occurs when individuals identify with and extend effort towards organizational 
goals and values (Reichers, 1985). Patchen (1970) has argued that organizational 
commitment may occur as a result of feelings of belongingness and solidarity (involvement), 
and feelings of shared characteristics and common goals (integration). Therefore, employee 
ownership can lead to higher organizational commitment indirectly through increasing 
integration and increasing involvement. 
Employee ownership might also directly affect organizational commitment. The intrinsic 
satisfaction model of employee ownership suggests that the simple fact of ownership 
(ownership qua ownership) increases employees' commitment to the company (Klein, 1987). 
According to this model, the benefits of employee ownership stem directly from ownership, 
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not from a specific characteristic of the employee ownership schemes or of the company as a 
whole. Pendleton, Wilson, and Wright (1998) hypothesized that employee share ownership 
schemes will be associated with increased levels of organizational commitment. Hammer, 
Landau, and Stern (1981), for instance, reported positive correlations between stock 
ownership and organizational commitment (r0.87, p<O.Ol). Surveys of British employers 
reported that the reasons most frequently mentioned for the introduction of shareholding or 
profit sharing schemes are to increase worker identification and commitment to the 
organization (Dewe, Dunn, and Richardson, 1988; Baddon, et al• 1989; Poole, 1989). 
In addition, Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian (1974) proposed that satisfaction would 
causally precede organizational commitment. Research evidence indicates that job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment are positively related (Williams and Hazer, 1986; 
Mottaz, 1987). In a firm that had converted to employee ownership, Hammer, Landau, and 
Stern (1981) found a positive correlation between job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment (r=O.51, p<O.00l). Similar findings were reported by French and Rosenstein 
(1984), who found a correlation of 0.606 between job satisfaction and commitment in an 
employee-owned firm. In their meta-analysis, Mathieu and Zajac (1990) found an average 
correlation of 0.533 (p<0.01) between satisfaction and commitment. The antecedent effects of 
job satisfaction on organizational commitment have been noted in other researches too 
(Bluedom, 1982; DeCotiis and Summers, 1987; Marsh and Mannari, 1977; Mathieu, 1988; 
Price and Muller, 1986; Steers, 1977; Luthans, Baack, and Taylor, 1987; Mottaz, 1987; 
Williams and Hazer, 1986). For example, in a sample of 91 hospital pharmacists Savery and 
Syme (1996) concluded that "job satisfaction does seem to impact on a pharmacist's 
commitment to the department and that the direction is as might have been hypothesized in 
that more satisfied pharmacists were more committed" (p.20). In his model, Buchko (1993) 
presented a positive association between job satisfaction and organizational commitment. 
Florkowski (1989) found that job satisfaction had a positive, direct effect on organizational 
commitment. Alternatively, some researchers have concluded that organizational 
commitment was causally prior to job satisfaction (Bateman and Strasser, 1984; Long, 1978; 
O'Reilly and Caidwell, 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Although previous research is not 
entirely consistent, there appears to be greater support for satisfaction as a cause of 
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organizational commitment (Mathieu, 1988). The research model postulated that there will be 
a positive association between job satisfaction and organizational commitment. 
6.1.2. Employee Participation Perceived Pay Equity, Perceived Performance-
Reward Contingencies, Perceived Influence on Decision Making 
Organizational Commitment 
Expectancy theory provides one of several paradigms that can express a process through 
which employee ownership can create a set of social-psychological and behavioural effects 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991). Even when not entered into with strictly an 
investment orientation, employee ownership has very real and direct financial outcomes for 
the employee participants. Organizational growth, survival, and success are logically 
associated with increasing the value of an individual's ownership share. The employee-owner 
is placed in a position of risk due to organizational decline, failure, and demise. Therefore, for 
the employee-owner the survival, growth, and success of the organization are likely to be 
critical and valued outcomes. In addition, for Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (1991), "the 
simple perception of gains and losses associated with an individual's current and future 
equity, as well as a person's influence and informational rights, may have a motivational 
effect" (p.133). 
Figure 6.3. Relationships between Employee Participation/Participation in Decision Making 
and Commitment 
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In his model, Florkowski (1989) showed a direct relationship between the three employee 
perceptions (pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making) and organizational commitment. The statistical analyses indicated that performance-
reward contingencies (r = .28, p<.00l; b .09, p< .10) and influence on decision making (r = 
.29, p<.001; b = .14, p< .001) are positively and significantly related to organizational 
commitment (see Tables 9.1 and 9.5 in Chapter Nine). But the study did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between pay equity and organizational commitment. In 
the new model, therefore, it is proposed that through increasing employee perceptions of pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making, (a) employee 
participation and (b) participation in decision making will affect organizational commitment. 
The study did so because even though it did not find a relationship between pay equity and 
organizational commitment this variable was added into the new model as Florkowski (1989) 
did. 
Employee Ownership - Pay Equity 
The concept of pay equity stems from the equity theory of motivation and involves a social 
comparison process (Adams, 1965). An important impact on perceptions of pay equity is the 
amount of pay received (Lawler, 1973), and it is this factor which it is expected would affect 
differentially perceptions of pay equity in the organization with employee ownership vis-à-vis 
the conventional organization. Florkowski (1989) suggested that the size of the profit-based 
incentives should affect perceptions of pay equity among participants. Employees having the 
opportunity to share profits are expected to choose referents to evaluate the fairness of 
anticipated rewards from the employee share ownership scheme (Adams, 1965; Goodman, 
1974). According to Florkowski (1989) individuals would compare the relationship between 
regular work inputs and outcomes with the anticipated inputs and outcomes associated with 
the schemes. If increased efficiency and effectiveness necessitate more inputs than are 
invested in a non-share ownership context, participants would expect larger rewards than 
would otherwise be the case. However, individuals may think that the contribution formula 
favours the company too much, thereby holding back money that should go into the profit 
sharing pooi. Similarly, for Florkowski, the method of allocating individual earnings 
(compensation, tenure, or a combination) may be objectionable to some people. In either 
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instance, employee participants will not feel that the employer has allocated a fair share of the 
additional profits that were created by their supplemental efforts. Participants also should feel 
high pay inequity if non-profit sharing rewards offer other referents with highly 
disproportionate returns relative to those from profit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes. 
Employee Ownership ' Perceived Performance-Reward Contingencies 
People believe that there should be a close and direct link between their performance and 
reward prospects (Fisher, 1995). Rhodes and Steers (1981) suggest that perceptions of 
performance-reward contingencies would be greater in the cooperative than in the 
conventional organization. Since reinforcement theorists maintain that desired behaviours are 
shown more often as the frequency of reinforcement increases (Luthans and Kreitner, 1975), 
Florkowski (1989) suggests that employees will link their performance with plan payouts 
more readily if these rewards are paid out soon after they were earned. Therefore, for 
Florkowski, cash and mixed profit sharing schemes should foster better performance-reward 
contingencies than approved deferred share schemes, under which employees are merely 
informed about increases that are credited to their individual accounts. 
According to Florkowski (1989), a similar pattern is expected when company shares are 
distributed instead of cash. "Under voluntary plans, unrestricted shares are provided as soon 
as the relevant period's profits are identified, whereas under mixed plans part of the profit 
pool is issued as cash and the remainder is set aside as shares in trust that have a compulsory 
retention period. Deferred share/trust plans only allocate shares that are retained in trust for 
future distribution" (Florkowski, 1989, p.102). Consequently, voluntary and mixed schemes 
should foster stronger performance-reward contingencies than deferred share/trust schemes 
do. 
Florkowski (1989) argued that the organizational units or sub-units used to evaluate 
profitability also should influence perceived performance-reward contingencies. When plan 
earnings are based on the experiences of broad operational units, many factors can affect 





plant increase their performance, it may not affect the profitability of the larger unit (or the 
whole organization). Thus, perceived performance-reward contingencies are expected to be 
stronger when the profit centers are narrowly circumscribed around participants of the 
schemes. 
Employee Ownership Perceived Influence on Decision Making 
Florkowski (1989) suggested that the quality of participation in decision making designed 
into the scheme is expected to affect employees' perceived influence on decision making. 
There are formal and informal opportunities to elicit employees' input. Informal opportunities 
exist when organizations persuade the participants of the schemes to exercise independent 
judgment in their jobs, to decrease time and materials waste, or to otherwise increase 
profitability. The formality of participation increases when structured changes are made to 
foster more systematic involvement (e.g., quality circles and committee systems). According 
to Florkowski (1989), as the mode of participation becomes more formal and widespread in 
the organization, employees should perceive that they exert greater influence over decision 
making. 
Perceived Pay Equity, Performance-Reward Contingencies, and Influence on 
Decision Making 'Organizational Commitment 
Figure 6.4. Relationships between Perceived Pay Equity, Performance-Reward 
Contingencies, Influence on Decision Making, and Organizational Commitment 
Perceived Perceived Performanci Perceived Influence 
Pay Equity Reward Contingencies on Decision Making 
Commitment 
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The extrinsic model of ownership suggests that if the employee ownership experience is 
financially rewarding to employees, employee ownership increases employees' organizational 
commitment (Klein, 1987). Utilizing data from previous studies, this perspective examines 
employees' perceptions of the financial benefits of ownership schemes and relates this to 
organizational commitment. Using the extrinsic model, French (1987) argued that employee 
attitudes are affected primarily by the financial value of employee ownership. Employees, he 
argued, regard ownership as an investment. If the value of the investment is increasing, 
employees will have greater satisfaction with and commitment to the company. Klein (1987) 
and Klein and Hall (1988) presented data to support the opinion that the value of the company 
employee share ownership plans is positively related to organizational commitment (r=0 .41, 
p<O.O5) . Research by French and Rosenstein (1984) has found a positive relationship between 
the value of employees' ownership and commitment (r=O.394). 
The instrumental satisfaction model of employee ownership suggests that employee 
ownership increases employees' influence in company decision making, which in turn 
influences organizational commitment (Klein, 1987). Researchers in this perspective argue 
that it is not ownership per se that increases organizational commitment, but rather the 
opportunity of employees (as owners) to affect directly the firm's activities through the 
decision-making process. As proponents of this model suggest that employee ownership has a 
positive effect on employee job attitudes if the company provides significant opportunities for 
employee participation in decision making (Long, 1978a,, 1978b, 1979; Hammer and Stem, 
1980; Tannenbaum, 1983), they investigated the relationship between employee ownership, 
employee participation in decision making, and employee job attitudes (Long, 1978b, 1979). 
In her study of 37 employee-owned firms, Klein (1987) presented evidence for the 
instrumental perspective of ownership. Similarly, French and Rosenstein (1984) found 
support for the mediating impacts of influence and control on the employee ownership -
attitudes relationship. However, Tucker, Nock, and Toscano (1989) reported no change in 








6.1.3. Employee Participation Perceived Pay Equity, Performance Reward 
Contingencies, Influence on Decision Making Support for PS, Support for 
SAYE, Satisfaction with PS/SAYE Organizational Commitment 
The effect of employee ownership on employees' perceptions of pay equity, performance-
reward contingencies, and influence on decision making has been explained before. The 
model postulates that personal perceptions about pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, and influence on decision making are expected to affect one's support for the 
schemes (profit sharing and SAYE schemes). 
In his model, Florkowski argued that personal feelings about 'pay equity', 'performance-
reward contingencies', and 'influence on decision making' are expected to affect one's 
support for profit sharing plans. After explaining how support for profit sharing could be 
created in organizations, he suggested that profit sharing support should, in turn, affect 
positively the organizational commitment of plan members. 
Figure 6.5. Relationships between Employee Participation/Participation in Decision Making 
andOrganizational Commitment _____________________________ 
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Florkowski's theoretical framework was tested with a variety of multivariate techniques. He 
hypothesized that if pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making were not at acceptable levels, individuals would not support profit sharing. The 
correlational analysis, multiple regression analysis, and path analysis indicated that two of the 
three projected determinants of support for profit sharing were proved. Performance-reward 
contingencies (r = .27, p<.00l; b = .24, p< .001) and influence on decision making (r = .15, 
p<.Ol; b = .12, p< .05) were determinants of support for profit sharing, with the former 
having a bigger impact (see Tables 9.1 and 9.5 in Chapter Nine). The study did not find the 
relationship between pay equity and support for profit sharing that was found in Florkowski's 
(1989) research. 
Florkowski also hypothesized that profit sharing support would be positively associated with 
organizational commitment. The results of the statistical analyses showed that plan support 
was positively and significantly related to organizational commitment (r = .56, p<.001; b = 
.42, p< .00 1) (see Tables 9.1 and 9.5). 
Therefore, in the new research model it is proposed that, apart from their direct effects, 
employee participation and participation in decision making will indirectly affect 
organizational commitment in the following way: employee participation and participation in 
decision making are expected to enhance employee perceptions of pay equity, performance-
reward contingencies, and influence on decision making. These perceptions will, in turn, 
indirectly lead to organizational commitment by favourably influencing support for profit 
sharing and support for SAYE schemes. In the model it is also argued that employees' 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes will be affected by employees' perceptions of pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making. 
Employee participants are expected to continually compare job inputs (e.g. job 
responsibilities and performance) to the schemes' outcomes when evaluating pay equity. 
Individuals should experience tension stemming from feelings of inequity if the schemes fail 
to enlarge financial participation commensurate with the required change in inputs. Since 
equity may be re-established by altering one's inputs or withdrawing from the situation 
(Adams, 1965; Ilgen and Seely, 1974), employees who believe that profit sharing and SAYE 
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schemes have increased pay equity should express greater support for the scheme(s) than 
those who do not. 
Expectancy theory suggests that motivation will not be high if individuals do not perceive a 
strong relationship between goal accomplishment and the likelihood that such performance 
actually will result in promised outcomes (Vroom, 1964; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and 
Weik, 1970; Lawler, 1973; Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen, 1980). Thus, employees' support for 
profit sharing and SAYE schemes should increase as the perceived relationship between 
performance and the financial benefits of the schemes increase. As their performance-reward 
contingency becomes stronger, these individuals are expected to support profit sharing and 
SAYE schemes more vigourously. 
Greater involvement in decision making may either satisfy personal needs for achievement, 
autonomy, and esteem (Lowin, 1968) or increase the estimated likelihood that participants 
can meaningfully influence operations (Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen, 1980). Long (1978) 
hypothesized that financial participation and participation in decision making have 
independent effects on employee job attitudes. Florkowski (1989) suggested that support for 
profit sharing among employees should be more intense when meaningful opportunities for 
input accompany the plan. Following Florkowski (1989), the model postulates that increased 
participation in decision making will affect employees' support for profit sharing scheme and 
support for SAYE schemes. 
The employee ownership literature suggests that employees' satisfaction with ownership 
schemes depends on the extent to which the schemes meet employee needs and expectations 
for financial gain, influence in company decision making, and a sense of greater involvement 
in the company (Long, 1979; Tannenbaum, 1983; French, 1987; Klein, 1987). Klein's (1987) 
research showed the importance of both the financial benefits of the ESOP and management's 
employee ownership policies and practices in explaining between-company differences in 
average employee satisfaction with the ESOP. The research on pay and other benefit plans 
documented the positive correlation between the size of the benefit and employee satisfaction 
with that benefit (Lawler, 1971, 1981; Schwab and Wallace, 1974; Berger and Schwab, 1980; 
Heneman, 1984). Consistent with employee ownership research (French and Rosenstein, 
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1984; Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1986; 1-lochner and Granrose, 1985; Klein, 1987), Klein and 
Hall (1988) suggested that an employee's ESOP satisfaction may reflect how much money he 
or she has personally earned through the employee ownership plan. They also suggested that 
the degree to which participation expectations are met by the employee ownership scheme 
had an impact on employees' satisfaction with that scheme. Based on their comparative study 
of ESOP companies, Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986) argued that "employees seem to react 
to ownership primarily in financial terms" (p.9). Therefore, in the model it is proposed that 
employees' satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes would be affected by their perceptions of 
pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making. 
Support for PS, support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE organizational 
commitment: After explaining the relationships between perceptions of pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, influence on decision making, and support for the 
schemes (PS and SAYE), satisfaction with the schemes, the relationship between support for 
the schemes, satisfaction with the schemes, and organisational commitment will now be 
discussed. It is widely accepted that profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes 
consciously attempt to unify the entire workforce in a main organizational objective: higher 
profits (Florkowski, 1989). Under financial participation schemes, personal investments may 
act as a commitment mechanism, increasing one's identification with the organization 
(Becker, 1960; Scholl, 1981). Thus, Florkowski (1989) hypothesized that employees' 
personal support for profit sharing should increase an individual's expressed level of 
organizational commitment to the company. Klein's (1987) three satisfaction models 
(intrinsic, instrumental, and extrinsic) are based on the assumption that if employees are 
satisfied with the employee ownership scheme, they will feel committed to the company and 
motivated to keep working there. After reviewing research on employee-owned firms, 
Buchko (1993) stated that satisfaction with the ESOP programme and general satisfaction are 
positively associated with organizational commitment. He then hypothesized that there is a 
positive association between ESOP satisfaction and organizational commitment. Among 
employee-owned firms, the research of Klein (1987) presented evidence for the ESOP 
satisfaction-commitment relationship (r=0.87, p <ZO.Ol). In the light of these hypotheses and 
the fmdings, the research model postulated that organizational commitment would be affected 
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by support for profit sharing, support for SAYE schemes, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes. 
6.1.4. Motivation General Interest in the Job, Pride in Job Accomplishment, and 
Interest in Innovation 
According to Patchen (1970) there are three indicators of a person's motivation to perform his 
job (job motivation): general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in 
innovation on the job. Regarding general interest in the job, he stated that "for some people, 
the meaning of their work is primarily in the 'living' it brings them -i.e., something to be 
endured in order that one may live outside of work hours" (pp.43-44). Interest in innovation 
refers to the extent to which the individual is vigilant to new and better ways of doing things, 
instead of being content to do his job in a routine and mechanical fashion. Pride in job 
accomplishment refers to individual's enthusiasm about things he/she had recently done on 
the job about which he/she felt proud. As these three factors are the indicators of job 
motivation, the model postulates that increased motivation will result in higher levels of 
interest in innovation, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation. 
6.2. Research Strategy and Procedures Utilized in This Study 
6.2.1. General Research Strategy 
As was mentioned before, it is known from research primarily conducted on small and 
medium-size companies that profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes affect 
employee job attitudes. What is not clear is how far the results of these studies are indicative 
of what would happen in the larger organization. Therefore, this study investigates the effects 
of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on employee job attitudes in large 
organizations. The large organization is the focus of this study, which applied to 40 large 
organization to get research access. The aim was to get four large organizations to participate 
in the research. As some authors (e.g., Peshkin, 1984; Glesne and Peshkin, 1992) thought, 
gaining access was not a simple matter. Although the researcher spent tremendous effort to 
get access from organizations, of 40 large organizations, only one has participated in the 
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study (see Appendix for a selection of the letters from the large organizations which were 
contacted). Non-participating organizations cited different reasons, such as internal personnel 
problems; the length of the questionnaire; company policy, which does not allow them to give 
this kind of information to external researchers; and the sensitivity of the subject. 
However, the participating organization is believed to be a most appropriate company for the 
purpose of this study for several reasons. First, it has both types of financial participation, 
namely profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. Second, for the purpose of 
analysis at the individual level, it is important to note that not all employees have participated 
in the schemes. This allows certain types of analysis that would otherwise not be possible. 
Third, when the researcher applied to the organization, managers were very keen on the 
subject of the study because, as they said, "we want to encourage our employees to participate 
in the schemes and make them believe that they are all more than employees, they are 
owners. Therefore, we attempt to better understand employees' needs and preferences in 
order to shape the schemes to these". As they believed that the study would provide them 
with valuable information, they helped the researcher to issue the questionnaire and to get a 
very good return rate. 
6.2.2. Data Collection (Questionnaire Data) 
The questionnaire method of data collection was used to gather the necessary data. 
a) The questionnaire: Probably no other data collection method is used more frequently in 
social research than the questionnaire (Black and Champion, 1976; Blaxter, Hughes, and 
Tight, 1996), as it is capable of reaching sample respondents living in widely dispersed 
geographic areas at relatively low costs (Dawson, Kiass, Guy and Edgley, 1991; Sarantakos, 
1993). In most cases, questionnaires are used as the only method of data collection. In other 
cases they are employed in addition to other methods. The main characteristic of this method 
is that data are provided by the respondents with limited inference on the part of research 
personnel. 
A narrow definition of a questionnaire is a set of questions for respondents to complete 
themselves (Newell, 1993). It is a data collection instrument comprising a select group of 
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questions chosen because of their relevance, carefully worded for clarity, and carefully 
formatted for printed copy (Labovitz and Hagedorn, 1971; Dawson et al., 1991). With a mail 
questionnaire, data collection is highly structured in order to make people's responses as 
comparable as possible (Bryman, 1989). Hall and Hall (1996) stated that "it addresses the 
issue of reliability of information by reducing and eliminating differences in the way in which 
questions are asked, and how they are presented" (p.97). Each respondent is provided the 
same instrument and answers each question in the same order as the other respondents do. 
Due to these practices, the questioning is standardized, so that variation in people's responses 
can be attributed to genuine variations and not to divergences in the manner or order of 
asking questions. 
b) Why a questionnaire was chosen as a data collection method: The study variables 
included the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours of the respondents (employees), who are 
spread out over a fairly large geographical area in the UK. The ultimate goal of the data 
collection method, therefore, is to produce quantifiable measures of these variables that can 
be statistically analyzed to generate reliable observations. According to some authors (e.g., 
Labovitz and Hagedom, 1971; Sanders and Pinhey, 1983; Frey and Oishi, 1995; Mangione, 
1998) this is best achieved using a mailed questionnaire. 
Although there are some problems to overcome (cited in the next chapter), the mail 
questionnaire was used to collect the research data for a number of reasons: 
- Mailed questionnaires are the least expensive means of data gathering, and cost is not a 
trivial consideration (Selltiz, 1959; Black and Champion, 1976; Sanders and Pinhey, 1983; 
Mindel and McDonald, 1988; Judd, Smith, and Kidder, 1991; Dawson, Kiass, Guy, and 
Edgley, 1991; Moser and Kalton, 1992; Babbie, 1992; Sarantakos, 1993; Wilson, 1996; May, 
1997; Mangione, 1998). Cost often determines whether research can be conducted at all, and 
low cost may mean that responses can be obtained from more people, increasing the sample 
size (Judd, Smith and Kidder, 1991). With a mailed questionnaire a large population or a 
wider geographical area can be surveyed relatively cheaply (Selltiz, 1959; Sanders and 
Pinhey, 1983; Moser and Kalton, 1992; Newell, 1993; Bailey, 1994; Frankfurt-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996; May, 1997). A mailed questionnaire, therefore, is a useful technique if a 
survey requires wide coverage and addresses a large number of respondents who are spread 
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out over a fairly large geographical area (Labovitz and Hagedorn, 1971; Bryman, 1989; 
Frankfurt-Nachmias and Nacbmias, 1996). 
- Questionnaires offer greater assurance of anonymity due to the absence of an interviewer 
(Selltiz, 1959; Mmdcl and McDonald, 1988; Sarantakos, 1993; Bailey, 1994; Frankfurt-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; May, 1997; Mangione, 1998). The assurance of anonymity 
that a mail questionnaire offers is especially helpful when the survey deals with sensitive 
issues (Frankfurt-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; May, 1997). People in the sample are more 
likely to give answers to sensitive questions more voluntarily and accurately when they do 
not have to face an interviewer who is a complete stranger (Moser and Kalton, 1992; Bernard, 
1994) or speak to someone directly. Therefore, questionnaires are a more appropriate method 
in collecting data about especially sensitive issues if they are offer complete anonymity. 
- It is a convenient method; questionnaires can be completed at the respondents' convenience 
(Mindel and McDonald, 1988; Dawson et al., 1991; Sarantakos, 1993; Bailey, 1994; 
Mangione, 1998). The respondents are allowed to spend more total time on the questionnaire 
than they might in an interview study, as they are not forced to answer all questions at one 
time. Bailey (1994) stated that "with the mailed questionnaire the respondent is free to answer 
a question or two whenever he or she has a spare moment. The respondent is also able to 
answer the easy questions first and take time to think about answers to the more difficult 
ones" (p.148). 
- With a mail questionnaire many questions may be asked on a given topic, giving researchers 
considerable flexibility in their analyses (Babbie, 1992). 
- Questionnaires, for Fetterman (1989), are an excellent way to undertake questions dealing 
with representativeness. He stated that "they are the only realistic way of taking the pulses of 
hundreds or thousands of people" (p.65). So, questionnaires allow for large numbers of 
respondents to be surveyed in a relatively short time even if the respondents are widely 
distributed geographically (Mangione, 1998). 
- Structured questionnaires constitute a very popular way of collecting systematic information 
from a cross-section of cases (Marsh, 1982). 
Use of a questionnaire, therefore, was necessary because it is a highly efficient method of 
collecting a large amount of relatively precise data about many variables. As questionnaires 
provide data adaptable to statistical analysis, the researcher can distinguish and examine 
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complicated relationships between numerous variables. After conducting an extensive 
literature review and preliminary communication with some company managers in large 
British organizations, such as BT, Sainsbury's, and Barclays Bank, and academicians from 
the USA and UK, a questionnaire was developed. As some authors (e.g. Newell, 1993) 
suggested, the questionnaire was first tried on friends and colleagues, who cast a critical eye 
over the questions and the order in which they were placed. This helped to ensure that 
instructions and guidelines were clear. The questions were then revised and a working 
document produced. As the next step, the questionnaires were piloted among a small number 
of employees in a large British organization (BT). From the pilot, the researcher assessed 
whether the line of questioning was appropriate and whether the document was 
understandable and simple to use. 
The study attempted to gather the following information by using the questionnaire: (a) the 
demographic characteristics of the respondents, (b) the study variables, (c) respondents' 
opinions about the situation in the organization. Scales consisting of several Likert-type items 
were used to measure most variables. These items were adopted from different sources, the 
main sources being Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) studies. 
It should be noted that it would, of course, have been highly desirable to have been able to 
gather the questionnaire data before the introduction of the schemes as well as after, but this 
was not possible because the schemes were introduced in the organization a long time before 
the starting date of the study. 
The population for the study consisted of employees in a large retail organization in the UK. 
Once permission was obtained from the organization to administer questionnaires to their 
employees, in order to meet the requirement of the study, a stratified proportionate random 
sampling procedure was adopted to include employees at the managerial/non-managerial 
levels and in shareholder/non-shareholder groups. Apart from meeting the requirements of the 
research, to reflect as closely as possible the overall employee profile of the organization, the 
questionnaires were distributed to a broad geographical spread by selecting stores in Reading, 
Solihull, Aberdeen, Cheshunt, Edinburgh, Borehamwood, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Hatfield, 
and Nottingham, and depots in Crick and Northampton. 
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All questionnaires were anonymous, and were accompanied by a cover letter. In addition to 
the researcher's cover letter, a letter was attached by the organization to inform the employees 
about the research project and questionnaire and to give procedures for questionnaire 
distribution and return. In this letter, the organization urged cooperation by employees. 
Dillman (1978) argues that it is more difficult to generate a response with mail surveys 
because the potential respondent can examine the whole questionnaire at his or her leisure. 
Yammarino, Skinner, and Childers (1991) conducted a meta-analysis which studied, among 
other things, the length of the mailed questionnaire. They concluded that response rates can 
generally be raised by surveys of fewer than four pages, with longer surveys resulting in 
lower response rates. As the questionnaire of the study consisted of 16 pages, it can be surely 
regarded as a long questionnaire. Therefore, a three-wave approach was used to achieve a 
greater response rate than could be expected from one mailing. First wave: the questionnaires 
and cover letters were sent to the project manager at the head office of the organization, as 
they were requested to do so. Then, she sent them by inter-office mail to the managers of nine 
stores and two depots, and distributed some of the questionnaires at the head office. The 
managers distributed the questionnaires to the employees on work time and asked them to 
complete the questionnaires either on work time or at home. The employees were also asked 
to return the completed questionnaires either personally to the researcher or to the collection 
points on the company premises. They were given three weeks to complete and return the 
questionnaires. Second wave: after three weeks had passed a reminder letter was sent by 
electronic mail to these stores and depots from the head office of the organization. Finally, a 
third wave of telephone calls was used for the stores and depots to prompt the remaining non-
respondents, to try to obtain responses. 
1,000 questionnaires were mailed in October 1997 and a total of 450 returns were received - a 
response rate of 45%. Of these returns, 430 were usable for further analysis. Twenty had to be 
discarded because too many of the questions were left unanswered. Of the 450 returned 
questionnaires, 32% (144) were mailed directly to the researcher, the remainder being 
collected by the company managers and forwarded to the researcher. Overall, this response 
rate is much higher than most of the previous attempts in the USA and the UK and other 
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countries to obtain such data. Given the proprietary nature of the requested information, the 
response rate of the study may be regarded as excellent. 
c) Why different methods were not used to collect data: The researcher planned to use a 
number of different methods (a combination of methods) or data, primarily as a means of 
enhancing the validity of the findings. It was not possible, or even feasible, to employ the full 
range of methods and data sources applicable to the empirical research problem due to the 
following reasons: 
- Because of the influence of the funding source, there was a time limitation on conducting 
the research. 
- There was a limited type or amount of data available, because of restricted access to the 
research site. 
- The nature of the research problem forced the researcher to use one method of data 
collection, the questionnaire. The reasons for using the questionnaire were explained above. 
6.2.3. Respondents 
This section describes the sample of employees who returned their questionnaires and gives 
their personal and work-related characteristics. The representativeness of the sample in 
relation to the total population of company employees is also discussed. An account of the 
background information on the research site and the context of profit sharing and SAYE is 
presented in more detail in the Appendix. 
As mentioned, the administration of the questionnaire resulted in 430 usable returns, an 
overall response rate of 43%. 
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TiH1e t6 1 Crferczti'c nf Survey Reu,nndenfc
Characteristics - All Respondents ' Non-managerial2__Managerial3
_________________ n % II % n %
Age
Under20 11 2.6 9 3 2 1.6
20-25 43 10 36 12 7 5.4
26-30 65 15.1 34 11.3 31 24
31-35 84 19.5 47 15.6 37 28.7
36-40 54 12.6 34 11.3 20 15.5
41-45 54 12.6 42 14 12 9.3
46-50 52 12.1 40 13.3 12 9.3
51-55 31 7.2 24 8 7 5.4
56-60 21 4.9 20 6.6 1 .8
Over6O 15 3.5 15 5 - -
Education
Some primary school 2 .5 2 .7 - -
Completed secondary school - - - - - -
Some secondary school 20 4.7 17 5.6 3 2.3
Completed secondary school 228 53 190 63.1 38 29.5
Some university or technical training 128 298 84 27.9 44 34.1
beyond secondary school
Bachelor's degree 48 11.2 8 2.7 40 31
Master's degree 3 .7 - -- 3 2.3
Doctoral degree 1 .2 - - 1 .8
Full or part-time employee
Full-time 278 64.7 155 51.5 123 95.3
Part-time 152 35.3 146 48.5 6 4.7
Job status
Senior management 25 5.8 - - 25 19.4
Middle management 76 17.7 - - 76 58.9
Junior/supervisory management 28 6.5 - - 28 21.7
Clerical or secretarial 26 6 26 8.6 - -
Technical 34 7.9 34 11.3 - -
Other 241 56 241 80.1 - -
Marital Status
Married 285 66.3 200 66.4 85 65.9
Single 108 25.1 73 24.3 35 27.1
Widowed 2 .5 2 .7 - -
Divorced or separated 25 5.8 21 7 4 3.1
Other 10 2.3 5 1.7 5 3.9
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Table 6.1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents (Continued)
Characteristics All Respondents Non-mageria1 Mana erial
_________________ n % II % II %
Sex
Male 180 41.9 113 37.5 67 51.9
Female 250 58.1 188 62.5 62 48.1
Tenure
Less than six months 6 1.4 5 1.7 1 .8
More than six months, less than a year 16 3.7 11 3.7 5 3.9
More than a year, less than two years 53 12.3 44 14.6 9 7
More than two years, less than five years 97 22.6 71 23.6 26 20.2
More than five years, less than 10 years 146 34 115 38.2 31 24
More than 10 years, less than 15 years 76 17.7 43 14.3 33 25.6
Morethanl5years 36 8.4 12 4 24 18.6
Union member 211 49.1 185 61.5 26 20.2
Participant in profit sharing 331 77 220 73.1 111 86
Participant in SAYE 247 57.4 140 46.5 107 82.9
1 N=430 2N=301 3N=129
Table 6.1 summarizes the characteristics of those who were included in the study. When
asked to specify their job status, the respondents reported: senior managers (5.8%), middle
managers (17.7%), junior or supervisory managers (6.5%), clerical or secretarial employees
(6%), technical employees (7.9%), and 'other' (56%). The table shows that 64.7% were full-
time employees, 82.7% had been with the company for two years or longer, 49.1% were
union members, 77% participated in profit sharing, and 57.4% participated in SAYE
schemes. Regarding personal characteristics, 41.9% were male, 94.9% had completed at least
their secondary school education. When asked to specify their highest education level, the
following was reported: some primary school (0.5%), some secondary school (4.7%),
completed secondary school (53%), some university or technical training beyond secondary
school (29.8%), bachelor's degree (11.2%), master's degree (0.7%), and doctoral degree
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As can be seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, by comparing the proportion of managers and non-
managers in the sample to that in the total population, it is immediately apparent that 
managers are greatly over-represented; although they comprise only 1.56% of the company's 
employees, they comprise 30% of the respondents. Therefore, in all presentations of data in 
this thesis, the responses of managers and non-managers are presented separately. 
As can be seen from Table 6.1, of the non-managerial respondents 8.6% were clerical or 
secretarial employees, 11.3% were technical employees, and 80.1% categorized themselves as 
'other'. The table indicates that 51.5% were full-time employees, 80.1% had been with the 
company two years or longer, 6 1.5% were union members, 73.1% participated in profit 
sharing, and 46.5% participated in SAYE schemes. In terms of personal characteristics, 
37.5% were male, 93.7% completed at least secondary school, 66.4% were married, and 
41.9% were less than 36 years old. 
Of the managerial employees, 19.4% were senior managers, 58.9% were middle managers, 
and 21.7% were junior or supervisory managers. 95.3% were full-time employees, 88.4% had 
been with the company two years or longer, 20.2% were union members, 86% participated in 
profit sharing, and 82.9% participated in SAYE schemes. In terms of personal characteristics, 
51.9% were male, 97.7% completed at least secondary school, 65.9% were married, and 
59.7% were less than 36 years old. 
6.2.4. Measures of the Study Variables 
Questionnaire (attitude survey): In the questionnaire, respondents were presented with a 
series of statements and asked to mention their personal opinions or feelings about each one. 
Heiman (1998) stated that "when you design an interview or questionnaire, your first step 
should be to search the psychological literature for existing questionnaires and tests rather 
than creating your own questions. The advantage of using existing procedures is that their 
reliability and validity have already been established" (p.111). O'Brien (1995) also 
mentioned that comparability and validity are the obvious benefits of using or adopting 
existing scales rather than developing entirely new ones. Therefore, during the questionnaire 
development phase, the researcher attempted to find questionnaire items from existing 
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questionnaires. As the study replicates and extends Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) 
theoretical frameworks, many of the questionnaire items were taken from their studies. Apart 
from Long's and Florkowski's items, some items were adapted from other social science 
studies, such as Lodahi and Kejner (1965); Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979); Hackman and 
Lawler (1971); Patchen (1970); Graen (1966); Annstrong and Murlis (1994); and Walley and 
Wilson, (1992). When the appropriate and reliable scales for the variables being tested could 
not be found from the existing literature, the study developed items to assess attitudes about 
profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. 
Attitudes are measured using a number of different measurement strategies. One is the Likert 
scale, where the respondents say whether they 'strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree' with a series of statements (Arber, 1993). On the research questionnaire, unless 
otherwise indicated, respondents were given 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 ('strongly 
disagree') to 7 ('strongly agree') to record their answers. If otherwise not mentioned, a scale 
for each variable was constructed by averaging the responses across relevant items. Newell 
(1993) stated that "in most questionnaires and interview schedules, both open and closed 
questions will be included. However, when large numbers of individuals are to be studied by 
self-completion questionnaires, it is best to use mainly closed questions" (p. 103). Because in 
this study large numbers of employees were studied, the questionnaire consisted of mainly 
closed questions. Two steps were taken to reduce the possibility that respondents would 
systematically manipulate their answers. First, multiple-item scales were separated and 
scattered throughout the questionnaire. Second, several items were reverse coded. 
A copy of the cover letter and of the questionnaire are displayed in the Appendix. Three 
major sets of variables, namely participation in decision making, job attitudes, and 
organization attributes, will be examined by the analysis of the questionnaire data. Now the 
study variables will be identified and discussed. 
Participation 
Although, in the research studies that used 'participation' as a variable, there are different 
types of definitions and measures of participation, following several authors (Rhenman, 1968; 
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Rus, 1970) Long (1978) defined participation as the amount of influence possessed by 
employees over decisions. Moreover, Long assessed participation at three levels, namely the 
job level, the departmental level, and the organizational level, because Lischeron and Wall's 
(1975) research indicated that workers desire different types and amounts of participation 
depending on the nature of the decisions being made. This study will focus on Long's 
definition and employee influence will be evaluated at the three decision levels. 
Participation in decision making Participation in decision making was measured using 
Long's (1978) three-item (Q.127a,b,c) scale. A score for participation in decision making is 
obtained for each respondent by averaging personal influence reported at each of three 
decision levels, namely job, departmental, and organizational level. The three items are: 
127. How much say or influence do you actually have in decisions about...Q .
(a) overall policies of the company 
(b) matters affecting your own department 
(c) how your own job is done. 
Amount of workers' and personal influence . Long's (1978) three items (Q.125a, b, c) were 
used to measure the amount of influence which the individual perceived workers to possess 
('workers' influence') at the job, departmental, and organizational levels. The responses were 
assessed with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ('no say at all') to 7 ('very great deal'). 
Each respondent was also asked to rate how much say or influence he/she personally had in 
decisions at the three levels ('personal influence') (Q . 127a, b, c). According to Long (1978), 
there are three reasons for posing the question in each way ('workers' ' - 'personal'). First, it 
was done in order to assess whether perceptions of workers' influence or personal influence 
was most important in affecting certain job attitudes. Second, it seemed that workers in 
general may have substantial influence at the organizational level, but few workers would 
personally have much say at this level. Third, it enables comparison of managers' and non-
managers' perceptions of workers' influence, while still measuring the perceived personal 
influence of both groups. 
Decisional Deprivation. Long (1978) suggested that apart from the absolute level of influence 
which is perceived to exist, it is useful to know whether there is as much influence as the 
respondent feels there should be. Following Alutto and Belasco (1972), Long outlined a 
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procedure which involves computing the discrepancy between desired level of participation 
and actual level of participation. He describes 'decisional deprivation' as a situation where an 
individual has less participation than desired, and 'decisional saturation' as a situation where 
an individual has more participation than desired. 
On the same 7-point scale, respondents were asked to rate how much workers' influence 
(Q.126a, b, c) and personal influence (Q.128a, b,c) should exist at the job, departmental, and 
organizational levels. A workers' and a personal deprivation score were derived by 
subtracting actual levels from desired levels. The respondents who reported saturation will be 
treated separately. 
Participativeness. As numerous authors (Pennings, 1976; Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, 
Vianello, and Wieser, 1974) make a distinction between amount of influence and what they 
call 'participativeness' of the supervisor, Long (1978) used several measures of 
'participativeness'. 
'Supervisor style' was measured using Long's (1978) three-item scale (items 65a to 65c). The 
scale included items such as "my line manager encourages subordinates to speak up when 
they disagree with a decision". Question 65b is reverse coded. The items were averaged to 
form a scale. 
A final set of measures aimed to gather information about the degree to which employee 
participate in decisions about changes which would affect them. Long's (1978) four-item 
scale (items 132a to 132c) was used to measure 'participation in job changes'. A score for 
participation in job changes was obtained for each respondent by averaging across the four 
items. Respondents were given 5-item Likert scales, ranging from 1 ('never') to 5 ('almost 
always'), to record their answers. 
Long's (1978) slightly reworded version of the above question (items 133a to 133d) was used 
to measure 'employee influence of departmental change'. These four questions were averaged 





The following demographic variables were collected from respondents for the purpose of 
control: 1) sex of respondent (Q.1); 2) marital status (Q.2); 3) education level (Q.3); 4) tenure 
with organization (Q.4); 5) age (Q.5); 6) present job status (Q.6); 7) income (Q.7); 8) 
full/part-time employee (Q.8); 9) union status (Q.9). 
Job Attitudes 
The following job attitudes are considered in this study. 
Integration. Integration (items 68, 79, and 123) was measured using a three-item scale. While 
two items (Q.68, 79) were adopted from Long (1978), one item (Q.123) was developed 
specifically for this study. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 
such items as "what is good for the company is good for me". For each respondent the scale 
result was obtained by computing the mean response on the three items. 
InvolvementS Involvement (items, 40, 46, 57, 89, 92, 94, 95, and 97) was measured using 
Long's (1978) two-item scale (Q.89, 95), and Lodahi and Kejner's (1965) six-item scale 
(Q.40, 46, 57, 92, 94, 97). Item 92 was reverse coded. The scale result was derived by 
computing the average response for each respondent for the eight items. 
Commitment S Organizational commitment (items, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 99, 114, 115, 116, 
117, 118, 119, 120, 121, and 122) was measured using Long's (1978) one-item scale (Q.90), 
Florkowski's (1989) 13-item scale (Q . 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 originally 
adopted from Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian, 1974; Q . 84, 86, 87, and 99 adopted from 
Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian, 1974; Mowday, Steers, and Porter 1979), and Mowday, 
Steers, and Porter's (1979) six-item scale (Q . 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, and 99). These scales 
included items such as "I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar". 
Items 90, 99, 116, 117, 119, 121, and 122 were reverse coded. A score for overall 




General satisfaction (with the job and the company). General satisfaction (items, 41, 52, 69, 
81, and 108) was measured using Long's (1978) three-item (Q.41, 69, and 81) scale and 
Hackman and Lawler's (1971) two-item (Q.52 and 108) scale. These scales included items 
such as "overall, the company is a good place to work for". Items 41 and 81 were reverse 
coded. A score for general satisfaction was obtained for each respondent by averaging across 
the five items. 
MotivationS Motivation (items 36, 45, 55, 66, 76, and 134) was measured using a six-item 
scale. The items were adopted from Long (1978) (Q.55, 76, and 134) and Hackman and 
Lawler (1971) (Q.36. 45, and 66). This scale consisted of items such as "I feel bad when I do 
my job poorly". The scale result was derived by computing the average response for each 
respondent for the six items. 
Perceived pay equity Perceived pay equity (items, 135, 136, 137, 138, and 139) was 
measured using Florkowski's (1989) two items (Q.137 and 139), which are based on Rhodes' 
(1978) adaptation of the inequity-of-pay scale used by Caplan, Cabb, French, Harrison, and 
Pinneau (1975), and three more items (Q . 135, 136, and 138) were created especially for this 
study. The scale includes items such as "when considering my skills and the level of effort I 
put into my job, I get paid. . .". A 5-point Likert scale was supplied with answers ranging 
from 1 ('very much less than I should get') to 5 ('more than I should get'). The mean item 
response for each respondent was used as the perceived pay equity score. 
Perceived influence on decision making. Perceived influence on decision making (items 140a, 
140b, 141a, 141b, 142a, 142b, 143a, 143b) was measured using Florkowski's (1989) eight-
item scale adapted from Van de Ven and Ferry (1980). A 5-point Likert scale was supplied 
with answers ranging from 1 ('no influence') to 5 ('extensive influence'). The scale result 
was derived by computing the average response for each respondent for the eight items. 
Job satisfactionS In order to assess how satisfied respondents were with their work, 
supervisor, co-employees, earnings, previous career progress, and future chances for career 
advancement, Florkowski's (1989) six-item scale (items, 124a-f) (drawn from Van de Ven 




('very unsatisfied') to 5 ('very satisfied'). Respondent scores were computed from the six 
items. 
Support for profit sharing . Florkowski's (1989) seven-item scale (items 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 
23, and 25) was used to assess how strongly respondents support profit sharing and its 
underlying principles. Items 15, 19, and 23 were reverse coded. A score for plan support was 
obtained for each respondent by averaging across the seven items. The scale included items 
such as "profit sharing is one of the best ways for employees to benefit from the company's 
financial success". 
Support for SAYE• A three-item scale (Q.18, 24, and 26) was constructed to determine how 
strongly respondents support SAYE schemes and its underlying principles. The following 
three items were created for this study: 
Q.1 8. SAYE schemes encourage me to do my job well. 
Q.24. All in all, I am very happy with the SAYE scheme, as it carries no risk. 
Q.26. The SAYE scheme increases my commitment to the goals of the company. 
Employee scores were computed from questions 18 and 26. Although one other question 
(Q.24) originally was included in the alternate versions of this scale, it subsequently was 
deleted because the scale reliability improved with its omission. 
Satisfaction with FS/SA YE In order to evaluate how satisfied respondents were with profit 
sharing and SAYE schemes, a three-item scale (Q.16, 22, and 27) was constructed. The 
following three items were created for this study: 
Q.16. It is very important to me that the company has profit sharing and SAYE 
schemes. 
Q.22. Generally speaking, I am satisfied with profit sharing and SAlE schemes. 
Q.27. Participating in profit sharing arid SAlE schemes makes me more interested in 
the company's financial success. 





General interest in the Job S General interest in the job (item 144) was measured using 
Patchen's (1970) one item, which is "on most days on your job, how often does time seem to 
drag for you?". The response is assessed with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ('about 
half the day or more') to 5 ('time never seems to drag'). 
Interest in innovation. Interest in innovation (items 145 through 150) was measured using 
Patchen's (1970) six-item scale. The scale included items such as "in your kind of work, if a 
person tries to change his usual way of doing things, how does it generally turn out?". 
Although the words change in terms of the question, the responses are assessed with a 5-point 
Likert scale. For instance, for the above question answers could range from 1 ('usually turns 
out worse') to 5 ('usually turns out better'). A score for interest in innovation was obtained 
for each respondent by averaging across the six items. 
Pride in job accomplishmentS Pride in job accomplishment (items 151, 152) was measured 
using Patchen's (1970) two-item scale. The scale included items such as "how often do you 
feel really proud of something you have done on the job?". The responses were measured 
with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ('about once a month or less') to 5 ('almost every 
day'). Employee scores were computed from the two items. 
Aspects of Satisfaction 
In order to better understand the essence of employee satisfaction, five specific aspects of 
satisfaction were measured in the study: satisfaction with compensation, social satisfaction, 
satisfaction with the work itself, with promotion, and with supervisor. 
Satisfaction with compensation In order to evaluate how satisfied respondents were with 
compensation. Long's (1978) three-item scale (items 39, 72, and 107) was used. The scale 
included items such as " considering my skills and the effort I put into my work I am satisfied 
with my pay". Although a three-item scale was used, employee scores were computed from 
questions 72 and 107. The question 39 originally was included in the alternate versions of this 





Social satisfaction • Satisfaction with social relationships and opportunities for friendship 
within the company was measured with four items (Q . 44, 61, 102, and 112). Of these four 
items, two items (Q.102 and 112) were adapted from Long (1978) and two items (Q.44 and 
61) were created especially for this study, which are: 
"I am very proud to work with my work group." 
"There are high opportunities to establish and develop close friendship in my job." 
Employee scores were computed from these four questions. One other question (Q.38) was 
created for this study in order to measure social satisfaction. However, it subsequently was 
omitted to improve scale reliability. 
Satisfaction with workS Satisfaction with work itself (items 56, 81, and 96) was measured 
using Long's (1978) three-item scale. This scale included items such as "in working for the 
company, I get a lot of chances to do what I am best at". The scale result was derived by 
computing the average response for each respondent for the three items. 
Satisfaction with promOtiOfl Satisfaction with promotion opportunities (item 110) was 
measured using Long's (1978) one-item scale. The item was "there are good chances for 
getting ahead in the company". Although one more item (Q.11l) from Graen (1966) was used 
to measure this variable, it was subsequently deleted because of low reliability. 
Satisfaction with supervisor Satisfaction with supervisor (items 71, 100, and 106) was 
measured by three items, of which one is from Long (1978) (Q.106), one is from Graen 
(1966) (Q.lOO), and the other was especially created for this study (Q.71), which is "I am 
satisfied with the amount of respect and fair treatment I receive from my line manager". A 
score for satisfaction with supervisor was obtained for each respondent by averaging across 
the three items. 
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Other Perceptions and Attitudes 
Finally, six other perceptions and attitudes were measured, namely performance-reward 
contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, concern for performance of others, 
perceived task interdependencies, job security, and attitude towards change. 
Performance-reward contingencies The belief that good individual performance will lead to 
reward was measured using Long's (1978) three-item scale (items 101, 109, and 110) and 
Florkowski's (1989) (from Lawler, Seashare, and Cammann, 1975) five-item scale (items 37, 
51, 58, 62 and 67). The scale included items such as "the amount of pay I receive depends 
heavily on how well I perform my job". Employee scores were computed from the following 
questions: 51, 58, 62, 67, 101, 109, and 110. Question 34 was omitted to improve scale 
reliability. 
Effort-performance contingencies The belief that increased personal effort would lead to 
improved performance is measured using Long's (1978) one-item scale (item 103) and three 
other items (items 43, 47, and 80), which were developed especially for this study. Only 
Long's item was used to measure the variable. The three questions which were created for 
this study were deleted because of low reliability. Long's item is "on my type of job, the 
amount of work that gets done depends mostly on how much effort I put into my work". 
Concern for others' performance Concern for others' performance (items 75, 77, and 78) 
was measured using Long's (1978) three items. It was originally intended to average these 
items to form a scale, but, as in Long's (1978) study, the intercorr1ations between these 
items turned out to be low. Therefore, results will be presented separately for each item. 
Question 75, "as long as I am doing a good job, poor performance by other employees does 
not matter much to me", was reverse coded. 
Perceived task interdependencies The degree to which tasks in the organization are judged to 
be interdependent is measured using Long's (1978) one-item scale (item 49), which is "in my 
department most jobs are pretty much one-person jobs - not requiring much contact with 
others". 
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 Job security . The extent to which individuals feel that they are secure in their jobs was 
measured using three items. Questions were adapted from several sources, including Long 
(1978) (Q.64), Armstrong and Murlis (1994) (Q.105), and Graen (1966) (Q.113). The scale 
included items such as "I feel confident that I will have my job here for as long as I want it". 
The scale result was derived by computing the average response for each respondent for the 
three items. 
Attitude towards change Attitude towards organizational change was measured using Long's 
(1978) two-item scale (items 50 and 70). The scale included items such as "changes in the 
company always seem to create more problems than they solve". Two items were reverse 
coded. A score for attitude towards change was obtained for each respondent by averaging 
across the two items. 
Organization Attributes 
The study examined five perceived attributes of the organization, namely, cooperation, 
communication, group work norms, organizational trust, and worker commitment to 
organizational goals. 
Cooperation Two types of cooperation were measured, namely interpersonal and 
interdepartmental. Interpersonal cooperation was measured using Long's (1978) two-item 
scale (items 93 and 98). One more item (item 63 from Walley and Wilson, 1992) was used to 
measure the variable, but it subsequently was deleted to improve scale reliability. Long's 
scale included items such as "the people in my department cooperate with one another very 
well". Employee scores were computed from Long's two items. 
Interdepartmental cooperatipn was measured using two items (Q.48 and 91). The items were 
adapted from Long (1978) (Q.48) and Walley and Wilson (1992) (Q.91). Due to low 
reliability, only Long's item (Q.48) was used as a measure of interdepartmental cooperation. 






Communication S Long's (1978) one-item scale (item 104) was used to measure perceived 
communication between management and employees. The item is "communication between 
management and employees is good in the company". 
Group work norms • The study measured two types of group work norms, which are (a) the 
extent to which the work group provided rewards for good performance, (b) the extent to 
which the group provided sanctions for poor performance. 
Group provided rewards for good performance was measured using Long's (1978) two-item 
scale (items 53a, b).The scale consisted of the following items: 
The following questions ask what happens when you work very hard... 
You will gain respect from co-workers. 
You will receive better treatment by co-workers. 
Employees' scores were computed from the two items. 
Group provided sanctions for poor performance was measured using Long's (1978) two-item 
scale (items 54a,c). The items were: 
The following questions ask what happens when you do not work very hard... 
You will lose friends at work. 
You will have pressure from co-workers to work harder. 
The scale result was derived by computing the average response for each respondent for the 
two items. 
Organizational trust S Long's (1978) two-item scale (items 59 and 60) was used to measure 
the trust of the organization and the people in it. Employees' scores were computed from the 
two items. 
Worker Commitment to Goals Worker commitment to organizational goals was measured 
using Long's (1978) one item (Q.73), which is "employees in this company are very strongly 
committed to the goals of this company". 
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6.2.5. Sample Reliability for the Scale of Variables 
The reliability of a scale refers to its consistency. Internal reliability is particularly important 
when multiple item scales are used. The level of internal consistency reliability of scales 
raises the question of whether each scale is measuring a single idea and hence whether the 
items that form the scale are internally consistent (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The level of 
reliability for a given scale creates an upper limit on the extent to which that scale can 
correlate with other variables. Therefore, scales of low reliability may hinder relationships 
which in fact exist from being found. In other words, scales of low reliability will understate 
the relationships which are explored, and one should know that for this reason the true 
relationship will be stronger than the relationship which is reported. 
Table 6.3 displays sample reliability coefficients for the study variables. Since interval scales 
were used for responses, the widely used Cronbach's coefficient alpha was used to assess 
internal consistency (Gatewood and Field, 1987; Norusis, 1992; Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
While higher cutoffs, such as .80, are accepted as the rule of thumb (Bryman and Cramer, 
1997) especially in employment selection and other applied settings, Nunally (1978) stated 
that reliability as low as .70 is normally acceptable in basic research. 
As can be seen from Table 6.3, although there are 36 variables in total, the reliability 
coefficients could be measured for 28 of them since they are measured with multiple-item 
scales. For the remaining eight variables, with the exception of the one about concern for 
others' performance, the reliability coefficients could not be measured as they were measured 
with only one item. The reliability coefficients for the ten variables, namely perceived pay 
equity, perceived influence on decision making, commitment, group work norms (for good 
performance), employee influence in departmental changes, participation in job changes, 
satisfaction with supervisor, performance-reward contingencies, participation in decision 
making, and general satisfaction, exceeded .80. The aiphas of the five variables, including job 
security, interest in innovation, motivation, involvement, and satisfaction with compensation, 
were between .78 and .80, while those for job satisfaction, organizational trust, supervisor's 


























Table 6.3. Characteristics of Attitudinal Variables on the Survey
Variable Number Source Sample
of Items Alpha
Integration 3 (2) Long (1978) .671
(1) Created for this study
Involvement 8 (2) Long (1978) .781
(6) Lodahi & Kejner (1965)
Commitment 16 (1) Long (1978) .896
(9) Porter, Steers, Mowday, &
Boulian (1974); Florkowski
(1989)
(6) Mowday, Steers, & Porter (1979)
General Satisfaction 5 (3) Long (1978) .803
(2) Hackman & Lawler (1971)
Satisfaction with 2 (2) Long (1978) .781
Compensation *
Social Satisfaction* 4 (2) Long (1978) .707
(2) Created for this study
Satisfaction with Work 3 (3) Long (1978) .738
(Itself)
Satisfaction with 1 (1) Long (1978) -
Promotion
Satisfaction with 3 (1) Long (1978) .844
Supervisor (1) Graen (1966)
(1) Created for this study
Job Satisfaction 6 (6) Van de Ven & Ferry (1980); .772
Florkowski (1989)
Motivation 6 (3) Long (1978) .787
(3)Hackman & Lawler (1971)
Participation in Decision 3 (3) Long (1978) .820
Making
General Interest in the Job (1) (1) Patchen (1970)
Interest in Innovation (6) (6) Patchen (1970) .790
Pride in Job (2) (2) Patchen (1970) .527
Accomplishment
Performance Reward (7) (3) Long (1978) .804
Contingencies* (4) Lawler, Seashore, & Cammann
(1975); Florkowski (1989)
Effort Performance 1 (1) Long (1978)
Contingencies
Concern for Others' 3 (3) Long (1978)
Performance



























Table. 6.3. Characteristics of Attitudinal Variables on the Survey (Continued)
Variable Number Source Sample
of Items Alpha
Job Security 3 (1) Long (1978) .790
(1) Armstrong & Murlis (1994)
(1) Created for the study
Attitude towards Change 2 (2) Long (1978) .636
Cooperation
Interpersonal* 2 (2) Long (1978) .566
-Interdepartmental 1 (1) Long (1978) -**
Communication 1 (1) Long (1978) -**
Group Work Norms
-For good performance* 2 (2) Long (1978) .894
-For poor performance* 2 (2) Long (1978) .637
Organizational Trust 2 (2) Long (1978) .761
Worker Commitment to 1 (1) Long (1978) -**
Goals
Perceived Pay Equity 5 (2) Caplan, Cobb, French, Harrison,
& Pinneau (1975); Florkowski .926
(1989)
(3) Created for the study
Support for PS 7 (7) Florkowski (1989) .587
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE 3 (3) Created for the study .680
Support for SAYE* 2 (2) Created for the study .740
Supervisor's Style 3 (3) Long (1978) .742
Participation in Job 4 (4) Long (1978) .858
Changes
Employee Influence in 4 (4) Long (1978) .868
Departmental Changes
Perceived Influence on 8 (8) Van de Ven & Ferry (1980); .921
Decision Making Florkowski (1989)
* Although on the study questionnaire there was one more item than is shown on the
table, the item was deleted in order to improve the reliability coefficient of the
variable.
* * As the variable was measured by only one item, the reliability coefficient could not be
measured.
* * * Because of low reliability, the items were analysed as separate items.
So, out of 28 variables for which reliability coefficients were measured, 21 had reliability
coefficients that exceed .70. The aiphas of the remaining seven variables, including
satisfaction with PS/SAYE, integration, group work norms (for poor performance), attitude
towards change, support for PS, interpersonal cooperation, and pride in job accomplishment,
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did not meet this threshold. The scales were retained nevertheless because, with the exception 
of satisfaction with PS/SAYE, similar scales were used in other studies (e.g., Patchen, 1970; 
Long, 1978; Florkowski, 1989). The scale of the satisfaction with PS/SAYE, which was 
created especially for this study, was also retained because of the alpha's close proximity to 
.70. It should be noted that although it is true that if the reliabilities of the underlying scales 
increase, correlation coefficients increase in size, the gain is not likely to be dramatic 
(Nunnally, 1978). Consequently, if the .70 cutoff had been strictly enforced, the obtained 
correlations between these and other variables under study would not have been significantly 
larger. 
6.2.6. Analytic Procedure (Statistical Analyses) 
The analytic procedure of the study consisted of two main phases: (a) replication of Long's 
(1978) and Florkowski's (1989) theoretical frameworks, (b) development and analyses of the 
research model. In the first phase, Long's (1978) and Florkowski'(1989) models were tested 
by replicating their statistical analysis. After empirical research of these two theoretical 
models, a new research model was constructed and tested by, again, replicating Long's and 
Florkowski's statistical analysis. In this section the analytic procedures of the replication of 
Long's and Florkowski's models will be explained separately. The statistical analyses used to 
test the research model will be described at the beginning of Chapter Ten. Since the same 
statistical analysis will be used repeatedly, if the aim of using a statistical analysis is 
explained once, instead of making a repetition, just their names will be mentioned for further 
explanations in this section. 
Prior to statistical analysis, all questionnaire data were computer-coded for use with the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows (Norusis, 1992, 1993; 
Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
Statistical Analyses for the Replication of Long's (1978) Theoretical Model 
The overall aim of the following analysis of the questionnaire data was to attempt to draw 
inferences regarding the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on 
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employee job attitudes and other perceptions. The study data collected from a large 
organization will be analyzed using, first, the organization as the unit of analysis, and second, 
the individual as the unit of analysis. 
At the organizational level, perceptions of current levels of participation in decision making, 
job attitudes, and organization attributes will be summarized. According to Long, there are 
several reasons for doing so. First, since levels prior to the introduction of profit sharing and 
employee share ownership schemes are not known, these data, in themselves, are of little 
value in making causal inferences. However, analysis of these data may allow the researcher 
to assess whether current levels are more or less what would be expected on the basis of 
predictions made by the theoretical framework. Second, the current situation of the 
organization may be detected and understood by the assistance of these data. Third, these data 
create a base line against which to compare future attitudes. 
Long (1978) suggested that for managerial and non-managerial employees, this information 
be presented separately for several reasons. First, as discussed before, if managers are 
included with non-managers, they will be over-represented. Second, it will be helpful and 
interesting to compare responses of managerial employees and non-managerial employees on 
items for which the respondents are regarded as informants and asked to give information 
about some attributes of the organization, rather then their personal attitudes. If both groups 
of employees answer in a similar way this allows more confidence to be placed in this 
information. Long (1978) also suggested that the degree of agreement on such items indicates 
something about the relationship between managers and non-managers within the 
organization. To the extent that perceptions of organization attributes differ, this may indicate 
that managers and non-managers are 'out of touch' with one another. Long (1978) argued that 
if the difference is great the relationships between the two groups will be less effective. 
According to Long, the comparison of responses to attitudinal or 'respondent' items will also 
be useful. For example, if the desire of managers for workers' influence are compared to that 
of non-managers, it will be quite informative in explaining actual and future patterns of 
participation. He also found it very interesting to compare differences in job attitudes held by 
managers and non-managers to obtain some understanding of the outlook of each group. The 
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t statistic with a two-tailed test of significance will be used to assess these differences. A one-
tailed test will be used only for the assessment of the differences for which direct predictions 
have been made. 
At the individual level of analysis, differences in job attitudes between non-managerial 
participants of PS/SAYE and shareholders and non-participants of PS/SAYE and non-
shareholders are analysed in an attempt to infer the effects of individual profit sharing and 
SAYE schemes. Long (1978) noted that, unfortunately, this procedure has a number of 
weaknesses. First, since non-participants of PSISAYE and non-shareholders were self-
selected they cannot be regarded as a sufficient control group. From these data alone, it is not 
possible to infer causal directionality because pre-test questionnaire data are not available. 
But, it is possible to assess whether they are consistent with predictions made. If they are not 
consistent this would tend to reject the predictions. 
If the data are consistent, one must still take into account the possibility that the differences 
are caused by other differences between the two groups. Table 6.4 compares participants of 
PS/SAYE and shareholders, and non-participants of PSISAYE and non-shareholders on a 
variety of personal and work-related characteristics. Significant differences between the two 
groups were found for union status (p < .0 1), age, full or part-time employee, job status, and 
tenure (p < .001). 
In order to assess the effects of individual profit sharing and SAYE schemes, while 
controlling for the possibly confounding effects of age, fulllpart-time employee, job status, 
tenure, and union status, partial correlation analysis was used. Profit sharing and SAYE 
schemes were operationalized as a dishotomous dummy variable scored according to whether 
the respondents reported participating in both PS/SAYE and having some company shares 
('1') or not participating in both PS/SAYE schemes and having no company shares ('0'). In 
assessing the effects of participation on the same dependent variables, a similar procedure 
was used. 'Participation in decision making' was operationalized by averaging personal 
influence reported at each of three decision levels, namely job, departmental, and 



































Table 6.4. Comparison of(a) Participants of Both PS/SAYE and Shareholders, and





Male 41.9% 50.8% 1.53/1
Female 58.1% 49.2%
Age
Under 26 4.6% 2 1.3%
26-30 13.8% 23%




Over 50 16.1% 8.2%
Education
Completed secondary school or lower education level 5 1.6% 55.7%
Some university or technical training beyond 0.55/2
secondary school 34.6% 29.5%
Bachelor's degree or higher education level 13.8% 14.8%
Full or Part-time Employee
Full-time employee 75.6% 52.5% 12.24/1****
Part-time employee 24.4% 47.5%
Job Status
Senior management 11.1% 1.6%
Middle or junior/supervisory management 33.6% 14.8% 17.40/3****
Clerical or secretarial 11.5% 13.1%
Technical or other 43.8% 70.5%
Marital Status




Less than two years 0.5% 72.1%
More than two years, less than five years 18.4% 24.6% 197.17/4****
More than live years, less than 10 years 41% 1.6% (A)
More than 10 years, less than 15 years 25.8% -
More than 15 years 14.3% 1.6%
Union Member 50% 29.5% 8.1/1***
1 N=217 2N61 (A)= (.00000 sigrnticance)
***p < .01 ***p<.00l
As a final objective, it will be attempted to determine the relative and possible interactive
effects of the schemes (profit sharing and SAYE) and participation in decision making on
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organizational identification (integration, involvement, and commitment), general 
satisfaction, and motivation. In order to measure the relative effects of the schemes and 
participation on each of the dependent variables, while controlling for other possibly 
confounding variables, a multiple regression procedure was used. However, to use multiple 
regression analysis certain conditions must first be met, a vital one being absence of 
multicollinearity. Multicollienarity occurs when there is a high correlation between 
independent variables (Norusis, 1993) (i.e., PS/SAYE schemes and participation). 
Multicollinearity is usually accepted as a problem because it means that the regression 
coefficients may be unstable. Bryman and Cramer (1997) stated that "in any case, when two 
variables are very highly correlated, there seems little point in treating them as separate 
entities" (p.258). SPSS provides some diagnostic tools that allow one to detect the presence 
of multicollinearity. The tolerance of a variable is a frequently used measure of 
multicollinearity (Norusis, 1993). 'Tolerance' is a statistic which is derived from 1 minus the 
multiple R for each independent variable (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The multiple R for 
each independent variable comprises its correlation with all of the other independent 
variables. Bryman and Cramer (1997) explained that when the tolerance is high, the multiple 
correlation is low and there is no possibility of multicollinearity. The tolerance for PS/SAYE 
schemes and participation is substantially high (.995), suggesting that multicollinearity is 
unlikely. 
In order to assess whether there is a significant interaction effect, a new variable is created by 
multiplying dummy 'PS/SAYE and share ownership' times 'participation in decision 
making', and then inserting this variable into a hierarchically controlled regression procedure 
after insertion of the independent variables. If this variable adds a significant additional 
amount to explanation of the variance in the dependent variables, then it can be said that 
interaction effects exist. 
In this procedure, one further step is necessary. In preliminary analysis, tenure and age were 
found to correlate with the participation of profit sharing and SAYE schemes. As tenure and 
age also tended to correlate with some of the dependent variables they must be controlled for. 
Therefore, tenure first was inserted into the regression equation for each dependent variable. 
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(It was not found necessary to insert both variables because age tended to co-vary strongly 
with tenure.) 
Statistical Analyses for the Replication of Florkowski's (1989) Theoretical Framework 
Florkowski's (1989) hypotheses, which examine the attitudes that affect participant support 
for profit sharing as well as the link between profit sharing support and organizational 
commitment, are tested using path analysis, Pearson correlations, and t-test of mean 
differences. 
While path analysis cannot establish causality (Bryman and Cramer, 1997), it does 
demonstrate the implications of a set of causal assumptions (Kim and Kohout, 1975). The 
analytic procedure is started with a 'full model' of the hypothesized linkages among the 
variables under study. Each endogenous variable is regressed on the subset of variables that it 
is supposed to depend upon. Standardized regression coefficients are used to calculate path 
coefficients, which essentially describe "how many standard deviation units the dependent 
variable will change for a one standard deviation unit change in the independent variable" 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1997, p.257). In order to determine the direct effects and cumulative 
indirect effects that a variable has on other variables in the system, path coefficients are 
combined in accordance with the designated causal flows. The total effects should be equal to 
the correlation coefficients, when the model is completely identified. Differences between the 
two show how much of the bivariate correlations are attributable to causes outside of those 
that have been defined in the model. The formula (l-R 2)2 is simply used to determine the path 
coefficients from all residual causes. 
Next, a 'reduced model' is constructed by deleting paths with coefficients that are not 
statistically significant or meaningful (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973). A second round of 
regressions of the dependent variables is calculated using the remaining variables. As before, 
standardized regression coefficients or betas are used to calculate path coefficients. These 
results and the result of the full model are compared. If the reduced model provides 
comparable or superior approximations of the original correlation matrix, it may take the 
place of the full model. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This is a quantitative research study which used a questionnaire as the data collection method. 
As have all other data collection methods, the questionnaire has some advantages and 
disadvantages. In this chapter the limitations of quantitative research methodology will be 
discussed. First, in order to better understand the limitations of the methodology, the terms 
'methodology' and 'method' will be defined and epistemological origins of two 
methodological paradigms in social research (the quantitative and the qualitative) will be 
reviewed. Secondly, quantitative and qualitative methodologies will be briefly explained to 
understand the logic and characteristics of these two methodologies. Then, the limitations of 
quantitative methodology in general terms and the data collection method (questionnaire) in 
specific terms will be explained. In the methodological literature it is argued that in order to 
minimize the limitation of a single method, two or more methods of data collection can be 
used. This is the essence of 'triangulation'. Therefore, in the final part of this chapter 
'triangulation', 'problems of triangulation', and 'the reasons for using triangulation' will be 
assessed. 
7.1. Conceptual Limitations of Quantitative Research Methodology 
7.1.1. Definitions: Methodology and Method 
Several research methodologies have been introduced and practiced by many social 
researchers, some being unique. The term 'methodology' refers to the way in which 
researchers approach problems and seek answers (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). In the social 
sciences, the term refers to how one conducts research. 
As 'methods' refer to techniques and procedures used in the process of data gathering (Cohen 
and Manion, 1994), the aim of methodology, then, is, in Kaplan's (1973) words: 
to describe and analyse these methods, throwing light on their limitations and resources, 
clarifying their presuppositions and consequences, relating their potentialities to the twilight 
zone at the frontiers of knowledge. It is to venture generalizations from the success of 
particular techniques, suggesting new applications, and to unfold the specific bearings of 
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logica' and metaphysical principles on concrete problems, suggesting new formulations. 
(p.34). 
A 'methodology' is a model which entails theoretical principles as well as a framework that 
presents guidelines about how research is done in the context of a particular paradigm 
(Harding, 1987; Cook and Fonow, 1990; Lather, 1992). In simple terms, for Sarantakos 
(1993), "a methodology translates the principles of a paradigm in a research language, and 
shows how the world can be explained, handled, approached or studied" (p.30). 'Methods' 
refer to the tools or instruments employed by researchers to collect empirical evidence 
(Sarantakos, 1993). 
It is, therefore, helpful to distinguish initially between methodology as the philosophy or 
general principles behind research, and methods as the practice of research in terms of 
strategies and techniques (Hall and Hall, 1996). Kaplan (1973) suggested that the aim of 
methodology is to help us to understand, in the broadest possible terms, not the products of 
scientific inquiry but the process itself. 
7.1.2. Epistemological Origins: Building a Philosophic Vocabulary for Understanding 
Quantitative and Qualitative Methodologies 
Two major theoretical perspectives have ruled the social science scene (Bruyn, 1966; 
Deutscher, 1973). The first, positivism, traces its origins in the social sciences to the great 
theorists and distinct social philosophers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and 
especially to August Comte (1896) and Emile Durkheim (1938, 1951). According to Comte 
positivism was synonymous with science or with positive or observable facts (Stromberg, 
1986). The positivist research orientation considers that science is or should be primarily 
concerned with the explanation and the prediction of observable events (Kincheloe, 1991). 
Maykut and Morehouse (1994) stated that "it is the insistence on explanation, prediction, and 
proof that are the hallmarks of positivism" (p.3). 
The positivistic methodology shifted its discipline from philosophy to science and from 
speculation to the gathering of empirical data. The new methodology was to study positive 
phenomena, that is, phenomena that can be observed by the senses, and to use scientflc 
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methods, namely methods similar to those employed by physical scientists (Sarantakos, 
1993). The term 'positivism' is used by philosophers and social scientists; a residual meaning 
is always present and this stems from an acceptance of natural science as the paradigm of 
human knowledge (Mitchell, 1968). This includes the following connected assumptions 
which have been identified by Giddens (1975). First, the methodological procedures of 
natural science may be directly applied to the social sciences. Positivism here implies a 
particular stance regarding the social scientist as an observer of social reality. Second, the 
end-product of investigations by social scientists can be formulated in terms parallel to those 
of natural science. This means that their analyses must be expressed in 'laws' or 'law-like' 
generalizations of the same type that have been constructed in relation to natural phenomena. 
Positivism here regards scientists as analysts or interpreters of their subject matter. The 
positivist searches the facts or causes of social phenomena apart from the subjective states of 
individuals (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Durkheim (1938) told the social scientist to regard 
social facts, or social phenomena, as 'things' that exercise an external influence on people. 
Cohen and Manion (1994) stated that "positivism may be characterized by its claim that 
science provides us with the clearest possible ideal of knowledge" (J).l2). The scientific 
method starts consciously and deliberately by selecting from the total number of elements in a 
given situation. The elements the researcher concentrates on will naturally be suitable for 
scientific formulation; this implies basically that they will possess quantitative aspects. Their 
main working tool will be the hypothesis, which is a statement showing a relationship (or its 
absence) between two or more of the chosen elements and stated in such a way as to carry 
clear implications for testing (Cohen and Manion, 1994). Researchers then select the most 
appropriate method and put their hypotheses to the test. 
The second major theoretical perspective, which, following Deutscher (1973), Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984) describe as phenomenological, has a long history in philosophy and sociology 
(Husserl, 1913; Bruyn, 1966; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Schutz, 1962, 1967; Psathas, 
1973). Taylor and Bogdan (1984) stated that "the phenomenologist is committed to 
understanding social phenomena from the actor's own perspective. He or she examines how 
the world is experienced. The important reality is what people perceive it to be" (p.2). 
Douglas (1970) mentioned that "the 'forces' that move human beings, as human beings rather 
than simply as human bodies. . . are 'meaningful stuff. They are internal ideas, feelings, and 
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motives" (p.ix). Phenomenological approach is a concentration on understanding the meaning 
events have for persons being studied (Patton, 1991). The phenomenological position regards 
the individual and his or her world as co-constituted (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). 
Since positivists and phenomenologists tackle different types of problems and search 
different types of answers, their research demands different methodologies (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984). Adopting a natural science model of research, the positivists search for causes 
through methods such as questionnaires, inventories, and demography that create data subject 
to statistical analysis (quantitative methods). The phenomenologist searches for 
understanding through qualitative methods such as observation, in-depth interviewing, and 
others that produce descriptive data. In contrast to a natural science approach, the 
phenomenologist endeavour to what Max Weber (1968) called verstehen, "understanding on 
a personal level the motives and beliefs behind people's actions" (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). 
In summary, the quantitative research is based on a positivist position (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994). Positivism refers to a theory of meaning in which a proposition is 
acceptable only if there is a quantitative research method for deciding whether the proposition 
is true or false (Epstein, 1988). The theory requires that all meaningful propositions have to 
be tested by experiment or observation. The ultimate aim of such research is to create 
universal 'laws' of social behaviour analogous to the laws of the physical sciences. 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is based on a phenomenological position (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994). Qualitative research methods assume that by using the principles of 
quantitative research methodologies the subjective dimensions of human experience cannot 
be studied, as they are continuously changing. Instead, as Epstein (1988) stated, "emphasis is 
placed on fully describing and comprehending the subjective meanings of events to 
individuals and groups caught up in them" (p. 186). 
7.1.3. Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology 
In the literature the widely held idea is that there are two methodological paradigms in social 
research: the quantitative and the qualitative (Hammersley, 1992). 
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Quantitative Methodology 
A great deal of organizational research can be described as showing many of the 
characteristics of 'quantitative research' (Podsakoff and Dalton, 1987; Bryman, 1988). The 
principles of this model of the research process resemble closely a 'scientific' approach to the 
conduct of research. A term like 'scientific' is "inevitably vague and controversial but in the 
minds of many researchers and writers on methodology it entails a commitment to a 
systematic approach to investigations, in which the collection of data and their detached 
analysis in relation to a previously formulated research problem are minimal ingredients" 
(Bryman, 1989, p.6). 
Quantitative research refers to the type of research that is based on the methodological 
principles of positivism and neopositivism, and sticks to the standards of strict research 
design created before the research begins (Sarantakos, 1993). The research employs 
quantitative measurement and the use of statistical analysis. 
Some preoccupations in quantitative research: Bryman (1989, 1995) mentioned that there 
are some preoccupations in quantitative research: 
a) Concepts and their measurement: According to Bryman (1989) the starting point for a 
study is a theory about some aspect of organizational functioning. From this theory a specific 
hypothesis (or hypotheses) is created which will be tested. Thus, one portion of the enterprise 
of quantitative research is the need to render observable the concepts which are rooted in the 
hypotheses. The concepts need to be measured in order for the hypothesis to be 
systematically tested. Operationalization or operational definitions often refer to the process 
of translating concepts into measures. The measures are considered as variables, that is, 
attributes on which people, organization, or whatever show variability. There is always a 
perception that "a measure is likely to be a relatively imperfect representation of the concept 
with which it is purportedly associated, since any concept may be measured in a number of 
different ways, each of which will have its own limitations. In using the number of employees 
as a measure of organizational size, for example, a researcher may fail to encapsulate other 
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aspects of this concept which would be addressed by other measures such as turnover, assets 
and so on" (Bryman, 1989, pp.7-8). 
b) Causality: Quantitative research is often highly preoccupied with developing the causal 
relationships between concepts. This concern can be regarded as a transposing of what are 
deemed to be the ways of the natural sciences to the study of society. Davis (1985) stated that 
"social research aims to develop causal propositions supported by data and logic" (p. 10). This 
preoccupation with the demonstration of causal effects is often mirrored in the frequent use of 
the terms 'independent variable' and 'dependent variable' by quantitative researchers. The 
term 'cause' is frequently used to denote that something determines something else. This is 
regarded by Bryman (1989) as an inappropriate connotation, "since size, for example, does 
not determine organization structure. Other variables, such as technology, are known to 
impinge on structure, so that variation in the latter cannot be wholly attributed to size" (p.8). 
Therefore, the ability to establish cause-and-effect relationships is a major preoccupation 
among researchers employing experimental and social survey designs. 
c) Generalization: A third preoccupation is generalization; that is, the findings of a particular 
investigation can be generalized beyond the confines of the research location. In social survey 
research, the issue of generalizability manifests itself in an emphasis on how far the samples 
on which research is conducted are representative of a larger population. Mainly, the concern 
is to prove that results can be legitimately generalized to a wider population of which the 
sample is representative. If results have some generality beyond the particular and possibly 
idiosyncratic boundaries of a particular study, the quantitative researcher is moving nearer to 
the law-like findings of the sciences. 
d) Replication: Bryman (1995) stated that "the replication of established findings is often 
taken to be a characteristic of the natural sciences" (p.3 7). The belief in the importance of 
replication to scientists has resulted in a view among quantitative researchers that such 
activities should be an ingredient of the social sciences too. Quantitative research, therefore, 
shows a concern that investigations should be capable of replication. This means that it 
should be possible for a researcher to use the same procedures as those used in another study 
to check on the validity of the initial research. Replication can act as a check to establish 
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whether a set of findings is applicable to other contexts. In this sense, the issue of replication 
is often related to the focus of the generalization. A second rationale for emphasizing the 
replicability of research is to ensure that the biases and predictions of investigators can be 
checked, by allowing their findings to be verified. If the same research design and 
measurement procedures can be used by someone else, confidence in the main findings can 
be improved. 
e) Individualism: Finally, quantitative research tends to consider the individual as the focus 
for empirical investigation. Writing about what he calls 'instrumental positivism', Bryant 
(1985) has mentioned the tendency for the individual to be the centre of focus for researchers. 
In large part, this focus stems from the fact that survey instruments are administrated to 
individuals as main objects of investigation. Their responses are then aggregated to establish 
overall measures for the sample. There is no need that individuals should know each other, 
only that their survey responses can be added up. 
Qualitative Methodology 
Qualitative research alms to discover "what kinds of things people are doing, what kinds of 
processes are at work, what kinds of meanings are being constructed, what kinds of purposes 
and goals inform the participants' act, and what kinds of problems, constraints, and 
contingencies they see in the worlds they occupy" (Dawson et al., 1991, p.244). In the 
literature other terms used to refer to qualitative research processes are 'normative', 
'naturalism', 'naturalistic inquiry', or 'inductive'. Bogdan and Taylor (1975) define 
qualitative research this way: 
Qualitative methodologies refer to research procedures which produce descriptive data: 
people's own written or spoken words and observations. This approach directs itself at 
settings and the individuals within those settings holistically; that is, the subject of the study, 
be it an organization or an individual, is not reduced to an isolated variable or to an 
hypothesis, but is viewed instead as part of a whole (p.4). 
Bryman (1995) defines qualitative methodology as "an approach to the study of the social 
world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their 
groups from the point of view of those being studied" (p.46). According to Denzin and 
Lincoln (1998) "qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, 
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naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them" (p.3). In other words, as Epstein (1988) defines it, qualitative 
research tries to fully describe and comprehend the subjective meanings of events to 
individuals and groups. Qualitative researchers emphasize the socially constructed nature of 
reality, the intimate relationship between the investigator and what is investigated, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
Fundamentally, qualitative research aims to preserve the form and content of human 
behaviour and to analyse its qualities, rather than subject it to mathematical or other formal 
transformations (Lindlof, 1995). Anderson and Meyer (1988) stated that "qualitative research 
methods are distinguished from quantitative methods in that they do not rest their evidence on 
the logic of mathematics, the principle of numbers, or the methods of statistical analysis" 
(p.247). The raw materials of analysis in a qualitative research are actual talk, gesture, and 
other social action. The qualitative researcher attempts to elicit what is important to 
individuals as well as their interpretations of the environments in which they work through 
in-depth investigations of individuals and their milieus. Participant observation and 
unstructured or semi-structured interviewing are two of the most prominent methods of data 
collection associated with the qualitative approach to organizational research. Each requires 
satisfactorily prolonged contact with the people being investigated and each is somewhat 
unstructured in that the researcher seeks to constrain the individual as little as possible 
(Bryman, 1989). 
The characteristics of qualitative research: Bryman (1995) mentioned some of the chief 
characteristics of qualitative research: 
a) 'Seeing through the eyes of. . .': The most important characteristic of qualitative research 
is its express commitment to seeing events, action, norms, values, etc. from the perspective of 
the people who are being studied. Qualitative researchers experience reality as others 
experience it (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Blumer (1969) explains it this way: 
To try to catch the interpretive process by remaining aloof as a so-called 'objective' observer 
and refusing to take the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism- the 
objective observer is likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his own surmises in 
place of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting unit which uses it. 
(p.86) 
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b) Descriptive: One of the main aims of qualitative research style is to provide detailed 
descriptions of the social settings they investigate. 
c) Contextualism: Qualitative researchers exhibit a preference for contextualism in their 
commitment to understanding events, behaviour, etc. in their context. The main message that 
qualitative researchers convey is that "whatever the sphere in which data are being collected, 
we can understand events only when they are situated in the wider social and historical 
context" (Bryman, 1995, p.65). 
d) Process: There is an absolute longitudinal element built into much qualitative research, 
which is both a symptom and cause of an understanding to see social life in processual, rather 
than static, terms. 
e) Flexibility and Lack of Structure: Qualitative research has not been as refined and 
standardized as other research approaches. Qualitative researchers are flexible in how they go 
about organizing their studies. Taylor and Bogdan (1984) regard the qualitative researcher as 
a craftperson. The qualitative social scientists are persuaded to be their own methodologists 
(Mills, 1959). Consequently, they tend to prefer a research strategy which is relatively open 
and unstructured, rather than one which has decided in advance exactly what ought to be 
studied and how it should be done. 
J) Theory and Concepts: Qualitative researchers often do not accept the formulation of 
theories and concepts in advance of beginning their fieldwork. Especially, they regard the 
imposition of a pre-ordained theoretical framework as deleterious because it may excessively 
pressurize the investigator and also may show a poor fit with participants' perspectives. By 
and large, qualitative researchers prefer an approach in which the formulation and testing of 
theories and concepts continue with data collection. As Taylor and Bogdan (1984) mention, 
qualitative researchers develop concepts, insights, and understanding from patterns in the 
data, rather than gathering data to test preconceived models, hypotheses, or theories. 
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Moreover, Taylor and Bogdan (1984) pointed out the following characteristics of qualitative 
methodology: 
1. Qualitative researchers look at settings and people holistically; people, settings, or groups 
are not reduced to variables, but are regarded as a whole. 
2. In qualitative methodology the researchers are sensitive to their impacts on the people 
they study. 
3. In qualitative research, the researcher's own beliefs, perspectives, and predispositions are 
suspended or set aside. 
4. The qualitative researcher regards all perspectives as valuable. 
5. Qualitative methods are humanistic. 
6. Qualitative researchers concentrate on validity in their research. 
7. In a qualitative study, all settings and people are worthy of study. 
7.1.4. Limitations (Critiques) of Quantitative Methodology 
The statistical and/or numerical representation of the social world is not without problems 
and critics (May, 1997). The critique of purely quantitative research has a long history, 
starting in the 1950s (Silverman, 1997). Shipman (1988) stated that "indeed, if you are afraid 
of being hammered by critics, don't engage in quantitative research and spell out the methods 
used" (p.23). Many writers of varied origin and background have criticized quantitative 
research. This critique, as Sarantakos (1993) pointed out, has been systematically mentioned 
in the words of philosophers and social critics from the schools of philosophical hermeneutics 
(e.g., Gadamer, 1960); of Husserl's phenomenology (Husserl, 1950, and Schuetz, 1969); the 
school of symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology (Cicourel, 1970); and by Marxists and 
feminists and the followers of qualitative methodology. Such criticisms reflected a basic 
dissatisfaction with a number of elements of quantitative research, some being related to 
methodological practices and others to theoretical principles. 
In his book, Sarantakos (1993) presented Girtler's (1984) critique against positivism mainly 
from a qualitative stance, with some other authors' criticisms (Konegen and Sondergeld, 
1985; Lamnek, 1988; Hughes, 1990; Brieschke, 1992; Collins, 1992). These criticisms and 
some additional criticisms (e.g., Kerlinger, 1973; Bulmer, 1984; Bryman, 1989; Marsh, 1982; 
Sayer, 1992; Mays and Pope, 1996; May, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) will now be 
presented: 
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- Social phenomena exist not as positivism argues outside but in the interpretations of 
individuals. 
- Reality cannot be defined objectively as positivists argue, but should rather be interpreted as 
social action. Objectivity can also result in technocratic and bureaucratic dehumanisation 
(Brieschke, 1992). 
- Cicourel (1964) drew attention to how the choice of a purely mathematical logic can ignore 
the commonsense reasoning used by both participants and researchers. Instead of attending to 
the social construction of meaning, quantitative research, it is argued, employs a set of ad hoc 
procedures to define, count and analyse its variables (Silverman, 1997). As surveys are too 
statistical and reduce crucial questions to totally incomprehensible numbers, De Vaus (1993) 
stated that "statistics should be the servant rather than the master of the survey analyst" (p.9). 
Therefore, the over-emphasis positivists place on quantitative measurement is regarded as 
wrong and unjustifiable, for it cannot precisely explain the real meaning of social behaviour. 
Quantification often leads to 'meanings' that are closer to the beliefs of the investigators than 
to those of the respondents. For Sayer (1992), context-dependent actions or properties such as 
attitudes might therefore be regarded as unsuitable for quantification. If the researchers do 
insist on quantifying them they should at least be extremely wary of how the results are 
interpreted. 
- Using hypotheses thought by positivists to be correct is problematic for many reasons and 
also because it decides the process of the study at the outset and restricts the options of 
questions and responses, pressurizing the respondents into giving opinions which they might 
otherwise have not pronounced. 
- Quantitative researchers restrict experience in two ways: first by directing research to what 
is perceived by the senses; and second by using only standardised tools, based on quantifiable 
data, to test hypotheses. 
- Quantitative researchers abstract from the everyday social world and seldom examine it 
directly (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). They seek a nomothetic or etic science based on 
probabilities stemming from the study of large numbers of randomly selected cases. These 
types of statements stand above and outside the constraints of everyday life. Quantitative 
research seems to assume that human action is determined by external forces and ignore the 
role of human consciousness, goals, intentions, and values as important sources of action (Dc 
Vaus, 1993). Therefore, quantitative research is incapable of approaching the meaningful 
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aspects of social action (Marsh, 1982). Taylor (1978) believes that questionnaire items are 
fundamentally incapable of considering 'social reality as characterised by intersubj ective and 
common meanings'. So, quantitative research cannot distinguish between appearance and the 
essence of social events, thereby confusing the two, indicating no interest in essence, and in 
the end regarding appearance as reality. 
- Quantitative methodology uses a theoretical perspective and a form of research that supports 
the status quo and existing power structures. 
- In quantitative research, methods are thought to be the most important element of the 
research process: they are more important than the research objects; research is conducted by 
means of already established methods; methods decide what is allowed to be studied; 
methods decide what is experience. As a result, research is limited to what can be investigated 
through the existing methods; what is not investigated through quantitative methods is 
insignificant; is not worth studying; is not considered. Instead of attempting to adapt methods 
to reality, reality is adopted to methods. 
- Quantitative research regards reality as a sum of measured or measurable attributes, and its 
main aim is the quantification and measurement of this reality. In general, quantitative 
method attempts to show causal relations between variables, a strategy which is simply not 
applicable to the world of human action which is rule-following, not 'caused' (Williams, 
1997). However, De Vaus (1993) stated that "surveys cannot adequately establish causal 
connections between variables" (j).7). Cicourel's (1964) criticism is directed against attempts 
to develop a scale with ordinal and interval properties from social data; the researchers have 
to be able to prove that the thing that they are measuring has the properties that they are 
trying to measure; rather than just assume that it does. 
- Quantitative research tries to neutralise the researchers or to reduce or eliminate as much as 
possible their impact on the researched, to the extent that they become 'disembodied 
abstractions' and depersonalised (Collins, 1992). 
- Quantitative research accepts natural sciences as a model. However, such an idea is feasible 
neither in their theoretical perception of reality, nor in their methodological approach 
(Konegen and Sondergeld, 1985). The methods of natural sciences are not suitable for social 
researches. Sarantakos (1993) stated that: 
Firstly, natural sciences operate in isolation, that is, to dissect the research object into elements 
and analyse them in parts; social sciences do not. Secondly the natural sciences try to quantif' 
the experience and to reproduce the findings through repetition of the research; this should not 
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be the guide for social sciences. Finally, natural sciences assume a nomological regularity 
behind the natural process, which does not exist in society (p.43). 
- As quantitative research works on the principles of natural sciences (i.e., objectivity, 
neutrality), research objects are regarded as scientific objects and treated as such. 
Respondents are, therefore, treated as objects and as procedures of data or information. But 
social sciences are not natural sciences, and respondents are not objects but partners and 
'experts' whose opinions are sought. 
- In quantitative research, respondents' motivations and abilities vary widely, and this 
variation can affect results (Dawson et al., 1991). With survey data and especially the self-
administered questionnaire, motivation is a crucial factor in getting all questions answered. 
Since this answering process requires substantial energy on the part of the subjects, 
motivational levels must be kept high. 
- Quantitative researchers attempt to achieve objectivity in their research, which they regard 
as one of the most important properties of social research, and use several methods to achieve 
it, such as standardization. Sarantakos (1993) stated that this is criticised by qualitative 
researchers in three ways: 
(1) Objectivity is not possible. Standardization and distance from the research object does not 
guarantee objectivity because the perceptions and meanings of the researcher penetrate the 
research process in many ways. A state of objectivity is therefore just an illusion. (2) 
Standardization results in converting the social world under study into an artificial world 
which has nothing in common with the real world. (3) Objectivity is not necessary. The 
personal involvement of the researcher is required in order to help to take the position of the 
respondent and see human life as seen by people themselves. (p.43) 
- The emphasis on interpretation is less mentioned in quantitative research, wherein 
researchers typically decide on the parameters of what is interesting and important to them, 
rather than to their subjects (Bryman, 1989). 
- The research procedure used by the quantitative researchers presupposes a definition of the 
research design, including hypotheses, before the research starts. Consequently, this design 
decides what is relevant and how it will be studied, and decides what is meaningful and 
required, even before the study begins. This limits the options of the research process, hinders 
the work and motivation of the researcher, limits the effectiveness of the research enterprise, 
and creates artificial data, which do not present reality as a whole. 
- In quantitative research, there is a principle of distance between the researcher and the 
subject (the researched) (Bryman, 1989), and quantitative researchers try to maintain this 
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relationship at all costs (Sarantakos, 1993). One way is to hire assistants, interviewers, 
observers, etc. The result is that "the researchers are rather removed from the research 
process, lose contact with the researched and become alienated from the world they are 
supposed to study" (Sarantakos, 1993, p.44.). Therefore, for example, in a sample survey it is 
very difficult for the researcher to make sure that the questions, categories, and language used 
in the questionnaire are shared uniformly by respondents (Mays and Pope, 1996). 
- The methods used by quantitative researchers seem to separate the research object from its 
context. Qualitative researchers criticize such procedures and suggest that research must be 
conducted as it unfolds in real life situations, and that the structure and process of social life 
should not be changed by the researcher. 
- Quantitative studies tend to give little attention to context (Bryman, 1989). Surveys, for 
example, just look at particular aspects of people's beliefs and actions without looking at the 
context in which they occur (De Vaus, 1993). Taken out of context the meaning of behaviour 
is easily misunderstood. 
- As the research information ordinarily does not penetrate very deeply below the surface 
(Kerlinger, 1973) the research tends to deal less well with the processual aspects of 
organizational reality (Bryman, 1989). 
- Most quantitative research requires the rigorous preparation of a framework within which 
data are to be gathered (Bryman, 1989). In survey research, this tendency is clear in sample 
selection and, to an even greater extent, in the questionnaire or schedule, which sets out very 
precisely in advance what the researcher can and cannot find. In each case, the confines of 
what can be found are specified at the outset, so that there is rarely any opportunity to change 
the direction of the research, as the structure largely specifies the course of events. In 
quantitative research people do not have the opportunity to challenge ideas on their own 
terms, as the research uses the concept of standardization (Williams, 1997). Moreover, 
Williams (1997) stated that "the myriad of differences in people's attitudes and the meanings 
which they confer on events can hardly be accommodated by compartmentalizing them into 
fixed categories (closed questions) at one point in time (the actual completion of the 
questionnaire)" (p. 104). 
- By and large, quantitative research tends to employ a single data source (Bryman, 1989). 
Additional data are sometimes gathered from company records, but this tends to appear in 
connection with particular variables that are not directly amenable to questioning, such as the 
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widespread use of companies' financial records to provide performance measures in studies 
of strategic management. 
- Survey research is weak on validity and strong on reliability (Babbie, 1986; Dawson et al., 
1991). As surveys are regarded as poor approximations of direct observations (Dawson eta!., 
1991), the measures are not always good indicators of what they are supposed to measure. 
- Survey research needs a good deal of research knowledge and sophistication (Kerlinger, 
1973). Sampling, question and schedule construction, interviewing, the analysis of data, and 
other technical aspects of the survey must be known by the competent survey investigator. As 
such knowledge is hard to come by, few investigators have this kind and amount of 
experience. 
7.2. Limitations of Data Collection 
7.2.1. Methods of Data Collection 
The methods of data collection for social research which are readily available are fairly few in 
number: questionnaire survey, interview, observation, and use of documents and secondary 
data (Hall and Hall, 1996). The decision regarding the method(s) of data collection will be 
affected by many factors but the research methodology that provides the framework for the 
study is one of the most important (Sarantakos, 1993). If the qualitative methodology has 
been chosen, it is very likely that the researcher will choose unobstructive methods of data 
collection. Therefore, the fundamental methods relied on by qualitative researchers for 
collecting data are (1) participation in the setting, (2) direct observation, (3) in-depth 
interviewing, and (4) document review (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995). If the quantitative methodology has been chosen, it is expected to involve 
methods requiring direct participation of the respondents in the study. Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Lowe (1991) distinguish four main ways of gathering quantitative data: 
interviews, questionnaires, test/measures, and observation. Data can also be collected from 
archives and databanks, although this seems more straightforward because data are already in 
existence and do not need to be produced by the researcher in the same way as the responses 
to an interview are created. 
283 
In principle, qualitative methods have the same purpose as quantitative methods, namely to 
gather the data that will provide the basis for further thinking and operation. However, their 
structures are rather different, predominantly since they are established on a theoretical basis 
and are geared towards a methodology, both of which are mainly different (Sarantakos, 
1993). 
In some cases, qualitative and quantitative researchers use different methods. However, in 
most cases, the methods used in both research contexts are similar. Both may use, for 
example, content analysis, interviewing or observation. Nevertheless, in these cases their 
structure and theoretical orientation are different. One method may be designed to be used in 
a quantitative research in one study but in a qualitative research in another. For instance, 
Sarantakos (1993) stated that "interviewing can be designed as a quantitative method (e.g. in 
the form of standardized interviewing) or as a qualitative method (e.g. narrative interviewing 
or intensive interviewing). Similarly, content analysis can be designed as a quantitative 
method or as a qualitative method" (p. 153). 
7.2.2. Limitations or Disadvantages of Questionnaires 
In the methodological literature four general forms of data collection may be distinguished: 
(1) observational methods (controlled observation, noncontrolled observation), (2) survey 
research (mail questionnaires, personal interviews, and telephone interviews), (3) qualitative 
research (participant observation, in-depth interviews, group interviews, other sources), and 
(4) secondary data analysis (Frankfort-Nacbmias and Nachmias, 1996). As the research data 
in this study were collected by questionnaires, the emphasis will now be placed on the 
limitations of this method of collection. 
- The main arguments against using postal questionnaires have generally been that the 
response rate is usually low (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983; Fetterman, 1989; Gilbert, 1993; 
Bailey, 1982, 1994; Hall and Hall, 1996) if they do not engage the respondents' interests or 
the research is not perceived to be of direct value to the respondent (Wilson, 1996). The bulk 
of the discussion about this problem in the methodological literature relates to postal 
questionnaires, which appear to be particularly prone to low response rates (Bryman, 1989). It 
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is often difficult to get an adequate response rate from a postal questionnaire (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). As a result of low returns from postal questionnaires, valid 
generalization calmot be made (Kerlinger, 1973). Although follow-up questionnaires, 
enclosing money, interviewing a random sample of nonrespondents, and analyzing 
nonrespondent data are regarded as means of securing larger returns and reducing 
deficiencies, these methods are costly, time-consuming, and often ineffective (Kerlinger, 
1973). 
- In a mailed questionnaire study the identity of the respondent and the conditions under 
which the questionnaire was answered are not known (Sarantakos, 1993). Researchers do not 
know who has answered a questionnaire (Bryman, 1989; Dawson et al., 1991; Hall and Hall, 
1996). The surveyor, thus, cannot be sure that the right person completes the questionnaire 
(Moser and Kalton, 1971, 1992; Sarantakos, 1993; Bernard, 1994; Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996). When the researcher receives a completed questionnaire, it does not always 
mean that the person they sent it to has filled it out (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983). It could have 
been answered by a secretary, one of the respondent's children, the respondent's spouse, or 
anybody who might have found it and decided to answer the questions. With mail 
questionnaires, researchers also have no control over the respondent's environment 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996); hence there is no assurance that the respondent 
will be able to answer the questions in private (Bailey, 1994). A spouse, parent, or colleague 
might want to see the completed questionnaire and censor it. 
- It is not possible to know whether the question order was followed by respondents 
(Sarantakos, 1993). A masterpiece of question order, created by the researcher to eliminate 
response bias, may be ruined by a respondent who read the whole questionnaire before 
starting to answer the first question, skipped some questions, or did not answer questions in 
the order in which they were presented (Bailey, 1994). 
- There is no opportunity to collect additional information through making observations or 
requesting documents while questionnaires are being completed; hence, the respondent's 
answers cannot be supplemented by observational data (Bryman, 1989; Moser and Kalton, 
1992; Sarantakos, 1993). 
- Not only must the questions on a mailed questionnaire generally be simpler and 
straightforward to understand, but a complex format with a lot of contingency questions is 
also probably too confusing for the average respondent (Bailey, 1994). Researchers can use 
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the mail questionnaire as an instrument for data collection only when the questions are 
sufficiently simple and straightforward to be understood with the help of the printed 
instructions and definitions (Moser and Kalton, 1992; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1996). Moreover, the format of the questionnaire has to be especially easy to follow (Bryman, 
1989). 
- The answers to a mail questionnaire have to be accepted as final (Moser and Kalton, 1992; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996) if re-checking or collection of the questionnaires 
by interviewers cannot be afforded. There is no opportunity to probe beyond the given 
answer, to clarify ambiguous answers, to overcome unwillingness to answer a particular 
question, to appraise the validity of what a respondent said in the light of how he/she said it, 
or to appraise the nonverbal behaviour of respondents (Moser and Kalton, 1992; Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
- It is difficult to obtain spontaneous first opinions, as the respondent has an opportunity to 
erase a hasty answer that he or she later decides is not diplomatic (Bailey, 1994). The mail 
questionnaire, thus, is inappropriate where spontaneous answers are desired, where it is 
important that the opinions of one person only will be obtained, uninfluenced by discussion 
with others, and where questions testing a person's knowledge are to be included (Moser and 
Kalton, 1992). 
- Questionnaires do not offer opportunities for motivating the respondent to participate in the 
survey orto answer the questions (Sarantakos, 1993). 
- Due to lack of supervision while filling in the questionnaire, the respondent may leave some 
questions unanswered (Sarantakos, 1993; Bailey, 1994). 
- The population of the study is limited, because in order to answer the questions respondents 
must be able at least to read and write (Labovitz and Hagedom, 1971). 
- The questionnaire must be restricted in length and scope, because respondents may lose 
interest or become fatigued (Labovitz and Hagedorn, 1971). 
As can be understood from all of these explanations, questionnaires, as all other data 
collection methods, have some inherent limitations, and these are the main limitations of the 
data collection method of this study. To minimize these limitations, two or more methods of 
data collection, such as in-depth interviewing or field observation, could have been used to 
measure variables; in the research methodology literature this is regarded as the essence of 
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'triangulation' (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). If the findings of the study are 
confirmed by the findings of the different data collection methods, the validity of those 
findings is increased. Validity is claimed, as replication of the findings by different methods 
minimizes the possibility that the findings may be the result of particular measurement biases 
(Bloor, 1997). Each method discloses slightly different facets of the same symbolic reality. 
Berg (1989) stated that "every method is a different line of sight directed toward the same 
point, observing social and symbolic reality. By combining several lines of sight, researchers 
obtain a better, more substantive picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols 
and theoretical concepts; and a means of verif'ing many of these elements" (p.4). The use of 
multiple lines of sight is often called 'triangulation', which will now be briefly explained. 
7.3. Triangulation 
Quite frequently, researchers combine different methods of data collection, for instance 
surveys and experiments, experiments and observation, or observation and documentary 
methods, when studying the same social issue, if the research conditions require it 
(Sarantakos, 1993). Such combination of methods is called triangulation. 
The term 'triangulation', as Denzin took it from Webb (1966), referred to four basic types of 
triangulation with a range of sub-types. Denzin (1978) outlines these four categories as 
follows: 
(1) Data triangulation has three subtypes: (a) time, (b) space, and (c) person. Person analysis, 
in turn, has three levels: (a) aggregate, (b) interactive, and (c) collectivity. (2) Investigator 
triangulation consists of using multiple rather than single observers of the same object. (3) 
Theory triangulation consists of using multiple rather than single perspectives in relation to 
the same set of objects. (4) Methodological triangulation can entail within-method 
triangulation and between-method triangulation. (p.295) 
So, there are four categories of triangulation: theoretical, data, investigator and 
methodological.. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (1991) explain these four categories as 
follows: 
Triangulation of theories involves borrowing models from one discipline and using them to 
describe situations in another discipline. 
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Data triangulation refers to research where data are gathered over different time frames or 
from different sources. Many cross-sectional designs use this type of research. 
Triangulation by investigators is where different investigators collect data on the same 
situation, and the findings are then compared. 
Methodological triangulation refers to research in which both quantitative as well as 
qualitative methods of data collection are used. 
Dawson et al. (1991) stated that "triangulation means going at a problem from several 
methodological directions at the same time" (p. 132). It is common for researchers to use more 
than one method. According to Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight (1996) there are good reasons for 
deliberately seeking to employ more than one method in the main body of a study. 
Researchers may follow up a survey with some interviews, in order to get a more detailed 
perspective on some of the issues raised. The telling anecdote may be much more revealing 
and powerful than almost any amount of figures. 
7.3.1. The Reasons for Using Triangulation 
Triangulation is used for a number of reasons. Using two methods, for example, is thought 
(Burgess, 1984; Shipman, 1988; Blaikie, 1988; Layder, 1993; Bryman, 1992, 1995) to allow 
the researcher: 
- to confirm or disconfrm a fmding or hypothesis initially produced by the use of one 
particular method; 
- to collect a variety of information on the same issue; 
- to use the advantages of each method to overcome the deficiencies of the other; 
- to obtain a higher degree of validity and reliability; and 
- to overcome the disadvantages of single-method studies. 
7.3.2. Problems of Triangulation 
Although the use of triangulation is generally accepted to produce more valid and reliable 
results than the use of single methods, some researchers warn about generalizations of this 
kind, and point to the fact that expanding the spectrum of methods employed to gather the 
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data does not necessarily guarantee better results (Sarantakos, 1993). Bryman (1992) warns 
that "in spite of its initiative appeal, the suggestion that quantitative and qualitative research 
may be combined for the purposes of triangulation is by no means as unproblematic as it first 
appears" (p.63). 
Many writers (e.g., Blaikie, 1988; Lamnek, 1988; Bryman, 1992; Sarantakos, 1993; Hall and 
Hall, 1996) have discussed the problems and conditions of triangulation. Lamnek (1988) 
warns that the use of triangulation might be associated with serious methodological problems. 
He argues that triangulation: 
- and single-method procedures can be equally useless if they are based on wrong 
conditions and wrong research foundations; 
- can be used as a way of legitimising personal views and interests; 
- is difficult to replicate; 
- per se is not more valuable than a single-method procedure, which can be more 
suitable, useful, and meaningful to answer certain questions; 
- therefore is not suitable for every issue. (Cited in Sarantakos, 1993, p.156.) 
In addition to problems stemming from the theoretical justification of triangulation and the 
positivistic impression it seems to entail, there is no evidence to suggest that studies using 
triangulation create necessarily more valid results (Sarantakos, 1993). Even if all diverse 
methods confirm each other's findings, all findings might be invalid. Sarantakos (1993) 
stated that "in simple terms, the findings of a study based on several methods are not 
necessarily 'better' than the findings of a single-method study" (p.156). If multiple methods 
are employed in the same study and produce different findings, it is not clear which is to be 
preferred (Sarantakos, 1993; Hall and Hall, 1996). Bryman (1992) pointed out that "if a 
researcher finds that his or her qualitative evidence does not confirm the quantitative results 
(or vice versa) how should the researcher respond?" (p.64). Beyond this, since quantitative 
and qualitative research have different preoccupations, the ensuing data may not be as 
comparable as is sometimes argued by the advocates of triangulation (Bryman, 1992). In 
other words, it is quite questionable whether quantitative and qualitative research are tapping 
the same things even when they are searching apparently similar issues. 
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7.4. What Could Have Been Done to Overcome the Limitations of the Research 
Methodology? 
a) The findings of the quantitative study might have been checked against the findings 
deriving from a qualitative study. 
This was practically not possible as the study investigated the relationships between more 
than 30 variables. By using a qualitative method the researcher could not have measured all 
these variables, and hence established relationships among them. 
b) Apart from the quantitative research, by using qualitative research some background 
information on context and subject could have been provided. 
The researcher had problems of access and used up a tremendous amount of time in gaining 
access to companies. It was not possible to conduct qualitative research as well, because the 
researcher had a time limit within which to complete the research. Apart from problems of 
access and time lost in gaining access to companies, the participating organization did not 
allow the researcher to collect qualitative data because of confidentiality. 
c) Although the quantitative research readily allowed the researcher to establish relationships 
among the study variables, it was weak when it came to exploring the reasons for those 
relationships. A qualitative study might have been used to help explain the factors underlying 
the broad relationships that were established. 
Again time was not available to do so, and access was not given to the researcher to conduct 
a qualitative study. 
d) The study data were collected by using questionnaires. However, the validity of findings 
and the degree of confidence in them might have been enhanced by the deployment of more 
than one approach to data collection. Moser and Kalton (1992) noted that "some of the 
disadvantages of the mail questionnaire can be overcome by combining it with interviewing" 
(p.261). Therefore, in-depth interviews, or observation, for example, might have been used to 
check patterns or findings generated through questionnaires. 
The reasons for using one method of data collection, the questionnaire, were the same as the 
reasons mentioned above. If the researcher had not come across such problems, different 
data collection methods could have been used But collecting the study data by questionnaire 
enabled the researcher to: 
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- analyse the data more thoroughly. After collecting the data the researcher found enough 
time to analyse them. 
- use complex statistical analyses, such as path analysis. If the researcher had spent time on 
collecting data by using other data collection methods, the complex analyses, which were 
very necessary to test the new research model, could not have been conducted due to time 
limitation. 
- present papers at conferences, which gave the researcher opportunities to get very good 
comments from other researchers. These comments and criticisms increased the quality of the 
research. 
7.5. Summary of the Limitations of the Study 
A major limitation of this study is that data about employees' job attitudes and other 
perceptions prior to the introduction of profit sharing and SAYE schemes were not available. 
That is, it is practically impossible to establish conclusively the direct cause-effect 
relationships that are suggested in the models. All that can be established is the fact that 
certain variables are significantly correlated with one another. 
Another limitation stems from the fact that control is extremely difficult to achieve in a field 
setting because of the plethora of variables. Therefore, even if the variables in the research 
models are significantly correlated with one another, there is always the danger that the 
correlation is spurious. 
The choice of the population from which the sample is drawn and the method of selection of 
the sample site create major limitations as to the generalizability of study results, although 
attempts were made to assure representativeness of the sample. Because of the choice of 
population, inferences cannot conclusively be made regarding employee shareholders in an 
organization which has methods of financial participation, such as profit sharing and SAYE, 
versus those in conventional organizations for all retail organizations. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to make definite inferences regarding the job attitudes and behaviours of employee 
shareholders in retail organization versus those of employees in conventional retail 
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organizations. Inferences may realistically be generalizable only over employees at the 
sample site. 
The main limitation of the data collection is that all of the study variables were measured 
solely by questionnaire. No other data collection methods, such as interviews, were used to 
gather these data. Limitations also exist in the method of questionnaire distribution. As some 
of the questionnaires were completed on employees' oi time, there is no way of knowing 
whether the conditions under which the questionnaires were completed were equivalent. 
A maj or concern regarding the method of statistical analysis is that quite frequently statistical 
tests which are suitable for interval data are used for analysis of ordinal scales (Kerlinger, 
1973). That is to say, in most cases scales are being treated as though they have properties of 
interval data. Although multivariate analytic techniques are believed appropriate for analysis 
of scalar data, some caution should be exercised in their use and in the interpretation of the 
results (Anderson, 1961; Kerlinger, 1973; Labovitz, 1967; Torgerson, 1958). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RESULTS OF THE REPLICATION OF LONG'S (1978) STUDY 
In this chapter, Long's (1978) theoretical model (see Figure 3.6 in Chapter Three) is 
replicated by using the study data collected in a large British retail organization. The main 
aim of this chapter is to attempt to find out the effects of profit sharing (PS) and employee 
share ownership schemes on employee participation in decision making, on job attitudes, and 
on organization attributes in a large organization. 
In order to replicate Long's theory, first, attitudes toward employee participation in decision 
making and, second, employees' current job attitudes are reported. Then, the respondents' 
assessment of current organization attributes are summarized and an individual level of 
analysis is conducted to evaluate the impacts of profit sharing and employee share ownership 
on employees' job attitudes. The relative effects of the schemes and participation in decision 
making are also analysed. Finally, conclusions are drawn from this empirical application of 
Long's theory. 
8.1. Perceived and Desired Levels of Employee Participation in Decision Making 
This section examines patterns of participation and attitudes toward participation as they 
existed in the organization when the study data were collected in October 1997. Managerial 
and non-managerial employees' perceptions of levels of employees' influence and personal 
influence are reported and an attempt is made to find out whether actual (perceived) levels of 
participation are compatible with desired levels of participation. Finally, employees' attitudes 











8.1.1. Perceived Levels of Participation
Table 8.1 indicates non-managerial employees' perception of the levels of employees' and
their own personal influence at each of the three decision levels. Over four-fifths of
employees report employees have at least 'some say' in job decisions, but nearly three-
quarters (73%) report the reverse for organizational policies, with employees having little or
no say. Just over half (5 1.8%) report employees have 'little or no say' in departmental
decisions. For 'personal influence', the majority report that they have 'little or no say' in
departmental decisions and organizational policies (60.5%, 84.1%, respectively), but a slight
majority (53.8%) report that they have at least 'some say' in job decisions.
Table 8.1. Perceived Levels of Influence, Non-managers
Little or Some Good or Great Deal
No Say Say
_____________ % % %
Non-managerial Employees' Influence in:
Job Decisions 42.5 37.2 20.3
Departmental Decisions 51.8 32.2 16
Organizational Policies 73 20.6 6.4
Non-managerial Employees' Perceived
Personal Influence in:
Job Decisions 46.2 31.6 22.2
Departmental Decisions 60.5 26.6 13





	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 8.2. Perceived Participation, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD t
Non-managerial Employees' Influence
in:
Job Decisions 4.57 1.22 3.54 1.43 7.58****
Departmental Decisions 4.21 1.20 3.27 1.40 7.03****
Organizational Decisions 2.74 1.11 2.57 1.33 1.41
Respondent's Personal Influence in:
Job Decisions 5.40 1.41 3.54 1.60 11.45****
Departmental Decisions 4.81 1.56 3.02 - 1.43 11.54****
Organizational Decisions 2.75 1.37 2.09 1.24 4.90****
Respondent's Participation in Job 3.82 1.10 3.02 1.21 6.50****
Changes
Respondent's Participation in 3.68 1.04 3.01 1.24 5•75****
Departmental Changes












Table 8.2 compares the levels of participation as perceived by managers and non-managers.
While managers and non-managers perceive similar levels of employee influence in
organizational policies, managers perceive a significantly higher (3) < .00 1) level of employee
influence in job and departmental decisions than do non-managers. Consistent with
expectations, managers report significantly higher (p < .001) amount of personal influence at
all three decision levels.
Table 8.2 also shows the means and standard deviations for the three scales measuring the
'participativeness' of superiors. Managers reported significantly higher levels (p < .001), than
did non-managers, of participation in all three scales, including participation in job and
departmental changes and participative supervisor.
Table 8.3. Decisional Deprivation, Balance, and Saturation, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
(N=129) - (N=301)
__________________________ Sat.' Ba!.2 - Dep.2	Sat.' Bal.2 Dep.3
Non-managerial Employee
Influence in:
Job Decisions 6.20% 26.36% 67.44% 3.99% 18.94% 77.08%
Departmental Decisions 6.20% 22.48% 71.32% 2.99% 19.60% 77.41%
Organizational Policies 6.20% 15.50% 78.29% 3.32% 19.60% 77.08%
Managerial or Non-managerial
Personal Influence in:
Job Decisions 4.65% 48.84% 46.5 1% 2.33% 26.25% 71.43%
Departmental Decisions 2.36% 41.73% 55.9 1% 2.99% 19.27% 77.74%





8.1.2. Decisional Deprivation and Desired Participation 
Long used three measures, namely decisional deprivation, balance, and saturation, to compare 
perceived participation with desired participation. 'Decisional saturation' exists when 
perceived levels are greater than desired levels; 'decisional balance' exists when desired 
levels are consistent with perceived levels; and 'decisional deprivation' exists when actual 
influence is lower than desired levels. According to Long, the absolute levels are not, 
however, very informative and "of possibly more importance is the extent to which actual 
levels of participation are consistent with what respondents believe should exist" (p.138). 
As Table 8.3 shows, a substantial majority of non-managers report that there is less non-
managerial employees' influence than there should be at all three decision levels. At the same 
time, oniy a few non-managers believe that employees had more influence than they should 
have at the three decision levels. This pattern is similar for 'personal influence'. 
The pattern for managers was similar to the pattern for non-managers for non-managerial 
employees' influence. For 'personal influence' the majority of managers believe that they 
have less influence than they should have at departmental and organizational policy levels, 
and nearly half (48.84%) report 'decisional deprivation' in job decisions. In contrast with the 
non-managerial employees, more managers believe there to be decisional balance at three 
decision levels, especially job and departmental. Less than 5% of both groups believe that 
they had more influence than they should have in any of the three decision levels. 
Table 8.4 indicates comparison of mean levels of decisional deprivation as perceived by 
managers and non-managers. In terms of non-managerial employees' influence, non-
managers report significantly higher levels of deprivation in job, departmental decisions (p < 
.001) and organizational policies (p < .01) than do managers. Managers reported low levels of 
personal deprivation at all three decision levels, while non-managers reported significantly 
higher personal deprivation atjob, departmental, and organizational policy (p < .00 1) levels. 
297 
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	








	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	1.80 .94 2.49 1.51 4.36****
1.73 .97 2.58 1.45 5.69****
	1.82 .96 2.40 1.23 4.56****
Table 8.4. Comparison of Decisional Deprivation, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
(N=129)' (N=3 01)1












1.74 .97 2.33 1.43 4.22****
1.72 .91 2.44 1.46 5.36****





j Those reporting decisional saturation and balance are not included in these computations. Therefore, N's are
3 to 63 lower for managers and 8 to 79 lower for non-managers.
Finally, Table 8.5 compares managers and non-managers in terms of desired levels of
participation. While managers and non-managers desire about the same amount of employee
influence at the organizational level, managers desire a significantly higher amount at the job
(p < .01) and departmental (p < .10) levels than do non-managers. In terms of personal
influence, again managers desire significantly more job and departmental (p < .00 1) influence




	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 8.5. Desired Participation, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD t
Amount of Influence Non-
managerial Employees Should
Have in:
Job Decisions 5.65 1.04 5.28 1.23 3.19***
Departmental Decisions 5.34 .98 5.12 1.15 1.94*
Organizational Decisions 4.19 1.12 4.32 1.17 1.03
Amount of Influence I (as a
manager or non-manager)
Should Have in:
Job Decisions 6.19 .93 5.28 1.24 8.41****
Departmental Decisions 5.71 1.08 5.02 1.21 5.60****
Organizational Decisions 3.98 1.34 4.04 1.31 .40
* p < .10, two-tailed
*** p < .01, two-tailed
****p <.001, two-tailed
In sum, both managers and non-managers report that there is less non-managerial employees'
influence and personal influence at the three decision levels than there should be. Although a
higher proportion of non-managers (see Table 8.3) report statistically higher levels of non-
managerial employees' deprivation and personal deprivation (see Table 8.4) at the three
decision levels than managers do, managers desire a significantly higher non-managerial
employee influence and personal influence at job and departmental levels (see Table 8.5) than
non-managers (except at the organizational level). But, if perceived participation (see Table
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8.2) is compared with desired participation (see Table 8.5) it can be seen that non-managers 
desire more non-managerial employees' influence and personal influence at the three decision 
levels than do managers. So, both managers and non-managers perceive a substantial gap 
between what should exist and what does exist; therefore both groups believe that there 
should be more non-managerial employee's influence and personal influence at job, 
departmental, and organizational levels (see Tables 8.2, 8.5). 
8.1.3. Participation on the Board of Directors 
Three questions were asked to respondents to explore their attitudes toward one specific form 
of non-managerial employees' participation: non-managerial employees' representation on 
the board of directors. To the question asking, "Do you feel that it is a good idea for some 
non-managerial employees to be on the board of directors?" (Q.33), of the non-managers, 
74.1% believed that it was a 'good idea' (41%) or 'very good idea' (33%) while only 5% 
believed that it was 'poor idea' or 'very poor idea'. Over half of non-managers (59.5%) felt 
that it is personally 'quite important' or 'very important'; however the remaining 40.5% 
believed that it was 'a little bit important' (19.6%), or 'not very/not at all important' (20.9%). 
For managers, 41.9% believed that it is a 'good idea' or 'very good idea', while 34.1% 
believed it is a 'poor' or 'very poor' idea. The remaining 24% were not sure. The majority of 
managers (59.7%) believed it personally 'not very/not at all important', while only 27.9% felt 
it personally 'very/quite important'. These differences can be seen in Table 8.6. The table 
shows that non-managers have significantly (p < .001) more favourable attitudes toward 
worker representation on the board of directors than do managers. Respondents were also 
asked, "To what extent do you feel that non-managerial employees should elect all or some 
members of the board of directors?" Three quarters of non-managers (75%) felt that, at least 
to some extent, employees should elect all or some members of the board of directors, while 
nearly 46% of managers responded likewise. It can be seen from Table 8.6 that the difference 
between managers and non-managers is statistically significant (p < .00 1). So, non-managers 
felt that non-managerial employees should be entitled to elect all or some members of the 
board of directors. And it can be seen that nearly half of the managers were positive towards 




	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 8.6. Comparison of Job Attitudes Toward Worker Representation on Board of
Directors, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD t
Good idea 2.93 1.24 2.00 .92 7.65****
Personal importance 3.58 1.31 2.41 1.24 8.83****
Non-managerial employees
should elect all or some members
oftheboardofdirectors 3.65 1.28 2.85 1.18 6.06****
Note: A lower mean indicates a more tavourable attitude
** * *p<•001 ,two-tailed
8.2. Employee Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions
In this section, job attitudes, specific aspects of satisfaction, and other relevant perceptions
are summarized. Managers' and non-managers' perceptions on these variables are compared.
8.2.1. Employee Job Attitudes
According to Long's theoretical work, employee ownership may affect five job attitudes:
integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation. Regarding
integration, 48.8% of non-managers agreed that "the welfare of my company and my welfare
are strongly related" (Q.79), while 44.8% agreed that "what is good for the company is good
for me" (Q.68). In terms of involvement, 49.2% agreed that "1 feel that I am an important
member of the company" (Q.95), while 61.7% agreed that "I feel that I am a respected
member of the company" (Q.89). For or ganizational commitment, 42.9% disagreed with the
statement "if I were offered a similar job with another firm at a slight increase in pay, I would
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take it" (Q.90). For general satisfaction, 79.8% agreed that "overall, this company is a good 
place to work" (Q.69), while 49.2% disagreed with the statement "I often think about 
quitting" (Q.41). Regarding motivation, 61.9% agreed that "working for this company really 
makes me want to try to do my job the best it can be done" (Q.76), while 45.2% agreed that 
"I will stay overtime to finish a job, even if I am not paid for it" (Q.55). If the proportion of 
non-managers who neither agree nor disagree with the above statements (integration 28.8%, 
involvement 20.6%, organizational commitment 22.3%, general satisfaction 14.1%, and 
motivation 19.5%) are considered, it could be said that non-managers have comparatively 
high levels of general satisfaction, low levels of involvement and motivation, and fairly low 
levels of integration and commitment. Table 8.7 compares the mean values of these scales for 
managers and non-managers. Managers report significantly higher levels of involvement, 
motivation (p < .00 1), commitment, and general satisfaction (p < .01) than do non-managers, 
and the level of integration is virtually the same as that of non-managers. 
8.2.2. Specific Aspects of Satisfaction 
Long argued that in order to better understand the structure of satisfaction in a company, five 
specific aspects of satisfaction have to be analysed: satisfaction with compensation, social 
satisfaction, satisfaction with the work itself, satisfaction with promotion opportunities, and 
satisfaction with supervisor. Regarding compensation, just over half (51.5%) of non-
managers agreed that "considering my skills and the effort I put into my work I am satisfied 
with my pay" (Q.72), and in terms of social satisfaction, half of the non-managers (50.6%) 
reported that "there are many opportunities for close and rewarding personal friendships in 
the company" (Q.112). For work satisfaction, two-thirds (66.8%) agreed that " I am really 
interested in my work" (Q.56), while a minority (3 5.9%) agreed that " in working for the 
company, I get a lot of chances to do what I am best at" (Q.96). In terms of satisfaction with 
promotion opportunities, slightly less than half of the non-managers (48.2%) reported that 
"there are good chances for getting ahead in this company" (Q.1 10). Two-thirds of the non-





	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table 8.7. Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD
Job Attitudes
Integration 4.40 1.16 4.38 1.37 0.10
Involvement 5.17 1.11 4.51 1.46 5.13****
Commitment 4.68 1.79 4.17 1.91 2.62***
General Satisfaction 5.49 1.07 5.15 1.20 2.90***
Motivation 5.82 0.79 4.75 1.20 10.85****
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation 4.81 1.22 4.73 1.28 0.54
Social Satisfaction 4.63 0.96 4.55 1.14 0.80
Work Satisfaction (Itself) 5.64 1.06 4.76 1.27 743****
SatisfactionwithPromotion 5.01 1.54 4.33 1.61 4.05****
Satisfaction with Supervisor 5.38 1.36 4.93 1.65 2.92***
Other Perceptions and Attitudes
Performance Contingencies
Performance-Reward 4.39 1.31 3.68 1.27 5.20****
Effort - Performance 5.35 1.40 4.98 1.65 2.22**
Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance 5.56 1.26 4.58 1.87 6.32****
"Poor Perf of Some Hurts
Everybody" 5.01 1.41 4.82 1.78 1.14
"Should Encourage Others to Work" 5.38 0.87 4.79 1.59 4.89****
Perceived Task Interdependencies 5.55 1.50 4.47 2.04 6.09****
Job Security 3.82 1.92 5.25 1.61 7.41****






Overall, these results indicate that, among the non-managers, there is low satisfaction with 
supervisor, with work, with compensation, and fairly low satisfaction with promotion 
opportunities. 
For managers and non-managers, Table 8.7 shows the mean and standard deviation for each 
of these variables. Managers reported significantly higher levels of satisfaction with work, 
with promotion opportunities (p < .00 1), and with supervisor, while they reported similar 
levels of satisfaction with compensation and social relations. Overall, for the five satisfaction 
variables, managers reported that they are most satisfied with their work and their supervisor. 
8.2.3. Other Perceptions and Attitudes 
Long suggested that there are a number of other perceptions and attitudes which might be 
affected by employee ownership or participation, which might moderate the impact of 
employee ownership. They are the following: performance contingencies, concern for the 
performance of others, perceived degree of task inter-dependencies, job security, and, 
attitude towards change. 
Two types of performance contingencies were analysed: performance-reward and effort-
performance. Regarding performance-reward, about half of the non-managers (50.9%) agreed 
that" if I do my job well, I will benefit financially over the long run" (Q.109), but only 
10.3% agreed that "in my department good employee performance often results in a rise or 
promotion" (Q.10l). For effort-performance, 69.2% agreed that "on my type of job, the 
amount of work that gets done depends mostly on how much effort I put into my work" 
(Q.103). 
Regarding concern for others' performance, 60.2% disagreed with the statement that "as long 
as I am doing a good job, poor performance by other employees does not matter much to me" 
(Q.75). 63.8% agreed that "when some employees perform poorly, it hurts everybody" 
(Q.77). 61.8% reported that "when some employees are not putting much effort into their 
jobs, other employees should encourage them to work harder" (Q.78). 
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With respect to task interdependencies, 54.4% disagreed with the statement that "in my 
department most jobs are pretty much one-person jobs - not requiring much contact with 
others" (Q.49). In terms of job security, 71.7% agreed that " I feel confident that I will have 
my job here for as long as I want it" (Q.64). Regarding attitudes towards change, 23.3% 
disagreed with the statement that "changes in this firm always seem to create more problems 
than they solve", and 31.9% disagreed that "when changes are made in this organization the 
employees usually lose out in the end" (Q.74). 
To summarise, the non-managerial employees feel they have high job security, strongly 
believe that effort leads to performance, hold a fairly high concern for the performance of 
other employees, but perceive only a moderate level of task interdependency, and generally 
hold less favourable attitudes toward performance-reward contingencies and change. 
For managers and non-managers, the means and standard deviations for each of these 
variables have been presented in Table 8.7. As can be seen, managers report significantly 
higher levels for all variables (p < .001; p < .05 for effort-performance contingencies) except 
job security where they report a significantly lower level (p < .00 1) than non-managers. 
8.2.4. Organization Attributes 
Long also analyzed five attributes of the organization: interpersonal and interdepartmental 
cooperation, communication between management and employees, group work norms, 
organizational trust, and worker commitment to organizational goals. Managers' perceptions 
of organization attributes are compared with non-managers' perceptions to evaluate the 
degree of consistency between the two groups. Long (1978) emphasized that in making 
causal inferences this information cannot be used; rather it serves as a further context from 
which data can be interpreted. 
In terms of cooperation, of the non-managers, 66.5% agreed that "the people in my 
department cooperate with one another very well" (Q.93), while 38% agreed that "people 
from different parts of this company cooperate very well" (Q.48). A minority of non-
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managers (32.8%) agreed that "communication between management and employees is good 
in the company" (Q. 104). 
Long divided group work nonns into two categories: (a) the extent to which the work group 
provided rewards for good performance, and, (b) the extent to which the work group 
sanctions poor job performance. For the first category, group rewards, 41.7% agreed that 
"when I work very hard . . . I will gain respect from co-workers" (Q.53a); 35.3% agreed that 
"when I work very hard . . . I will receive better treatment by co-workers" (Q.53b). For the 
second category, group sanctions, 35.3% reported that "when I do not work very hard . . . I 
will have pressure from co-workers to work harder" (Q.54c) and a fifth of the non-managers 
(20.3%) agreed that "when I do not work very hard. . . I will lose friends at work" (Q.54a). 
The relative absence of negative group norms was shown by the fact that 51.4% of 
respondents disagreed, and only 13.3% agreed, with the statement that "when I work very 
hard. . . I will have pressure from co-workers to not work so hard" (Q.53c). 
Regarding organizational trust, only a minority of non-managers (3 6.8%) agreed that "people 
here feel that you can trust this company" (Q.59). In terms of worker commitment to goals, 
again a minority (3 6.2%) agreed that "employees in this company are very strongly 
committed to the goals of this company" (Q.73). In sum, while non-managers report high 
levels of interpersonal cooperation (66.5%), they report quite low levels of interdepartmental 
cooperation (38%), communication between management and employees (33%), group work 
norms (for both group rewards and group sanctions) (33%), organizational trust (36.8%), and 
worker commitment to organizational goals (3 6.2%). These responses indicate that apart from 






	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table 8.8. Perceived Organization Attributes, Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD t
Cooperation
Interpersonal 5.15 1.05 4.68 1.36 3.83****
Interdepartmental 4.02 1.32 3.81 1.68 1.37
Communication Between Management and
Employees 4.16 1.34 3.44 1.74 4.60****
Group Work Norms
Group Rewards Good Performance 4.80 1.11 3.92 1.64 6.43****
Group Sanctions againstBad Performance 3.96 1.19 3.57 1.50 2.90***
Organization Trust 4.03 1.31 4.00 1.48 0.23
Worker Commitment to Organizational 4.66 1.31 3.97 1.53 4•45****





For managers and non-managers, the mean scores and standard deviations have been
presented in Table 8.8. As can be seen, except interdepartmental cooperation and organization
trust, managers reported significantly high levels of interpersonal cooperation,
communication between management and employees, group work norms, and worker
commitment to organizational goals (p <.001) than non-managers did. The high degree of
difference between managers and non-managers in their assessment indicates that these two
employee groups appear to be 'out of touch' with one another.
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Table 8.8 also indicates that, except concerning interpersonal co-operation, the non-managers 
do not have a favourable perception about the organization's attributes. Managers have only 
positive perceptions about interpersonal cooperation, group work norms where the group 
rewards good performance, and worker commitment to organizational goals. For the 
remaining organization attributes (interdepartmental cooperation, communication between 
management and employees, group work norms where the group sanctions bad performance, 
and organization trust) it can be seen that managers do not have favourable perceptions. 
8.3. Effects of Profit-Sharing (PS)IEmployee Share Ownership and Participation in 
Decision Making on Job Attitudes 
In the previous section of this chapter, the analysis was conducted at the organizational level. 
In this section, the analysis is at the individual level to investigate the effects of profit 
sharing/employee share ownership and participation in decision making on employees' job 
attitudes and some other perceptions. In the first part of this section, the relationship of profit 
sharing/employee share ownership to the dependent variables is analysed by using partial 
correlation analysis. In the second part, the same procedure is repeated to assess the 
relationship of participation to the dependent variables, regarding participation as the 
independent variable. In the final part, in order to empirically separate and analyse the 
relative impacts of profit-sharing/employee share ownership schemes and participation, 
multiple regression analysis is used to test for interaction effects between the two variables. 
Only the results for non-managerial employees are reported in this section. The manager 
group was excluded because it was not a part of Long's study. 
8.3.1. Profit-Sharing/Employee Share Ownership and Job Attitudes 
Long hypothesized that individual share ownership will have beneficial impacts on 
organizational identification, general satisfaction, work motivation, and a number of other 
variables. In order to examine these hypotheses, partial correlations were computed between 
dummy profit-sharing/employee share ownership and the dependent variables, while 
controlling for the possibly confounding effects of tenure and age, which tended to correlate 
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both with profit-sharing/employee share ownership and some of the dependent variables. 
Table 8.9 presents the resulting correlations. However, as Long (1978) mentioned, this 
procedure does not permit causal inferences. 
Job Attitudes. As Table 8.9 shows, PS/save-as-you-earn (SAYE) was significantly related to 
organizational commitment (p < .05) and general satisfaction (p < .0 1), but they were not 
significantly related to organizational integration, involvement and motivation. 
Aspects of Satisfaction. PS/SAYE was positively and significantly related to satisfaction 
with compensation (p <.10), and work satisfaction (p < .01), while it was negatively and 
significantly related to satisfaction with the supervisor. They were not significantly related to 
social satisfaction and satisfaction with promotion. 
Other Perceptions and Attitudes. Long hypothesized that share ownership might have 
effects on the performance-reward contingency and concern for the performance of others, 
mainly through its impact on integration. He also argued that share ownership may increase 
the degree to which tasks are perceived as being inter-dependent. As can be seen from Table 
8.9, PS/SAYE was, in fact, significantly related to performance-reward (p < .05) and one of 
the three items measuring concern for performance of others, namely the belief that "when 
some employees are not putting much effort into their jobs, other employees should 
encourage them to work harder" (p < .05). PS/SAYE was not related to perception of task 
interdependencies. 
Although Long did not give specific hypotheses about effort-performance contingency, job 
security and attitude toward change, he did assess them. While PS/SAYE was negatively and 
significantly related to effort-performance (p < .05), it was not related to job security and 






















Table 8.9. Partial Correlations Between (a) Participant of Both PS and SAYE, and
(b) Participation in Decision Making, Controlling for Length of Service
and Age, Non-managers






General Satisfaction .21*** 31****
Motivation .09 .32****
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation .12* .20****
Social Satisfaction .10 .29****
Work Satisfaction (Itself) .22***
Satisfaction with Promotion .06 .26****
Satisfaction with Supervisor .•10'K - ____________




Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance .02 .01
"Poor Perf. of Some Hurts
Everybody" .08
"Should Encourage Others to Work" .16**
Perceived Task Interdependencies .08 .08*
Job Security .02







8.3.2. Participation in Decision Making and Job Attitudes 
Long also hypothesized that employee participation in decision making might also have an 
impact on some of these job attitudes. Table 8.9 presents the partial correlation between 
participation in decision making and the dependent variables. 
Job Attitudes: Long hypothesized that participation in decision making would affect 
organizational integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation. 
As can be seen from Table 8.9 participation is significantly related (p < .00 1) to all of these 
job attitudes. 
Aspects of Satisfaction. Participation in decision making was significantly related to 
satisfaction with compensation, social satisfaction, work satisfaction, satisfaction with 
promotion, and satisfaction with supervisor (p < .00 1). 
Other Perceptions and Attitudes. Long hypothesized that participation in decision making 
positively affects performance-reward contingency, concern for performance of others, 
perceived task interdependencies, job security, and attitude towards change. As Table 8.9 
shows, participation in decision making, in fact, is significantly related to all of these five 
variables except one measure of concern for the performance of others, namely importance of 
others' performance. Participation was strongly related to performance-reward contingency (p 
< .001), job security (p< .01), and attitudes towards change (p < .001). Participation was 
somewhat less strongly related to effort-performance contingency (p < .05), perceived task 
interdependencies (p< .10) and one measure of concern for the performance of others, namely 
'poor performance of some employees hurts everybody' (p < .0 5). 
8.3.3. Relative Effects of Independent Variables: PSISAYE and Participation in 
Decision Making 
The analysis reported so far in this chapter indicates that while PS/SAYE has had positive 




positive effects on all five job attitudes (integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, and motivation). However, the analysis made so far does not indicate the relative 
effects of these two independent variables, although this is clearly an important point. 
Therefore, this section now separates and analyses the relative effects of PS/SAYE, and 
participation in decision making on organizational integration, involvement, commitment, 
general satisfaction and motivation of non-managers, while controlling for potential 
confounding variables. 
The next aim is to find out whether an interaction between PS/SAYE and participation in 
decision making exists. An important question is "Would each of the independent variables 
be more effective when accompanied by the other than if they occurred separately?" Multiple 
regression analysis is used to achieve these two aims. 
Table 8.10 Combined and Independent Effects of PS/SAYE, and Participation in Decision 
Making, Controlling for Length of Service, (Non-managers) 
Beta Weights 
R2 PS/SAYE Participation 
Integration 10.3%**** .09 31**** 
Involvement .11 34**** 
Commitment 4.6%** .18* .13* 
Satisfaction 8.2%*** .21 * 




**** p < .001 
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Relative Effects. Table 8.10 shows the squared multiple regression coefficients (R2s) and the 
standardized partial regression coefficients (BETA) for PSISAYE-share ownership and 
participation in decision making for each of the dependent job attitude variables, while 
statistically controlling for length of service. As can be seen, all R2s are statistically 
significant beyond the .05 level. This indicates that combined PSISAYE share ownership and 
participation 'explain' a significant amount of the variance in all job attitudes variables, 
integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, and motivation. The proportion of the 
variance 'explained' (R2) ranges from 4.6% for organizational commitment to 13.6% for 
organizational involvement. 
The betaweights points to the relative amount that each of the two independent variables 
contributes to 'explained' variance, after the impact of the other has been statistically 
controlled. As can be seen from Table 8.10, while PS/SAYE explains a significant amount of 
the variance in two variables (commitment and satisfaction), participation in decision making 
explains a significant amount of the variance in all five variables (integration, involvement, 
commitment, satisfaction, and motivation). PS/SAYE shows no significant relationship to 
three variables (integration, involvement, and motivation). 
In comparing the effects of PS/SAYE share ownership and participation in decision making, 
it can be seen that participation in decision making has a stronger effect on integration, 
involvement, satisfaction and motivation, and a similarly significant effect on commitment. 
PSISAYE has no stronger effect on any of the job attitude variables, but does show a similar 
significant effect on commitment. 
Interaction Effects. By adding a multiplicative term to the regression equation, possible 
interactive effects between PSISAYE and participation were examined. The added proportion 
of the variance in the dependent variables 'explained' by the interaction terms has been 
presented in Table 8.11. As can be seen from the table, these interaction effects are extremely 
small, ranging from an increase of 2.2% for motivation down to 0.2% for integration. There 
were no statistically significant interaction effects. Therefore, it must be concluded that the 










Table 8.11. Interaction Between (a)PS/SAYE, and (b) Participation in Decision Making
(Non-managers)
R2
(a) PS/SAYE + (a) PS/SAYE x Interaction
Participation Participation Effects
Integration 10.3% 10.5% 0.2%
Involvement 13.6% 14.0% 0.4%
Commitment 4.6% 5.8% 1.2%
Satisfaction 8.2% 8.9% 0.8%
Motivation 7.0% 9.2% 2.2%
*p < .10 **p<.05 ***p<.o1 ****p<.001
8.4. Summary of the Findings of the Replication Study of Long's Theoretical
Framework
In this part, the findings of the replication of Long's study will be summarized. He
investigated the effects of share ownership and participation in decision making at two levels:
organizational and individual.
8.4.1. Organizational Level of Analysis
l.A. At the organizational level of analysis, Long, first, attempted to find out the effect of
employee ownership on patterns of influence and participation in decision making within the
organization. He hypothesized that employee ownership would set in motion forces resulting
in increased worker participation or influence, directly by voting for the board of directors, by
increasing worker desire for participation, and by increasing managers' desire for worker
participation. These forces would probably lead to increased power-equalization over time,
especially in job and departmental decisions. However, Long believed that these forces could
be moderated by certain personal and situational factors.
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Analysis of the data indicated that non-managerial employees' influence was not particularly 
high, and over three-quarters of non-managers (more than 77%) believed that non-managerial 
employees' influence at each of the three decision levels was substantially less than it 'should 
be' (see Table 8.3). Therefore, non-managers reported that non-managerial employees should 
have more influence at all of the three decisions levels than they have already. Regarding 
non-managerial employees' influence, the majority of the managers also reported decisional 
deprivation at job, departmental, and organizational levels, and desired more non-managerial 
employees' influence at these three decision levels. However, by comparing the mean values 
of perceived and desired participation (in Tables 8.2 and 8.5) it can be seen that managers 
reported a lower gap between 'actual non-managerial employee influence' and 'desired non-
managerial employee influence' than non-managers did. 
In terms of 'personal influence', both managers and non-managers believed that they have 
less influence than they should have. However, when mean values of perceived and desired 
participation (in Tables 8.2 and 8.5) are compared, it can be seen that non-managers reported 
a bigger gap between 'actual influence' and what 'should exist' (desired influence), desiring 
more personal influence, than managers did. 
In sum, there are several important points which should be mentioned: 
a) Not only non-managers but also managers believe that non-managerial employees have 
less influence than they should have, and both groups desire more workers' influence at job, 
departmental and organizational levels. 
b) When mean values of perceived and desired participation (in Tables 8.2 and 8.5) are 
compared, it can be seen that managers desire more influence for non-managerial employees 
than they desire for themselves. 
c) Managers desire there to be more non-managerial employees' influence at not only job and 
departmental levels but also the organizational level. 
As a result, while non-managers and managers desire more non-managerial employees' 
influence, this could not support or reject Long's hypothesis mentioned above, as it cannot be 
inferred that the desire for more non-managerial employees' influence is caused by employee 
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share ownership. But it is very clear that the prediction that employee ownership will 
eventually increase power equalization is not supported because decisional deprivation was 
reported by both groups at all three levels (job, departmental, and organizational). 
Other evidence suggesting that power equalization has not significantly occurred is that the 
majority of union member managers (66.1%) disagreed with the statement that "a union is not 
really necessary in the company at this time" (Q.88c), and 68.5% of union member (non-
managerial) employees disagreed with the same statement. Only 22.1% of non-union member 
(non-managerial) employees believed that a union is unnecessary. In addition, only a 
minority of non-union member (non-managerial) employees (38%), and union member (non-
managerial) employees (27.5%) disagreed with the statement that "the best way of obtaining 
employee say or influence in decision making in this firm is through increasing the influence 
of the union" (Q.88g). 
1.B. At the organizational level of analysis, Long, second, analysed the effect of share 
ownership on various job attitudes of organization members. Long hypothesised that 
employee ownership would positively affect five main job attitudes (organizational 
integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation) both directly 
through the impacts of share ownership, and indirectly through increasing employee 
participation in decision making. He concluded that employee ownership does appear to have 
caused an increase in employee participation. 
In order to test this hypothesis one sensible approach is to conduct a 'before and after 
analysis'. If the survey could have been conducted before and after the introduction of the 
employee share ownership schemes, the employees' job attitudes could easily be compared 
and the effects of the schemes could be reported. But as was the case in Long's study, this 
study could not conduct this kind of analysis because the profit sharing and employee share 
ownership schemes were introduced in the organization about 15 years before the starting 
date of the study. Long examined the hypothesised relationship through a longitudinal study 
of a medium-sized trucking company purchased by most of its workers and managers about 
six months prior to the start of his study. 
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Therefore, in order to test Long's hypothesis, the study compared the job attitudes of 
managers and non-managers, as did Long. In addition, to get a more reliable result, the study 
compared the job attitudes of non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE with the job attitudes 
of non-managerial, non-participant PS/SAYE schemes. 
Among non-managers, it was found that three of the job attitudes (general satisfaction, 
motivation, and involvement) were favourable and the other two (commitment and 
integration) were slightly favourable. Among managers, while all five of these attitudes were 
favourable, three of them (motivation, general satisfaction, and involvement) were especially 
very favourable. Table 8.12 presents the comparison of job attitudes and other perceptions 
held by non-managerial participants and non-managerial, non-participants of PS/SAYE 
schemes. As can be seen from the table, except for integration, non-managerial participants of 
PS/SAYE schemes have significantly higher levels of favourable job attitude than do non-
managerial, non-participants of the schemes. 
Long also hypothesized that employee ownership would affect several other perceptions and 
attitudes. He hypothesized that employee ownership would affect the performance-reward 
contingency, the effort-performance contingency, concern for performance of others, and 
perceived task interdependencies, through both share ownership and participation. Long 
believed that increased participation would indirectly affect job security and attitudes toward 
change. 
Among non-managers, most of these job attitudes or perceptions were found to be favourable 
with several exceptions, which were performance-reward contingency, perceived task 
interdependencies, and attitude towards change. Compared with the job attitudes and other 
perceptions held by non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, non-
participants of PSISAYE, it was found that these job attitudes, except attitudes towards 
change and perceived task interdependencies, had been higher among the participant group 
than the non-participant group. But these differences were statistically significant only for 
work satisfaction (p<.O01), and for two out of the three measures of 'concern for performance 
of others' (p< .10). Among managers (with the exceptions of perceived task 






	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table 8.12. Comparison of Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions,
(a) Participant of Both PS and SAYE, and (b) Non-participant of Both PS and
SAYE, (Non-managers)
(a) Participant of (b) Non-participant
PS/SAYE of PS/SAYE
N=120 N=51
Mean SD Mean SD
Job Attitudes
Integration 4.69 1.35 4.41 1.39 1.24
Involvement 4.94 1.40 4.51 1.43 1.84*
Commitment 4.55 1.89 3.82 2.03 2.25**
General Satisfaction 5.48 1.08 4.99 1.32 2.52**
Motivation 5.06 1.15 4.73 1.38 1.62*
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation 4.91 1.30 4.59 1.30 1.46
Social Satisfaction 4.73 1.13 4.68 1.02 0.29
Work Satisfaction (Itself) 5.17 1.12 4.50 1.39 3.36****
Satisfaction with Promotion 4.49 1.67 4.44 1.51 0.19
Satisfaction with Supervisor 4.95 1.78 5.22 1.56 0.94
Other Perceptions and Attitudes
Performance Contingencies
Performance - Reward 3.83 1.24 3.65 1.22 0.87
Effort - Performance 4.97 1.60 5.29 1.55 1.23
Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance 4.74 1.88 4.67 1.93 0.24
"Poor Perf of Some Hurts
Everybody" 5.04 1.80 4.51 1.88 1.74*
"Should Encourage Others to Work" 5.08 1.53 4.59 1.62 1.90*
Perceived Task Interdependencies 4.53 2.14 4.57 1.95 -0.11
Job Security 5.30 1.66 5.10 1.69 0.71






In general, it is concluded that PS and employee share ownership schemes have at a least a 
small effect (mostly not statistically significant) on most job attitudes. However, it should be 
mentioned that our study found smaller effects than Long's did. 
1.C. At the organization level of analysis, Long (1978), finally, analysed the effects of share 
ownership on certain attributes of the organization, such as communication, cooperation, and 
group work norms. He hypothesized that certain global characteristics or attributes of the 
organization might be affected by employee ownership, through affecting individual job 
attitudes. Five such attributes which he considered were: pattern of cooperation (interpersonal 
and interdepartmental), communication between management and employees, group work 
norms, organizational trust, and worker commitment to organizational goals. 
The study found no evidence that PS and SAYE have favourably affected these attributes. 
Non-managers reported a favourable attitude only toward interpersonal cooperation, while 
they reported unfavourable attitudes toward the rest of the organization attributes. Moreover, 
when the mean values of non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial non-
participants of PS/SAYE were compared (see Table 8.13) it was found that for interpersonal 
and interdepartmental cooperation, communication between management and employees, and 
worker commitment to organizational goals, the non-managerial non-participants of 
PS/SAYE schemes reported more favourable attitudes (not statistically significant, with the 
exception of interdepartmental cooperation) than did the non-managerial participants of 
PSISAYE schemes. Managers reported favourable attitudes only for interpersonal 
cooperation, one measure of group work norms, and employee commitment to organizational 





	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table 8.13. Perceived Organization Attributes, (a) Participant of Both PS and SAYE, and
(b) Non-participant of Both PS and SAYE, Non-managers
(a) Participant of (b) Non-participant
Both PS & SAYE of Both PS & SAYE
N= 120 N=51
Mean SD Mean SD t
Cooperation
Interpersonal 4.95 1.29 5.01 1.19 0.30
Interdepartmental 3.86 1.69 4.48 1.45 2.28**
Communication between Management and 3.54 1.76 3.90 1.71 1.23
Employees
Group Work Norms
Group Rewards Good Performance 4.07 1.70 3.92 1.71 0.53
Group Sanctions against Bad Performance 3.59 1.68 3.55 1.56 0.15
OrganizationTrust 4.08 1.55 4.07 1.28 0.04
Worker Commitment to Organizational 4.13 1.57 4.29 1.46 0.65




**** p < .001
8.4.2. Individual Level of Analysis
2.A. At the individual level of analysis, Long, first, analysed the effects of share ownership
on the job attitudes of individual employees. He hypothesised that individual share ownership
would directly affect the organizational integration, involvement, and commitment of
employees and, in turn, affect other attitudes and beliefs, namely performance-reward
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contingency, effort-performance contingency, concern for the performance of others, 
perceptions of task interdependencies, motivation, and satisfaction. 
In order to test these hypotheses, those non-managers who participated in PS and SAYE 
schemes and had shares were compared to those who had not participated in the schemes and 
held no shares. It was found that participant shareholders were significantly higher only in 
commitment, even after controlling for length of service and age. When the effects of 
organizational identification (the second set of hypotheses) were tested it was found that the 
belief that performance would be rewarded, one measure of concern for performance of 
others, and general satisfaction were significantly higher among participant shareholders. 
However the rest of the job attitudes and beliefs, such as integration, involvement, 
motivation, and perception of task interdependencies, were not higher among participant 
shareholders. 
There is, however, a very important point which should be mentioned. A substantial majority 
of non-participants (74.5%) gave a positive answer to the question "If you have not 
participated in profit sharing andlor SAYE schemes, do you intend to be a beneficiary of 
profit-sharing and/or SAYE in the future?" Therefore, they could be regarded as potential 
future beneficiaries of the schemes. So, the weak differences between the mean values of 
participants and non-participants may have stemmed from non-participants' positive attitudes 
toward PS and SAYE schemes. Several types of data seem to provide evidence supporting 
this interpretation. As can be seen from the Table 8.12 both participants and non-participants 
were high in integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation, 
with the exception of an unfavourable commitment level for non-participants. Profit sharing 
and SAYE schemes have a strong effect on some job attitudes and beliefs, namely 
organizational commitment, general satisfaction, and performance-reward contingency, but 
have a negligible effect on other job attitudes such as integration, involvement, and 
motivation. It is also clear that the schemes have no effect on perceived task 
interdependencies and attitude towards change. However, when the findings of the study are 
compared with Long's fmdings, it is clear that employee share ownership has less of an effect 
on job attitudes in the large organization we studied than it had in the medium-small 
organization studied by Long. 
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2.B. At the individual level of analysis, Long, second, examined the relative effects of 
individual share ownership in comparison to the effects of individual participation in 
decisions and, third, analysed the interaction effects between individual share ownership and 
participation for certain job attitudes. 
Long hypothesised that employee participation in decision making would be affected by 
employee ownership and would, in turn, affect many of the job attitudes believed to be 
affected by individual share ownership, as well as some other variables. Therefore, it is 
important to examine the effects of this participation. Since, PS/SAYE schemes and 
individual participation are conceptually and empirically (r=.06, N.S.) separate variables, it is 
important to separate and analyse their relative effects. Long also hypothesised that there may 
be interaction impacts between share ownership and participation for general satisfaction and 
motivation, so this hypothesis was also tested. 
Long specifically hypothesised that individual participation in decision making would affect 
the following job attitudes, which are also affected by individual share ownership: 
organizational integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, 
performance-reward, effort-performance, concern for performance of others, and perceived 
task interdependencies. As Table 8.9 presents, with the exception of one measure of concern 
for performance of others, participation in decision making was found to be significantly and 
positively related to all of these job attitudes after controlling for length of service and age. 
Long also hypothesized that participation in decision making would affect two variables not 
hypothesized to be affected by individual share ownership: job security and attitudes toward 
change. The study found that individual participation in decision making was significantly 
related to these two variables (p<.O1, p < .001 for job security and attitudes towards change, 
respectively). 
Multiple regression analysis was used to assess the relative impacts of individual share 
ownership and individual participation in decision making on organizational integration, 
involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation. While profit sharing and 
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SAYE schemes were significantly related to only two variables (commitment and general 
satisfaction), participation in decision making was seen to explain a significant amount of the 
variance in all five variables. In comparing the impacts of PS/SAYE schemes and 
participation in decision making it was seen that participation has a significantly stronger 
effect on integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and motivation, while PS/SAYE 
schemes and participation had significantly the same effect on only one variable, 
commitment. The schemes had no stronger effect on any of the job attitudes than 
participation in decision making had. 
The study did not provide support for the hypothesis that strong interaction effects exist, 
because there were very small interaction effects for all job attitudes. Therefore, it could not 
be argued that PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making would each be most 
effective when used together. 
8.5. Conclusion for the Replication of Long's Study 
As the study did not gather data about employees' job attitudes and participation levels in the 
organization prior to the introduction of PS and SAYE schemes, it is not clear whether the 
schemes have had an effect on individual participation in decision making. However, it is 
clear that both managers and non-managers reported that workers have less influence than 
they should have and both groups desire more workers' influence at all three decisions levels. 
In addition, the study did not provide support for the hypothesis that employee ownership will 
eventually increase power equalization. 
At the organizational level, the study found that PS and SAYE schemes have a small 
favourable effect on most job attitudes of its organization members. In general, these 
favourable effects were much higher for managers than for non-managers, possibly indicating 
that the greatest effect of the schemes has been on managerial employees. It could also be 
concluded that, in comparing the results of Long's study, the schemes have weaker effects in 
the large organization, in this case at least, than they had in the small and medium-sized 
organizations that Long studied. In terms of organization attributes, the schemes have only a 
very weak or negative effect. 
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At the individual level of analysis, the study concluded that profit sharing and SAYE schemes 
have a very strong effect on organizational commitment, general satisfaction, and 
performance-reward contingency, but have a negligible effect on integration, involvement, 
and motivation, after controlling for length of service and age. However, the schemes have no 
effect on perceived task interdependencies and attitude towards change. The study also 
concluded that participation in decision making had statistically significant effects on 
integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, performance-reward, 
effort-performance, concern for performance of others, perceived task interdependencies, job 
security, and attitude toward change after controlling for length of service and age. 
In order to find out the combined effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation, multiple 
regression analysis was used. While participation was seen to explain a significant amount of 
the variance in all five job attitudes, PS and SAYE schemes were significantly related to only 
two job attitudes, organizational commitment and general satisfaction. In comparing the 
impacts of PS/SAYE schemes and participation, it was concluded that participation has a 
stronger effect on integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and motivation, while it has 
the same effect on only one variable, commitment. So, PS and SAYE schemes had no 
stronger effect on any of the job attitudes than participation had. 
Long's hypothesis that there may be interaction impacts between share ownership and 
participation in decision making for job attitudes was not supported because the study found 
only small interaction effects for all job attitudes. In general, participation in decision making 
has stronger effects than PS and SAYE schemes have. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE REPLICATION OF FLORKOWSKI'S (1989) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, the attitudinal relationships hypothesized by Florkowski (1989) are assessed 
by using the same methods of statistical analysis which Florkowski used in his study, namely 
correlation, partial correlation, moderated regression, and path analysis. 
Florkowski argued that personal feelings about 'pay equity', 'performance-reward 
contingencies', and 'influence on decision making' are expected to affect one's support for 
profit sharing plans (see Figure 3.7). After explaining how support for profit sharing could be 
created in organizations, he suggested that profit sharing support should, in turn, affect 
positively the organizational commitment of plan members. According to his model, the 
relationship between support for profit sharing and organizational commitment should be 
moderated by current job satisfaction. 
In order to replicate Florkowski's study, the respondents who are participants of profit 
sharing PS schemes were regarded as the sample. 
9.1. Correlational Analyses 
The analysis commences with the computation of Pearson correlations. According to 
Florkowski, although Pearson correlations cannot explain cause-and-effect relationships, this 
kind of analysis is useful for three important purposes. First, it allows one to analyse the 
relative strength of the associations between profit sharing support and other attitudes. 
Second, it may point out the need to partial out the effect of demographic variables that are 
related to both variables underlying a given correlation. Third, it helps calculations of the 
amount of bivarite variation that is not defined by the path models. The correlation 
coefficients for all participants of PS (n= 331) are presented in Table 9.1. The correlations for 
employee-participants of PS (n=220) and manager-participants of PS (n=1 11) are displayed 
in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. 
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When Table 9.1 is analysed for all participants of PS, it can be seen that all three exogenous 
variables, namely, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making, were positively associated with support for profit sharing. This is compatible with 
Florkowski's research model. Performance-reward contingencies showed the strongest 
relationship (r=.266, p < .001), followed by the influence on decision making (r= .145, p 
<.01) and pay equity (r= .113, p < .05). Influence on decision making, performance-reward 
contingencies, and pay equity had progressively weaker, positive relationships with 
commitment, while two other variables (support for profit sharing and job satisfaction) 
exhibited even stronger association with organizational commitment. All coefficients were 
significant at .001 level. Plan support and job satisfaction also were related to each other 
(r—.250, p < .00 1). 
Few changes occurred when the sample was stratified by job level. Only one exogenous 
variable out of the three, performance-reward contingencies, continued to be positively 
associated with profit sharing for employees and managers. While pay equity had a positive 
relationship with support for profit sharing for employees only (not for managers), influence 
on decision making was positively related to support for profit sharing for managers only (not 
for employees). All of the attitudinal constructs were positively related to organizational 
commitment for both employees and managers. All coefficients were significant at .001 level 
with the exception of the correlations involving influence on decision making (p < .01 for 
employees and managers) and pay equity (p < .10 for managers only). The correlations 
involving support for profit sharing and job satisfaction were substantially higher than those 
for pay equity, performance-reward contingency, and influence on decision making among 
employees and managers, as they were among all respondents. For employees and managers, 
a slightly different rank ordering was apparent regarding the correlations involving pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making. While the rank 
order for all respondents was, first, influence on decision making (r=.287), second, 
performance reward contingencies (r=.283), and, third, pay equity (r.217), for employees it 
became, first, pay equity (r=289), second, performance reward contingencies (r.258), and, 
third, influence on decision making (r=.197), and for managers, performance-reward 
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9.2. The Need for Control Variables 
At times, the personal characteristics of survey respondents may have had a confounding 
impact on the attitudinal relationships being investigated. From the researcher's perspective, 
it was important to interpret whether the associations indicated true relationships. As the 
variables may have falsely seemed to be associated because of their common relationship 
with another factor, the true relationships could be found only after controlling for the 
confounding factors. Therefore, partial correlation analysis was used to find the associations 
between profit sharing support and the attitudinal variables related to it, while controlling for 
various demographic characteristics. As 'support for profit sharing' plays a pivotal role in 
most of Florkowski's hypotheses, it was selected. The results of the partial correlation' 
analysis are presented in Table 9.4. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the simple correlations for all respondents indicate that 
pay equity, performance reward contingencies, inflxerice on decisior tcn, 
organizational commitment were all related to profit sharing support. In several instances, 
both attitudinal constructs were related to sex, tenure, age, and education, necessitating the 
use of partial correlation analysis to partial out their effect. As Table 9.4 shows, after the 
impacts of these demographic variables when partialled out, the magnitude and significance 
levels of the simple correlations changed very little. It is therefore evident that subsequent 
data analyses would be unlikely to be strongly distorted by the spurious relationships. 
In his attitudinal hypotheses, Florkowski stratified respondents into two job levels, employees 
and managers. Table 9.4 shows the simple correlations for both groups. Among employees, 
support for profit sharing was associated with pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, 
and organizational commitment. Five personal characteristics were related to one or more of 
the attitudinal pairings, namely sex, tenure, age, education, and union status. In order to 
remove the contaminating impacts of these variables, partial correlations were computed. Any 
of the simple correlations did not materially change after controlling for the respective effects 
of these characteristics. Again, this indicated that it was not necessary to control for either 
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Among managers, support for profit sharing was associated with performance-reward 
contingencies, influence on decision making, and organizational commitment. Sex, tenure, 
age, and education were the factors correlated with the attitudinal constructs under study. The 
significance levels of the simple correlations did not change after the influence of these 
demographic variables were partialled out. Once again, as with the whole sample and the 
employee group, these results did not show any evidence that spurious relationships would 
distort future data analysis. 
9.3. Path Analysis of Florkowski's Model 
Greater insight into the directional relationships, outlined in the previous section, can be 
obtained by using path analysis. Although this technique does not explain causality, like 
Pearson correlation analysis, it is capable of finding the implications of pre-existing causal 
assumptions about the variables being examined. 
Path analysis cannot be used for all data sets. For example, there should not be high 
intercorrelations among the independent variables in the study. Multicollinearity boosts large 
variances in regression parameter estimates. Lewis-Beck (1980) argues that high 
multicollinearity may be a problem when one or more of the following are seen: the equation 
has a crucial R2 but statistically insignificant coefficients; when independent variables are 
entered or deleted, the value of the regression coefficients change greatly; the regression 
coefficients are larger than expected; or the independent variables have bivariate correlations 
which are more than .8. None of these symptoms occurred in the ensuing data analyses. There 
was no regression which had a substantial R 2 without also having statistically significant 
coefficients. When independent variables were dropped from the equations, the value of the 
regression coefficients did not change greatly. Coefficient sizes were not inconsistent with the 
impacts proposed by the research model. Moreover, none of the attitudinal correlations in 
Tables 9.1 - 9.3 was higher than .638. 
Nonlinearity causes another serious problem. Path analysis, like standard regression analysis, 
assumes that there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the chosen set 
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of independent variables. Table 9.5 presents support for linearity. Five of the six regression 
equations had overall F-values that were significant at the .001 level, while the sixth was 
significant at the .01 level. This outcome is compatible with, if not definite proof of, a general 
linear model. In addition, in order to promote greater reliability of the regression statistics it is 
recommended that at least 100 subjects must be used for multiple regression (Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur, 1973). Fortunately, the number of respondents in both the employee and manager 
groups was more than 100. 
Florkowski's hypotheses about the determinants of profit sharing support and organizational 
commitment will now be analyzed. For the two dependent variables, all preceding attitudinal 
variables were included. By deleting nonsignificant coefficients, reduced path models were 
created and analysed to decide whether the remaining path coefficients changed in magnitude 
or significance level. 
9.3.1. Support for Profit Sharing 
Florkowski hypothesized that profit sharing support would be affected by personal 
perceptions about pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making. For all participants, regardless ofjob level, these factors are important concerns. The 
discussion now focuses on the examination of the findings of this study. 
Pay Equity 
Florkowski' s research model showed that support for profit sharing would be higher if the 
plan member believed that total rewards, including profit sharing earnings, were consistent 
with the inputs required for greater profitability. While the correlation coefficient in Tables 
9.1-9.2 supported this contention for all respondents and employees only, Table 9.3 indicated 
that pay equity was not significantly associated with plan support for managers only. As 
correlations do not provide enough information about the direction of this relationship, other 
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The multiple regression results for all respondents are presented in Table 9.5, and the total 
effects of the predictor variables are displayed in Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 for all respondents, 
employees, and managers, respectively. Although the correlation coefficients in Tables 9.1 -
9.2 indicated a significant relationship between pay equity and support for profit sharing, 
Tables 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 showed that pay equity was not a determinant of plan support for all 
respondents and employees only. For managers, the results were even more striking. None of 
the applicable correlations and beta coefficients in Tables 9.3, 9.5, and 9.8 achieved statistical 
significance. 
Therefore, all of these results indicate that Florkowski's hypotheses, "(a) employees' and (b) 
managers' perceived pay equity is positively related to their support for profit sharing", are 
not supported in this study. 
Performance-Reward Contingencies 
Florkowski's model suggested that support for profit sharing would be dependent upon the 
perceived link between performance and individual rewards. Tables 9.1-9.2 indicated that 
performance-reward contingencies were strongly associated with support for profit sharing. 
The multiple regression results for all respondents in Table 9.5 confirm that plan support was 
affected by the perceptions of performance-reward contingencies (b.243, p=.001). As 
mentioned before, path analysis uses the outcomes of regression analysis to explain one 
variable's full causal impact on another. Since no indirect effects were hypothesised for plan 
support, as can be seen from Table 9.6, the direct and total effects are the same. Together, 
these tables show that performance-reward contingency was the most important determinant 
of one's attitude toward profit sharing for the whole sample. Moreover, it should be 
mentioned that 8.6% of the correlation r 24 was attributable to noncausal variation. This 
suggests that the underlying assumption of causal closure was quite largely satisfied. 
Florkowski also tested his model by dividing the sample into two subgroups, employees and 
managers. He hypothesized that (a) employees' and (b) managers' perceptions of 
performance-reward contingencies are positively related to their support for profit sharing. 
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These hypotheses were tested by repeating the above analyses for employees and managers. 
The data provided support for both hypotheses. Table 9.5 indicates that beta-coefficients for 
performance-reward contingencies were positive and statistically significant for each 
subgroup. As can be seen from the total effect of the predictor variable in Tables 9.7 and 9.8, 
once again, performance-reward contingencies emerged as the most powerful precursor of 
profit sharing support. 
Influence on Decision Making 
The final predictor variable incorporated in the model was influence on decision making. 
Florkowski believed that participants would not support the profit sharing plan if they did not 
perceive that meaningful opportunities for input existed. The r34 correlation in Table 9.1 is 
consistent with this assertion. A statistically positive relationship (p < .01) existed between 
influence on decision making and plan support. This was further confirmed by the outcomes 
of multiple regression and path analysis for all respondents. Tables 9.5 and 9.6 indicate that 
influence on decision making was an important predictor variable in shaping profit sharing 
attitudes. 18.6% of the variation in the simple r remained unexplained by the total effects. 
Therefore, the evidence of causal closure was weaker than was the case for performance 
reward contingencies. 
For the subgroups of the sample, Florkowski hypothesised that (a) employees' and (b) 
managers' perceived influence on decision making are positively related to their support for 
profit sharing. For employees, there was no connection between influence on decision making 
and profit sharing support. Tables 9.5 and 9.7 indicate the results for this subgroup. None of 
the applicable correlations and beta coefficients in Tables 9.2, 9.5, and 9.7 achieved statistical 
significance. Thus, the above hypothesis for employees is not supported in this study. 
In contrast, those holding managerial positions showed significant connection between 
influence on decision making and profit sharing support. The r34 value in Table 9.3 was 
positive for managers. The multiple regression and path analysis outcomes for managers are 
presented in Tables 9.5 and 9.8. All of them achieved statistical significance and, therefore, 
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are compatible with the overall sample. Therefore, the above hypothesis for managers is 
supported by the data. 
9.3.2. Organizational Commitment 
The discussion now focuses on the empirical support for hypothesis which dealt with the 
effect that plan support has on organizational commitment as well as the potentially 
moderating impact ofjob satisfaction. 
Support for Profit Sharing 
According to Florkowski's (1989) model individual support for profit sharing would 
strengthen one's level of organizational commitment. He argued that those who accept the 
desirability of heightened profitability should mention a greater willingness to stay with the 
organization and work hard on its behalf. As can be seen in Table 9.1, for all respondents the 
correlations between profit sharing support and organizational commitment were very strong 
(r.556, p < .001). Tables 9.5 and 9.6 provide further evidence of a causal relationship. As 
Table 9.5 shows, apart from being statistically significant (p < .00 1), the standardized beta for 
plan support was larger than it was for any of the predictor variables. This showed that 
support for profit sharing was the most powerful determinant of commitment. However, it 
should be mentioned that 24.6% of the variation in the simple r was not explained by the 
direct effect. 
For employees, Florkowski hypothesized that "employees' support for profit sharing is 
positively related to their organizational commitment to the company". The r45 correlation in 
Table 9.2 is compatible with the hypothesis. A statistically significant (p < .001), positive 
relationship existed between support for profit sharing and organizational commitment. This 
was further proved by the outcomes of multiple regression and path analysis for employees. It 
again was clear that plan support had the biggest effect on organizational commitment. 
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Florkowski also hypothesised that, "managers' support for profit sharing is positively related 
to their organizational commitment to the company" (p. 115). The correlation coefficient 
between profit sharing and organizational commitment was very strong (p <. 001) for 
managers. As can be seen from Table 9.5, the standardised beta for plan support was also 
significant at .001 level. Consequently, the hypothesis for managers is supported by the data. 
9.4. Satisfaction as a Moderator 
Florkowski argued that the relationship between profit sharing support and organizational 
commitment would be moderated by job satisfaction. Moderated regression analysis was used 
to test this proposition (Cohen and Cohen, 1975; Saunders, 1956). To follow this three-step 
approach, first the dependent variable (commitment) is regressed on the predictor variable 
(p lan support). Then a second regression is done, in which the moderator (satisfaction) is 
entered as a linear, independent variable. One evaluates whether the second equation creates a 
significantly higher R2 value than the first one did, as follows: 
-k- 1)(R12-R52)/ 
t = ' I _______________ 
\J (1-R12) 
where N = sample size 
k = number of independent variables in the restricted model (first equation) 
R1 2 = explained variance of the full model (second equation) 
= explained variance of the restricted model (first equation) 
A third regression is performed with the original predictor, the moderator in linear form, and 
an interaction term representing the product of the predictor and moderating variables. One 
again assesses whether the new regression explains more of the variance in the dependent 
variable than the previous equation did. In this case, the second equation functions as the 
restricted model, while the third becomes the full model. 
Crucial information is obtained from these findings. The moderating variable would be 
considered as a distinct, independent variable in further regression analyses if the first t-
statistic was significant but the second one was not. Only the interaction term would be 
included, if the opposite held true. If each t-statistic is significant, one should enter both 
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forms. The last result is indicative of a quasi-moderating variable that interacts with the 
predictor as well as being a predictor variable in its own right (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-
Arie, 1981). 
The outcomes of moderated regression analysis for the sample are presented in Table 
(Appendix). The linear form of job satisfaction clearly improved one's ability to explain the 
variance in commitment levels for all respondents (t= 8.70, p < .0010). But there was no 
indication that the relationship between plan support and organizational commitment was 
moderated by satisfaction. The t-statistic for the third equation was non-significant, indicating 
that the inclusion of an interaction term did not meaningfully increase the explained variance. 
Therefore, in Table 9.5, satisfaction was considered as an independent variable in the 
regression equation. For employees and managers, these relationships were tested separately. 
As can be seen from Table (Appendix), both t-statistics were significant at .001 and .10 levels 
for the second and third equations, respectively, for employees. As this result indicates that 
job satisfaction was a quasi-moderator, linear and interaction forms of satisfaction were 
included to the equation for organizational commitment in Table 9.5. However, multiple 
regression analysis did not provide a statistically significant beta-coefficient for the 
interaction term. Table (Appendix) showed that job satisfaction was not a quasi-moderator for 
managers, because the equation with an interaction term for this subgroup did not have a 
significant t-statistic (t=.225). As before, in Table 9.5, job satisfaction was regarded as a 
predictor because it explained the variance in commitment over and above that explained by 
plan support alone. 
It should be mentioned that all of these results were consistent with the findings of 
Florkowski's study. In Florkowski's study, while job satisfaction was added as a quasi-
moderator variable and predictor variable to the regression equation for organizational 
commitment for employees only, it was added only as a predictor variable to the equation for 
all respondents, and the subgroup of managers. 
Multiple regression analysis provided evidence that job satisfaction had a positive, direct 
effect on organizational commitment. Table 9.5 indicates that the beta-coefficients of job 
satisfaction were almost as large as those of support for profit sharing for all respondents and 
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the subgroup of employees. Job satisfaction had the largest beta-coefficient for managers. The 
outcomes of path analysis in Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 repeat this pattern. 
As Florkowski mentioned, these results are compatible with other research findings about the 
relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment. In the literature, several 
studies have concluded that commitment can be partially explained as a time-lagged result of 
satisfaction (Bluedorn, 1982; DeCotiis and Summers, 1987; Marsh and Mannari, 1977; Price 
and Mueller, 1979). However, some researchers have concluded that there is a causal path 
from organizational commitment to job satisfaction (Bateman and Strasser, 1984; O'Reilly 
and Caidwell, 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Therefore, one must be careful when 
interpreting this finding. 
The theory-trimming approach to path analysis indicated that pay equity did not impact on 
organizational commitment for all respondents and both the subgroups of employees and 
managers. Performance-reward contingencies had an effect on organizational commitment. 
Combining the information in Tables 9.5-9.8 it can be seen that performance-reward 
contingencies had direct and indirect impacts on commitment for all respondents and for 
employees. Only an indirect effect was evident for managerial respondents. Influence on 
decision making also had an effect on organizational commitment. It had a direct effect only 
for all respondents and an indirect effect for all respondents and for managers. Neither type of 
effect was found for employees. 
In order to determine the completeness of the subsystems for profit sharing and 
organizational commitment, the amount of variance that remains unexplained for each 
variable is examined. Estimates of the residual causes can be acquired by "taking the R 2 for 
each equation away from 1 and taking the square root of the result of this subtraction" 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1997, p.T7O). As can be seen from Table 9.5, the path regressions for 
commitment had much higher R2 values than did those for plan support. Using the formula, 1-
R2 (Kim and Kohout, 1975), it is found that between 74 to 65 percent of the variance in 
commitment levels remains unexplained, compared with 97 to 92 percent of the variance in 
support for profit sharing. Therefore, this suggests that several important potential variables 





















































The final analytic step was to generate and test the efficacy of reduced models. New 
regressions were conducted including only those predictor variables that had showed 
statistically significant beta-coefficients. The path diagrams for each reduced model are 
presented in Figures 9.1-9.3. In general, the magnitude and significance level of the path 
coefficients were closely similar to those obtained from the full models. Therefore, it can be 
said that there was little or no loss of explanatory power with the reduced models. The oniy 
difference in the Adjusted R2 value was .01 (profit sharing support for managers). In addition, 
better approximations of the correlation matrix were obtained from the reduced models. in 
sum, all of these results indicate that the reduced models appear to be more defensible. 
9.5. Conclusion for the Replication of Florkowski's Theory 
Florkowski's theoretical model was tested with a variety of multivariate techniques. Before 
conducting any of these analyses, the need for control variables was searched. Such 
demographic characteristics as sex, tenure, age, education, and union status were 
simultaneously correlated with profit sharing support and other variables in the model. Partial 
correlations showed that the attitudinal relationships being studied were not materially 
affected by these factors. Therefore, no effort was made to control for personal attributes. 
Florkowski hypothesised that if pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence 
on decision making were not at acceptable levels, individuals would not support profit 
sharing. The correlational, multiple regression, and path analyses indicated that performance-
reward contingency was the most important determinant of plan support for all respondents 
and the subgroups of employees and managers. Influence on decision making affected profit 
sharing support for all respondents and the subgroup of managers only. This variable did not 
influence employee support. The study did not provide any evidence indicating a relationship 
between pay equity and support for profit sharing across groups. 
Florkowski also hypothesized that profit sharing support would be positively associated with 
organizational commitment. The results of the statistical analyses proved that plan support 
was a major determinant of organizational commitment across groups. It was the most 
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powerful factor for the total sample and the subgroup of managers, and second in importance 
for the subgroup of employees. 
It was also hypothesized that the relationship between profit sharing support and 
organizational commitment would be more effective for those who mentioned high job 
satisfaction. By using moderated regression analysis, it was found that job satisfaction did not 
act as a moderator for the all respondents and the subgroup of managers. However, a strong 
linear affect on commitment was apparent for both groups. Job satisfaction acted as a 
moderator and predictor variable for employees only. Further regression analyses indicated 
that job satisfaction was not a moderator for employees either. 
9.6. Main Conclusion for the Florkowski Replication Study 
The analytic procedure used in this chapter indicated that two of the three projected 
determinants of support for profit sharing (pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, 
and influence on decision making) were proved. Performance-reward contingencies and 
influence on decision making were determinants of support for profit sharing; the former had 
a bigger impact. The study did not find a relationship between pay equity and support for 
profit sharing. 
The positive relationship between support for profit sharing and organizational commitment 
was confirmed, indicating that plan support was a major determinant of organizational 
commitment. The analysis indicated that job satisfaction did not moderate the relationship 
between support for profit sharing and organizational commitment, but it exhibited a 
substantial effect on organizational commitment. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH MODEL 
In this chapter, the model developed for this study is tested by using the study data. The main 
aim of the first part of this chapter is to determine the separate and combined effects of 
financial participation (profit sharing and save-as-you-earn schemes) and participation in 
decision making on employee job attitudes and other perceptions and attitudes in the light of 
the research model. 
Perceptions of current levels of job attitudes and other perceptions will be summarized 
separately for managers and non-managers. The reason for doing so was explained in the 
research methodology chapter (Chapter Six). As some of the perceptions of current levels of 
job attitudes and organization attributes were summarized in Chapter Eight on the replication 
of Long's (1978) study (such as: integration, involvement, motivation, general satisfaction, 
commitment, satisfaction with compensation, social satisfaction, satisfaction with the work, 
satisfaction with promotion opportunities, satisfaction with the supervisor, performance 
reward contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, concern for others' performance, 
perceived degree of task interdependencies, job security, attitude towards change, 
cooperation, communication between management and employees, group work norms, 
organizational trust, and worker commitment to organizational goals), in this chapter the 
remaining job attitudes will be summarized, such as perceived pay equity, perceived 
influence in decision making, general interest in the job, interest in innovation, pride in job 
accomplishment, support for profit sharing (PS), support for save-as-you-earn (SAYE), and 
satisfaction with PS/SAlE schemes. 
It should be mentioned that in the previous two replication chapters, the variables were 
measured by using Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) own questionnaire items. In this 
chapter, in order to increase the reliability of the scales, apart from Long's or Florkowski's 
questionnaire items, additional items were used. Because of this, although the same statistical 
analyses were used for the same variables, the results of this chapter may be different from 
those of the replication chapters. 
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In order to compare differences in job attitudes held by managers and non-managers, the t 
statistic with a two-tailed test of significance will be used. This analysis will be done to 
obtain some understanding of the outlook of managerial and non-managerial groups. 
In an attempt to infer the impacts of individual PS and SAYE schemes, differences in job 
attitudes between non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, non-
participants of PS/SAYE schemes will be analysed. As the differences found from this 
procedure may have been caused by other differences between the two groups, a chi-square 
2) test will be used to compare the groups on a variety of personal and work-related 
characteristics. 
In order to investigate the effects of individual PS and SAYE schemes, while controlling for 
the possibly confounding effects of employees' personal and work-related characteristics, 
partial correlation analysis will be used. Profit sharing and SAYE schemes will be 
operationalized as a dichotomous dummy variable scored according to whether the 
respondents reported participating in either profit sharing or SAYE schemes ('1') or not 
participating in both PS and SAYE schemes ('0'). A similar procedure will be used to 
examine the effects of participation in decision making on the same variables. 'Participation 
in decision making' will be operationalized by averaging personal influence reported at each 
of three decision levels, namely job, departmental, and organizational levels (Q.127a, b, c). 
The relative and possible interactive effects of financial participation (PS and SAYE) and 
participation in decision making on organizational identification (integration, involvement, 
and commitment), general satisfaction, motivation, perceived pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, 
and satisfaction with PS and SAYE will be determined. Multiple regression analysis will be 
used to measure the relative effects of the schemes and participation in decision making on 
each of the dependent variables. Regression analysis can be used because the analysis 
indicated absence of multicollinearity between independent variables (see Chapter Six, 
research methodology). Interaction effects Will be investigated by using dummy 'PS/SAYE 
schemes' times 'participation in decision making' (see Chapter Six). 
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In the second part of this chapter, a second set of analyses, including a Pearson correlation 
and path analysis, was used to test the whole model. Pearson correlation analysis was used to 
assess the relative strength of the association among attitudinal variables, illustrated in the 
model, and facilitate calculations of the amount of bivariate variation that is not explained by 
the path models. 
A 'full model' of the hypothesised linkages among the variables under study was assessed by 
using path analytic techniques. The underlying relations among variables were tested in a 
series of hierarchical regression analyses. In order to control for the effects of demographic 
variables such as sex, education, tenure, age, job status, full/part-time employee, union 
membership, a hierarchical regression procedure was employed. The seven demographic 
variables were entered as a group on step 1 and the overall R was calculated. Following this, 
the relevant path variables for each dependent variables were entered on step 2. Overall R was 
again calculated, along with the change in the total R as a result of the addition of the path 
variables. The change in the overall R becomes the key test statistic to determine the 
explanatory power of the path model. 
Tables 10.10-10.12 present the structural equations for the causal model, controlling for the 
effects of demographic characteristics. The numeric values in the columns for step I represent 
beta weights for the control variables. The numeric values in the columns for step 2 are the 
beta weights for the path variables, after controlling for the effects of demographic 
characteristics. As the model postulated that both employee participation and participation in 
decision making have separate effects on employee job attitudes, these two variables were 
entered into the regression equations separately for some dependent variables, such as 
perceived pay equity, perceived performance-reward contingencies, perceived influence on 
decision making, commitment, involvement, and integration. Therefore, in Tables 10.10-
10.12 the numeric values in parentheses in the columns for step 2 represent beta weights for 
the path variables, when participation in decision making (not employee participation) was 
entered into the regression equations as a path variable. 
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The direct, indirect, and total effects that a variable has on other variables in the system were 
determined and presented in Tables 10.13-10.15 (for employee participation) and Tables 
10.16-10.18 (for participation in decision making). Finally, by deleting paths with 
coefficients that are not statistically significant or meaningful, a 'reduced model' was 
constructed. (For further information see Chapter Six, research methodology). The beta 
weights have been displayed in Figures 10.2-10.4 (for employee participation) and Figures 
10.5-10.7 (for participation in decision making), which present the reduced models, structural 
equations, and the beta weights for the path variables. 
10.1. The Separate and Combined Effects of PS/SAYE Schemes and Participation in 
Decision Making on Employee Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions and 
Attitudes 
Because on the research model financial participation (PS and SAYE schemes) and 
participation in decision making are combined, before testing the whole model the separate 
effects of fmancial participation and participation in decision making on job attitudes will be 
investigated. Although such effects have already been investigated in the Long replication 
chapter (Chapter Eight), the same procedure will be used in this chapter as well for the 
following reasons: 
(1) Variables in Long's replication chapter were measured using only Long's own items. In 
order to test the research model in this chapter, in addition to Long's questionnaire items, 
some additional items were used to measure the variables by obtaining higher scale 
reliability. For example, commitment, one of the main variables, was measured with a one-
item scale in Long's study, although in the literature researchers spent tremendous effort to 
develop reliable measures of employee commitment (see Chapter Three). In this chapter, 
apart from Long's item, 15 items (including the frequently used measure of the 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire, developed by Porter, Steers, Mowday, and 
Boulian in 1974) were used to measure organizational commitment. 
(2) As the research model is an advanced model of Long's model, a number of other variables 
(mentioned below) were argued to be affected by employee participation and participation in 
decision making. Therefore, apart from Long's study variables, some additional variables 
were introduced into the analyses in this chapter. 
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10.1.1. Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions 
This section summarizes job attitudes and other relevant perceptions which were not 
summarized in Chapter Eight (the Long replication), as they were reported by the 
respondents. Responses of managers and non-managers on these and other attitudinal 
variables will be compared. A comparison of non-managerial participants of PSISAYE and 
non-managerial, non-participants of PSISAYE on these variables will also be provided. 
Summary of the Responses on Attitudinal Variables 
In addition to job attitudes and other perceptions which were summarized in Chapter Eight, a 
number of other attitudes and perceptions were hypothesized to be affected by financial 
participation or participation in decision making. They are: perceived pay equity, perceived 
influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE, 
general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation. 
In tenns of perceived pay equity, more than half (59.7%) of non-managers reported that 
"when comparing my job experience with others in this company, I get paid..." 'very much' 
(9%) 'much' (22%) or 'slightly' (28.7%) 'less than I should get', while nearly two-fifths 
(39.7%) reported that 'I get paid about the same as I should get'. Only a small minority 
(0.7%) reported that 'I get paid more than I should get'. More than half (55.5%) of non-
managers reported that "when considering the contributions I make in relation to others in the 
company, I get paid..." 'very much' (8.7%), 'much' (17.4%) or 'slightly' (29.4%) 'less than I 
should get', while 44.1% reported that 'I get paid about the same as I should get'. Only a 
small minority (0.3%) reported that 'I get paid more than I should get'. 
For perceived influence on decision making, to the question asking "How much influence do 
work group members individually have in deciding what kinds of work or tasks are to be 
performed in your work group?" only a small minority of non-managers (18.8%) reported 'no 
influence', while a substantial proportion (69.9%) reported 'little' (27.6%), or 'some' (42.3%) 
influence. Only a small minority reported 'considerable' (9.2%) or 'extensive' (2.0%) 
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influence. When respondents were asked "How much influence do the work group supervisor 
and members as a group in meetings have in deciding about changing how you do your 
work?" 14.0% of non-managers reported 'no influence', while more than half (58.9%) 
reported 'little' (18.8) or 'some' (40.1%) influence. More than one-quarter of non-managerial 
employees(27.0%) reported 'considerable' (21.9%) or 'extensive' (5.1%) influence. 
Regarding support for profit sharing, a substantial proportion (83%) of non-managerial 
employees agreed that "Profit sharing is one of the best ways for employees to benefit from 
the company's financial success", while nearly half (49.5%) disagreed with the statement that 
"Profit sharing is not a fair method of getting paid for my work performance". It should be 
noted that for the second statement only slightly more than one-quarter (26.4%) of non-
managerial employees agreed with the statement; the remainder (26.8%) neither agreed nor 
disagreed. 
In terms of support for SAYE schemes, slightly more than one-third (34.9%) of non-
managerial employees agreed that "the SAYE scheme increases my commitment to the goals 
of the company", while only slightly more than one-quarter (28.4%) disagreed with the 
statement. 26.9% of non-managerial employees agreed that that "SAYE schemes encourage 
me to do my job well", while 3 6.9% disagreed with this statement. 
For satisfaction with PS/SAYE, a substantial proportion (77.6%) of non-managerial 
employees agreed that "generally speaking, I am satisfied with profit sharing and SAYE 
schemes", while more than two-thirds (68.6%) agreed that "participating in profit sharing and 
SAYE schemes makes me more interested in the company's financial success". 
Regarding general interest in the job, to the question asking "On most days on your job, how 
often does time seem to drag for you?", 44.3% of non-managerial employees reported that 
'time never seems to drag'. In terms of interest in innovation, slightly more than half (51.7%) 
of non-managerial employees disagreed with the statement that "in my kind of job, it is 
usually better to let my line manager worry about new or better ways of doing things". To the 
question asking "In your kind of work, if a person tries to change his usual way of doing 
things, how does it generally turn out?" around one-fifth (20.8%) of non-managerial 
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employees reported 'usually turns out better; our methods need improvement', while the 
remaining majority (79.2%) reported either 'usually does not make much difference' (56.7%) 
or 'usually turns out worse; the tried and true methods work best in my work' (22.5%). For 
pride in job accomplishment, the respondents were provided a 5-point scale (1= about once a 
month or less, 2= once every few weeks, 3= about once a week, 4= once every few days, and 
5= almost every day) to answer the question asking "How often do you feel really proud of 
something you have done on the job?". More than two-fifths (42.5%) of non-managerial 
employees reported 'almost every day' (27.3%) or 'once every few days' (15.2%), while the 
remaining 57.5% reported 'about once a week' (19.2%), 'once every few weeks' (16.8%) or 
'about once a month or less' (21.5%). On a 5-point scale, (1=rarely or never, 2= about once a 
month, 3= about once a week, 4= several times a week, and 5= almost every day) the 
respondents were asked "How often do you tell your husbandlwife or other family members 
about something you have accomplished on the job?". 15.6% of non-managerial employees 
reported 'almost every day', while the remaining 84.4% reported 'several times a week' 
(12.6%), 'about once a week' (28.6%), 'about once a month' (15.0%), or 'rarely or never' 
(28.2%). 
In sum, these responses indicate, among non-managerial employees, a fairly high satisfaction 
with PS/SAYE schemes, a fairly strong support for PS schemes, but a fairly low perception of 
influence on decision making, and generally less favourable attitudes toward pay equity, 
general interest in the job, interest in innovation, pride in job accomplishment, and fmally a 
very weak support for SAYE schemes. 
A Comparison of Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions of Managerial and Non-
managerial Employees 
It is expected that the job attitudes held by managerial and non-managerial employees will be 
different. Thus, if the results of the t-test show a great difference between managers' and non-
managers' attitudes, further analysis, in this chapter, will be conducted separately for 





	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Table 10.1. Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions of Managers and Non-managers
Managers Non-managers
N=129 N=301
Mean SD Mean SD
Job Attitudes
Integration 4.35 1.02 4.26 1.27 0.76
Involvement 4.32 0.86 3.66 0.97 6.72****
Commitment 5.09 0.85 4.57 0.95 5•44****
General Satisfaction 5.34 1.01 5.07 1.15 2.31**
Motivation 6.00 0.65 5.07 1.05 11.13****
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation 4.26 1.62 4.31 1.64 -0.34
Social Satisfaction 4.88 0.85 4.73 1.06 1.53
Work Satisfaction (Itself) 5.64 1.06 4.76 1.27 7•43****
Satisfaction with Promotion 5.01 1.54 4.33 1.61 4•Ø5****
Satisfaction with Supervisor 5.66 1.17 5.01 1.44 4•9Ø****
Other Perceptions and Attitudes
Performance Contingencies
Performance - Reward 3.56 1.21 3.04 1.08 4•39****
Effort- Performance 5.35 1.40 4.98 1.65 2.22**
PerceivedPayEquity 2.95 0.86 3.10 0.87 -1.54
Perceived Influence on Decision Making 3.33 0.55 2.64 0.81 10.16****
Support for Profit Sharing 4.71 0.96 4.52 0.85 2.04**
Support for SAYE 3.90 1.58 3.87 1.45 0.19
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE 5.73 1.05 5.34 1.12 334****
Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance 5.56 1.26 4.58 1.87 6.32****
"Poor Perf of Some Hurts Everybody" 5.01 1.41 4.82 1.78 1.14
"Should Encourage Others to Work" 5.38 0.87 4.79 1.59 4.89****
Perceived Task Interdependencies 5.55 1.50 4.47 2.04 6.09****
Job Security 4.07 1.51 4.87 1.25
Attitude Towards Change 4.48 1.22 3.64 1.39 6.32****
General Interest in the Job 4.53 0.88 3.88 1.31 6.07****
Pride in Job Accomplishment 3.11 1.08 2.91 1.21 1.65
Interest in Innovation 3.86 0.88 2.63 0.87 13.38****
* p<.IO ** p<.05 p<.01 ****p<Øfl
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Job attitudes: Table 10A displays the mean scores and standard deviations on job attitudes 
and other perceptions for managers and non-managers. Managers reported significantly 
higher levels of motivation, involvement, commitment (p's < .00 1), and general satisfaction 
(p < .05), and a slightly higher, not statistically significant, level of integration than did non-
managers. 
Specific aspects of satisfaction: In order to better understand the structure of satisfaction in 
this organization, five specific aspects of satisfaction were examined: satisfaction with 
compensation, social satisfaction, satisfaction with the work itself, satisfaction with 
promotion, and satisfaction with the supervisor. 
Table 10.1 shows the means and standard deviations for each of these variables, for managers 
and non-managers. Managers reported significantly higher levels (p's < .00 1) of satisfaction 
with work, with supervisor, and with promotion opportunities, while they reported a slightly 
higher, not statistically significant, level of social satisfaction, and a similar level of 
satisfaction with compensation. Overall, with the exception of satisfaction with 
compensation, managerial employees seemed to be quite highly satisfied with specific aspects 
of satisfaction. 
Other perceptions and attitudes: A number of other perceptions and attitudes which might 
be affected by financial participation (PS and SAYE schemes) and participation in decision 
making were also assessed. They are: perceived pay equity, perceived influence on decision 
making, support for profit sharing, support for SAYE, satisfaction with PSISAYE, general 
interest in the job, interest in innovation, pride in job accomplishment, performance-reward 
contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, concern for others' performance, perceived 
task interdependencies, job security, and attitude towards change. 
The means and standard deviations for these variables, for managers and non-managers, are 
shown in Table 10.1. As can be seen, managers reported significantly higher levels of 
perceived influence on decision making, satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, general interest 
in the job, interest in innovation, performance-reward contingencies, importance of others' 
performance, belief that other employees should encourage lagging employees, perceived 
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task interdependencies, attitudes towards change (p's < .001), and support for PS (p < .05), 
and a slightly higher (not statistically significant) level of pride in job accomplishment and 
belief that poor perfonnance of some hurts everybody than did non-managers. They reported 
a significantly lower level ofjob security (p < .001) and a lower (not statistically significant) 
level of perceived pay equity than did non-managers. Managerial and non-managerial 
employees reported the same level of support for SAYE schemes. 
Main findings of the comparison of job attitudes and other perceptions of managerial 
and non-managerial employees: Analysis, so far, has indicated that managerial employees, 
mostly, had more favourable 'job attitudes' higher belief about 'other perceptions and 
attitudes', and more favourable perceptions on 'aspects of satisfaction' than did non-
managerial employees. As great differences occurred between job attitudes of managerial and 
non-managerial employees, it was required that further analysis in this chapter be conducted 
separately for managerial and non-managerial employees. Where groups cannot be created 
separately for managerial and non-managerial employees because of the sample of the study, 
analysis will be conducted for non-managerial employees only. 
A Comparison of Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions of Participants and Non-
participants of PS/SAYE Schemes 
A comparison of managers and non-managers on job attitudes and other perceptions has 
already been provided. Here, the same procedure will be used to compare job attitudes and 
other relevant perceptions of non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, 
non-participants of PS/SAYE to obtain some understanding of the outlook of each group. As 
was mentioned earlier in this chapter, this comparison cannot be used to make causal 




	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Table 10.2. Job Attitudes and Other Perceptions, Participants of Either PS or SAYE, and
Non-participants of Both PS/SAYE (Non-managers)
Participants of Either Non-participants of Both
PS or SAYE PS/SAYE
N= 227 N= 74
Mean SD Mean SD
Job Attitudes
Integration 4.59 1.26 4.22 1.36 1.68*
Involvement 3.95 1.00 3.61 1.02 1.98**
Commitment 4.78 0.95 4.59 0.98 1.16
General Satisfaction 5.40 1.03 4.89 1.25 2.80***
Motivation 5.37 0.94 5.03 1.24 1.79*
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation 4.41 1.73 4.21 1.65 0.71
Social Satisfaction 4.92 0.98 4.88 0.94 0.28
Work Satisfaction (Itself) 5.17 1.12 4.50 1.39 3.36****
Satisfaction with Promotion 4.49 1.67 4.44 1.51 0.19
Satisfaction with Supervisor 5.12 1.54 5.24 1.34 0.46
Other Perceptions and Attitudes
Performance Contingencies
Performance - Reward 3.14 1.13 2.93 1.01 1.16
Effort-Performance 4.97 1.60 5.29 1.55 1.23
Perceived Pay Equity 3.12 0.88 3.05 0.98 0.46
SupportforProfitSharing 4.59 0.84 4.58 0.75 0.13
SupportforSAYE 4.20 1.51 3.86 1.35 1.37
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE 5.80 0.92 4.94 1.25 4.42****
Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance 4.74 1.88 4.67 1.93 0.24
"Poor Perf. of Some Hurts Everybody" 5.04 1.80 4.51 1.88 1.74*
"Should Encourage Others to Work" 5.08 1.53 4.59 1.62 1 •9Ø*
Perceived Task Interdependencies 4.53 2.14 4.57 1.95 0.11
Job Security 5.01 1.25 4.87 1.32 0.65
Attitude Towards Change 3.77 1.35 3.76 1.42 0.01
General Interest in the Job 4.01 1.23 4.06 1.33 0.24
Pride in Job Accomplishment 3.13 1.21 3.05 1.31 0.37
Interest in Innovation 2.59 0.84 2.68 1.00 0.60
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 ****p<.001
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Job attitudes: Table 10.2 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the job 
attitudes: integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation. Non-
managerial participants of PS/SAYE schemes reported a significantly high level of general 
satisfaction (p < .0 1), involvement (p < .05), and motivation and integration (p's < .10), while 
they reported a slightly higher (not statistically significant) level of commitment. Therefore, 
these results indicate that there are great differences between the job attitudes of non-
managerial participants of PS/SAYE groups and non-managerial, non-participants of 
PS/SAYE groups. 
Aspects of satisfaction: The means and standard deviations for each aspect of satisfaction 
(satisfaction with compensation, social satisfaction, satisfaction with the work itself, 
satisfaction with promotion opportunities, and satisfaction with supervisor) for non-
managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, non-participants of PS/SAYE are 
presented in Table 10.2. While the non-managerial participants group reported significantly 
higher levels of satisfaction with work itself (p < .00 1) and a slightly higher (not statistically 
significant) level of satisfaction with compensation, they reported similar levels of 
satisfaction with social relationships, with promotion, and with the supervisor. In sum, non-
managerial participants of PS/SAYE schemes did not seem to have more satisfaction with the 
five aspects of satisfaction (except satisfaction with work itself) than did non-managerial, 
non-participants of PS/SAYE schemes. 
Other perceptions and attitudes: Table 10.2 shows the means and standard deviations for 
other perceptions and attitudes (such as: perceived pay equity, perceived influence on 
decision making, support for profit sharing, support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE, 
general interest in the job, interest in innovation, pride in job accomplishment, performance-
reward contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, concern for others' performance, 
perceived task interdependencies, job security, and attitude towards change) for non-
managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, non-participants of PS/SAYE 
schemes. The participant group reported significantly higher satisfaction with PS/SAYE (p < 
.001), significantly stronger beliefs that 'poor performance of some hurts everybody', 'other 
employees should encourage lagging employees (p's < .10), and a slightly higher (not 
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statistically significant) level of support for SAYE, job security, and performance-reward 
contingencies, while they reported a non-significantly lower level of effort-performance 
contingencies than did the non-participant group. Both groups reported the same level of 
support for PS, pay equity, general interest in the job, interest in innovation, pride in job 
accomplishment, importance of others' performance, task interdependencies, and attitudes 
towards change. 
Main findings of the comparison of job attitudes and other perceptions of participants 
and non-participants of PS/SAYE schemes: While the outcomes for some job attitudes 
(such as integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and motivation) and other perceptions 
and attitudes (satisfaction with PS/SAYE and support for SAYE) are consistent with the 
proposed relationships on the research model, other outcomes (for commitment, performance-
reward contingencies, group work norms, cooperation, pay equity, and support for PS) are 
not. Therefore, these findings suggest that it would be desirable to conduct further analysis in 
order to find out the 'real effect' of financial participation and participation in decision 
making on employee job attitudes. The term 'real effect' is used, because the analysis made 
so far, does not take into account the personal (demographic) differences between participants 
and non-participants, and aims to obtain some understanding of the outlook of each group. 
Further analysis will now aim to determine the relationship between financial 
participation/participation in decision making and job attitudes by considering the possibility 
that the differences might have been caused by other differences between the two groups. 
10.1.2. Effects of PS/SAYE Schemes and Participation in Decision Making on Job 
Attitudes 
This section investigates the effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision 
making on job attitudes and other perceptions. First, partial analysis is used to evaluate the 
relationship of PS/SAYE schemes to the dependent variables, and in the second part of this 
section the same procedure is repeated using participation in decision making as the 
independent variable. Before the partial correlation analysis, chi-square (X 2) analysis is used 
to find the differences between participants and non-participants of PS/SAYE schemes. 
Finally, multiple regression analysis is used to empirically separate and assess the relative 
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effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making, and to test for interaction 
effects between the two variables. 
PS/SAYE Schemes and Job Attitudes 
It has been hypothesized that PS/SAYE schemes will have positive effects on integration, 
involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, and a number of other variables, 
such as perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, support for PS, support for 
SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE. In order to test these hypotheses, it was necessary to 
find the differences in demographic characteristics between participants and non-participants 
of PS/SAYE schemes. Therefore, a chi-square (X 2) analysis was used. 
Table 10.3 compares non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE and non-managerial, non-
participants of PS/SAYE on a variety of personal and work-related characteristics. As can be 
seen, significant differences between the two groups were found for sex (p < .05), age (p < 
.01), full/part-time employee (p < .10), tenure (p < .001), and union membership (p < .001). 
Partial correlations were computed between dummy PS/SAYE schemes and the dependent 
variables, while controlling for the possibly confounding effects of sex, age, full/part-time 
employee, tenure, and union membership, which tended to correlate both with PS/SAYE 
schemes and some of the dependent variables. Table 10.4 shows the resulting correlations. It 
should be mentioned that this procedure alone, however, does not allow causal inference. 
Job attitudes: As can be seen from Table 10.4, PS/SAYE schemes were significantly related 
only to general satisfaction (p <.05) and slightly (not significantly) related to integration and 
motivation. They showed a very weak relationship with involvement and commitment. 
This does not necessarily indicate that PS/SAYE schemes have not improved job attitudes, 
since the analysis did not show a zero or negative relationship between the schemes and 
employee job attitudes. Thus, it can be said that with the exception of general satisfaction (a 































Table 10.3. Comparison of Non-managerial (a) Participants of Either PS or SAYE, and





Male 35.2% 44.6% 5.70/1**
Female 64.8% 55.4%
Age
Under 26 13.7% 18.9%
26-30 9.3% 17.6%




Over 50 21.6% 13.5%
Education
Completed secondary school or lower education level 70.0% 67.6%
Some university or technical training beyond 0.24/1
secondary school, or higher education level 30.0% 32.4%
Full or Part-time Employee -
Full-time employee 53.3% 45.9% 2.86/1*
Part-time employee 46.7% 54.1%
Job Status
Clerical/secretarial or technical 20.7% 17.6% 0.6 1/1
Other 79.3% 82.4%
Marital Status
Married 66.1% 67.6% 1.82/2
Single 24.2% 24.3%
Widowed/divorced, separated, others 9.7% 8.1%
Tenure
Less than two years 9.7% 5 1.4%
More than two years, less than five years 23.3% 24.3% 119.24/4****
More than five years, less than 10 years 45.8% 14.9%
More than 10 years, less than 15 years 16.7% 6.8%
More than 15 years 4.4% 2.7%

































Table 10.4. Partial Correlations Between (a) PS/SAYE, and (b) Participation, Controlling for






General Satisfaction .193 ** .326****
Motivation .062
Aspects of Satisfaction
Satisfaction with Compensation .088 .169* * *
Social Satisfaction .115* 349****
Work Satisfaction (Itself) .154**
Satisfaction with Promotion .068 .255****
Satisfaction with Supervisor -.033 ________________




Perceived Pay Equity .085
Perceived Influence on Decision Making .020
Support for Profit Sharing 097*
Support for SAYE .201***
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE .329****
Concern for Performance of Others
Importance of Others' Performance .012 .017
"Poor Perf. of Some Hurts Everybody" .036 .096*
"Should Encourage Others to Work" .137**
Perceived Task Interdependencies .053 .084
Job Security .041
Attitude Towards Change .016
General Interest in the Job .105*
Pride in Job Accomplishment .046






Aspects of satisfaction: PS/SAYE. schemes were significantly related to satisfaction with the 
work itself (p < .05) and social satisfaction (p < .10). They were slightly (non-significantly) 
and positively related to satisfaction with compensation and promotion, and negatively 
related to satisfaction with the supervisor. 
Other perceptions and attitudes: PSISAYE schemes were positively and significantly 
related to satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes (p <. 001), performance-reward contingencies 
(p < .01), support for SAYE schemes (p < .01), one of the three items measuring concern for 
the performance of others, namely the belief that employees should encourage lagging 
employees to improve their performance (p < .05), and support for PS schemes (p < .10), 
while they were negatively and significantly related to effort-performance contingencies (p < 
.05) and general interest in the job ( p< .10). The schemes showed a small positive (not 
significant) effect on perceived pay equity, perceived task interdependencies, pride in job 
accomplishment, job security, and one of the three items measuring concern for performance 
of others, namely 'poor performance of some hurts everybody', but they showed nearly a zero 
relationship with interest in innovation, attitude towards change, and the personal importance 
of the performance of others. 
Participation in Decision Making and Job Attitudes 
Job attitudes: As can be seen from Table 10.4, participation in decision making was strongly 
related to all five job attitudes, namely integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, and motivation (p's < .001). 
Aspects of satisfaction: Perceived participation in decision making was significantly related 
to all aspects of satisfaction: social satisfaction, work satisfaction, satisfaction with 
promotion, satisfaction with supervisor (p's < .00 1), and satisfaction with compensation (p's 
<.01). 
Other perceptions and attitudes: As Table 10.4 shows, with the exception of one measure 
of concern for the performance of others and perceived task interdependencies, participation 
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in decision making was strongly and significantly related to performance-reward 
contingencies, job security, attitude towards change, general interest in the job, pride in job 
accomplishment, perceived pay equity, support for PS, satisfaction with PSISAYE, support 
for PS (p's < .001), interest in innovation (p <.01), and the feeling that 'poor performance of 
some hurts everybody' (p < .10). 
Relative Effects of PS/SAYE Schemes and Participation in Decision Making 
The preceding analysis shows that both PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision 
making have had positive effects on job attitudes: integration, involvement, commitment, 
general satisfaction, motivation, perceived influence on decision making, performance-reward 
contingencies, and perceived pay equity. However, the type of analysis conducted so far does 
not allow assessment of the relative effects of these two independent variables, although this 
is clearly an important question. Therefore, the first major aim of this part of the section is to 
separate and assess the relative effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision 
making on such variables. 
The second major aim here is to investigate whether an interaction between the schemes and 
participation in decision making may exist. That is, would each be more effective when 
accompanied by the other than if they occurred separately? Multiple regression analysis is 
used to achieve these two aims, and the specific procedures used here have been explained in 
Chapter Six (methodology). The results of this analysis are now evaluated. 
Relative effects: Table 10.5 shows the squared multiple regression coefficients (R2s) and the 
standardized partial regression coefficients (beta weights) for PS/SAYE schemes and 
participation in decision making for integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, motivation, perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and 
perceived influence in decision making, while statistically controlling for sex, age, full/part 
time employee, union membership, and tenure. All R2s are statistically significant beyond the 
.01 level. This indicates that combined PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision 











proportion of the variance 'explained' (K2) ranges from 11.77% for performance-reward 
contingencies to 26.99% for integration. 
Table. 10.5. Combined and Independent Effects of PS/SAYE, and Participation in Decision 
Making, Controlling for Sex, Age, Full/Part-time, Union Membership, Length of 
Service (Non-managers) 
Beta Weights 
R2 PS/SAYE Participation 
Integration 26.99 .12 37**** 
Involvement 26.38 .05 
Commitment23.22 34****.06 
Satisfaction 26.38 
Motivation 26.08 O/**** .08 
Pay Equity 15.87 °/**** .12 
Performance-Reward Cont. ll.77%*** .31*** 







The beta weights show the relative amount that each of the two independent variables 
(PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making) contributes to 'explained' variance, 
after the effect of the other has been statistically controlled. As can be seen from Table 10.5, 
participation in decision making explains a statistically significant amount of the variance in 
all eight variables (integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, 
pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and perceived influence on decision making), 
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while PS/SAYE schemes are significantly related to two variables: general satisfaction and 
performance reward contingencies. PS/SAYE schemes show almost no relationship to 
perceived influence on decision making, involvement, commitment, and motivation, but they 
show only a small (not significant) relationship to integration and perceived pay equity. 
In comparing the effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making it is seen 
that participation in decision making has a stronger impact on integration, involvement, 
commitment, satisfaction, motivation, perceived pay equity, and perceived influence on 
decision making, while PS/SAYE schemes have the stronger effect (not statistically 
significant) on only one variable, performance-reward contingencies. 
There are several possible reasons for the apparently weaker effect of PS/SAYE schemes. The 
first is, as mentioned in Chapter Eight (the Long replication), the substantial majority of non-
participants (74.5%) reported that they intended to become participants of the schemes in the 
near future. Therefore, they are regarded as potential future beneficiaries of the schemes, and 
the weaker effect of PS/SAYE schemes may have stemmed from non-participants' positive 
attitudes towards PS and SAYE schemes?. 
Second, the operationalization of PS/SAYE schemes as a dichotomous variable scored 
according to whether respondents are participants or non-participants of the schemes may 
have artificially understated the effects of the schemes, since each participant owns different 
amounts of shares in the organization. To the question asking "How many shares do you 
have?", 134 respondents gave usable answers to this question. Of these respondents, the 
majority (63.4%) had between five and 1,000 shares, while the remaining (36.6%) had 
between 1,000 and 15,000 shares. In analysis here all shareholders are lumped into the same 
group, although the effects of owning very few shares would be expected to be weaker than 
the effects of owning a much larger amount of shares. 
Third, it is possible that widespread employee share ownership has positively affected certain 
job attitudes of both the participants group and the non-participants group by positively 




















Table 10.6. Interaction Between (a)PS/SAYE, and (b) Participation in Decision Making,































Interaction effects: Possible interactive effects between PS/SAYE schemes and participation
in decision making were examined by adding a multiplicative term to the regression equation.
Table 10.6 shows the added proportion of the variance in the dependent variables 'explained'
by the interaction term. As can be seen, there are some interaction effects between the
independent variables, ranging from 4.2% for motivation down to almost zero (0.02%) for
involvement. Interaction effects were found especially for motivation, commitment, general
satisfaction, and perceived influence on decision making. Small interaction effects were
found for perceived pay equity, while there were almost negligible interaction effects for
performance-reward contingencies, integration, and involvement. It can be concluded that
there is a possibility of interaction effects between PS/SAYE schemes and participation in
decision making.
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10.2. Analysis of the Full Model: Path Analysis 
10.2.1. Correlational Analysis 
Analysis of the model began with the computation of Pearson correlations. Although it 
cannot explain cause-and-effect relationships, this form of analysis serves two useful 
purposes. First, it helps to assess the relative strength of the associations among the variables 
which are related to each other on the model. Second, it enables one to calculate the amount 
of bivariate variation that is not explained by the path models. Table 10.7 shows the 
correlation coefficients for all respondents (n=430). Tables 10.8 and 10.9 display the 
correlations for employees (n=301) and managers (n=129). 
As can be seen from Table 10.7, the combination of financial participation and participation 
in decision making (hereafter called employee participation) was positively and significantly 
associated with all dependent variables, namely perceived influence on decision making 
(i—.505, p < .00 1), involvement (r=.464, p < .00 1), commitment (r=.414, p < .00 1), 
performance-reward contingencies (r=.345, p <.001), integration (r=.307, p < .001), and pay 
equity (r=.088, p <. 10) This is consistent with the research model. When the sample was 
stratified by job level, employee participation continued to be positively associated with all 
six variables (perceived influence on decision making, involvement, commitment, 
performance-reward contingencies, integration, and pay equity, excluding pay equity for the 
managerial group) for both the non-managerial and managerial group (see Tables 10.8 and 
10.9). Comparing with all respondents, for non-managerial and managerial groups, a different 
rank ordering was apparent regarding correlations involving employee participation. While 
the rank order for all respondents was, first, perceived influence on decision making (r=.505), 
second, involvement (r=.464), third, commitment (r.414), fourth, performance-reward 
contingencies (r=.345), fifth, integration (r=.307), and sixth, pay equity (r.088), for non-
managerial employees it became, first, perceived influence on decision making (r.422), 
second, involvement (r=.3 72), third, integration (r=.3 33), fourth, commitment (r.295), fifth, 
performance reward contingencies (r=.246), and sixth, pay equity (r=.149), and for managers, 
commitment (r=.472), involvement (r=.3 96), performance-reward contingencies (r=.3 67), 
integration (r=.340) and perceived influence on decision making (r=.3 13), respectively. 
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As was postulated in the model, participation in decision making was positively and 
significantly associated with all six dependent variables (integration, involvement, 
commitment, perceived pay equity, perceived performance-reward contingencies, and 
perceived influence on decision making, excluding pay equity for managerial employees) for 
all respondents and two subgroups, non-managerial and managerial employees. 
In sum, the results of the correlation analysis indicated that, consistent with the research 
model, employee participation and participation in decision making were positively and 
significantly associated with perceived performance-reward contingencies, perceived 
influence on decision making, integration, involvement, and commitment for all respondents 
and two subgroups, managerial and non-managerial employees. They were positively and 
significantly associated with pay equity for all respondents and non-managerial employees. 
Pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making were 
positively and significantly associated with support for PS, support for SAYE, and 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for all respondents and the non-managerial group. For 
managers, while all three variables (pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and 
influence on decision making) were positively and significantly associated with support for 
PS, only one of these variables, namely performance-reward contingencies, was positively 
and significantly associated with support for SAYE and satisfaction with PSISAYE schemes. 
As can be seen from correlation tables (Tables 10.7, 10.8 and 10.9), performance-reward 
contingencies were the only variable which positively and significantly associated with 
support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for all 
respondents and both groups. Moreover, it had the strongest associations with such variables. 
The other two variables, pay equity and influence on decision making, were positively 
associated with support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes 
for all respondents and the non-managerial group. 
There was a strong and significant (p's < .001) association between integration and 
involvement for all employees (r=.619), and both subgroups, namely non-managerial 
employees (i—.685) and managerial employees (r=.501). 
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Consistent with the research model, all nine variables, namely, pay equity, performance-
reward contingencies, influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE, integration, involvement, and satisfaction, were strongly and 
significantly related to organizational commitment for all respondents and both subgroups. 
Looking at Tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9, one finds that integration was positively associated 
with co-operation, group work norms, and motivation for all employees and both subgroups, 
as it was proposed on the research model. Consistent with the research model, involvement 
was positively and significantly (p's < .001) associated with cooperation and satisfaction for 
all respondents and both subgroups. Motivation had positive and significant relationships 
with general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation for all 
respondents and both subgroups. This is consistent with the research model. 
10.2.2. Path Analyses 
Perceived Pay Equity, Performance-Reward Contingencies, and Influence on Decision 
Making 
It was anticipated that perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies and influence 
on decision making would be influenced by the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making (employee participation) and participation in decision 
making alone. For all respondents and two employee subgroups, namely managerial and non-
managerial employees, the findings of this study are examined below. 
Perceived pay equity: The research model indicated that employees' perception of pay 
equity would be higher if employees participate in PS/SAYE schemes and have an influence 
in decision making processes. Table 10.10, 10.11, and 10.12 display the multiple regression 
results for all respondents and two employee subgroups, namely managerial and non-
managerial employees, respectively. As the correlation table (Table 10.7) for all respondents 
indicated that employee participation was significantly associated with perceived pay equity, 
the multiple regression results (Table 10.10) showed that perceived pay equity was affected 
by employee participation (b= .219, p <.01). Employee participation accounted for a very 
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small amount of the variance in the perception of pay equity variable for the whole sample 
(R22- R1 2= .031, p < .001). As mentioned before, path analysis uses the outcomes of 
regression analysis to indicate one variable's full causal impact on another. Table 10.13 
shows the total effects of the predictor variables. Since no indirect effects were hypothesised 
for perceived pay equity, the direct and total effects are identical. 
The same analyses were repeated for non-managerial and managerial employees. Consistent 
with the results of correlation analysis (see Tables 10.8 and 10.9), the multiple regression 
results indicated that perceived pay equity was significantly affected by employee 
participation for only one employee subgroup, non-managerial employees. For this subgroup, 
employee participation accounts for a change in the overall adjusted R 2 of .041 (p < .001). 
For non-managerial employees and managerial employees, the total effects of the predictor 
variables are listed in Tables 10.14 and 10.15, respectively. Once again, the direct and total 
effects are identical, because no direct effects were hypothesized for the two employee 
subgroups. 
Consistent with the correlation analysis, the multiple regression results showed that perceived 
pay equity was significantly affected by participation in decision making for all respondents 
(b=.227, p < .001), and non-managerial employees (b.200, p < .001) (see Tables 10.10 and 
10.11). In comparing with employee participation, participation in decision making accounted 
for a slightly higher amount of the variance in the perception of pay equity variable for the 
whole sample (R22- R1 2=.037, p < .00 1), but it accounted for a slightly lower amount of the 
variance in these variables for non-managerial employees (R 22- R1 2=.037, p < .001). 
Perceived pay equity was not significantly affected by participation in decision making for 
only one employee subgroup, managerial employees. 
In sum, the results of multiple regression analysis and path analysis indicated that both 
employee participation and participation in decision making affected perceived pay equity for 
the whole sample and the non-managerial group. For the managerial group neither employee 
participation nor participation in decision making showed an effect on the perception of pay 
equity. 
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Table 10.10. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for all respondents)
Step I
______________ PPayEq PeReCo PerInDM SuPS SuSAYE SaPSSA Commit Invol.
1.Sex .055 .125** .010 -.083 -.079 -.027 .048 .052
2. Education _.136** .026 .056 .042 .034 .047 .003 .071
3.Tenure .013 -.003 -.043 -.061 .026 .192**** -.018 .015
4.Age .063 .044 -.072 .147*** .082 .129** .244**** .255****
5.JobStatus -.051 _.238**** _394**** _.132** -.041 _.126** _.323**** _294****
6. Full/Part-time .223**** .071 .042 -.015 .036 -.042 .019 _.134**
7. Union Memb. .024 -.015 .045 -.059 -.038 -.048 -.021 -.025
R1 2	.098 .062 .191 .038 .014 .105 .132 .191
Adjusted R1 2	.083 .046 .177 .027 -.002 .090 .118 .177
F 6.51**** 3.96**** 13.96**** 2.36** .87 7.06**** 9.16**** 14.16****
Step2 __________ __________ ___________ ________ ________ ________ ___________ ___________
8.Emp. Particip. .219*** .350**** •459**** -.033 .174****
(PDM) (.227****) (.315****) (.511****) _________ _________ _________ (.007) (.210****)
9.PayEquity .099* .066 .116** .066**
________________ ___________ ___________ ____________ _________ _________ _________ (.065**) ____________
10. Per.-Rew. C. .277**** .325**** .178**** .054*
_________________ ____________ ____________ ____________ _________ _________ _________ (.049) ____________
11. Infi. on DM .098* .086* .076 .076**
________________ ___________ ___________ ____________ _________ _________ _________ (.064**) ____________
12. Sup. PS .178"
__________________ ____________ ____________ _____________ __________ __________ __________ (.175****) _____________
13. Sup. SAYE -.034
________________ ___________ ___________ ____________ _________ _________ _________ (-.032) ____________
14. Sat PS/SAVE .003
15. Commitment
16. Involvement .250****
__________________ ____________ ____________ _____________ __________ __________ __________ ( .244****) _____________
17. Integration .210**** .542****
_________________ ____________ ____________ _____________ _________ __________ __________ (.207****) (.522****)
18. Satisfaction 344****
_________________ ____________ ____________ _____________ _________ _________ __________ ( .341****) _____________
19. Cooperation
20. Cr. Wo. Nor.
21. Motivation
22. Gen. In. Job
23. Pr. Job Acco.
24. mt. in Innov.
R22	.131 (.136) .147 (.136) .336 (.387) .159 .151 .175 .740 (.739) .525 (.535)
Adjusted R22	.114 (.120) .130 (.120) .324 (.375) .139 .130 .155 .728 (.728) .514 (.525)
F 7.87**** 9_02**** 26.17**** 7.78**** 7.29**** 8.71**** 67.43**** .S1.2'7****
(8.28****) (8.28****) (32.59****) (67.23****) (53.35****)
Adj. R22- R1 2	.031 (.037) .084 (.074) .147 (.198) .112 .132 .065 .610 .337 (.348)
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Table 10. 10. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for all respondents) (Continued)
Step I
________________ Integ GrWoNo CoopPe SatGen Motiv GnlnJob PrJoAc Intlnno
1.Sex -.001 .006 -.033 .076 .183**** .146*** .117** -.044
2.Education -.049 .108* .019 .028 .072 -.003 -.015
3.Tenure -.029 .011 -.009 -.034 -.046 _.092* _.121** -.036
4.Age .326**** .018 .177**** .304**** .268**** .314**** .107** -.036
5.JobStatus .127** _.223**** _194*** _.217**** _43Q**** _.264**** -.102 _.405****
6. Full/Part-time .016 .062 .115* .033 _.111** _.133** _.170**** _.147***
7. Union Memb. .007 .012 .091* -.048 -.031 .095* -.042 .058
R1 2	.107 .071 .073 .120 .285 .188 .046 .371
Adjusted R1 2	.092 .056 .057 .106 .273 .174 .030 .361
F 7.18**** 459**** 4.71**** 8.23**** 23.92**** 13.88**** 2.92**** 3553****
Step2 __________ ________ __________ _________ __________ _________ _________ _________
8.Emp. Particip. .398****













21.Motivation .428**** .400**** .231****
22.Gen. In. Job
23.Pr. Job Acco.
24. Int. in Innov.
R22	.214 (.235) .147 .203 .385 .478 .319 .161 .410
Adjusted R22	.199 (.221) .131 .186 .371 .467 .306 .145 .398
F 14.24**** 8.98**** 11.85' 29.10**** 42.29**** 24.51**** 10.06**** 36.42****
(16.12****)
Adj. R22-R12 .107 (.129) .075 .129 .265 .194 .132 .115 .037
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Table 10.11. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for non-managerial employees)
Step1 ___________ __________ ___________ ________ ________ _________ __________ __________
______________ PPayEq PeReCo PerInDM SuPS SuSAVE SaPSSA Commit Invol.
I.Sex .160*** -.070 -.024 .011 -.002 .097 .174*** .047
2. Education _.112** .003 .026 .008 .009 .034 .009 .117**
3.Tenure -.044 -.060 -.044 _.193*** -.092 .090 _.124** .005
4.Age .037 .015 -.054 .146** .010 .141** .267**** .305****
5.JobStatus .183*** .070 _.168*** .071 .016 .011 .059 .009
6. Full/Part-time .178*** .067 .077 -.068 .005 -.103 .010 -.102
7.UnionMemb. .009 -.060 -.012 _.116* -.052 -.050 .121** -.071
Ri2 .164 .018 .040 .053 .013 .057 .123 .113
Adjusted R1 2	.144 -.006 .012 .030 -.011 .035 .102 .091
F 8.15**** 0.75 1.52 2.32** 0.55 2.52** 5.86**** 5.29****
Step 2
8.Emp. Particip. .215**** .292**** .470**** -.062 .136***
(PDM) (.200****) (.259****) (.516****) ________ ________ _________ (-.048) (.172****)
9. Pay Equity .126* .090 .133** .059
10. Per.-Rew. C. .222**** .308**** .179*** .059
________________ ____________ ___________ ____________ _________ _________ _________ (.057) ___________
11. Infi. on DM .081 .109* .115** .072**
________________ ____________ ____________ ____________ _________ _________ __________ (.070**) ____________
12. Sup. PS .167
_________________ _____________ ____________ _____________ __________ __________ __________ (.168****) _____________
13. Sup. SAVE -.042
_____________ __________ _________ __________ ________ ________ ________ (-.041) __________
14. Sat PS/SAVE -.011
_____________ __________ _________ __________ ________ ________ ________ (-.014) __________
15. Commitment
16. Involvement .244****
________________ ____________ __________ ____________ ________ _________ __________ (.245****) ___________
17. Integration .240**** .624****
__________________ _____________ ____________ _____________ _________ _________ ___________ (.239****) (.603****)
18. Satisfaction 359****
__________________ _____________ ____________ ______________ _________ _________ __________ (.356****) _____________
19. Cooperation
20. Gr. Wo. Nor.
21. Motivation
22. Gen. In. Job
23. Pr. Job Acco.
24. mt. in Innov.
R22	.207 (.203) .098 (.083) .235 (.295) .153 .163 .149 .742 (.740) .525 (.535)
Adjusted R22	.185 (.181) .073 (.058) .213 (.275) .123 .133 .119 .726 (.724) .510 (.521)
F 944**** 394**** 10.93**** 513**** 5.51" 494**** 46.62**** 3549****
(9.22****) (3.30***) (14.90****) (46.25****) (36.97****)
Adj. R22- R12	.041 (.037) .079 (.064) .201 (.263) .093 .144 .084 .624 (.622) .419 (.430)
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Table 10.11. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for non-managerial employees) (Continued)
Step1 __________ ________ _________ _________ ________ _________ ________ _________
_______________ Integ GrWoNo CoopPe SatGen Motiv GnlnJob PrJoAc Intlnno
1.Sex .054 .030 -.033 .136** .235**** .193*** .189*** -.055
2. Education -.030 .154** .048 -.017 .076 -.005 .001 .107*
3.Tenure -.066 -.033 -.063 -.084 -.090 _.134** .177*** -.027
4.Age •347**** .039 .183*** .311**** .308**** .362*** .138** -.059
5. Job Status .002 .016 .014 .025 -.080 -.065 -.046 _.125**
6. FuHfPart-time .002 .049 .136* .029 -.103 _.148** _.182*** _.178***
7. Union Memb. .025 -.018 .048 .112* _.100* .078 -.076 .035
.127 .026 .056 .142 .162 .168 .071 .103
Adjusted R1 2	.106 .002 .034 .122 .164 .148 .048 .081
F 6.06**** 1.10 2.50** 6.92**** 808**** 8.40**** 317*** 4.78****
Step2 __________ ________ _________ _________ ________
8.Emp. Particip. .365****
(PDM) (.380****) _________ __________ __________ __________ ___________ __________ __________
9. Pay Equity
10.Per.-Rew. C.






17. Integration .315**** .154** .441****
18.Satisfaction
19.Cooperation - .200****
20. Gr. Wo. Nor.
21. Motivation .413**** 399**** .262****
22. Gen. In. Job
23. Pr. Job Acco.
24.mt. in Innov.
R22	.245 (.268) .113 .198 .410 .311 .204 .160
Adjusted R22	.224 (.248) .088 .173 .393 .391 .292 .182 .137
F 11.74**** 4.57**** 7.91**** 22.55**** 22.13**** 16.38**** 9.32**** 6.94****
(13.27****)
Adj.R22-R1 2	.118 (.142) 0.86 .139 .271 .227 .144 .134 .056
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Table 10.12. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for managerial employees)
StepI __________ __________ _________ ________ ________ _______ __________ __________
_____________ PPayEq PeReCo PerInDM SuPS SuSAYE SaPSSA Commit Invol.
1.Sex -.025 -.121 .060 -.114 -.120 _.182** -.077 .138
2. Education -.137 .072 .076 .148 .158* .147* .012 -.044
3.Tenure .050 .086 -.007 .193* .301*** .424**** .193* .066
4. Age .083 -.047 _.227** .001 -.107 -.051 -.041 -.043
5.JobStatus -.082 ...358**** _154* _.240*** _.171* -.131 _.316**** _•397****
6.FuII/Part-time .072 -.095 -.058 -.021 -.081 -.098 _.187**
7. Union Memb. -.027 .029 .274*** .001 -.094 -.106 .163** .066
R1 2	.058 .200 .177 .144 .152 .278 .271 .320
Adjusted R1 2	.003 .153 .129 .094 .103 .236 .228 .281
F 1.06 4.31**** 3.68*** 2.91*** 3.10*** 6.64**** 6.41**** 8.14****
Step 2
8.Emp. Particip. .087 .291**** •359**** .040 .140*
(PDM) (.133) (.241***) (.446****) __________ __________ __________ (.107*) (.142*)
9. Pay Equity .014 .012 .042 .041
________________ ___________ ____________ ___________ _________ _________ _________ (.044) ___________
10.Per.-Rew.C. .287*** .280*** .125 -.002
_______________ ___________ ___________ __________ ________ ________ ________ (-.004) ___________
11.Infl.onDM .172** -.007 -.082 .141**
_________________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ __________ __________ (.107*) _____________
12. Sup. PS - j39**
_________________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ __________ __________ (.138**) _____________
13. Sup. SAYE .010
________________ ____________ ____________ ___________ _________ _________ _________ (.017) ___________
14. Sat PS/SAYE .016
________________ ____________ ____________ ___________ _________ _________ _________ (.0 13) ___________
15. Commitment
16. Involvement .237****
__________________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ __________ __________ (.231***) _____________
17. Integration .183*** .361****
_________________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ _________ _________ (.172**) (.359****)
18. Satisfaction .332****
_________________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ _________ _________ (.319****) _____________
19. Cooperation
20. Gr. Wo. Nor.
21. Motivation
22. Gen. In. Job
23. Pr. Job Acco.
24. mt. in Innov. ___________ ____________ __________ ________ ________ ________
R22	.066 (.072) .264 (.248) .283 (.344) .249 .216 .298 .743 (.748) .474 (.475)
Adjusted k22	-.004 (.011) .215 (.198) .235 (.299) .184 .149 .238 .703 (.709) .434 (.435)
F 1.06 5•39**** 5.88**** 3.87**** 3.23**** 496**** 18.70**** 11.92****
(1.17) (4.95****) (7.78****) (19.20****) (1 1.95****)
Adj. R22- Ri2 - .062 (.045) .106 (.170) .090 .046 - .475 (.481) .153 (.154)
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Table 10.12. Results of Hierarchical Regression (for managerial employees) (Continued)
Step 1
________________ Integ GrWoNo CoopPe SatGen Motiv GnlnJob PrJoAc Intlnno
1.Sex -.113 .028 .047 -.010 .163** .091 -.007 -.058
2. Education -.047 -.025 -.047 .122 .055 .083 .005 .216**
3. Tenure .085 .073 .115 .092 .046 .139 .039 -.100
4.Age .081 -.002 .118 .093 .074 -.089 -.118 .010
5.JobStatus -.152 -.049 -.114 _.201** _.147* _.210*** -.008 -.146
6.FulIIPart-time -.135 .111 -.070 _.153* _.384**** _.285*** _.258*** -.078
7. Union Memb. .060 .-077 .124 .101 .164** .078 .020 .139
R12	.128 .022 .096 .162 .284 .186 .071 .145
Adjusted R12	.078 -.035 .043 .114 .242 .138 .017 .095
F 2.55** 0.39 1.83* 335*** 6.85**** 394**** 1.31 2.93***
Step2 _________ ________ ________ _________ _________
8.Emp. Particip. .301****












20.Gr. Wo. Nor. -.010
21. Motivation .238** .139 .277***
22. Gen. In. Job
23. Pr. Job Acco.
24. mt. in Innov.
R22	.197 (.200) .089 .176 .363 .383 .226 .084 .200
Adjusted R22 .144 (.147) .028 .114 .315 .336 .174 .023 .147
F 3.69**** 2.46** 2.83*** 754**** 8.20**** 438**** 1.38 375****
(3.75****)
Adj. R22- R12	.066 (.069) .063 .071 .201 .094 0.36 - .052
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Perceived performance-reward contingencies: The model proposed that the perceived link 
between performance and individual rewards would be affected by employee participation 
and participation in decision making. The r 14 and r24 correlations in Table 10.7 are consistent 
with this assertion. Employee participation and participation in decision making were 
positively and significantly related to performance-reward contingencies. Tables 10.10, 
10.13, and 10.16 indicate that employee participation and participation in decision making 
have statistically significant, positive effects on performance-reward contingencies for all 
respondents, accounting for a change in the overall adjusted R2 of .084 and .074 (p's < .00 1), 
respectively. 
For non-managerial employees and managerial employees, the r 14 correlations in Tables 10.8 
and 10.9 present a statistically significant, positive relationship between employee 
participation and performance reward contingencies. The r24 correlations in Tables 10.8 and 
10.9 also present a statistically significant, positive relationship between participation in 
decision making and performance-reward contingencies for non-managerial employees and 
managerial employees. These results were further substantiated by the outcomes of multiple 
regression and path analysis. As can be seen from Tables 10.11 and 10.12 for non-managerial 
and managerial employees, respectively, employee perception of performance-reward 
contingencies was significantly affected by employee participation and participation in 
decision making. The changes in the explained variance in perceived performance reward 
contingencies due to employee participation were .079 (p < .001), .062 (p < .001) for non-
managerial and managerial employees, respectively. Participation in decision making 
accounted for a lower amount of the variance in the perception of performance reward 
contingencies variable for non-managerial employees (R22- R 1 2=.064, p < .01) and managerial 
employees (R22- R1 2=.045, p <.001) than did employee participation. 
Perceived influence on decision making: The model suggests that employee participation 
and participation in decision making may have an impact on perceived influence on decision 
making. The r15 and r25 correlations in Tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9 are consistent with this 
assertion. There was a statistically significant (r=.505, p <.001; r= .422, p < .001; r= .3 13, p < 
.001 for all respondents, non-managerial employees and managerial employees, respectively), 
positive relationship between employee participation and perceived influence on decision 
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making for all respondents and two subgroups of the sample. The correlation analysis 
indicated a statistically significant, positive relationship between participation in decision 
making and perceived influence on decision making for all respondents (i—.586, p < .001), 
and two subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial employees (r=.507, p < .001) and 
managerial employees (r=.466, p < .001). The multiple regression results for all respondents, 
non-managerial employees, and managerial employees (see Tables 10.10, 10.11, and 10.12, 
respectively) confirm that perceived influence on decision making was affected by employee 
participation and participation in decision making. The beta-coefficients, regarding employee 
participation and participation in decision making, were positive and statistically significant 
(p's < .001) for all respondents (b= .459; b=.511, respectively), non-managerial employees 
(b= .470; b=.516, respectively), and managerial employees (b= .359; b=.446, respectively). 
The changes in the explained variance in perceived influence on decision making due to 
employee participation were .147 (p < .001), .201 (p < .001) and .106 (p < .001) for the whole 
sample, non-managerial employees and managerial employees, respectively. Participation in 
decision making accounted for a higher amount of the variance in the perception of influence 
on decision making variable for the whole sample (R 22- R1 2 .198, p < . 001), and two 
subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial employees (R22- R1 2=.263, p < .00 1) and 
managerial employees (R22- R1 2=.170, p < .00 1), than did employee participation. 
In sum, the analyses indicated that both employee participation and participation in decision 
making affected perceived influence on decision making for the whole sample and two 
subgroups of the sample, non-managerial employees and managerial employees. 
387 
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 10.13. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (all respondents) ____________
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
Effect Variation
EmployeePart. PayEquity .219 --- .219 -.131
Employee Part. Per-Rew Cont. .350 --- .350 -.005
Employee Part. Inf. on DM .459 --- .459 .046
Sup. For PS
Pay Equity .099 --- .099 .088
Per-Rew Cont. .277 --- .277 .072
Inf. on DM ______________ .098 --- .098 .078
Sup. for SAYE
PayEquity --- --- --- .192
Per-Rew Cont. .325 --- .325 .036
Inf. onDM ____________ .086 --- .086 .051
Sat. PS/SAYE
PayEquity .116 --- .116 .048
Per-RewCont. .178 --- .178 .092
Inf.onDM --- --- --- .153
Commitment
Employee Part. --- .335 .335 .079
Pay Equity .066 .018 .084 .238
Per-Rew Cont. .054 .049 .103 .399
Inf.onDM .076 .017 .093 .264
Sup. forPS .178 --- .178 .381
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .400
Sat. PS/SAYE --- --- --- .469
Involvement .250 .179 .429 .279
Integration .210 .244 .454 .226
Satisfaction ______________ .344 --- .344 .382
Involvement
Employee Part. .174 .216 .390 .074
Integration ______________ .542 --- .542 .077
Employee Part. Integration .398 --- .398 -.091
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .291 --- .291 -.0 19
Cooperation
Involvement .266 --- .266 .120
Integration _____________ .169 .144 .313 .043
Satisfaction
Involvement .470 .049 .519 .036
Cooperation _____________ .186 --- .186 .204
Motivation
Integration .399 .043 .442 .051
Or. Wor. Nor. _____________ .148 --- .148 .207
Motivation Gen. mt. in Job .428 --- .428 .093
Motivation Pri. in Job Acc. .400 --- .400 -.028
Motivation Int. in Innov. .231 --- .231 .158
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Table 10.14. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (for non-managers)
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
_______________ ______________ _____________ Effect _____________ Variation
Employee Part. Pay Equity .215 --- .215 -.066
Employee Part. Per-Rew Cont. .292 --- .292 -.046
Employee Part. Inf. on DM .470 --- .470 -.048
Sup. For PS
Pay Equity .126 --- .126 .088
Per-Rew Cont. .222 --- .222 .078
Inf.onDM --- --- --- .139
Sup. for SAYE
Pay Equity --- --- --- .222
Per-Rew Cont. .308 --- .308 .059
Inf.onDM ____________ .109 --- .109 .078
Sat. PS/SAYE
Pay Equity .133 --- .133 .065
Per-RewCont. .179 --- .179 .059
Inf.onDM ___________ .115 --- .115 .043
Commitment
Employee Part. --- .295 .295
Pay Equity --- .021 .021 .371
Per-Rew Cont. --- .037 .037 .403
Inf.onDM .072 --- .072 .216
Sup. forPS .167 --- .167 .374
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .391
Sat. PS/SAYE --- --- ....: .463
Involvement .244 .178 .422 .268
Integration .240 .275 .515 .199
Satisfaction ______________ .359 --- .359 .369
Involvement
Employee Part. .136 .228 .364 .008
Integration ______________ .624 --- .624 .061
Employee Part. Integration .365 --- .365 -.032
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .315 --- .315 -.034
Cooperation
Involvement .280 --- .280 .091
Integration .154 .175 .329 .032
Satisfaction
Involvement .440 .056 .496 .057
Cooperation _____________ .200 --- .200 .196
Motivation
Integration .441 .058 .499 .053
Gr. Wor. Nor. ______________ .184 --- .184 .138
Motivation Gen. mt. in Job .413 --- .413 .078
Motivation Pri. in Job Ace. .399 --- .399 .020
Motivation mt. in Innov. .262 --- .262 -.066
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Table 10.15. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (for managers) ____________
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
Effect Variation
Employee Part. Pay Equity ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
Employee Part. Per-Rew Cont. .291 --- .291 .076
Employee Part. Inf. on DM .359 --- .359 -.046
Sup. For PS
Pay Equity --- --- .158
Per-Rew Cont. .287 --- .287 .122
Inf.onDM ____________ .172 ___________ .172 .021
Sup. for SAYE
Pay Equity ---




Per-Rew Cant. --- --- .263
Inf.onDM __________ _________ __________ _________ __________
Commitment
Employee Part. --- .228 .228 .244
Pay Equity .253
Per-Rew Cont. --- .040 .040 .525
Inf.onDM .141 .024 .165 .138
Sup. forPS .139 --- .139 .456
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .468
Sat. PS/SAYE --- --- .408
Involvement .237 .159 .396 .263
Integration .183 .154 .337 .300
Satisfaction ______________ .332 --- .332 .386
Involvement
Employee Part. .140 .109 .249 .147
Integration ______________ .361 --- .361 .140
Employee Part. Integration .301 --- .301 .039
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .217 --- .217 .027
Cooperation
Involvement --- --- --- .312
Integration ______________ .214 --- .214 .120
Satisfaction
Involvement .480 --- .480 .067
Cooperation _____________ .144 --- .144 .177
Motivation
Integration .340 --- .340 .074
Gr. Wor. Nor. --- --- ---
Motivation Gen. Int. in Job .238 --- .238 .146
Motivation Pri. in Job Acc. --- --- --- .199
Motivation mt. in Innov. .277 --- .277 .044
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Table 10.16. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (for PDM) (all respondents)
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
Effect Variation
PDM Pay Equity .227 --- .227 -.124
PDM Per-Rew Cont. .315 --- .315 .029
PDM Inf.onDM .511 --- .511 .075
Sup. For PS
PayEquity .099 --- .099 .088
Per-Rew Cont. .277 --- .277 .072
Inf. on DM ______________ .098 --- .098 .078
Sup. for SAYE
Pay Equity --- --- - .192
Per-Rew Cont. .325 --- .325 .036
Inf. on DM _____________ .086 --- .086 .051
Sat. PSI SAYE
Pay Equity .116 --- .116 .048
Per-RewCont. .178 --- .178 .092
Inf.onDM --- --- --- .153
Commitment
PDM --- .347 .347 .102
Pay Equity .065 .017 .082 .240
Per-Rew Cont. --- .048 .048 .454
Inf.onDM .064 .017 .081 .276
Sup. forPS .175 --- .175 .384
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .400
Sat. PSI SAYE --- --- --- .469
Involvement .244 .177 .421 .287
Integration .207 .231 .438 .242
Satisfaction ______________ .341 --- .341 .385
Involvement
PDM .210 .216 .426 .061
Integration______________ .522 --- .522 .097
PDM Integration .414 --- .414 -.089
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .291 --- .291 -.0 19
Cooperation
Involvement .266 --- .266 .120
Integration ______________ .169 .139 .308 .048
Satisfaction
Involvement .470 .049 .519 .036
Cooperation _____________ .186 --- .186 .187
Motivation
Integration .399 .043 .442 .051
Gr. Wor. Nor. _____________ .148 --- .148 .207
Motivation Gen. Int. in Job .428 --- .428 .093
Motivation Pri. in Job Acc. .400 --- .400 -.028
Motivation mt. in Innov. .231 --- .231 .158
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Table 10.17. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (for PDM) (for non-managers)
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
Effect Variation
PDM Pay Equity .200 --- .200 -.030
PDM Per-Rew Cont. .259 --- .259 -.008
PDM Inf.onDM .516 --- .516 -.009
Sup. For PS
Pay Equity .126 --- .126 .088
Per-Rew Cont. .222 --- .222 .078
Inf.onDM --- --- --- .139
Sup. for SAYE
Pay Equity --- --- --- .222
Per-RewCont. .308 --- .308 .059
Inf. on DM _____________ .109 --- .109 .078
Sat. PS/SAYE
Pay Equity .133 --- .133 .065
Per-Rew Cont. .179 --- .179 .059
Inf.onDM ___________ .115 --- .115 .043
Commitment
PDM --- .310 .310 .019
Pay Equity --- .021 .021 .371
Per-Rew Cont. --- .037 .037 .403
Inf. on DM .070 --- .070 .218
Sup. forPS .168 --- .168 .373
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .391
Sat. PS/SAYE --- --- --- .463
Involvement .245 .177 .422 .268
Integration .239 .265 .504 .210
Satisfaction ______________ .356 --- .356 .372
Involvement
PDM .172 .229 .401 .002
Integration ______________ .603 --- .603 .082
PDM Integration .380 --- .380 -.023
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .315 --- .315 -.034
Cooperation
Involvement .280 --- .280 .091
Integration ______________ .154 .169 .323 .038
Satisfaction
Involvement .440 .056 .496 .057
Cooperation ______________ .200 --- .200 .196
Motivation
Integration .441 .058 .499 .053
Gr. Wor. Nor. ______________ .184 --- .184 .138
Motivation Gen. mt. in Job .413 --- .413 .078
Motivation Pri. in Job Acc. .399 --- .399 .020
Motivation Int. in Innov. .262 --- .262 -.066
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Table 10.18. Total Effects of the Predictor Variables (for PDM) (for managers)
Independent Dependent Direct Effect Indirect Total Effect Noncausal
_______________ _______________ ______________ Effect Variation
PDM Pay Equity ---
PDM Per-Rew Cont. .241 ____________ .241 .119
PDM Inf. on DM .446 ____________ .446 .020
Sup. For PS
Pay Equity --- .158
Per-Rew Cont. .287 .287 .122
Inf.onDM ___________ .172 --- .172 .021
Sup. for SAYE
Pay Equity
Per-Rew Cont. .280 .280 .086




Inf. on DM ______________ _____________ _____________ ____________ ____________
Commitment
PDM 107 .217 .324 .211
Pay Equity --- .253
Per-Rew Cont. .040 .040 .525
Inf.onDM .107 .024 .131 .172
Sup. forPS .138 .138 .457
Sup. for SAYE --- --- --- .468
Sat. PS/SAYE --- .408
Involvement .231 .153 .384 .275
Integration .172 .148 .320 .317
Satisfaction ______________ .319 --- .319 .399
Involvement
PDM .142 .105 .247 .169
Integration______________ .359 --- .359 .142
PDM Integration .293 --- .293 .048
Integration Gr. Wor. Nor. .217 --- .217 .027
Cooperation
Involvement --- .312
Integration______________ .214 _____________ .214 .120
Satisfaction
Involvement .480 .480 .067
Cooperation_____________ .144 ____________ .144 .177
Motivation
Integration .340 --- .340 .074
Gr. Wor. Nor.
Motivation Gen. Int. in Job .238 _____________ .238 .146
Motivation Fri. in Job Ace. --- .199
Motivation mt. in Innov. .277 --- .277 .044
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Support for PS, Support for SAYE, and Satisfaction with PS/SAYE Schemes 
It was suggested that support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
would be affected by perceived pay equity, perceived performance-reward contingencies, and 
perceived influence on decision making. 
Support for PS: It is hypothesized that support for PS would be affected by employee 
perceptions about pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making. The correlation tables, Tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9, revealed that perceived pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making were 
significantly and positively associated with support for PS. 
Regarding all respondents, the standardized betas for perceived pay equity, performance-
reward contingencies, and influence on decision making were statistically significant and 
positive (see Table 10.10). These results indicated that each of the three predictor variables 
had an effect on support for PS. The total change in the explained variance in support for PS 
due to these three variables was .112 (p < .00 1). Since no indirect effects were hypothesized 
for support for profit sharing, as can be seen from Table 10.13, the direct and total effects are 
the same. Together, these tables indicate that performance-reward contingencies were the 
most important determinant of employees' support for PS for the whole sample. It should be 
mentioned that 47.1%, 20.6%, and 44.3% of the correlation r25 , r35 , r45 (for pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making, respectively) were 
attributable to non-causal variation (see Table 10.13). These suggest that the underlying 
assumption of causal closure was more largely satisfied for performance-reward 
contingencies than for perceived pay equity and perceived influence on decision making. 
The above analyses were repeated for non-managerial employees and managerial employees. 
For non-managerial employees, Tables 10.11 and 10.14 indicated that performance-reward 
contingencies (b= .222, p< .001) and perceived pay equity (b .126, p < .10) were all 
significant and positively related to support for profit sharing, as predicted by the model. 
However, perceived influence on decision making was not significantly related to support for 




variables was .093 (p < .001). 41.1% and 26% of r36, r46 (for pay equity and performance 
reward contingencies, respectively) were attributable to non-causal variation (see Table 
10.14). All of these results indicated that for non-managerial employees performance-reward 
contingencies were the most important determinant of support for PS, followed by perceived 
pay equity. 
For managerial employees, Tables 10.12 and 10.15 indicated that performance-reward 
contingencies (b= .287, p < .01) and perceived influence on decision making (b= .172, p < 
.05) were significantly and positively related to support for PS, while perceived pay equity 
was not significantly related to the same variable. The total change in the explained variance 
in support for PS due to these three variables was .090 (p < .001). For managerial employees, 
performance-reward contingencies, again, was the most important determinant of support for 
PS, followed by perceived influence on decision making. 29.8% and 10.9% of the 
correlations r35 , r45 (for performance-reward contingencies, and perceived influence on 
decision making, respectively) were attributable to non-causal variation (see Table 10.15). 
In sum, the results of multiple regression and path analysis indicated that perceived 
performance-reward contingencies, pay equity, and influence on decision making were 
determinants of one's attitude toward profit sharing (support for PS) for the whole sample. 
For non-managerial employees, perceived pay equity and performance-reward contingencies 
were statistically and positively related to support for profit sharing. Perceived performance-
reward contingencies and influence on decision making were the two determinants of 
managerial employees' attitude toward profit sharing. It should be mentioned that for the 
whole sample and the subgroups of the sample, performance-reward contingencies were the 
most important determinant of support for PS. 
Support for SAYE: The model postulated that support for SAYE scheme would be affected 
by perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies and influence on decision 
making. Starting with the sample in its entirety, one learns that the correlations between 
support for SAYE and the predictors (perceived pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, and influence on decision making) were positive and statistically significant 
(see Table 10.7). The multiple regression results indicated that support for SAYE was 
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affected by the perceptions of performance-reward contingencies (b= .325, p< .001) and 
influence on decision making (b= .086, p < .10). However, the perception of pay equity was 
not significantly related to support for SAYE schemes (see Table 10.10). The total change in 
the explained variance in support for SAYE due to these three variables was .132 ( p < .001). 
Since no direct effects were hypothesized for support for SAYE, as can be see from the Table 
10.13, the direct and total effects are the same. Together these tables show that performance-
reward contingencies were the most important determinant of the attitude toward SAYE for 
the whole sample. Moreover, it should be mentioned that 10% of the correlation r 47 was 
attributable to noncausal variation. This suggests that for performance-reward contingencies, 
the underlying assumption of causal closure was quite largely satisfied. 
For non-managerial employees, the results of correlation analysis in Table 10.8 showed a 
statistically significant (p's < .00 1) and positive relationship between the predictor variables 
(the perceptions of pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision 
making) and support for SAYE schemes. However, the multiple regression analysis showed 
that support for SAYE was affected by performance-reward contingencies (b= .308, p < .01) 
and influence on decision making (b= .109, p < .10), while it was not affected by the 
perception of pay equity. As was for the whole sample, perceived performance-reward 
contingencies were the most important determinant of support for SAYE schemes. The total 
change in the explained variance in support for SAYB due to these three variables was .144 (p 
<.001). 16.1 and 41.7 percent of the variations in the simple r 47 , r57 remained unexplained by 
the total effect of performance-reward contingencies and influence on decision making, 
respectively. Therefore, the evidence of causal closure of influence on decision making was 
weaker than was the case for performance-reward contingencies. 
For managerial employees, the correlation analysis (see Table 10.9) indicated that there was a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between one of the predictor variables 
(namely, performance-reward contingencies) and support for SAYE, while it did not show a 
statistically significant relationship between the remaining two predictor variables (namely, 
perceived pay equity and influence on decision making) and the plan support. These findings 
were further confirmed by the outcomes of multiple regression and path analysis. Tables 
10.12 and 10.15 indicated that performance-reward contingencies were the only predictor 
396 
 
variable which had an impact on support for SAYE schemes. The standardized betas for pay 
equity and influence on decision making were not significant (see Table 10.12). The change 
in the explained variance in support for SAYE due to these three variables was .046 (p < 
.001). However, 23.5% of variation in the simple r47 (see Table 10.15) remained unexplained 
by the total effect of performance-reward contingencies. 
In summary, the results of correlation, multiple regression, and path analysis indicated that 
performance-reward contingencies and influence on decision making were the determinant 
variables in shaping SAYE scheme attitudes for the whole sample and non-managerial 
employees. For managerial employees, performance-reward contingencies were the only 
variable which had a significantly positive effect on support for SAYE schemes. From the 
results of the analysis it can be said that performance-reward contingencies were the most 
powerful determinant of support for SAYE schemes for the whole sample and the subgroups 
of the sample. 
Satisfaction with PS and SAYE schemes: The model suggested that employees' satisfaction 
with PS and SAYE schemes would be affected by the perceptions of pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making. 
For the whole sample, the correlation analysis showed statistically significant (p < .00 1) and 
positive relationships between the predictor variables (namely, perceived pay equity, 
performance reward-contingencies, and influence on decision making) and satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes. The multiple regression results indicated that the perceptions of pay 
equity (b= .116, p < .05) and performance-reward contingencies (b= .178, p < .00 1) were 
significantly and positively related to satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes. However, the 
perception of influence on decision making was not significantly related to satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes. The total change in the explained variance in satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes due to these three variables was .065 (p < .001). 29.3% and 34.1% of variation in 
the simple r38, r48 (for pay equity and performance reward contingencies) remained 
unexplained by the total effects of such variables (see Table 10.13). 
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For non-managerial employees, the correlation analysis indicated that perceived pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making were significantly and 
positively related to satisfaction with PSISAYE schemes. These results were confirmed by 
the results of multiple regression analysis. Consistent with the hypothesized causal model, the 
multiple regression results indicated that all three variables (namely, perceived pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making) were significantly and 
positively related to satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes. The total change in the explained 
variance in satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes due to these three variables was .084 (p < 
.001). Performance-reward contingencies emerged as the most powerful precursor of 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, followed by perceived pay equity and influence on 
decision making. 32.8%, 24.8%, and 27.2% of variations in the simple r38, r48, r58 (for pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making, respectively) 
remained unexplained by the total effects of such variables (see Table 10.14). 
For managerial employees, the correlation analysis showed that among perceived pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making, only performance-
reward contingencies were significantly and positively related to satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes. The results of the multiple regression analysis were inconsistent with the 
hypothesized causal model. Neither perceptions of pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, nor influence on decision making were significantly related to satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes (see Table 10.12). 
In, sum pay equity and performance-reward contingencies were significantly and positively 
related to satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for the whole sample and one group of the 
sample, namely non-managerial employees. In addition, influence on decision making had a 
significantly positive effect on satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for only non-managerial 
employees. For managerial employees, none of the standardized betas for the perceptions of 
pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on decision making were 
statistically significant. For the whole sample and non-managerial employees, performance-
reward contingencies were the most important predictor variable in shaping employee 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, followed by pay equity. 
398 
Commitment 
The model postulated that organizational commitment would be directly affected by 
employee participation, participation in decision making, pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, satisfaction 
with PS/SAYE, involvement, integration, and general satisfaction. 
For the whole sample, the correlation analysis indicated that all of these variables were 
significantly (p's < .001) and positively related to organizational commitment. As the model 
postulated that both employee participation and participation in decision making have 
separate effects on employee job attitudes, these two variables were entered into the 
regression equations separately. When employee participation was entered into the regression 
equation, regarding commitment, as an independent variable, with the exception of employee 
participation, support for SAYE schemes, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, the 
results for the rest of the variables were as predicted by the model (see Table 10.10). Pay 
equity, performance-reward contingencies, influence on decision making, support for PS, 
involvement, integration, and general satisfaction were all significantly and positively related 
to organizational commitment. 
When participation in decision making was entered into the regression equation as an 
independent variable, pay equity, perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, 
involvement, integration, and satisfaction were all significantly and positively related to 
organizational commitment. The rest of the variables, namely perceived participation in 
decision making, performance-reward contingencies, support for PS, and satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE, were not significantly related to organizational commitment. 
As can be seen from the results, entering employee participation or participation in decision 
making into the regression equations did not significantly change the 'explained' amount of 
the variance in commitment. This shows that both employee participation and participation in 
decision making do not have a direct effect on commitment. There is, however, an important 
point which should be mentioned: the model argued that "organizational commitment would 
be directly affected by employee participation, and participation in decision making" but this 
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was not supported by the study data. However, this does not mean that employee participation 
and participation in decision making do not have an effect on employees' organizational 
commitment. Although standardized betas (regarding organizational commitment) for 
employee participation and participation in decision making were not statistically significant 
(see Table 10.10), employee participation and participation in decision making had the 
highest indirect effect on organizational commitment (see Tables 10.13 and 10.16). With this 
indirect effect, the total effect of employee participation on organizational commitment was 
the fourth highest, behind the total effects of integration, involvement, and satisfaction. The 
total effect of participation in decision making on organizational commitment was the third 
highest, behind the total effects of integration and involvement. So, it may be said that 
employees' organizational commitment would be indirectly affected by employee 
participation and participation in decision making. 
As the model suggested that employee participation, pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, influence on decision making, involvement, and integration also had indirect 
effects on organizational commitment, there were differences between direct and total effects 
of such variables on organizational commitment. 
Table 10.10 indicated that, for the whole sample, general satisfaction was the most important 
predictor variable in shaping employee commitment, followed by involvement and 
integration. The total change in the explained variance in commitment due to employee 
oiership, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, influence on decision making, 
support for PS, support for SAYIE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, involvement, 
integration, arid general satisfaction was .610 (p < .00 1). 
For non-managerial employees, the correlation analysis indicated that employee participation, 
participation in decision making, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, influence on 
decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE, 
involvement, integration, and general satisfaction were significantly (r's < .001) and 
positively related to organizational commitment (see Table 10.8). However, multiple 
regression results presented a different picture of the relationship among the variables (see 
Table 10.11). Perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, involvement, 
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integration, and satisfaction were significantly and positively related to organizational 
commitment, while employee participation, participation in decision making, pay equity, 
performance-reward contingencies, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes were not predictors of organizational commitment. The total change in the 
explained variance in commitment due to these variables was .624 (when employee 
participation was entered into the regression equation) and .622 (when participation in 
decision making was entered into the regression equation). As mentioned above, the model 
suggested an indirect effect for some variables, such as employee participation, participation 
in decision making, integration, etc. Therefore, although employee participation and 
participation in decision making did not have a statistically significant direct effect on 
organizational commitment, they had the highest indirect effect on this variable (see Tables 
10.14 and 10.17). Due to these indirect effects, employee participation and participation in 
decision making had the fourth highest total effect on organizational commitment behind 
integration, involvement, and general satisfaction. 
For managerial employees, the multiple regression results indicated that participation in 
decision making, perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, involvement, 
integration, and general satisfaction were significantly and positively related to organizational 
commitment, while employee participation, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, 
support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes were not significantly related to 
organizational commitment (see Table 10.12). The total change in the explained variance in 
commitment due to these variables was .475 (when employee participation was entered into 
the regression equation) and .481 (when participation in decision making was entered into the 
regression equation). As it was for non-managerial employees, although employee 
participation did not have a direct effect on organizational commitment, it had an indirect 
effect on this variable. 
In summary, influence on decision making, support for PS, involvement, integration, and 
general satisfaction were significantly and positively related to organizational commitment 
for the whole sample, non-managerial employees, and managerial employees. There was a 
positive and significant relationship between pay equity and commitment for the whole 
sample. In addition to these variables, performance-reward contingencies were significantly 
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and positively related to organizational commitment for the whole sample only when 
employee participation was entered into the regression equation. However, employee 
participation, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes were not 
significantly related to organizational commitment. It should also be mentioned that although 
employee participation did not have a significant direct effect on organizational commitment, 
it had a substantial indirect effect on it for the whole sample and the subgroups of the sample. 
Participation in decision making was significantly related to organizational commitment for 
managerial employees only. Although participation in decision making did not have a 
significant direct effect on organizational commitment for the whole sample and non-
managerial employees, it had a substantial indirect effect on this variable. 
Involvement 
The model postulated that involvement would be affected by employee participation, 
participation in decision making, and integration. The correlation analysis indicated that 
employee participation, participation in decision making, and integration were significantly 
(p's < .001) and positively related to involvement for the whole sample and the subgroups of 
the sample, namely non-managerial employees and managerial employees (see Tables 10.7, 
10.8, and 10.9). The multiple regression results confirmed that integration was significantly 
(p's < .001) and positively related to involvement for the whole sample and the subgroups of 
the sample (see Tables 10.10, 10.11, and 10.12). A statistically significant and positive 
relationship was found between employee participation and involvement for the whole 
sample (b=.174, p < .001) and the subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial 
employees (b=.136, p < .01) and managerial employees (b=.140, p < .10). The total changes 
in the explained variance in involvement due to these variables (employee participation and 
involvement) were .337 (p < .001), .419 (p < .001), and .153 (p < .001) for the whole sample, 
non-managerial employees, and managerial employees, respectively. 
When compared with employee participation, participation in decision making was more 
significantly related to involvement for the whole sample (b=.210, p < .00 1) and one 
subgroup of the sample, namely non-managerial employees (b.172, p < .001). For 
managerial employees there was no significant difference between the effect of employee 
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participation and participation in decision making on involvement. The total changes in the 
explained variance in involvement due to participation in decision making and integration 
were .348 (p < .001), .430 (p < .001), and 154 (p < .001) for the whole sample, non-
managerial employees, and managerial employees, respectively. 
The model suggested that employee participation and participation in decision making had 
both a direct and an indirect effect on involvement. Therefore, the total effects of employee 
participation and participation in decision making were different from their direct effects (see 
Tables 10.13 - 10.18). 15.9%, 2.2%, and 37.1% of the variations in the simple r 1 . 10 for the 
whole respondents, non-managerial employees, and managerial employees, respectively, 
remained unexplained by the total effects of employee participation (see Tables 10.13 -
10.15). 12.5%, 0.5%, and 40.6% of the variation in the simple r210 (for the whole 
respondents, non-managerial employees, and managerial employees, respectively) remained 
unexplained by the total effects of participation in decision making. 
In summary, as predicted by the model, employee participation, participation in decision 
making, and integration were three important predictor variables in shaping employee 
involvement for the whole sample and the subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial 
employees and managerial employees. For the whole sample and non-managerial employees, 
participation in decision making was a more important predictor variable in shaping 
involvement than was employee participation. As can be seen from the regression tables (see 
Tables 10.10 - 10.12) and the total effects of the predictor variables in Tables 10.13 - 10.18, 
integration emerged as the most powerful precursor of involvement for the whole sample and 
the subgroups of the sample. 
Integration 
The model suggested that integration would be affected by employee participation and 
participation in decision making. The results of correlation analysis indicated that employee 
participation and participation in decision making were, as predicted by the model, 
significantly (p's < .00 1) and positively related to integration for the whole sample and the 
subgroups of the sample (non-managerial employees and managerial employees) (see Tables 
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10.7, 10.8, and 10.9). These results were confirmed by the multiple regression results. Tables 
10.10, 10.11, and 10.12 indicated that employee participation was an important predictor 
variable in shaping employee integration for the whole sample (b=.398, p < .001), non-
managerial employees (b=.365, p < .001), and managerial employees (b=.301, p < .001). The 
total changes in the explained variance in integration due to employee participation were .107 
(p < .001), .118 (p < .001), and .066 (p < .05) for the whole sample, non-managerial 
employees, and managerial employees, respectively. 
As was the case for involvement, participation in decision making was more significantly 
related to integration for the whole sample (b=.414, p < .001) and one subgroup of the 
sample, namely non-managerial employees (b=.380, p < .001) than was employee 
participation. For managerial employees there was no significant difference between the 
effect of employee participation and participation in decision making on integration. The total 
changes in the explained variance in integration due to participation in decision making were 
.129 (p <.001), .142 (p < .001), and .069 (p < .001) for the whole sample, non-managerial 
employees, and managerial employees, respectively. 
Group Work Norms 
The model postulated that integration would have an effect on group work norms. Tables 
10.7-10.9 revealed that integration was strongly associated with group work norms. The 
multiple regression results for all respondents (b=.291, p < .001) (see Table 10.10), non-
managerial employees (b=.3 15, p < .001) (see Table 10.11), and managerial employees 
(b=.217, p < .01) (see Table 10.12) confirmed that group work norms were affected by 
integration. The total changes in the explained variance in group work norms due to 
integration were .075 (p < .00 1), .086 (p < .00 1), .063 (p <.05) for the whole sample, non-
managerial employees, and managerial employees, respectively. 
Cooperation (Cooperative Behaviours) 
The model suggested that cooperation would be affected by integration and involvement. The 




significantly (p's < .001) and positively associated with cooperation for all respondents, non-
managerial employees, and managerial employees (see Tables 10.7 - 10.9). 
For all respondents, the multiple regression results indicated that the standardized betas for 
integration and involvement were statistically significant and positive (see Table 10.10). 
These results indicated that both integration and involvement were determinants of 
cooperation. The total change in the explained variance in cooperation due to these two 
variables was .129 (p < .001). In addition, it should be noted that 12.1% and 31.1% of the 
correlation r11 r1 0-13 (for integration and involvement, respectively) were attributable to 
non-causal variation. These suggest that the underlying assumptions of causal closure were 
largely satisfied. 
For non-managerial employees, the multiple regression results showed that integration and 
involvement were significantly and positively related to cooperation. The total change in the 
explained variance in cooperation due to these two variables was .139 (p < .001). As can be 
seen from Table 10.14, 8.9% and 24.5% of the correlation r 1113 , r1013 (for integration and 
involvement, respectively) were attributable to non-causal variation. Once again, integration 
and involvement emerged as predictor variables in shaping cooperation for non-managerial 
employees. 
For managerial employees, as can be seen from Table 10.12, involvement had no significant 
direct effect on cooperation. However, integration was significantly and positively related to 
cooperation. The total change in the explained variance in cooperation due to these variables 
was .071 (p < .0 1). 3 5.9% of the correlation r 1113 was attributable to non-causal variation. 
Therefore, the evidence of causal closure was weaker for managerial employees than it was 
for all respondents and non-managerial employees. 
In sum, the results of the analysis showed that integration was significantly and positively 
related to cooperation for the whole sample and the subgroups of the sample, while 
involvement was significantly and positively related to cooperation for the whole sample and 
non-managerial employees. The standardised beta for involvement was not statistically 




Satisfaction (General Satisfaction) 
The model postulated that satisfaction would be affected by involvement and cooperation. 
The results of the correlation analysis showed that both involvement and cooperation were 
significantly (p's <.001) and positively associated with satisfaction for all respondents and 
for the subgroups of the sample (see Tables 10.7 - 10.9), as was predicted by the model. 
These results were confirmed by the multiple regression results (see Tables 10.10 - 10.12). 
The standardized betas for involvement and cooperation were statistically significant and 
positive for all respondents and the subgroups. In addition, these two variables account for a 
significant amount of the variance in general satisfaction for the whole sample (R 22- R12= 
.265, p < .001), non-managerial employees (R22- R1 2= .271, p < .001), and managerial 
employees (R22- R1 2= .201, p < .001). It should also be noted that, as can be seen from the 
total effects of the predictor variables in Tables 10.13-10.15, involvement emerged as the 
most powerful precursor of general satisfaction. 
Motivation 
The model suggested that motivation would be affected by integration and group work norms. 
For all respondents and non-managerial employees, the results of correlation analysis 
indicated that both integration and group work norms were significantly (p's < .001) and 
positively associated with motivation, as predicted by the model. These results were further 
substantiated by the outcomes of multiple regression and path analysis for all respondents and 
non-managerial employees. Tables 10.10 and 10.11 showed that the standardized betas for 
integration and group work norms were statistically significant and positive. The total 
changes in the explained variance in motivation due to these two variables were .194 (p < 
.001) and .227 ( p < .001) for the whole sample and non-managerial employees, respectively. 
Regarding integration, 10.3% and 9.6% of the variation in the simple r (for all respondents 
and non-managers) remained unexplained by the total effects. Regarding group work norms, 
58.3% and 42.9% of the variation in the simple r (for all respondents and non-managers) 
remained unexplained by the total effects. All of these results indicated that integration was a 
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more important predictor variable in shaping motivation than were group work norms for all 
respondents arid non-managerial employees. 
For managers, correlation analysis found a statistically significant (p < .001) association 
between integration and motivation. There was no significant relationship between group 
work norms and motivation. These results were confirmed by multiple regression results. 
Group work norms had no significant direct effect on motivation. However, the standardized 
beta for integration was significant (p < .00 1) and positive. The total change in the explained 
variance in motivation due to these variables was .094 (p < .00 1). 
In sum, for all respondents and non-managerial employees integration and group work norms 
were predictor variables in shaping employee motivation. However, for managerial 
employees only integration emerged as the determinant of motivation. It should also be noted 
that integration was a more important predictor variable than group work norms for all 
respondents and for the subgroups. 
General Interest in the Job, Pride in Job Accomplishment, and Interest in Innovation 
The model postulated that motivation would have an effect on general interest in the job, 
pride in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation. The r 15. 16, r1517 , r15 .. 18 correlations in 
Tables 10.7-10.9 were consistent with this assertion. For all respondents and the subgroups, a 
statistically significant, positive relationship existed between motivation and these three 
variables (namely, general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in 
innovation). These results were further confirmed by the outcomes of multiple regression and 
path analysis for all respondents and non-managerial employees. The standardized betas for 
motivation were significant (p's < .001) and positive, indicating that motivation was a 
powerful precursor of general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and interest in 
innovation for all respondents and non-managerial employees. For the whole sample, the total 
changes in the explained variances in general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, 
and interest in innovation due to motivation were .132 (p <.001), .115 (p <.001), and .037 (p 
< .001), respectively. For non-managerial employees they were .144 (p < .001), .134 (p< 
.001), and .056 (p < .001) for general interest in the job, pride in job accomplishment, and 
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interest in innovation, respectively. As can be seen from Table 10.13, 17.9% and 40.6% of 
the variations in the simple r' s (for general interest in the job and interest in innovation, 
respectively) were not explained by the total effects of motivation. Regarding pride in job 
accomplishment, the total effect of motivation was greater than the bivariate correlation. 
Table 10.14 indicated that 15.9% and 4.8% of the variation in the simple r's (for general 
interest in the job, and pride in job accomplishment, respectively) remained unexplained by 
the total effects of motivation. Regarding interest in the job, the total effect of motivation was 
greater than the bivariate correlation. These results suggested that the underlying assumptions 
of causal closure were largely satisfied. Consequently, it can be said that motivation was an 
important predictor variable in shaping general interest in the job, pride in job 
accomplishment, and interest in innovation for the whole sample and non-managerial 
employees. 
For managerial employees, the multiple regression results indicated that motivation was a 
predictor variable in shaping general interest in the job and interest in innovation. However, 
motivation was not significantly related to pride in job accomplishment. The total changes in 
the explained variances in general interest in the job and interest in innovation due to 
motivation were .036 (p < .001) and .052 (p <.001), respectively. 
In sum, the results of the analysis showed that motivation was significantly and positively 
related to general interest in the job and interest in innovation for the whole sample and the 
subgroups, while it was significantly related to pride in job accomplishment for the whole 
sample and non-managerial employees. 
10.2.3. Reduced Models 
The final analytic step was to create and test the efficacy of reduced path models. New 
regressions were run including only those predictor variables that had showed statistically 
significant beta-coefficients. Tables 10.19-10.21 indicated the results of the multiple 
regression for the dependent variables, of which one or more potential predictor variables did 
not have statistically significant standardized betas in the previous multiple regression 










10.7 (for participation in decision making) present the path diagrams for each reduced model
for the whole sample and two subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial employees
and managerial employees. In general, the magnitude and significance level of the path
coefficients were closely similar to those derived from the full models. Therefore, there was
little or no loss of explanatory power with the reduced models. Compared with the previous
multiple regression results, only very small differences in the adjusted R 2 values were found,
ranging from .001 (zero) for commitment (for all respondents) to .015 for support for SAYE
schemes (for managerial employees). In sum, all of these results showed that the reduced
models appear to be more tenable.
Table. 10.19. Results of Hierarchical Regression for Reduced Model (for all respondents)
____________________ Sup. SAYE Sat. PS/SAYE Commitment
9.PayEquity .125** .065**
________________________ _______________________ _______________________ (.077***)
10. Per.-Rew. C. .350**** .189**** .045
____________ ____________ ____________ C---)
11. Infi. on DM .094* .067**
______________________ ______________________ ______________________ (.067**)
12. Sup. PS
______________________ ______________________ ______________________ (.167****)
16. Involvement .244****
_____________________ _____________________ _____________________ (.251****)
17. Integration
______________________ ______________________ ______________________ (.213****)
18. Satisfaction
________________________ _______________________ _______________________ (.348****)
R2 .147 .170 .738 (.737)
AdjustedR2	.129 .153 .729 (.729)
F 7.91**** 954**** 81.96****























	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Table. 10.20. Results of Hierarchical Regression for Reduced Model (for non-managers)
____________________ Sup. PS Sup. SAYE Commitment
9.PayEquity .140**








F 555*4*4 59Ø**** .64.09****
Table. 10.21. Results of Hierarchical Regression for Reduced Model (for managers)
_____________________ Sup. PS Sup. SAYE Commit. Coop. Motiv
1. Participation in DM (.104k)
10. Per.-Rew. C. .293*4* .283*4*
11.Infl.onDM .174* .150***
______________________ _____________ _____________ ( . 109*) ___________ _____________
12.Sup.PS .155*4
_______________________ _____________ ______________ (.151) ____________ ______________
16. Involvement .235****
________________________ ______________ ______________ (.224****) _____________ _______________
17. Integration .183*4* .277*4*
_____________________ ____________ ____________ ( . 1744 * 4) ___________ _____________
18. Satisfaction .3604*4*
_________________________ _______________ _______________ (339****) _____________ ________________
.248 .216 .740 (.746) .163 .383
AdjustedR2	.191 .164 .713 (.717) .107 .342
F 4334*4* 4.14*44* 27.26**** 2.91*** 9.30****




















































































































10.3. Conclusion of the Model Test 
As explained in this chapter, before testing the full model, a number of analyses were 
conducted to compare differences in job attitudes held by managers and non-managers, and 
participants of PS/SAYE schemes and non-participants of PS/SAYE schemes. These analyses 
were done to obtain some understanding of the outlook of each group. 
The results of the t-test showed that, consistent with expectations, managerial employees had 
significantly higher levels of motivation, involvement, commitment, and general satisfaction, 
higher beliefs about 'other perceptions and attitudes' (such as perceived influence on decision 
making, satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes, general interest in the job, interest in 
innovation, performance-reward contingencies, importance of others' performance, attitude 
towards change, and support for PS), and more favourable perceptions of 'aspects of 
satisfaction' (namely, satisfaction with work, with supervisor, with promotion opportunities, 
and social satisfaction) than did non-managers. As great differences occurred between the job 
attitudes of managerial and non-managerial employees, further analysis was conducted 
separately for managerial and non-managerial employees. 
In order to obtain some understanding of the outlook of non-managerial participants of 
PS/SAYE, and non-managerial, non-participants of PS/SAYE schemes, the job attitudes and 
other perceptions of both groups were compared by using a t-test. The results indicated that 
non-managerial participants of PS/SAYE schemes had a significantly higher level of general 
satisfaction, involvement, motivation, and integration than did non-managerial, non-
participants of the schemes. Therefore, it can be said that there are great differences between 
the job attitudes of non-managerial participants of the PS/SAYE group and non-managerial, 
non-participants of the PS/SAYE group. However, it cannot be concluded that these 
differences stemmed from the effects of the PS and SAYE schemes, because the analysis to 
this point did not take into account the personal (demographic) differences between 
participants and non-participants. Therefore, in order to determine the 'real effect' of financial 
participation and participation in decision making, further analysis was conducted. The main 
aim of this analysis was to determine the relationship between financial participation and 
participation in DM on job attitudes by considering the possibility that the differences found 
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so far might have been caused by other differences between the two groups. The results of a 
partial correlation analysis showed that after controlling for the possibly confounding effects 
of sex, age, frill/part-time employee, tenure, and union membership, PS/SAYE schemes were 
significantly related to general satisfaction, and slightly (not significantly) related to 
integration and motivation. They showed a very weak relationship with involvement and 
commitment. Therefore, it can be concluded that the schemes have at least a small effect on 
job attitudes. Although financial participation was significantly related to only general 
satisfaction, partial correlation analysis indicated that participation in DM was strongly and 
significantly related to all five job attitudes, namely integration, involvement, commitment, 
general satisfaction, and motivation. 
The preceding analysis tends to indicate that both PS/SAYE schemes and participation in DM 
have had positive effects on job attitudes. However, this analysis does not allow assessment 
of the relative effects of these two independent variables, although it is clearly an important 
question. Therefore multiple regression analysis was used to assess the relative and 
interaction effects of financial participation and participation in DM on employee job 
attitudes. The results of the analysis indicated that combined PS/SAYE schemes and 
participation in DM 'explain' a significant amount of the variance in each dependent variable. 
Regarding the relative amount that each of the two independent variables (financial 
participation and participation in DM) contributes to 'explained variance', after the effects of 
the other have been statistically controlled, participation in DM explained a statistically 
significant amount of the variance in all eight variables (integration, involvement, 
commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, 
and perceived influence on DM), while PS/SAYE schemes were significantly related to two 
variables: general satisfaction and performance-reward contingencies. In comparing the 
effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in DM it was found that, with the exception of 
performance-reward contingencies, participation in DM had a stronger impact on all seven 
job attitudes than had financial participation. Consistent with the research model, the results 
of multiple regression analysis indicated the possibility of interaction effects between 
PS/SAYE schemes and participation in DM. 
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The full research model was tested with a variety of multivariate techniques. It was 
hypothesized that perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and influence on 
DM would be affected by employee participation (the combination of financial participation 
and participation in DM) and participation in decision making. The correlational, multiple 
regression, and path analyses indicated that performance-reward contingencies and perceived 
influence on DM were significantly affected by employee participation and participation in 
decision making for all respondents and the subgroups of non-managerial employees and 
managerial employees. Employee participation and participation in decision making affected 
perceived pay equity for all respondents and the subgroup of non-managerial employees only. 
The model postulated that support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PSISAYE 
schemes would be affected by perceived pay equity, perceived performance-reward 
contingencies, and perceived influence on DM. For all res pondents the results of the 
statistical analyses proved that support for PS was affected by pay equity, performance-
reward contingencies, and influence on DM. Support for SAYE schemes was affected by two 
predictor variables, namely performance-reward contingencies and influence on DM. 
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes was affected by pay equity and performance reward 
contingencies. For non-managerial employees, pay equity and performance-reward 
contingencies were determinants of support for PS, while performance-reward contingencies 
and influence on DM were determinants of support for SAYE schemes. Consistent with the 
research model, all three variables (performance-reward contingencies, pay equity, and 
influence on DM) were determinants of satisfaction with PSISAYE schemes. For managerial 
employees, performance-reward contingencies were the determinant of support for PS and 
support for SAYE schemes, while influence on DM was a predictor variable only for support 
for PS. The study did not provide any evidence indicating a relationship between pay equity 
and three dependent variables, namely support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction 
with PS/SAYE schemes. The results of the statistical analyses indicated that, with the 
exception of satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for managerial employees, performance 
reward contingencies were the most important determinant of support for PS, support for 
SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for all respondents and the subgroups of 
non-managerial and managerial employees. 
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It was hypothesized that organizational commitment would be directly affected by employee 
participation, participation in decision making, pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, influence on DM, support for PS, support for SAYE, satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE, involvement, integration, and general satisfaction. The study found that influence 
on DM, support for PS, involvement, integration, and satisfaction were positively and 
significantly associated with organizational commitment, while employee participation, 
support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes were not significantly related to 
organizational commitment for the whole sample and for the subgroups of non-managerial 
employees and managerial employees. There was a positive and significant relationship 
between pay equity and commitment for the whole sample only. In addition to these 
variables, performance-reward contingencies were significantly related to organizational 
commitment for the whole sample only when employee participation was entered into the 
regression equation. Participation in decision making was significantly related to 
organizational commitment for managerial employees only. Although participation in 
decision making did not have a significant direct effect on organizational commitment for the 
whole sample and non-managerial employees, it had a substantial indirect effect on this 
variable. It should also be mentioned that although employee participation did not have a 
significant direct effect on organizational commitment, it had a substantial indirect effect on it 
for the whole sample and the subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial employees 
and managerial employees. 
The research model suggested that involvement would be affected by employee participation, 
participation in decision making, and integration. The correlational, multiple regression, and 
path analyses indicated that integration, participation in decision making, and employee 
participation were three important predictor variables in shaping employee involvement for 
all respondents and for the subgroups of the sample, namely non-managerial employees and 
managerial employees. Participation in decision making was a more important predictor 
variable in shaping involvement than was employee participation. 
It was hypothesized that integration would be affected by employee participation and 
participation in decision making. The results of the statistical analyses proved that employee 
participation and participation in decision making were two important predictor variables in 
421 
shaping employee integration for all respondents and the subgroups of non-managerial and 
managerial employees. For the whole sample and non-managerial employees, participation in 
decision making was more strongly related to integration than was employee participation. 
The model postulated that group work norms would be affected by integration. The results of 
statistical analysis indicated that integration was significantly and positively associated with 
group work norms for all respondents, and the subgroups of non-managerial and managerial 
employees. 
It was hypothesized that cooperation would be affected by integration and involvement. The 
results of analysis indicated that integration was significantly and positively associated with 
cooperation for all respondents and the subgroups of non-managerial and managerial 
employees, while involvement was significantly and positively related to cooperation for all 
respondents and non-managerial employees. 
It was hypothesized that satisfaction would be affected by involvement and cooperation. The 
results of the statistical analyses proved that both involvement and cooperation were 
significantly and positively related to satisfaction for all respondents and for the subgroups of 
non-managerial employees and managerial employees. The study also found that involvement 
was the most powerful precursor of general satisfaction. 
The model suggested that motivation would be affected by integration and group work norms. 
The results showed that integration and group work norms were predictor variables in 
shaping employee motivation for all respondents and non-managerial employees. For 
managerial employees, only integration emerged as the determinant of motivation. 
It was hypothesized that motivation would have an effect on general interest in the job, pride 
in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation. The study found that motivation was 
significantly and positively associated with general interest in the job and interest in 
innovation for the whole sample and the subgroups of non-managerial and managerial 
employees, while it was significantly associated with pride in job accomplishment for all 




This final chapter will first summarize the findings of the replication of the Long's (1978) 
and Florkowski's (1989) studies. Second, the results of the test of the new research model 
will be summarized. Third, the findings of the analyses will be summarized, and four research 
questions will be answered in the light of the findings. Fourth, the question "How does this 
research advance Long's and Florkowski's models or studies?" will be answered. Fifth, 
overall conclusions about the effects of financial participation, participation in decision 
making, and the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making 
on employee job attitudes will be briefly stated. Implications of these findings for 
practitioners will be briefly discussed. Finally, the last section will suggest possible directions 
for future research. 
11.1. The Findings of the Replication Study 
11.1.1. The Findings of the Replication of Long's (1978) Study 
Long (1978) tested his hypotheses at two levels: organizational and individual. 
a) The organizational level of analysis: At the organizational level, Long (1978) first 
hypothesized that employee ownership would set in motion forces leading to increased 
worker participation or influence, directly, by voting for the board of directors, by increasing 
worker desire for participation, and by increasing managers' desire for worker participation. 
These forces would probably result in increased power-equalization over time, especially in 
job and departmental decisions. Analysis of the data indicated that the majority of both non-
managers and managers believed that non-managerial employees' influence at job, 
departmental, and organizational levels was substantially less than it 'should be' and desired 
more non-managerial employees' influence at these three decision levels. Regarding 
'personal influence', again, both non-managers and managers believed that they have less 
influence than they should have, desiring more personal influence. These results are 
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inconsistent with the findings of a series of early studies involving 12 countries (Heller, 
Wilder, Abell, and Warner, 1979; IDE Research Group, 1981). These studies found that 
although the total amount of involvement in decision making at work was astonishingly low 
in the medium-sized organizations of the manufacturing and service sectors of British 
industry, there was little evidence that workers wanted to have more influence over decisions. 
It should be mentioned that this study does not have the benefit of data about employees' job 
attitudes and participation levels in the organization prior to the introduction of PS and SAYE 
schemes. Therefore, in the light of these results, the study concluded that while non-managers 
and managers desire more non-managerial employees' influence, this could not support or 
reject Long's (1978) hypothesis mentioned above, as it cannot be said that the desire for more 
non-managerial employees' influence stems from the effect of employee share ownership. 
But, Long's prediction that employee ownership would eventually increase power-
equalization is not supported because both managers and non-managers reported decisional 
deprivation at all three decision levels (job, departmental, and organizational). 
At the organizational level of analysis, Long (1978), second, analysed the effect of share 
ownership on various job attitudes of organization members. He hypothesized that employee 
ownershzp would positively affect five main job attitudes (organizational integration, 
involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation) both directly through the 
effects of share ownership, and indirectly through increasing employee participation in 
decision making. As was the case in Long's (1978) study, this study could not conduct a 
'before and after' analysis to test this hypothesis, since the profit sharing and employee share 
ownership schemes were introduced in the organization about 15 years before the starting 
date of the study. Therefore, in order to test Long's hypothesis, the study compared the job 
attitudes of managers and non-managers, as did Long. The study found that among both non-
managerial and managerial employees these five main job attitudes were favourable. 
Long (1978) also hypothesized that employee ownership would affect several other 
perceptions and attitudes, namely the performance-reward contingencies, the effort-
performance contingencies, concern for the performance of others, and perceived task 
interdependencies, through both share ownership and participation in decision making. Long 
424 
believed that increased participation in decision making would indirectly affect job security 
and attitudes toward change. Among non-managers, most of these job attitudes or 
perceptions (with the exception of performance-reward contingencies, perceived task 
interdependencies, and attitude towards change) were found to be favourable. Among 
managers, these j oh attitudes (with the exception of perceived task interdependencies and job 
security) were very high or high. 
At the organizational level of analysis, Long (1978), third and finally, hypothesized that 
employee ownership might affect certain global characteristics or attributes of the 
organization (namely, interpersonal and interdepartmental cooperation, communication 
between management and employees, group work norms, organizational trust, and worker 
commitment to organizational goals) through affecting individual job attitudes. The study did 
not find any evidence showing that PS and SAYE schemes have favourably affected these 
attributes. With the exception of interpersonal cooperation, non-managers reported 
unfavourable attitudes toward the organization attributes. Managers reported favourable 
attitudes only for interpersonal cooperation, one measure of group work norms, and employee 
commitment to organizational goals. Therefore, the study concluded that PS and SAYE 
schemes seem to have only either a weak or negative effect on organization attributes. 
b) The individual level of analysis: At the individual level of analysis, Long (1978) first 
hypothesized that individual share ownership will directly affect the organizational 
integration, involvement, and commitment of employees, and in turn affect other attitudes and 
beliefs, namely performance-reward contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, 
concern for the performance of others, perceptions of task interdependencies, motivation, and 
satisfaction. By comparing those non-managers who participated in PS and SAYE schemes 
and have shares to those who do not participate in the schemes and hold no shares, the study 
found that participant-shareholders were significantly higher in commitment, the belief that 
performance would be rewarded, one measure of concern for the performance of others, and 
general satisfaction, even after controlling for the length of service and age. However, the rest 
of the job attitudes and beliefs, such as integration, involvement, motivation, and perception 
of task interdependencies, were not higher among participant-shareholders. As a substantial 
majority of non-participants (74.5%) intend to be a beneficiary of PS andlor SAYE schemes 
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in the future, the weak differences between the mean values of participants and non-
participants may have stemmed from non-participants' positive attitudes toward the schemes? 
However, when the results of the study are compared with Long's results, it is clear that the 
schemes have less effect on job attitudes in the large organization studied here than in the 
medium-small organization studied by Long. 
At the individual level of analysis, Long (1978) also hypothesized that employee 
participation in decision making, would be affected by employee ownership, and would in 
turn affect many of the job attitudes believed to be affected by individual share ownership, as 
well as some other variables. He specifically hypothesized that individual participation in 
decision making would affect the following job attitudes, which are also affected by 
individual share ownershzp: organizational integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, motivation, performance-reward contingencies, effort-performance 
contingencies, concern for performance of others, and perceived task interdependencies. 
Long (1978) also hypothesized that participation in decision making would affect two 
variables not hypothesized to be affected by individual share ownership: job security and 
attitudes toward change. With the exception of one measure of concern for the performance 
of others, participation in decision making was found to be significantly and positively 
related to all of these job attitudes after controlling for length of service and age. 
Long (1978) also hypothesized that there may be interaction impacts between share 
ownership and participation. Multiple regression analysis was used to assess the relative 
impacts of share ownership and participation in decision making on the five major job 
attitudes and to test for interaction impacts between share ownership and participation in 
decision making. Separately, PS and SAYE schemes were significantly related to only two 
variables (commitment and general satisfaction); participation in decision making was 
significantly related to all five variables: integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, and motivation. It was seen that participation in decision making has a 
significantly stronger effect on integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and motivation, 
while PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making had a significantly similar 
effect on only one variable, commitment. Only small interactions between PS/SAYE schemes 
and participation in decision making were found. 
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In sum, the study could not determine whether the schemes have had an impact on individual 
participation in decision making, because data about employees' job attitudes arid 
participation levels in the organization prior to the introduction of PS/SAYE schemes were 
not available. However, the study did not provide support for the hypothesis that employee 
ownership will eventually increase power-equalization. 
At the organizational level, the study found that managers have more favourable attitudes 
than non-managers do, possibly indicating that the greatest effect of the schemes has been on 
managerial employees. Regarding organization attributes, the schemes have only a very weak 
or negative effect. 
The study found that PSISAYE schemes have a very strong impact on commitment, general 
satisfaction, and performance-reward contingencies, but have a negligible impact on 
integration, involvement, and motivation, after controlling for length of service and age. But 
the schemes have no impact on two attitudes: perceived task interdependencies and attitude 
towards change. The study also found that participation in decision making had a statistically 
significant effect on all of the job attitudes, and on other perceptions and attitudes. 
By using multiple regression analysis, the study found separate effects of two independent 
variables. It was concluded that while PS and SAYE schemes were significantly related to 
only two job attitudes (organizational commitment and general satisfaction), participation in 
decision making was significantly related to all five job attitudes. In comparing the effects of 
PSISAYE schemes and participation in decision making, it was concluded that participation 
in decision making has a stronger effect on integration, involvement, general satisfaction, and 
motivation, while it has the same effect on commitment. For all job attitudes, the study found 
only small interaction effects between PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision 
making. 
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11.1.2. The Findings of the Replication of Florkowski's (1989) Study 
Florkowski (1989) hypothesized that if pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and 
influence on decision making were not at acceptable levels, individuals would not support 
profit sharing. He also hypothesized that profit sharing support would be positively associated 
with organizational commitment. It was also hypothesized that the relationship between profit 
sharing support and organizational commitment would be more effective for those who 
mentioned high job satisfaction. The analysis of the data in this study indicated that 
performance-reward contingencies were the most important determinant of plan support for 
all respondents and the subgroups of employees and managers. Influence on decision making 
affected profit sharing support for all respondents and the subgroup of managers only. 
Furthermore, plan support was a major determinant of organizational commitment across 
groups. Other attitudinal relationships were not supported. For example, the anticipated link 
between pay equity and support for profit sharing was not confirmed, nor was job 
satisfaction's moderating effect on the relationship between support for profit sharing and 
commitment. 
11.2. The Findings of the Test of the Research Model 
Because in the research model, financial participation (PS and SAYE schemes) and 
participation in decision making are combined, before testing the whole model the researcher 
conducted some analysis to determine the separate effects of financial participation and 
participation in decision making on job attitudes. Although the separate effects of these two 
variables had been found during the replication of Long's (1978) model (by using his 
questionnaire items only), it was done once more, because apart from Long's items more 
items were added to the questionnaire to increase the reliability of the scales. For example, 
Long (1978) used only one questionnaire item to measure commitment, which is one of the 
main variables of his model. So the research model was tested by constructing the new 
measures for the study variables. 
The analysis of the data indicated that PS/SAYE schemes were significantly related to 
general satisfaction, and slightly (not significantly) related to integration arid motivation. 
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They had a very weak positive relationship with involvement and commitment. Therefore, the 
study concluded that the schemes have at least a small impact on job attitudes. However, 
participation in decision making was strongly and significantly related to all five job 
attitudes: integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, and motivation. 
By using multiple regression analysis, the relative and interaction effects of financial 
participation and participation in decision making were assessed. It was found that combined 
PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making 'explain' a significant amount of the 
variance in each dependent variable (integration, involvement, commitment, general 
satisfaction, motivation, pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and perceived 
influence on decision making). Regarding the relative amount that each of the two 
independent variables (financial participation and participation in decision making) 
contributes to 'explained variance', after the effects of the other has been statistically 
controlled, while PS/SAYE schemes were significantly related to two variables (general 
satisfaction and performance-reward contingencies), participation in decision making 
explained a statistically significant amount of the variance in all eight variables. In comparing 
the effects of PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making, the study found that, 
with the exception of performance-reward contingencies, participation in decision making 
had a stronger effect on all seven job attitudes than had financial participation. Consistent 
with the research model, the possibility of interaction effects between PS!SAYE schemes and 
participation in decision making was found. 
In sum, the preceding analyses tend to indicate that although financial participation and 
participation in decision making had positive effects on job attitudes, participation in decision 
making had a stronger effect than did financial participation. The combination of financial 
participation and participation in decision making explains a significant amount of the 
variance in each dependent variable, and, moreover, there is a possibility of interaction effects 

































Table 11.1. Results of the Attitudinal Relationships Postulated in the Research Model 
Anticipated Relationships All Respondents Non-managerial Managerial 
- ______________________________________________ ________________ Employees Employees 
The combination of financial participation 
and participation in decision making would 
affect 
a) perceived pay equity Supported 
b) performance-reward contingencies Supported 
c) perceived influence on decision making Supported 
Participation in decision making would affect 
a) perceived pay equity Supported 
b) performance-reward contingencies Supported 
c) perceived influence on decision making Supported 
3 Support for PS would be affected by 
a) perceived pay equity Supported 
b) performance-reward contingencies Supported 
c) perceived influence on decision making Supported 
4 Support for SAYE would be affected by 
Supported Not supported 
Supported Supported 
Supported Supported 
Supported Not supported 
Supported Supported 
Supported Supported 
Supported Not Supported 
Supported Supported 
Not Supported Supported 
a) perceived pay equity Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
b) performance-reward contingencies Supported Supported Supported 
c) perceived influence on decision making Supported Supported Not Supported 
5 Satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes would 
be affected by 
a) perceived pay equity Supported Supported Not Supported 
b) performance-reward contingencies Supported Supported Not Supported 
c) perceived influence on decision making Not Supported Supported Not Supported 
6 Organizational commitment would be 
directly affected by 
a) employee participation Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
b) pay equity Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
c) performance-reward contingencies Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
d) perceived influence on decision making Supported Supported Supported 
e) support for PS 
1) support for SAYE 
g) satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes 
h) involvement 
i) integration 
j) general satisfaction 
Supported Supported Supported 
Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
Supported Supported Supported 
Supported Supported Supported 
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Table 11.1. Continued 
- Anticipated Relationships All Respondents Non-managerial Managerial 
- _______________________________________________ ________________ Employees Employees 
Organizational commitment would be 
directly affected by 
a) Participation in decision making Not Supported Not Supported Supported 
b) pay equity Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
c) performance-reward contingencies Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
d) perceived influence on decision making Supported Supported Supported 
e) support for PS Supported Supported Supported 
f) support for SAYE Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
g) satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
h) involvement Supported Supported Supported 
i) integration Supported Supported Supported 
j) general satisfaction Supported Supported Supported 
8 Involvement would be affected by 
a) employee participation Supported Supported Supported 
b) integration Supported Supported Supported 
9 Involvement would be affected by 
a) participation in decision making Supported Supported Supported 
b) integration Supported Supported Supported 
10 Integration would be affected by employee 
participation Supported Supported Supported 
11 Integration would be affected by 
participation in decision making Supported Supported Supported 
12 Group work norms would be affected by 
integration Supported Supported Supported 
13 Cooperation would be affected by 
a) integration Supported Supported Supported 
b) involvement Supported Supported Not Supported 
14 Satisfaction would be affected by 
a) involvement Supported Supported Supported 
b) cooperation Supported Supported Supported 
15 Motivation would be affected by 
a) integration Supported Supported Supported 
b) group work norms Supported Supported Not Supported 
16 Motivation would have an effect on 
a) general interest in the job Supported Supported Supported 
b) pride in job accomplishment Supported Supported Not Supported 
- c) interest in innovation Supported Supported Supported 
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In order to test the full model, a variety of multivariate techniques were used. The outcomes 
for each relationship, postulated on the research model, are summarized in Table 11.1. Most 
of the hypothesized relationships were confirmed by the findings of the statistical analyses. 
It was hypothesized that perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, and 
influence on decision making would be affected by (a) the combination of PS/SAYE schemes 
and participation in decision making (employee participation) and (b) participation in 
decision making. It was found that employee participation and participation in decision 
making affected performance-reward contingencies and perceived influence on decision 
making for all respondents and the subgroups of non-managerial employees and managerial 
employees, while they affected perceived pay equity for all respondents and the subgroups of 
non-managerial employees only. 
It was hypothesized that support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes would be affected by perceived pay equity, perceived -performance-reward 
contingencies, and perceived influence on decision making. The study found that support for 
PS was affected by performance-reward contingencies (across the groups), pay equity (for all 
respondents and non-managerial employees), and perceived influence on decision making 
(for all respondents and managerial employees). Support for SAYE was affected by 
performance-reward contingencies (across the groups) and perceived influence on decision 
making (for all respondents and non-managerial employees). The study did not provide any 
evidence indicating a relationship between pay equity and support for SAYE scheme. 
Satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes was affected by pay equity (for all respondents and non-
managerial employees), performance-reward contingencies (for all respondents and non-
managerial employees) and perceived influence on decision making (for non-managerial 
employees). The results of the statistical analyses showed that, with the exception of 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for managerial employees, performance-reward 
contingencies were the most important determinant of support for PS, support for SAYE, and 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes for all respondents and for the subgroups of non-
managers and managers. 
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The model postulated that organizational commitment would be directly affected by 
employee participation, participation in decision making, pay equity, performance-reward 
contingencies, perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, 
satisfaction with PS/SAYE, involvement, integration, and general satisfaction. As the 
previous analyses indicated that employee participation and participation in decision making 
have separate effects on job attitudes, these two variables were entered into the regression 
equation separately. When employee participation was entered into the regression equation it 
was found that perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, involvement, 
integration, and satisfaction were positively and significantly associated with organizational 
commitment, while employee participation, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes were not significantly related to organizational commitment across the 
groups. There was a positive and significant relationship between pay equity and performance 
reward contingencies for the whole sample only. 
When participation in decision making was entered into the regression equation it was found 
that perceived influence on decision making, support for PS, involvement, integration, and 
satisfaction were positively and significantly related to organizational commitment, while 
performance-reward contingencies, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes were not associated with organizational commitment across the groups. In addition 
to these variables, participation in decision making and pay equity were significantly related 
to organizational commitment for managerial employees and the whole sample, respectively. 
Although employee participation (across the groups) and participation in decision making 
(for the whole sample and non-managerial employees) did not have a significant direct effect 
on organizational commitment, they had a substantial indirect effect on it. 
It was suggested that involvement would be affected by employee participation, participation 
in decision making, and integration. The results of the analyses proved that integration, 
participation in decision making, and employee participation were three important predictor 
variables in shaping employee involvement across the groups. Participation in decision 
making emerged as a more powerful precursor of involvement than employee participation. 
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As was postulated in the model, employee participation and participation in decision making 
were two important predictor variables in shaping integration for all respondents and the 
subgroups of non-managerial employees and managerial employees. For the whole sample 
and one subgroup of the sample, namely non-managerial employees, participation in decision 
making was more strongly related to integration than employee participation was. 
Consistent with the model, the results of the statistical analyses indicated that integration was 
significantly and positively related to group work norms across the groups. 
It was suggested that cooperation would be affected by integration and involvement. The data 
showed that integration was significantly and positively associated with cooperation for 
across the groups, while involvement was significantly and positively associated with 
cooperation for the whole sample and non-managerial employees. 
The model postulated that satisfaction would be affected by involvement and cooperation. 
Consistent with the model, both involvement and cooperation were significantly and 
positively associated with satisfaction across the groups. Involvement emerged as the most 
powerful precursor of general satisfaction. 
It was suggested that motivation would be affected by integration and group work norms. The 
results indicated that integration and group work norms were positively and significantly 
related to employee motivation for the whole sample and non-managerial employees. For 
managerial employees, only integration emerged as the precursor of motivation. 
The model postulated that motivation would have an effect on general interest in the job, 
pride in job accomplishment, and interest in innovation. The results showed that motivation 
was positively and significantly related to general interest in the job and interest in innovation 
across the groups, while it was significantly associated with pride in job accomplishment for 
all respondents and non-managerial employees. 
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There are four important points which should be mentioned: 
i) Although the results of the statistical analyses supported Florkowski's (1989) hypothesis 
that "employees' support for profit sharing is positively related to their organizational 
commitment to the company", they did not support the researcher's own hypotheses that (a) 
employees' support for SAYE schemes and (b) employees' satisfaction with PS/SAYE 
schemes are positively related to their organizational commitment. 
ii) The hypothesis "organizational commitment would be directly affected by the combination 
of financial participation and participation in decision making" was not supported by the 
study data. But it does not mean that the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making does not have an effect on employees' organizational 
commitment. Although the standardized beta (regarding organizational commitment) for 
employee participation was not statistically significant (see Table 10.10), employee 
participation had the highest indirect effect on organizational commitment (see Table 10.13). 
Whit this indirect effect, the total effect of employee participation on organizational 
commitment was the fourth highest behind the total effects of integration, involvement, and 
satisfaction. So, it may be said that employees' organizational commitment would be 
indirectly affected by the combination of financial participation and participation in decision 
making. 
iii) As was proposed by the researcher, employees' motivation is positively related to their 
general interest in the job, interest in innovation, and pride in job accomplishment. 
iv) As described in Chapter Eight, by using only Long's (1978) one item to measure 
commitment, a strong relationship between financial participation and organizational 
commitment was found. As the scale reliability of one item could not be measured, the 
researcher used 16 items to measure the commitment. The reliability of the new scale is .90. 
By using this new scale, the study found a very weak positive relationship between financial 
participation and organizational commitment. Therefore, in future studies researchers must be 
sure about the reliabilities of the scales they use. Otherwise, they may reach the wrong 
conclusions. 
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11.3. Summary of the Findings, and the Answers to the Four Research Questions 
This study investigated the effect of financial participation (profit sharing and SAYE 
schemes) and participation in decision making on employee job attitudes and behaviours. 
Three main conclusions can be derived from the results presented in this study. The first is 
that the results provide support for the instrumental satisfaction model developed by Klein 
(1987), as participation in decision making showed a positive and statistically significant 
effect on most job attitudes. This is no surprise, because virtually every US study in this area 
(French 1987 is the main exception) and some UK studies (e.g., Pendleton et al., 1998) has 
mentioned the importance of participation in decision making as a key determinant of 
attitudinal change. This result is also consistent with the ideas of organizational 
psychologists, who claimed with insistence that worker participation in organisational 
decision making is a substantial ingredient in job satisfaction, motivation, and work 
performance as well as in the psychological growth and development of the worker (Argyris, 
1964; Hackman, 1975; Flerzberg, 1966; Lawler, 1977; Likert, 1961; Maslow, 1954). In the 
literature studies that analysed the relationship between participation and outcomes such as 
motivation, satisfaction, and productivity, concluded that those relationships are at least 
moderately positive (Bass and Leavitt, 1963; Coch and French, 1948; Denison, 1984; French, 
Israel and As, 1960; Guzzo, Jette, and Katzell, 1985; Lawler, 1982; Lawler and Hackman, 
1969; Long, 1978; Miller and Monge, 1986; Spector, 1986; Strauss, 1963). 
The second conclusion is that, consistent with Klein's (1987) study, the data offer almost no 
support for the intrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership, since financial 
participation showed a significant relationship only to some job attitudes, such as satisfaction 
and performance-reward contingencies, and just a small effect on other attitudes, such as 
integration, involvement, and motivation. There are three plausible explanations for the small 
effect of financial participation on employees' job attitudes: 
(i) The motivational effect of employee ownership depends on employees' perception that 
their effort has a significant effect on company performance. If they believe that there is a 
significant link between their effort and company performance, they may believe that they 
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can increase the value of their stock account by working harder. This study was conducted in 
a large organization; therefore, more probably the individual employees cannot see a 
significant link between their efforts and company performance, and this may hinder their 
efforts. Hence, as Weitzman and Kruse (1990) claimed, if employees do not work harder 
themselves while attempting to free-ride off others, financial participation cannot have a 
substantial impact upon a large organization. 
(ii) Employee ownership will have a positive effect on worker commitment to the 
organization and its goals, and it will decrease alienation from work if employees believe that 
they are true owners of the enterprise (Hammer, Stern, and Gurdon, 1982). It is argued that 
employee share ownership schemes change the employee's status from one of 'employee' to 
'owner' (Poole and Jenkins, 1991), and hence the employee is more likely to feel like a part 
of the organization (Long, 1978; Smith, Lazarus, and Kalkstein, 1990). In this study, of the 
managerial participants of PS/SAYE schemes, slightly less than half (46.3%) responded that 
they feel like an owner, while 40% reported that they do not feel like an owner. 45.4% of 
managerial participants reported that they feel like an employee. Of the non-managerial 
participants of PS/SAYE schemes, a majority (71.4%) reported that they do not feel like an 
owner, while only a small minority (13.5%) reported that they feel like an owner. A 
substantial majority (95%) of non-managerial participants reported that they feel like an 
employee, while only a small minority (9.5%) reported that they do not feel like an employee. 
Because in this study employees only have a small number of company shares, financial 
participation did not change the employee's status from one of 'employee' to 'owner'. 
Therefore, holding company shares did not make any significant difference in employees' job 
attitudes. This finding is consistent with Rosen's (1983) argument that "when employees own 
so little stock, there simply is no reason to believe that there will be any change in their 
behaviour" (p.53). 
(iii) A substantial majority of non-participants in the PS/SAYE schemes (74.5%) reported 
that "they intend to be a beneficiary of profit sharing and SAYE schemes in the future". 
Therefore, they could be regarded as potential future beneficiaries of the schemes. So, the 
small effect of financial participation may have stemmed from non-participants' positive 
attitudes toward PS and SAYE schemes. 
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Third and finally, the study concludes that the effect of the combination of financial 
participation and participation in decision making on employee job attitudes is not higher 
than the independent effect of participation in decision making. The results provide only 
weak support for the proposition that favourable results are much more likely if the two types 
of participation - financial and non-financial - are combined (Ben-Ner, Han, and Jones, 1996; 
Blinder, 1990; Doucouliagos, 1995; Jones, 1997; Kunkel and Landau, 1995; Rosen, 1983). 
Although hierarchical multiple regression analysis indicated that the combination of financial 
participation and participation in decision making are positively and significantly related to 
most job attitudes and perceptions, the results showed that participation in decision making 
on its own has slightly stronger relations to some attitudes and perceptions. But it should be 
mentioned that it is not known in this study whether financial participation changed 
employees' actual influence in decision making, as the study did not collect any data on it. 
Therefore, there is the possibility that if the same study were conducted in organizations with 
financial participation schemes which increase employees' influence in decision making, the 
effect of the combination of fmancial participation and participation in decision making might 
be found to be stronger than was reported in this thesis. 
11.3.1. The Answers to the Research Questions 
Although all explanations made so far aimed to answer the four research questions, in order 
to make them more clear, here they will be summarized. 
Research Question 1: What are the effects ofprofit sharing and employee share ownership 
schemes (fInancial participation) on the job attitudes of individual employees in a large 
organization? The analyses of the data in Chapter Eight (the Long replication) and Chapter 
Ten (the test of the research model) indicated that PS/SAYE schemes (financial participation) 
were significantly related to some job attitudes and behaviours, such as general satisfaction 
and performance-reward contingencies, and slightly (not significantly) related to integration, 
motivation, and perceived pay equity. They had a very weak (not statistically significant) 
positive relationship with involvement, commitment, job security, and pride in job 
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accomplishment. Therefore, the study concluded that the schemes have at least a small impact 
on job attitudes. 
Research Question 2: What are the effects ofparticipation in decision making on employee 
job attitudes in a large organization? Participation in decision making was strongly and 
significantly related to all job attitudes, and other perceptions arid attitudes (with the 
exception of perceived task interdependencies), such as integration, involvement, 
commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, all five aspects of satisfaction, performance-
reward contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, perceived pay equity, support for the 
schemes, and job security. Therefore, the study concluded that participation in decision 
making is a strong variable in shaping employee job attitudes and behaviours. 
Research Question 3: What are the relative effects offinancial participation in comparison 
to the effects of individual participation in decisions? When the relative amount that each of 
the two independent variables (PS/SAYE schemes and participation in decision making) 
contributes to 'explained variance', after the effects of the other has been statistically 
controlled, it was found that participation in decision making had a stronger effect on job 
attitudes than PS/SAYE schemes had. Therefore, the study concluded that, compared with the 
effects of financial participation, participation in decision making emerged as the stronger 
variable of the two. 
Research Question 4: Does the combination offinancial participation and participation in 
decision making produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes than does 
participation in decision making on its own? The results of the analyses indicated that 
although the combination of fmancial participation and participation in decision making 
(employee participation) positively and significantly affected most employee job attitudes and 
behaviours, these effects are not stronger than the independent effects of participation in 
decision making. Therefore, the study did not provide evidence for the suggestion that the 
combination of financial participation and participation in decision making would produce a 
stronger effect on job attitudes than the independent effect of participation in decision 
making. Apart from their direct effects, employee participation and participation in decision 
making significantly affected some employee job attitudes, such as commitment, through 
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influencing other job attitudes and behaviours, such as perceived pay equity, perceived 
performance-reward contingencies, perceived influence on decision making, and support for 
profit sharing. 
11.4. How Does This Research Advance Long's and Florkowski's Models or Studies? 
11.4.1. Theoretical Refinements 
As mentioned earlier, prior to the construction of the new model, Long's and Florkowski's 
theoretical frameworks were tested. As the results, in general, supported the main arguments 
of Long's and Florkowski's models, the new model was based on the fmdings of their 
models. However, the model constructed for this study is an improved model of employee 
participation for the following reasons: 
1. Previous research (e.g., Long, 1978b, 1980, 1982; GAO, 1987) argues that participation in 
decision making is at least as important as simple participation in ownership. Although Long 
(1981) discussed that the relationship between employee ownership and employee influence 
is a complicated one, he later suggested that these variables need to be incorporated in future 
models (Long, 1989). The existing literature suggested that the full favourable effect of 
financial participation is not obtained without satisfying employees' expectations for more 
influence in the decision-making process (e.g., Ben-Ner, Han, and Jones, 1996; 
Doucouliagos, 1995; Jones, 1997), and found that financial participation does not meet this 
expectation automatically. However, none of the researchers has combined them in their 
models. Therefore, in the new model financial participation and participation in decision 
making were combined the argument being that the combination of the two will achieve the 
full favourable effect of financial participation and, at the same time, the independent effect 
of participation in decision making. Hence, the new model is a comprehensive model for 
ascertaining the attitudinal consequences of the combination of financial participation and 
participation in decision making. 
2. In his study Long stated that "in this study a large number of hypotheses have been 
suggested or implied. In addition, there are probably many other dependent variables which 
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could be identified and considered". In the new model some additional dependent variables 
(such as perceived pay equity, perceived performance-reward contingencies, perceived 
influence on decision making, support for PS, support for SAYE, and satisfaction with 
PS/SAYE schemes), which were not used on Long's model, were identified and measured to 
better understand the effect of financial and non-financial participation on employee job 
attitudes. 
3. Although in their respective models Long referred only to employee share ownership, and 
Florkowski only to profit sharing, the new model refers to two all-employee share ownership 
schemes together: profit sharing and SAYE schemes. As many organizations nowadays 
operate both schemes together (IDS Study, 641, 1998), the new model is the most appropriate 
model for investigating the effects of financial participation on employee job attitudes and 
behaviours. 
4. The new model is the first model to explore the possible determinants of participants' 
support for SAYE and their satisfaction with profit sharing and SAYE schemes. Prior models 
have not mentioned the relationships between support for SAYE, satisfaction with PS/SAYE, 
and perceptions about pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, or influence in decision 
making. The new model extends the existing knowledge considerably regarding the potential 
precursors of support for SAYE and satisfaction with PS/SAYE schemes. 
11.4.2. Methodological Refinements 
1. Florkowski (1989) conducted his study among employee participants in profit sharing. 
However, he recommended that not only employee participants but also employee non-
participants should be included in the survey research. Consistent with his recommendation, 
in this study both employee shareholders and employee non-shareholders were surveyed to 
investigate the effect of financial participation on employee job attitudes. 
2. The site Long (1978) chose - a medium-sized trucking company - was purchased by the 
employees from the parent company in order to avoid a potential liquidation, since the firm 
had been suffering several years of financial losses. According to Buchko (1993), in such a 
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case the effects of ownership may have been confounded by the need of employees to 
preserve their jobs. The data for the present study were collected in a large British 
organization which had no financial problems. Moreover, as can be seen from the 
performance figures of the organization in the Appendix, the organization grows continuously 
and continues to move ahead in an increasingly competitive UK marketplace. For example, in 
the year in which the data were collected, group sales rose 18.7% to £17.8bn, group profit 
before tax increased by 10.9% to £832m, and fully diluted earnings per share rose by 13.2% 
to26.6p. 
3. Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) studies were conducted in companies with only 
one form of employee ownership scheme: an employee share ownership scheme and profit 
sharing, respectively. As do many large organizations in the UK, the organization in which 
the present research was conducted operates two all-employee share ownership schemes 
together: approved profit sharing and a SAYE scheme. In both, shares in the company are 
allocated to participants in the schemes. However, there is a difference in the operation of the 
schemes. In the approved profit sharing scheme, all eligible employees receive a bonus in the 
form of shares and there is no initiation fee and no obligation to save each month, only the 
prospect of a future benefit. By contrast, participation in the SAYE scheme is voluntary and 
the individual has to pay a price, by saving, to belong. Of those employees who participated 
in share schemes in the sample, the majority (68.9%) are beneficiaries of both profit sharing 
and SAYE schemes, and a substantial majority (96.5%) are beneficiaries of the profit sharing 
scheme. Therefore, the combined effects of both schemes were investigated to find the 
attitudinal effects of financial participation in the company. 
11.5. General Conclusions and Implications 
This section will first attempt to formulate some conclusions about the general effects of 
financial participation and participation in decision making. Second, the implications of these 
findings and conclusions for practitioners will be briefly discussed. Finally, some 
recommendations for future studies will be stated. 
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11.5.1. General Conclusions 
It is concluded that, in this case at least, financial participation (profit sharing and SAYE 
schemes) had a significant effect on some job attitudes, such as satisfaction and performance-
reward contingencies, while it had just a small (not significant) effect on other job attitudes 
and behaviours, such integration, involvement, and motivation. Following the results of the 
replication of Long's (1978) and Florkowski's (1989) models, and the existing literature, the 
study investigated the relative and combined effects of financial participation and 
participation in decision making. It was found that participation in decision making was 
positively and significantly related to most job attitudes, and when compared with the effects 
of financial participation, participation in decision making emerged as the stronger variable of 
the two. Although the combination of financial participation and participation in decision 
making (employee participation) was positively and significantly related to most job 
attitudes, participation in decision making on its own also showed a positive and significant 
effect on these job attitudes. Therefore, the study did not provide evidence for the suggestion 
that the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making would 
produce a stronger effect on job attitudes than would the independent effect of participation in 
decision making. But it should be mentioned that in the study organization, the majority of 
both managerial employees and non-managerial employees reported non-managerial 
employees' influence at each of the three decision levels was substantially less than it 'should 
be' (decisional deprivation), and they desired more non-managerial employees' influence at 
these three decision levels (desired participation). In terms of 'personal influence', both 
managers and non-managers believed that they have less influence than they should have, and 
desired more personal influence at the three decision levels. Therefore the study concludes 
that financial participation and participation in decision making will only have an increased 
combined effect when decisional deprivation for participation in decision making is reduced. 
11.5.2. Managerial Implications 
Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten indicate that financial participation (PS and SAYE schemes) 
has a strong effect on some job attitudes, such as general satisfaction and performance-reward 
contingencies, while it has a very small effect on other job attitudes, such as integration, 
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involvement, motivation, and commitment. But chapters Eight and Ten show that 
participation in decision making has a very strong effect on all job attitudes, including 
integration, involvement, commitment, general satisfaction, motivation, performance-reward 
contingencies, effort-performance contingencies, concern for the performance of others, 
perceived task interdependencies, job security and attitudes toward change. Moreover, the 
study found that participation in decision making has a stronger effect on employee job 
attitudes than does financial participation. In the light of these and other findings, while 
further research is needed, this study lends credence to the following recommendations: 
(a) In organizations, a tremendous amount of financial resources is being allocated as the 
profit sharing pooi. One of the most important reasons organizations do this is that they want 
to affect employee job attitudes, such as motivation and commitment. But the study found 
that participation in decision making has a stronger effect than financial participation, and 
there are interaction effects between these two participation methods. The study data aiso 
provided evidence that merely introducing financial participation will not guarantee power 
equalization in the organizations. Chapter Eight indicated that both managers and non-
managers believe that non-managerial employees' influence and their personal influence at 
job, departmental, and organizational levels were substantially less than it 'should be', and 
they desire more non-managerial employees' influence and their personal influence at these 
three decision levels. These results are consistent with Bartkus' (1997) argument that 
"employee ownership may create new expectations within an organization and lead to subtle 
changes in power and influence" (p.342). So, the companies must link financial and non-
financial participation if they want to achieve their aims efficiently, such as improving 
employee motivation, promoting teamwork, helping employees understand the business, 
improving the compensation package, retaining employees, and building employee 
commitment (Long, 1997). 
(b) Chapter Ten showed that fmancial participation, and even the combination of fmancial 
participation and participation in decision making, has a very weak (not statistically 
significant) direct effect on organizational commitment, which is one of the main job 
attitudes. But the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making 
has a very strong indirect effect on organizational commitment through its effects on other 
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variables, such as integration, involvement, satisfaction, and support for PS. The companies, 
therefore, must obtain support for profit sharing before the plan has any likelihood of 
improving organizational commitment. As the model postulated, the results of the statistical 
analyses in Chapter Ten indicated that employees' support for profit sharing is improved if 
they perceive that they are paid equally (pay equity), their good performance is rewarded 
(performance-reward contingencies), and they have enough influence in decision-making 
processes (perceived influence on decision making).' So, how may organizations increase 
their employees' support for profit sharing schemes? 
i) The profit sharing distribution schedule should improve employees' perceptions that 
performance and rewards are closely linked. Performance-reward contingencies were the 
most important determinant of profit sharing support in this research. Reinforcement theorists 
suggest that desired behaviours are exhibited more often as the frequency of reinforcement 
increases (Luthans and Kreitner, 1975), arguing that employees will relate their performance 
to scheme payouts more readily if these rewards are disbursed soon after they were earned. 
Thus, cash, share, and mixed schemes should foster stronger performance-reward 
contingencies than approved deferred share trust schemes do. In theory, as mentioned in 
Chapter Five, cash schemes, share schemes, and mixed schemes provide tangible 
reinforcement for performance much closer in time to its occurrence, while under approved 
deferred schemes employees are merely informed about increases that are credited to their 
individual accounts. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, in cash schemes there are four ways of distributing profit 
shares. Profits are distributed (a) as a percentage of basic pay with no increments for service, 
(b) as a percentage of earnings with payments related to length of service, (c) as a fixed sum 
irrespective of earnings or service, or (d) in proportion to pay and some measure of individual 
performance. The last way seems to be the best way to foster better performance-reward 
contingencies as individual performance is taken into account, while the third (c) way is the 
Chapter Nine also provided evidence showing that performance-reward contingencies and influence on 
decision making are positively and significantly related to support for profit sharing. But Chapter Nine, in 
contrast to Chapter Ten, did not find a significant relationship between pay equity and support for profit 
sharing. This is because different scales were used in these two chapters to measure pay equity. Although in 
Chapter Nine pay equity was measured by using Florkowski's (1989) two items, in Chapter Ten, in order to 
increase the scale reliability, the researcher's own three items were added to the scale. The reliability of the new 
scale is .93. 
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least effective way to increase employees' perception of performance-reward contingencies 
due to the free-rider problem (see Chapter Three). 
The size of the profit-centre unit in which profitability is assessed also may have an effect on 
employees' perception of performance-reward contingencies. When the size of the unit grows 
larger, so many factors can affect corporate or divisional profitability that members of a 
department or a single plant cannot control them in a given facility. Although members of a 
department or single plant may perform well, this high performance may not result in an 
increase in the profitability of the whole organization. Therefore, Florkowski (1989) proposed 
that the perceived relationship between performance and rewards would be greater if profit-
centre units were narrowly circumscribed around participants of the profit sharing plan. For 
example, one drug retailer efficiently combined profit sharing at the corporate and store levels 
(Metzger, 1979). In order to measure profitability, as the whole organization is treated as a 
profit-centre unit, in companies with multiple plants or offices, for example, product 
divisions, regional divisions, or individual plantloffice locations may also be treated as 
independent profit centres. Organizational structure, as well as existing accounting and 
information systems, will prescribe the options that are available in this regard. However, it 
should be mentioned that it is unlikely that corporate reporting policies will be altered for the 
specific aim of reinforcing the profit sharing scheme. Nevertheless, it is thought that 
organizations may make changes in these policies if they have other reasons to do so. 
ii) Among the participants of the schemes, the perception of pay equity should be fostered 
collectively by funding and allocation provisions. Like performance-reward contingencies, 
pay equity influenced respondents' attitudes toward profit sharing. Pay equity refers to a 
positive relationship between job performance or effort (inputs) and the economic rewards 
(outcomes) one receives (Goodman, 1977). Employees having the opportunity to share profits 
are expected to choose referents to evaluate the fairness of anticipated rewards from the plan 
(Adams, 1965; Goodman, 1974). Participants are more likely to support the profit sharing 
scheme if they believe that it is capable of creating rewards that are commensurate with their 
contributions toward profitability. Therefore, the organizations should concentrate on the 
choices regarding the funding formula, allocation criteria, and inclusion of conditions or 
reservations which may significantly affect employees' attitudes toward profit sharing 
schemes. 
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(c) Employees may expect that financial participation will change their status from one of 
'employees' to 'owners'. As 'owners', they may be more committed to the organizational 
goals and so work harder and more effectively. In the large organization in this study, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, financial participation did not change the perceptions of 
employees from feeling like 'employees' to feeling like 'owners'. To feel like 'owners', 
employee participants must understand and subjectively value their financial participation 
(Rosen, 1984). To improve understanding of financial participation, companies may benefit 
from initiatives which increase the perceived value of financial participation amongst their 
employees, who otherwise may neither understand nor have an interest in the benefits of 
being a beneficiaiy of PS and SAYE schemes. 
(d) In large organizations, financial participation can be a less effective motivator (Lawler, 
1987) since the relationship between shares received and individual employee effort is very 
weak (Cheadle, 1989). In these organizations, one person's performance rarely has more than 
a negligible effect on corporate performance and profits (Kruse, 1984), and the relationship 
between individual performance and stock price is nearly nonexistent (Lawler, 1987). 
However, even in large organizations financial participation can act as an indirect incentive 
by pointing out to everyone that they are an important member of the organization and 
focusing attention on the collective responsibility for company performance. 
11.6. Recommendations for Future Research on Profit Sharing and Employee Share 
Ownership Schemes 
Future studies of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes should contain the 
following methodological and theoretical refmements: 
1. This research studied a single organization, and the data may be affected by elements 
related to the organization and the nature of the UK retailing industry; the results, therefore, 
are limited in their generalizability. There is a need to replicate this study in much larger 
sample sizes of companies that operate employee share ownership schemes to determine 
whether the same relationships hold. The inclusion of many more companies with financial 
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participation would strengthen the reliability of the findings. It would also allow the findings 
of the data analyses to be generalized. 
2. Pre/post measures are needed for all of the attitudinal variables incorporated in the research 
model. One could then better evaluate the effect that financial participation has on employee 
job attitudes and behaviours. This study also measured attitudes at a single point a very long 
time after the introduction of the financial participation schemes. 
3. The new research model assumes nothing about the quantity of shares owned by the 
individual, although it is believed that the effects of financial participation may tend to be 
somewhat weaker or stronger at different ownership levels. 
4. The study data were collected by using questionnaires. However, the validity of findings 
and the degree of confidence in them could be enhanced in future studies by the deployment 
of more than one approach to data collection. Hence, in-depth interviews or observation, for 
example, could be used to check patterns or findings generated through questionnaires. 
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Dear Dr. Pinnington. 
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I have reviewed your research proposal and the accompanying questionnaire. My main 
reservation about the questionnaire is that it is very long and for that reason, I think 
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although the title of the q,iestionnaire is 'Profit Sharing and Employee Share 
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to BT shares, which may be bought and sold through the Stock Exchange. 
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Dear Dr Pinnington 
Thank you for your letter dated 4th June. 1 confess that after all this time I had rather lost 
sight of the project but I have since had a call from Ismail who is dearly very anxious to 
make progress. Just to let you know that I am asking my colleagues in Personnel for their 
views on the questionnaire and if they are happy for it to be used. There are a number of 
practical problems over selecting staff because of the Data Protection Act restrictions. 
However, subject to views of colleagues I promised Ismail that I would get back to him as 
soon as possible. 
Yours sincerely 
M....i/ 
Nigel F. Matthews 
Group Secretary 
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Dr Ashley Pinnington 
Lecture in Management 
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Thornlea 
New North Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4JZ 
Dear Mr Pinnington 
EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP SCHEMES 
ISMAIL BAKAN - QUESTIONNAIRE 
Mr Matthews has asked me to investigate and respond to your recent correspondence 
and proposed questiànnaire reratiñ'g ro a iiry f pIoyee share schemes by Ismail 
Bakan. 
Having spoken with a number of different areas within Sainsbury's and in particular with 
Personnel Department, I am afraid that I can detect little enthusiasm for progressing this 
proposal. 
A survey of the size and nature of this proposal will require some considerable 
administrative support from the Company. Appropriate name and location lists will have 
to be produced, documents collated and envelopes stuffed, packages circulated and 
responses gathered. At this time, we are working to maximum staff capacity and would 
not be able to provide the resources necessary to support such a project. 
With regard to the questionnaire itself, it repeats a number of questions which have 
already been asked in a major Sainsbury's staff survey last year. The opinion in the 
Company is that to circulate such questions again would reflect badly on management and 
result in a very negative arid possibly unrepresentative response from staff. Additionally, 
a number of the questions asked have nothing to do with employee share schemes and 
would lead to further doubts amongst employees as to the purpose of the questionnaire. 
Whilst I appreciate the reasons for these extra questions, employees may not. 
Contld. 
Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd 
Stamford House Stamford Street 
London SE1 9LL 
Telephone 0111 .921 6000 
Faimile 0171 .921 7610492 
Iitred ofce abo,t 
Rqezered nwnbcr 3261722 England 
A 5ubadiar' o(J Sai,nbuiy plc 
-2-
It is therefore with regret that I have to advise you that we will not find it possible to 
support Mr Bakans proposals for undertaking a survey on opinions of employee share 
schemes run byJ Sainsbury plc. 
Yours sincerely 
W Ha ilton 
Assistant Company Secretarj 











1. THE COMPANY 
1.1. Company Description: 
The company is one of Britain's largest and best-known multiple food retailers with 
superstores and supermarkets in England, Scotland, and Wales. In 1998 it had 586 stores 
throughout England, Scotland, and Wales. The company has also started to open stores in 
Central Europe, so far in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Total Central 
Europe sales rose by 28.6% to £288m in 1998 (see Table 1) over the comparable period in 
1997 (224m). In Central Europe, the company aims to become a major retailer and to 
participate in the steady growth in consumer demand and expenditure that is expected to 
occur as these economies develop. The company is investing early, to grow the business by 
opening large stores. 
Table 1. Central European Sales Performance 
Existing stores sales growth Total stores sales growth 
Sales (in local currency) (in local currency) 
£m % (%) 
Hungary 78 23.9 80.5 
Poland 34 41.2 99.4 
Czech Republic 96 6.4 6.4 
Slovakia 80 13.9 13.9 
Total 288 
Source: The Company's Annual Report and Financial Statements, 1998, p.2. 
The company is committed to expansion and believes the best way to secure a healthy and 
growing share of the market is to be innovative and efficient both in the creation of high-
quality products and in the way they are produced, distributed, and sold. The company and its 
suppliers invest heavily in the development of new products to broaden the range of goods 
available to the consumer. The company's view is that it is also crucial to have outlets fully 
equipped to sell these products. The stores the company is building today respond to market 
changes and to increasingly sophisticated consumer demands. In recent years the company 
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has streamlined its operations substantially and determinedly. Although the number of stores 
decreased from 673 to 337 in the 1978-1987 period, it increased from 379 in 1988 to 586 in 
1998. 
1.2. Corporate Strategy: 
The company is committed to delivering shareholder value through the energy of its staff and 
in partnership with its suppliers in these ways: 
Customer loyalty. With over eight million issued, the Clubcard has become the most popular 
loyalty card in the UK, delivering benefits to customers and to the business. 
Value for money. The company is determined to give customers the greatest choice and 
higher quality at the best value. 
Customer service. In its industry, its reputation for first-class service to its customers is 
second to none. Helping customers is at the centre of everything they do. 
Product offer. The company aims to provide products which are always in perfect condition, 
thus ensuring that customers are always satisfied with everything they buy. 
Store format. The stores of the company are designed to reflect customer needs for value, 
products, and services. Its store formats give employees the flexibility to respond to 
customers, wherever they live or work. 
In the 1992 Annual Report and Accounts it was reported that the company is committed to: 
• offering customers the best value for money, and the most competitive prices, of any 
national superstore chain. A Which? report published in January 1992 confirmed to the 
public that, of the large-scale national multiples, the company has the most competitive 
prices. 
• meeting the needs of customers by constantly seeking, and acting on, their opinions 
regarding product quality, choice, innovation, store facilities, and service. 
• providing shareholders with outstanding returns on their investment. 
• improving profitability through investment in efficient stores and distribution depots, in 
productivity improvements, and in new technology. 
• developing the talents of its people through sound management and training practices, 
while rewarding them fairly with equal opportunities for all. 
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• working closely with suppliers to build long-term business relationships based on strict 
quality and price criteria. 
participating in the formulation of national food industry policies on key issues such as 
health, nutrition, hygiene, safety, and animal welfare. 
supporting the well-being of the community and the protection of the environment. 
1.3. Products: 
The ranges of food and non-food sold by the company are comprehensive and many of the 
products are innovative. The company sells food, drink, housewares, garden products, 
toiletries, textiles, clothes, and petrol. The strength of the company brand, which attracts over 
eight million customers every week continues to grow, supported by many initiatives and 
substantial investment. The company has been introducing many new products into its stores, 
including healthy eating ranges, environmental ranges, and traditional recipe products. The 
company is also introducing in-store pharmacies as another important facility, much valued 
by customers. 
The superstores stock up to 18,000 product lines, while supermarkets carry a product range 
consistent with their size and location. The store managers is concerned with people -
customers and staff- and is responsible for the efficient running of the store. Product range is 
controlled by a central marketing policy. 
Fresh foods are a major success for the company. Fresh food products include chilled food 
products, fruit and vegetables, cheese and dairy products, meat and poultry, and fresh bread. 
All stores carry fresh fruit and vegetables and have meat departments. One in three has an in-
store bakery. The company is continuously increasing its market share in food and drink 
shops. Over the last 10 years the company increased its market share in food and drink shops 




In 1998 the company employs over 185,000 people (including over 1,600 senior managers), 
160,000 of them in the UK - making the company one of the UK's largest private-sector 
employers. The average number of employees per week during 1998 was: UK 159,109 (1997 
- 143,694), Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland 14,181 (1997 - nil), rest of europe 
12,290 (1997 - 9,504). The average number of full-time equivalent employees is increasing 
continuously. The number of full-time employees in the UK increased from 50,192 in 1988 to 
99,997 in 1998. The average number of full-time equivalents was: UK 99,997 (1997 -
89,649), Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland 12,585 (1997 - nil) and rest of europe 
11,590 (1997- 8,791). 
In the 1998 Annual Report and Financial Statements the company's employment policies 
were listed as the following: 
The company depends on the skills and commitment of its employees in order to achieve 
its objectives. Company staff at every level are persuaded to make their fullest possible 
contribution to the company's success. 
• A key business priority is to provide first-class service to customers. On-going training 
programmes aim to ensure that employees understand the company's customer service 
objectives and strive to achieve them. 
The company's selection, training, development, and promotion policies ensure equal 
opportunities for all employees regardless of gender, marital status, race, age, or 
disability. 
Internal communications are designed to ensure that employees are well informed about 
the business of the company. These include a staff magazine, videos, and staff briefmg 
sessions. Staff attitudes are frequently researched through surveys and store visits, and 
management seeks to respond positively to the needs of employees. 
• Employees are encouraged to become involved in the financial performance of the 
company through a variety of schemes, principally the company employee profit sharing 
scheme, and the savings-related share option scheme. 
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Recruitment and development: 
The company uses more accurate selection tools to assess ability, potential, and, above all, 
whether an individual will fit in with the company's values. According to the company, they 
are highly successful in recruiting graduates for their Excel training programme, with nearly 
25% of new recruits coming from Europe. 
The company aims to develop its people to be the best at giving customer service. In 1998, 
9,000 of the company's management team were put through its Core-Skills programme to 
learn effective management skills. The company aims to develop business managers with a 
broad range of skills, and as a result have moved over 100 senior managers into new areas of 
responsibility. 
Training is regarded as vital to the continued success of the company, and is always the 
subject of close scrutiny. For instance, an important activity in 1987 was that all executive 
management underwent performance review training, designed to focus attention on target 
setting and reviewing performance against those targets. 
All new staff undergo initial training. Existing employees also receive training to improve 
their performance, to enable them to cope with changes such as the effect of new technology, 
and to assist their career development. 
A particular feature is the intensive training support given to the store opening programme, 
enabling a large new store to provide an efficient service from the outset, whilst employing 
staff many of whom had little or no relevant experience before joining the company. 
The company recognizes that it relies heavily on its managers to maintain its product and 
service standards, and to respond to the needs of the customer and the business. Management 




The company regards its employees as its most important asset and its management is 
committed to their welfare, training and development. According to the company, wage 
levels, employee benefits, the working environment of staff, and good human relations all 
have a bearing on the success of the business. For this reason the company has been 
reviewing its personnel policies and staff facilities and conditions to ensure that it attracts and 
retains the best people available. 
Retention and Reward: The company's management are keeping more and more of their best 
people, particularly in store, where 92% of their employees are based in 1998. Reducing 
labour turnover is one of their major priorities, because they know that by retaining their 
employees, they retain their customers. The company aims to motivate and retain its 
employees and revised its remuneration and benefits policy to ensure that higher performance 
attracts greater rewards. 
Over recent years major improvements in staff restaurants have been extended to most stores, 
in addition to established benefits including subsidized meals, the SAYE share option 
scheme, improved pension rights and the staff discount scheme. In 1987 the company 
extended the staff discount scheme to many part-time employees who had not previously 
benefited from this facility, and improved their retail pay scales to reflect more correctly the 
company's need for high-quality employees in a competitive marketplace. 
The company acknowledge that its employees have needs and ambitions to which it must 
react positively. These needs include a set of common goals with which employees can 
identify and which they can share with their colleagues, as well as clear and regular 
information about the company's progress and development. 
Consistent with this philosophy, the company wants employees to share in the wealth they 
help to create. The company introduced a profit sharing scheme which is designed to ensure 
that employees not only identify with company aims and objectives, but share the benefits of 

















over £144m in the 1994-1998 period, and nearly £260m since it started in 1987. While
24,000 employees participated in the scheme in its first year (1987), over 90,000 employees
will qualify to earn free shares through the scheme, which paid out £35m in 1998. Many
employees also have the chance to purchase shares through the company SAYE scheme. In
1998 there were 54,927 employee shareholders, who oved nearly 50 million of the
company's shares (see Table 2) - worth almost £300m - acquired through profit sharing and
the SAYE programme. Many more employees are becoming shareholders through the profit
sharing scheme.
Table 2. Shareholder profile
as at 28 February 1998
	Percentage Percentage
of number Number of of ordinary
Number of of ordinary shares
shareholders shareholders shares
Analysis by type of shareholder
Employees 54,927 33.38 49,-947,724 2.27
Other individuals 88,824 53.99 179,147,632 8.14
Corporate institutions 20,773 12.63 1,971,160,260 89.59
Source: The company's Annual Review, 1998, p.30.
Communication: The company communicates with its employees in a variety of ways, the
objective being to promote understanding of each other's needs and mutual respect and
commitment.
Communication with employees individually is achieved through the in-house newspaper,
information bulletins, and other such publications. Consultative meetings are attended by
senior trading managers with senior management on a weekly basis and other meetings of
retail staff are held at regular intervals. These meetings not only let information be passed to
employees and their representatives on matters affecting the business, but also provide a










1.5. Operating and Financial Review of the Company
Group performance: Group sales including VAT increased by 18.7% to £17,779m (1997 -
£14,984) (see Table 3). Excluding the business acquired in the year in Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland, group sales increased by 11.2% to £16,669m. On a comparable 52-
week basis, group sales rose by 9.2%.
Table 3. Group Summary
1998* 1997 Change
£m £m %
Group sales 17,779 14,984 18.7%
(including value added tax)
Group operating profit 912 774 17.8%
(prior to integration costs)
Profit on ordinary activities before tax 832 750 10.9%
(excluding net loss on disposal of fixed assets,
discontinued operations, and integration costs)
Fully diluted earnings per share 26.6p 23.5p 13.2%
(excluding net loss on disposal of fixed assets,
discontinued operations, and integration costs)
Dividend per share ll.6p lO.35p 12.1%
*53 weeks
Source: The Company's Annual Report and Financial Statements, 1998, p.1.
Group operating profit (prior to integration costs) rose by 17.8% to £912m (1997 - £774m).
On a 52-week basis, operating profits were up 15.6% to £895m. Group profit before tax rose
by 10.9% to £832m (1997 - £750m). This excludes the net loss on disposal of fixed assets and
discontinued operations of £9m (1997 - nil) and integration costs of £95m. On a-52 week
basis, profit before tax rose by 8.9% to £817m.
UK performance: The company has seen another year of strong like-for-like volume growth.
Over the 1994-1998 period, sales volumes grew by nearly 19%. Sales growth for the industry
as a whole has slowed, as expected, reflecting lower inflation and a modest slowdown in







on estimates of IGD data, increased again to 15.2% in the year to December 1997, from
14.6% last year.
UK sales (excluding property development sales) have grown by 12.4% to £15,762m (1997 -
£14,024) (see Table 4). This was for the 53-week period ended 28 February 1998 (1997 -52
weeks). On a comparable basis sales rose 10.2%, of which 6.1% came from existing stores,
including volume growth of 4.5%. New stores contributed a further 4.5% to total sales growth
before closures of 0.4%.
Table 4. UK Performance
1998* 1997 Change
£m £m %
Food retail sales 15,762 14,024 12.4%
(including value added tax)
Operating profit 866 760 13.9%
*53 weeks -
Source: The Company's Annual Report and Financial Statements, 1998, p.1.
UK operating profit rose by 13.9% to £866m (1997 - £760m) and the operating margin rose
to 5.9%. On a-52 week basis, UK operating profit was £850m, up 11.8%. This reflected the
company's strong trading driven by continued investment for customers in service.
Shareholder returns and dividends: Adjusted fully earning per share (excluding the net
loss on disposal of fixed assets and discontinued operations and integration costs) increased
by 13.2% to 26.6p in 1998 (1997 - 23.5p). This is on a 53-week basis compared to 52 weeks
in 1997. On a comparable basis, fully diluted earnings per share would be up 11.1% to 26.lp.
In 1998, the board proposed a final net dividend of 8.O5p, giving a total dividend for the year
of ll.6Op (1997 - lO.35p). The dividend is covered 2.3 times by earnings and represents an
increase of 12.1%.
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Over the 1994-1998 period the share price continuously increased. It rose from 223.5p in 
1994 to S17p in 1998. The company's share price rose from 349p at the start of the financial 
year to 517p on 27 February 1998, giving a market capitalisation of approximately £1l.4bn 
(1997 - £7.6bn). The share price reached a high of 539p on 30 January 1998. 
Over the 1994-1998 period total shareholder return, which is measured as the percentage 
change in the share price plus the dividend, was 170%, compared to the market average of 
134%, and was 131% over the 1995-1998 period, compared to the market average of 103%. 
In 1997 total shareholder return in the company was 58%, compared to the market average of 
31%. This reflects the company's efforts to grow the business while ensuring returns to 
shareholders are improved. 
2. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION SCHEMES: PROFIT SHARING AND SAVE-AS-
YOU-EARN 
2.1. Profit Sharing at the Company 
Profit sharing is regarded by the organization as a way of rewarding loyalty and hard work by 
offering employees, at no cost, valuable shares in the company. Provided that employees keep 
them for three years or more they are tax-free. And as well as being valuable in themselves, 
the shares entitle employees to a dividend payment twice a year. The amount paid in dividend 
changes slightly with the company's performance. Dividends are very similar to the interest 
paid by building societies and banks. 
2.1.1. How Profit Sharing Works in the Company 
2.1.1.1. Eligibility rules: Employees must have worked for the company for two continuous 
years at the company's year end (the last Saturday in February) and have signed their contract 
of participation. Employees must also be employed on the day when shares are normally 
allocated (the appropriation date). Maternity and sick-leave periods are included in the two 
years. If employees leave the company they will not qualify for new shares but if they leave 
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between the end of the company's financial year and the appropriation date because of 
redundancy, ill-heath, or retirement, they will receive shares. 
2.1.1.2. Allocation and Holding of Shares: The number of shares an employee receives 
depends on how profitable the company has been and on the number of employees qualifying 
for profit shares. In 1997, £32 million in profits was given back to employees in the form of 
profit shares. In 1998, staff with over two years' service were eligible to receive shares worth 
4% of earnings (IDS Report, 1998, p.15). The shares are held in trust (on the employee's 
behalf) by the company for the first three years, after which they are released to the employee 
and an ordinary share certificate is sent to the employee's home as proof of ownership. Every 
year the employees are sent a notice of appropriation, which states exactly how many shares 
have been allocated to them. 
2.1.1.3. Selling of the Shares: After three years, employees can sell their shares without 
paying any tax. Employees can either sell them through their bank, or through a stockbroker. 
If they wish, they can use a stockbroker with whom the company has negotiated special 
discount rates of commission for the company staff. 
If employees wish to sell their shares after two years, they will be liable to pay income tax. 
Because shares are counted as income, employees will be liable to pay income tax on them at 
their normal rate. If employees make a profit of more than £6,500 (unlikely for most of the 
company's employees) in the year in which they sell their shares, they will also be liable to 
pay capital gains tax. 
2.1.1.4. Leaving the company: If employees leave the company through retirement, injury, 
disability, or redundancy, they may either keep their shares or sell them. If they sell them 
before three years they will have to pay tax on them but only at half the normal rate. If 
employees leave for any other reason, they cannot sell their shares until they have held them 
for at least two years and they will be liable to the full rate of tax if they sell before three 




2.2. The Save-As-You-Earn (SAYE) Scheme at the Company 
The company's SAYE scheme gives employees the opportunity to take advantage of the 
company's success by saving regularly to buy company shares at a special discount. 
There are two choices available. Employees have the option to buy shares after three or five 
years. If at the end of the savings period employees decide not to buy the shares on offer, they 
receive instead their savings plus their bonus. If at any time employees find the payments 
difficult, they can either suspend payments for up to six months during a three- or five-year 
contract or withdraw their savings and cancel the scheme. 
The scheme is based on the company's offering employees the opportunity to buy the 
company shares at a discount at the end of the three- or five-year period. Technically this is 
called an 'option' to buy the company shares. When employees reach the end of their chosen 
period they are able to buy the shares. Three months' (three-year scheme) or nine months' 
(five-year scheme) worth of savings are given as a tax-free bonus. -
Once employees own the shares they are able to retain them and receive an annual 'dividend' 
(a payment based on the company's performance) or sell them at the going rate. Or 
employees may choose not to buy the shares but to spend the money in some other way. 
Three-year scheme: Table 5 shows how savings grow If an employee saves £20 every four 
weeks. 
If the share price were £2.49 each when the employee joined the scheme, this means at the 
end of the three-year period he/she would be able to buy 313 shares: (780 divided by the 
£2.49 option price equals 313 shares). 
If the share price were £4 at the end of the three-year term, the employee would be able to sell 










Table 5. Employees Profit in a Three-Year Scheme 
£ 
Four-weekly savings 20 
Three years later (20x36 months) 720 
Automatic bonus 60 
Total 780 
Shares selling price (313 shares x £4) 1,252 
Less shares purchase price 780 
Profit 472 
Five-year scheme: Table 6 shows how savings grow if employees choose the option to buy 
shares after five years. 
Table 6. Employee Profit in a Five-Year Scheme 
£ 
Four-weekly savings 20 
Five years later (20 x 60 months) 1,200 
Automatic bonus 180 
Total 1,380 
Shares selling price (554 shares x £4) 2,216 
Less share purchase price 1,380 
Profit 836 
2.2.1. Joining the scheme: If employees are eligible, they have an opportunity to join the 
scheme. The company issue invitations to everyone who has been working for the company 
for at least 12 months to apply for an 'option' to buy the company shares in either three or 
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five years' time. The price employees are asked to pay at the end of the period they choose is 
called the 'option price'. The price is fixed at the time of invitation and it is up to 20% lower 
than the market price of the shares. 
2.2.2. How many shares can an employee save for? The number of shares an employee can 
save for depends on a number of factors. Among them are: 
-How much the employee can afford to save every four weeks 
-How much the employees are entitled to save 
-How many shares are offered by the company 
The first factor entirely depends on the employee, as he/she can say how much he/she can 
afford to save. 
To join the scheme, employees must agree to save at least £5.00 every four weeks (or £1.25 if 
paid weekly). If they can afford more, they can save up to £250 every four weeks (or £62.50 
if paid weekly) over all their SAYE schemes. Employees may not be able to buy all of the 
shares they have applied for. The number of shares the company can offer under the scheme 
is limited and if it has more applications than it can issue shares for, employees may receive 
fewer shares than they wanted. So employees' savings will be correspondingly lower. 
2.2.3. How to begin saving: Once employees have been granted the right to buy a specific 
number of shares, they can begin saving. The amount they save is automatically deducted 
from their wages and paid into a 'Sharesave' account in their name with a bank. If for any 
reason employees cannot continue saving, their money is returned to them. If they have saved 
for more than a year they also receive interest. If employees do not want to leave the scheme 
completely, they can suspend payments for up to six months. 
2.2.4. Increasing employee's savings: If employees want to increase their contributions, 
they have to take advantage of another option to buy shares. These offers are usually made 
only once a year. But it should be mentioned that the total amount saved cannot be more than 






	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
2.2.5. Withdrawing money from the account: If employees want to get their money out of a
Sharesave account, they have to close the account. It is not like a building society or bank
account. Employees cannot put money in or take it out whenever they want. When employees
close an account, they lose the right to buy the company shares. However, they will get all of
their money back (plus interest after one year) and no tax is payable.
2.2.6. Earning interest on employees' savings: Employees are not paid interest on their
savings. Instead they receive a bonus at the end of the three- or five-year period. After three
years employees receive a tax-free bonus of three months' worth of savings and at the end of
five years, they receive nine months' worth (see Tables 7-8). The three-year bonus is
equivalent to an annual interest rate of 5.26% per annum, while the five-year bonus is
equivalent to 5.53%.
Table 7. Three-year Scheme
Total 36 monthly Total after 3 years
or 144 weekly Bonus after 3 as cash or to
Weekly savings 4-weekly savings payments years purchase shares
£ £ £ £ £
2.50 10.00 360.00 30.00 390.00
2.75 11.00 396.00 33.00 429.00
3.00 12.00 432.00 36.00 468.00
3.25 13.00 468.00 39.00 507.00
3.50 14.00 504.00 42.00 546.00
3.75 15.00 540.00 45.00 585.00
4.00 16.00 576.00 48.00 624.00
4.25 17.00 612.00 51.00 663.00
4.50 18.00 648.00 54.00 702.00
4.75 19.00 684.00 57.00 741.00
5.00 20.00 720.00 60.00 780.00
7.50 30.00 1080.00 90.00 1170.00
10.00 40.00 1440.00 120.00 1560.00
12.50 50.00 1800.00 150.00 1950.00
18.75 75.00 2700.00 225.00 2925.00
25.00 100.00 3600.00 300.00 3900.00
37.50 150.00 5400.00 450.00 5850.00
50.00 200.00 7200.00 600.00 7800.00
62.50 250.00 9000.00 750.00 9750.00







	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
Table 8. Five-year Scheme
Total 60 monthly Total after 5 years
or 240 weekly Bonus after 5 as cash or to
Weekly savings 4-Weekly savings payments years purchase shares
£ £ £ £ £
	2.50 10.00 600.00 90.00 690.00
2.75 11.00 660.00 99.00 759.00
3.00 12.00 720.00 108.00 828.00
3.25 13.00 780.00 117.00 897.00
3.50 14.00 840.00 126.00 966.00
3.75 15.00 900.00 135.00 1035.00
4.00 16.00 960.00 144.00 1104.00
4.25 17.00 1020.00 153.00 1173.00
4.50 18.00 1080.00 162.00 1242.00
4.75 19.00 1140.00 171.00 1311.00
5.00 20.00 1200.00 180.00 1380.00
7.50 30.00 1800.00 270.00 2070.00
10.00 40.00 2400.00 360.00 2760.00
12.50 50.00 3000.00 450.00 3450.00
18.75 75.00 4500.00 675.00 5175.00
25.00 100.00 6000.00 900.00 6900.00
37.50 150.00 9000.00 1350.00 10350.00
50.00 200.00 12000.00 1800.00 13800.00
62.50 250.00 15000.00 2250.00 17250.00
Source: The company's leallet about the SAYE scheme, RP6808, 1997, p.9.
2.2.7. Dropping out of the scheme: Employees can take their money out of the scheme at
any time. If employees do so before they have saved for a year, they simply get their money
back. After a year, they receive 3% tax-free interest. But they lose their right to buy shares.
2.2.7.1. Leaving the company: If employees are forced to leave due to injury, disability (if
receiving an ill health pension), or redundancy, they may use all or part of whatever money
they have in their Sharesave account (savings plus interest) to buy the company shares at the
option price within six months of leaving the company. If employees leave because they have
reached the normal retirement age (60+), they have six months to use whatever they have in
their Sharesave account to buy shares.
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If employees do not want to buy the company shares, they can continue making payments 
until they have been saving for three or five years (depending on their original choice). They 
are then be entitled to their tax-free bonus just as if they had never left the company. 
However, they will have lost the right to buy shares. 
2.2.7.2. Employees' leaving the company of their own accord: If employees leave the 
company of their own accord, or take early retirement and have been saving for less than one 
year, they can have their savings returned. If they saved for more than a year but for under 
three, they can have their savings plus 3% interest. If they have been in the scheme for three 
years, they can use their money to buy shares at the option price within six months from their 
date of leaving. 
Regarding the five-year scheme, the same rules apply as to a three-year saver but if 
employees have saved for three years or more they can use their savings plus interest to buy 
shares to that value at the option price. Again, employees have six months from their date of 
leaving to buy their shares. 
2.2.7.3. Going on working after reaching retirement age: If employees go on working after 
reaching retirement age, they may use the money they have in their Sharesave account to buy 
shares at the option price within six months of reaching retirement age. Or they can continue 
to save until their Sharesave contract matures (i.e., until they have been saving for three or 
five years). They will then be able either to buy their shares, or collect their savings plus a 
tax-free bonus. 
2.2.8. When do employees get their company shares? After employees have been saving 
for either three or five years, their Sharesave contract matures and the relevant bonus is added 
to their savings. This is known as the bonus or maturity date. This means employees can use 
the money they saved, plus their bonus, to buy the shares reserved for them three or five years 
earlier at the option price set at the start of the scheme. If employees intend to buy shares, 
they must do so within six months of their Sharesave contract maturing, otherwise they will 
lose their right to do so. Once employees have their shares they can either keep them, sell 
them, or transfer them to someone else, such as family members, husband, or wife. If 
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employees keep their shares, they receive a dividend twice a year. This is similar to the 
interest paid by banks and building societies. Also, like any other shareholder, they are 
entitled to vote at the company's general meeting. And of course if the company shares go up 
in value they may make a profit if they decide to sell them. 
2.2.9. What can employees do when their Sharesave contract matures? When employees' 
Sharesave contracts mature at the end of three or five years, they are free to use their money 
in any of the following ways: 
• they may use all their savings plus the bonus to buy the shares that were reserved for them 
three or five years ago, or 
• use part of their savings plus bonus to buy some of the shares that were reserved for them 
three or five years ago and take the rest in cash, or 
. withdraw all their savings and bonus in cash, or 
for five-year contracts only, leave all their savings and bonus with the bank for a further 
two years (and lose their right to buy the company shares). They will not make any more 
four-weekly or weekly savings, but after two years they will be given an additional bonus. 
• For three-year contracts no further bonus or interest is payable after the three-year 
maturity date. 
2.2.10. Paying Tax: Employees do not have to give up any part of their bonus in income tax, 
because the bonus paid on Sharesave accounts is tax-free. However, if employees decide to 
sell their shares, and they are worth more than they paid for them, they may be subject to 
capital gains tax. 
Tax people, who make large profits in a single year when they sell property or goods 
(including valuable land, paintings, and company shares) which have substantially increased 
in value without any particular effort on the owner's part, are liable to capital gains tax. Like 
all other taxes in the UK, capital gains tax can be altered in the annual budget, but, for 
instance, for the tax year 1997/98, an employee could make a profit of £6,500 before having 





APPENDIX 3- QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire has been designed to learn about employees' views on profit sharing and 
employee share ownership schemes. We confirm that your individual responses to the questionnaire 
will be kept strictly confidential and only the three external researchers will have access to the 
information you give. 
The research is part of Ismail Bakan's doctoral thesis and the results will be published in academic 
journals jointly with his two supervisors, Ashly Pinnington and Arthur Money. The general trends 
of this study will be presented to senior management to evaluate how the schemes can be run even 
more effectively. 
Your response is valuable to us and we request that you answer all of the questions frankly and 
spontaneously. In the questionnaire, some questions may be regarded as similar to others. However, 
each of the questions has been designed to measure different things. So, please read each one 
carefully. Since the study is about individual's opinions there are no right or wrong answers. 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. We hope you enjoy completing the 
questionnaire? We greatly appreciate your participation in this novel research study. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr Ashly Pinnington Professor Arthur Money Mr. Ismail Bakan 
Lecturer in Management Director, Doctoral Research Ph.D Research Student 


















Profit Sharing and Employee Share 
Ownership 
General Instructions 
Most of the questions ask you to answer to a statement by placing a circle around the number which 
most closely matches your opinion. 
The following is an example of a typical question. 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1. 1 like swimming.....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Neither Agree 
Strongly Slightly Nor Slightly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If you agree with the statement "I like swimming" you would place a circle around the number 6. If 
you strongly disagree with the statement, you would place a circle around the number 1. 
Some questions do not ask you to agree or disagree, but ask you how often something happens. 
Some questions request you to tick the box or circle one or more the followin g statements that 

























We need to get the following information in order to classify and comment on your responses. You can be 
sure that nobody will use it to identify individuals. Please Tick the box or circle the numbers representing 
appropriate response for the following items. 
1. Your Sex Male D Female 
2. Your marital status I Married 4 Divorced or separated 
2 Single 5 Other (specify) 
3 Widowed 
3. What is your highest education level? (Please circle one only) 
1 Some primary school 6 Bachelor's degree 
2 Completed primary school 7 Master's degree 
3 Some secondary school 8 Doctoral degree 
4 Completed secondary school 
5 Some university or technical 
training beyond secondary school 
4. How long have you worked for [X]? (Please circle one only) 
I Less than six months 5 More than five yearsJess than ten years 
2 More than six months less than a year 6 More than ten years less than fifteen years 
3 More than a year less than two years 7 More than fifteen years 
4 More than two years less than five years 
5. How old are you? I Under 20 








10 Over 60 
6. What is your job status? (Please circle one only) 
1 Senior management 4 Clerical or Secretarial 
2 Middle management 5 Technical 
3 Junior/Supervisory management 6 Other (specify)................ 
7. How much do you get in an average month, including overtime and bonus (net)9.................... 
8. Are you a Full time employee J Part time employee JJ 











	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Part II 
Extent of profit-sharing and share ownership 
The following questions aim to better understand your personal situation regarding Profit-sharing and br 
Save-As-You-Earn (SAYE) schemes. 
10. Do you participate in (a) SAYE Yes U NoU 
(b) Profit sharing Yes U NoD 
11. Do you have shares? Yes No 
If 'yes', how many (approximately)........... Unsure 
12. How long have you been a beneficiary of 
(a) profit-sharing ..............Year(s) Unsure 
(b) SAYE ................Year(s) Unsure LI 
113. What is the approximate value of all the shares you own now?.................... 
14. If you have not participated in profit sharing and/or SAYE schemes, do you intend to be a beneficiary of 
profit-sharing and/or SAYE in the future? Yes [] No 0 
Part ifi 
Views about the schemes 
The following questions ask for your opinion about your organization's profit-sharing and SAYE schemes. 
Each of the questions should be evaluated according to the following responses: 
Strongly Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you Agree or Disagree with each of the 
following statements. Please circle for each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
15. Profit sharing is not a fair method of getting paid for my work 
performance.....................................................................................1 2 3 4 567 
Strongly 
Agree 
16. It is very important to me that [X] has profit sharing and 
SAYEschemes................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I would accept almost any task assignment if I thought 




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	









19. I would not accept major changes in work methods or equipment 
even if I thought it would help to increase profits............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I am usually willing to work harder than is expected of me 
if it helps this company be financially successful.............. 1234567 
21. Profit sharing is one of the best ways for employees to benefit 
fromthe company's financial success........................................... 1234567 
22. Generally speaking, I am satisfied with profit sharing and 
SAYEschemes.............................................................................. 1234567 
23. Profit sharing does not increase my loyalty to [X]...................... 1234567 
24. All in all, I am very happy with the SAYE scheme, as it carries 
norisk......................................................................................... 1 2- 3 4 5 6 7 
25. The profit sharing scheme inspires me to perform well................ 1234567 
26. The SAYE scheme increases my commitment to the goals of 
[XI................................................................................................ 1234567 
27. Participating in profit sharing and SAYE schemes makes me 
more interested in the company's financial success................. 1234567 
28. I have enough information about the 
(a) profit-sharing scheme.........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) SAYE scheme....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I am less likely to leave [X} because of the 
(a) profit-sharing scheme....................................................... 1234567 




	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	









General job attitudes 
We need to know your opinion about the following questions in order to better interpret your answers to the 
previous questions. Each of the questions should be evaluated according to the following responses: 
Strongly Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




30. In [X], I 
(a) feel like an owner.......................................... 2345 67
(b) feel a sense of pride to work here................. 2345 67
(c) am one of the owners.................................... 2345 67 
(d) simply feel like an employee........................ 2345 67 
31. How important is it to you that [XI has a 
(a) profit-sharing scheme 
Not at all Slightly Somewhat Very 
Important important important El important El 
(b) SAYE scheme 
Not at all [ Slightly El Somewhat El Very ElImportant important important important 
Part IV 
The schemes, generally, may have some advantages and disadvantages 
because of their characteristics. The following question asks for your 
opinion about their advantages and disadvantages in your organization. 
32. Do you feel, overall, with profit-sharing and SAYE schemes... 
(Tick ANY of those which apply) 
(a) There are many more advantages than disadvantages 
(b) There are somewhat more advantages than disadvantages 
(c) The advantages and disadvantages are about equal 
(d) There are somewhat more disadvantages than advantages ________ 
(e) There are many more disadvantages than advantages 
b. Who does the profit-sharing scheme benefit the 
Managerial employees Non-managerial employees 
Undecided Both Equally 
c. Who does the SAYE scheme benefit the most 
Managerial employees Non-managerial employees 






	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	





33. Do you feel that it is a good idea for some non-managerial employees to be on the board of directors: 
1 Yes, very good idea 4 No, poor idea 
2 Yes, good idea 5 No, very poor idea 
3 Not sure 
34. To you personally, how important is it to have non-managerial employees on the Board of Directors: 
1 Very Important 4 Not Very Important 
2 Quite Important 5 Not At All Important 
3 A Little Bit Important 
35. To what extent do you feel that non-managerial employees should elect all or some members of 
the Board of Directors? 
I Very much 2 Much 3 Some 4 A little 5 Very little 
Part V 
The aim of the following questions is to obtain your opinions about various aspects of your job in the 
organization. Each of the questions should be evaluated according to the following responses: 
Strongly Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you Agree or Disagree with -
the following statements... 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
36. I feel a great sense of personal satisfaction when I do my job well. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. The amount of pay I receive depends heavily on how often 
lattendwork...................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
138. I can talk informally with other employees while at work..................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
139. Fringe benefits in [X] are good.........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. The major satisfaction in my life comes from my job......................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. I often think about quitting.................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. I have the relevant abilities and skills to do my job effectively.........1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
143. I know how my effort contributes to company performance 1234567 
144. 1 am very proud to work with my work group............................... 1234567 
45. I feel bad when I do my job poorly................................................. 1234567 






	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	




47. I believe that if I increase my effort it leads to an increase in my 
performance.................................................................................. 1234567 
48. People from different parts of [X] cooperate very well.............. 1234567 
49. In my department most jobs are pretty much one-person 
jobs - not requiring much contact with others..................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
50. Changes in [X] always seem to create more problems than 
theysolve.......................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51. Performing well in my job usually results in a bonus or pay increase. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. Generally speaking, I am very satisfied with my job........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53. The following questions ask what happens when you 
work very hard... 
(a) You will gain respect from co-workers.................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) You will receive better treatment by co-workers..................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) You will have pressure from co-workers not to work 
sohard................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54. The following three questions ask what happens 
when you do work very hard... -
(a) You will lose friends at work...............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) Your co-workers will not care very much.............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) You will have pressure from co-workers to work harder.......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
55. I'll stay overtime to finish a job, even if I'm not paid for it................1 2 3 4 5 6 71 
56. I am really interested in my work....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
57. I am very much involved personally in my work....................... ...1 234567 
58. The amount of pay I receive depends heavily on the combined 
performanceof my co-workers and me..................................... 1234567 
59. People here feel that you can trust this company....................... 1234567 
60. I feel I can trust people in [X].................................................... 1234567 
61. There is high opportunity to establish and develop close 
friendshipsin my job........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
62. The amount of pay I receive depends heavily on how well I 
performmy job.................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
64. 1 feel confident that I will have my job here for as long as I want it.. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
65. The following four questions ask you to think 
about your immediate line manager. 
My line manager... 
(a) lets subordinates alone unless they want help.......................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) never gives me a chance to make important decisions on 
myown.................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) encourages subordinates to speak up when they disagree 
witha decision......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(d) encourages and uses suggestions from employees................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
66. Doing my job well increases my feeling of self-esteem....................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
67. The amount of total pay I receive depends heavily on how 
much I personally help to increase company profits........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
68. What is good for the company is good for me.................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
69. Overall, {X] is a good place to work for.....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
70. If employees in [X] had more influence or say in 
decision-making, better decisions would be made about... -
(a) the employee's own jobs......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) matters affecting the employee's own department.................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) overall policies of {X]......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
71. I am satisfied with the amount of respect and fair treatment 
Ireceive from my line manager.......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
72. Considering my skills and the effort I put into my work 
Iam satisfied with my pay.............................................................. 1234567 
73. Employees in this company are very strongly committed to the 
goalsof this company................................................................... 1234567 
74. When changes are made in this organization the employees 
usuallylose out in the end............................................................. 1234567 
75. As long as I am doing a good job, poor performance by other 
employeesdoes not matter much to me.................................... 1234567 
76. Working for {X] really makes me want to try to do 
myjob the best it can possibly be done........................... 1234567 






	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
78. When some employees are not putting much effort into their jobs, 
other employees should encourage them to work harder...................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
79. The welfare of my company and my welfare are strongly related.....1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
80. I am very satisfied with my performance, considering my skills and 
theeffort I put into my work.............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
81. Basically, I don't like my job.........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
82. Answer the following three questions gj if you are a union 
member. 
(a) I feel I can influence union decisions................................... 1234567 
(b) I am satisfied with the success the union has in bargaining 
wageissues......................................................................... 1 2 3 4.5 6 7 
(c) I am satisfied with the success the union has had in 
bargainingnon-wage issues.................................................. 1234567 
83. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally 
expected in order to help this organization to be successful......... 1234567 
84. 1 would accept almost any type ofjob assignment in order to 
keepworking for this organization................................................ 1 2- 3 4 5 6 7 
85. I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
86. I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for 
over others I was considering at the time I joined............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
87. I am proud to tell others that! am part of this organization.............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
88. The following questions seek your opinion about unions. 
Please answer these questions whether or not you are 
a union member. 
(a) Basically, the union and management have similar goals......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) It is difficult to be loyal to the company 4 to the union......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) A union is not really necessary in [X] at this time.................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(d) There is no reason why the union and management cannot 
worktogether.......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(e) Without a union, employees would probably get fair 
treatmentfrom management...............................................1 2 4 6 73 5 
(1) The union works primarily for the best interests of its 
members..............................................................................1 2 4 63 5 7 
(g) The best way of obtaining employee say or influence in 
decision-making in this firm is through increasing the 




	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	




89. 1 feel that I am a respected member of [X]...............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
90. If I were offered a similar job with another firm at a slight 
increasein pay, I would take it.......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
91. The success of the company depends on the efforts of the 
workforce......................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
92. Most things in life are more important than work......................... 1234567 
93. The people in my department cooperate with one another 
yywelI....................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
94. I live, eat, and breathe my job......................................................... 1234567 
195 . I feel that I am an important member of [X]....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
96. In working for [X], I get a lot of chances to do what I am 
bestat ................................................................................... 1234567 
I97. I'm really a perfectionist about my work........................... 1234567 
98. In doing my job I get very good co-operation from other 
employees......................................................................... 1234567 
99. Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake 
onmy part..................................................................................... 1234567 
100. My line manager is unwilling to even listen to my suggestions.... 1234567 
101. In my department good employee performance often results in 
araise or promotion....................................................................... 1234567 
102. I look forward to being with members of my work group each day.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
103. On my type ofjob, the amount of work that gets done depends 
mostly on how much effort I put into my work...............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
104. Communication between management and employees is good 
in[X]...........................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
105. I feel secure in my job......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
106. I am generally satisfied with my line manager................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
108. Generally speaking, I am very satisfied with the kind of work 
Ihavetodoinmyjob....................................................................1 2 4 63 5 7 
109. If I do my job well, I will benefit financially over the long run.........1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
110. There are good chances for getting ahead in [X].........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
111. I expected promotion but I failed to receive it................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
112. There are many opportunities for close and rewarding personal 
friendshipin [X]........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
113. 1 receive objective signs that my job is secure...................... 1234567 
114. I really care about the future of [XI....................................... 1234567 
115. I find that what I believe in and what the company believes 
inare very similar.................................................................. 1234567 
116. It would take very little change in my present situation to cause 
meto leave [X]..........................................................................1 2- 3 4 5 6 7 
117. I could just as well be working for a different company as long 
asthe type of work was similar................................................... 1234567 
118. This is the best of all possible companies I could work for........ ....1 234567 
119. Often, I find it difficult to agree with policies of [X} 
on important matters relating to its employees........................... ....1 234567 
120. I frequently tell my friends that [X] is a great company to 
workfor....................................................................................... 1234567 
121.1 feel very little loyalty to [X]...................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
122. There's not much to be gained by sticking with [X] 
indefinitely.....................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
123. The company's achievement of its goals helps me to achieve my 








	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	









	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	


















124. Overall, how satisfied are you with of the following: 
(a) Your work9............................................................................1 2 
(b) Your line manager9................................................................1 2 
(c) Your i pay (wages/salary g incentive/bonus earnings)? 1 2 
(d) The friendliness and cooperatineness of your co-workers 9 1 2 
(e) The career progress you have made in [X] up to now 9  2 





















The following questions ask you to rate how much 
say or influence there is in each situation below... 











deal of say 
5 
Great 









125. How much say or influence do you feel that employees in 
general in [XI actually have in decisions about... 
(a) overall policies of [X]....................................................1 
(b) matters affecting their own department................................1 



















126. How much say or influence do you feel that employees in 
general should have in decisions regarding... 
(a) overall policies of [X}...................................................... 1 
(b) matters affecting their own department................................ 1 



















127. How much say or influence do you feel actuaIly have in 
decisions about... 
(a) overall policies of[XJ.....................................................1 
(b) matters affecting your own department................................1 



















128. How much say or influence do you feel y should have in 
decisions about... 
(a) overall policies of [X]....................................................1 
(b) matters affecting your own department................................1 




















	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Each of the following three questions should be evaluated according 
to the following responses: 
Very Little A Little Some A Lot A Great Deal 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very A Great 
Little Deal 
129. How much do you take part others in making decisions 
thataffectyou9............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 
130. How much do you participate yj others in helping set the way 
thingsare done on your job9 ..........................................................1 2 3 4 5 
131. How much do you decide others what part of a task 
youwill do9...................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 
The following questions ask you to rate 
how often the following things happen... 
Each of the questions should be evaluated according to the following responses: 
Almost Very Almost 
Never Never Occasionally Sometimes Often Often Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never Almost 
Always 
132. When my superiors make changes that affect the way I do my job... 
(a) I am informed well in advance.............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) The reasons for the change are fully explained.....................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) I am first asked for my opinions and advice.........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(d) jf I strongly disagree with the change it will be modified 
ornot be made .....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
133. When changes are made that affect the way my de partment is run... 
(a) Employees are fully informed well in advance......................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) The reasons for the change are fuily explained.....................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(c) Employees are first asked for their opinions and advice.......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(d) If employees strongly disagree with the change 
itwill be modified or not be made........................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 















	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Each of the questions should be evaluated according to the following responses: 
Very Much Less Much Less Slightly Less About the Same More 
Than Than Than as Than 
I should Get I Should Get I Should Get I Should Get I Should Get 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Much Less More 
Than Than 
I Should Get I Should Get 
135. When considering the kind of job I do in the company, I get paid... 1 2 3 4 5 
136. When comparing my job experience with others in this company, 
Igetpaid.........................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 
137. When considering the total pay of other people who work for 
other companies in jobs similar to mine, I get paid.........................1 2 3 4 5 
138. When considering the contributions I make in relation to others 
inthe company, I get paid...............................................................1 2 3 4 5 
139. When considering my skills and the level of effort I put into -
myjob, I get paid..........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 
Each of the following four questions should be evaluated according to the responses: 
No Little Some Considerable Extensive 
Influence Influence Influence Influence Influence 
1 2 3 4 5 
No Influence Extensive Influence 
140. How much influence do each of the following have in deciding 
what kinds of work or tasks are to be performed in your work group: 
(a) Work group members, individually9......................................1 2 3 4 5 
(b) The work group supervisor j4 members as a group in meetings? 1 2 3 4 5 
141. How much influence do each of the following have in deciding the 
important performance criteria/requirements, for your work group: 
(a) Work group members, individually9......................................1 2 3 4 5 
(b) The work group supervisor gjç, members as a group in meetings? 1 2 3 4 5 
142. How much influence do each of the following have in deciding o 
the procedures that you are expected to use: 
(a) Work group members, individually9......................................1 2 3 4 5 
(b) The work group supervisor members as agroup in meetings? 1 2 3 4 5 
143. How much influence do each of the following have in deciding 
about changing how you do your work: 
(a) Work group members, individually9......................................1 2 3 4 5 













144. On most days on your job, how often does time seem to drag for you? 
Tick one box only 
(1) About half the day or more 
(2) About one-third of the day 
(3) About one-quarter of the day E 
(4) About one-eight of the day LI 
(5) Time never seems to drag LI 
145. In your kind of work, if a person tries to change his usual way of doing things, how does it 
generally turn out? 
Tick one box only 
(1) Usually turns out worse; the tried and true methods work best LIin my work 
(3) Usually doesn't make much difference 
(5) Usually turns out better; our methods need improvement 
146. Some people prefer doing ajob in pretty much the same way because this way they can 
count on always doing a good job. Others like to go out of their way in order to think 
up new ways of doing things. How is it with you on your job? 
Tick one box only 
(1) I always prefer doing things pretty much in the same way 
(2) I mostly prefer doing things pretty much in the same way LI 
(4)! mostly prefer doing things in new and different ways 
LI 
(5) I always prefer doing things in new and different ways LI 
147. How often do you try out, on your own, a better or faster way of doing something on the job? 
Tick one box only 
(5) Once a week or more often 
(4) Two or three times a month L 
(3) About once a month LI 
(2) Every few months 
LI 


















148. How often do you get chances to try out your own ideas on the job, either before or after 
checking with your line manager? 
Tick one box only 
(5) Several times a week or more 
(4) About once a week El 
(3) Several times a month El 
(2) About once a month El 
(1) Less than once a month El 
149. In my kind of job, it's usually better to let my line manager worry about new or better ways of 
doing things. Tick one box only 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Mostly agree LI 
(4) Mostly disagree 11 
(5) Strongly disagree LI
150. How many times in the past year have you suggested to your line manager a different or better 
way of doing something on the job? Tick one box only 
(1) Never had occasion to do 
this during the past year 
(2) Once or twice El 
(3) About three times El 
(4) About five times LI 
(5) Six to ten times El 
(6) More than ten times had occasion 
to do this during the past year 
151. How often do you feel really proud of something you've done on the job? 
Tick one box only 
(5) Almost every day El 
(4) Once every few days LI 
(3) About once a week LI 
(2) Once every few weeks El 
(1) About once a month or less U 
528 
152. How often do you tell your husband/wife or other family members about something you've 
accomplished on the job? 
Tick one box only 
(5) Almost every day 
(4) Several times a week 
(3) About once a week 
(2) About once a month 
(1) Rarely or never 
No family members to talk to 
153. If you have any comments or information you would like to add please write in the space 
below: 
Many thanks for completing this questionnaire. We sincerely appreciate your time and participation. 
Ismail Bakan 
Coventry University 
Coventry Business School 














Table: Tests of Job Satisfaction as a Moderating Variable
VriibIe \'l ultiple R I ne emeiital R- t-statistic
All respondents
Support for Profit Sharing .556
Support + Job Satisfaction .684
Support + Satisfaction + Supxsat .686
Employees only
Support for Profit Sharing .507
Support + Job Satisfaction .653












Support for Profit Sharing .638 .4066
Support + Job Satisfaction .755 .5695 (.1629) 7•74****
Support + Satisfaction + Supxsat .755 .5696 (.000 1) .225
*
p<.10
** p<.05
*** p<.01
****p<.001
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